by Calculated Risk on 3/05/2009 09:56:00 AM

In the Treasury White Paper on the Capital Assistance Program, the Treasury announced that the 19 largest bank are current undergoing stress tests:

Examinations will be conducted across the 19 banking organization with assets in excess of $100 billion, as measured according to the data reported for 2008Q4 in the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System Consolidated Financial Statements for Bank Holding Companies.

Paul Kiel at ProPublica has compiled a list of the likely 19 banks by total assets: GMAC, MetLife Among Banks Undergoing Stress Tests

Name	Total Assets (Billions)
1. JPMorgan Chase	2,175
2. Citigroup	1,947
3. Bank of America (1)	1,822
4. Wells Fargo	1,310
5. Goldman Sachs	885
6. Morgan Stanley	659
7. MetLife	502
8. PNC Financial Services	291
9. U.S. Bancorp	267
10. Bank of New York Mellon	238
11. GMAC	189
12. SunTrust	189
13. State Street	177
14. Capital One Financial Corp.	166
15. BB&T	152
16. Regions Financial Corp.	146
17. American Express	126
18. Fifth Third Bancorp	120
19. KeyCorp	105

This shows that the assets are concentrated in just a few large banks.

(1) Note: Data as of Q4 2008. Merrill is not included in the BofA asset numbers. IF added, BofA would have almost $2.5 trillion in assets (ht Evan).

by Calculated Risk on 3/03/2009 09:12:00 AM

James Baker writes in the Financial Times: How Washington can prevent ‘zombie banks’

[T]he US may be repeating Japan’s mistake by viewing our current banking crisis as one of liquidity and not solvency. Most proposals advanced thus far assume that, once confidence in financial markets is restored, banks will recover.

But if their assumption is wrong, we risk perpetuating US zombie banks and suffering a lost American decade.
...
First, we need to understand the scope of the problem. The Treasury department – working with the Federal Reserve – must swiftly analyse the solvency of big US banks. Treasury secretary Timothy Geithner’s proposed “stress tests” may work. Any analyses, however, should include worst-case scenarios. We can hope for the best but should be prepared for the worst.

Next, we should divide the banks into three groups: the healthy, the hopeless and the needy. Leave the healthy alone and quickly close the hopeless. The needy should be reorganised and recapitalised, preferably through private investment or debt-to-equity swaps but, if necessary, through public funds. It is time for triage.

There are calls across the political spectrum to avoid zombie banks. No one wants to nationalize the banks, just preprivatize the "hopeless".

This is similar to my suggestion (and others) a few weeks ago:

The banks will probably fall into one of three categories:

1) No additional assistance required. ...

2) The banks in between that will need additional capital. This is where the Capital Assistance Program comes in: ...

3) Banks that will need to be nationalized or sold.
...
The sooner the better, although March 12th works for me (30 days from Geithner's speech)! ...

BTW the banks have been told to submit their stress test results to the Treasury by Wednesday March 11th. Although the stress test appears inadequate, and the 3rd option - "closing the hopeless" - is apparently off the table.

by Calculated Risk on 3/02/2009 08:40:00 PM

From the WSJ: Funding for 'Bad Banks' Starts to Get Fleshed Out

The Obama administration ... is considering creating multiple investment funds to purchase the bad loans and other distressed assets that lie at the heart of the financial crisis ...

The Obama team announced its intention to partner with the private sector to buy $500 billion to $1 trillion of distressed assets as part of its revamping of the $700 billion bank bailout last month. ...

... one leading idea is to establish separate funds to be run by private investment managers. The managers would have to put up a certain amount of capital. Additional financing would come from the government, which would share in any profit or loss.

These private investment managers would run the funds, deciding which assets to buy and what prices to pay. The government would contribute money from the $700 billion bailout, with additional financing likely coming from the Federal Reserve and by selling government-backed debt. Other investors, such as pension funds, could also participate. To encourage participation, the government would try to minimize risk for private investors, possibly by offering non-recourse loans.

... the government wants to encourage private investors to buy up the assets in a way that would come closer to setting a market price where no market currently exists.

By offering low interest non-recourse loans, these public-private entities can pay a higher than market price for the toxic assets (since there is no downside risk). This amounts to a direct subsidy from the taxpayers to the banks. It is amazing how many different ways they've tried to recycle the same bad idea.

by Calculated Risk on 3/02/2009 06:15:00 AM

From the Fed: U.S. Treasury and Federal Reserve Board Announce Participation in AIG Restructuring Plan

The U.S. Treasury Department and the Federal Reserve Board today announced a restructuring of the government's assistance to AIG in order to stabilize this systemically important company in a manner that best protects the U.S. taxpayer. ...

The company continues to face significant challenges, driven by the rapid deterioration in certain financial markets in the last two months of the year and continued turbulence in the markets generally. ...

As significantly, the restructuring components of the government's assistance begin to separate the major non-core businesses of AIG, as well as strengthen the company's finances. The long-term solution for the company, its customers, the U.S. taxpayer, and the financial system is the orderly restructuring and refocusing of the firm. This will take time and possibly further government support, if markets do not stabilize and improve.
...
Treasury has stated that public ownership of financial institutions is not a policy goal and, to the extent public ownership is an outcome of Treasury actions, as it has been with AIG, it will work to replace government resources with those from the private sector to create a more focused, restructured, and viable economic entity as rapidly as possible. This restructuring is aimed at accelerating this process. Key steps of the restructuring plan include:

Preferred Equity
The U.S. Treasury will exchange its existing $40 billion cumulative perpetual preferred shares for new preferred shares with revised terms that more closely resemble common equity and thus improve the quality of AIG's equity and its financial leverage. The new terms will provide for non-cumulative dividends and limit AIG's ability to redeem the preferred stock except with the proceeds from the issuance of equity capital.

Equity Capital Commitment
The Treasury Department will create a new equity capital facility, which allows AIG to draw down up to $30 billion as needed over time in exchange for non-cumulative preferred stock to the U.S. Treasury. This facility will further strengthen AIG's capital levels and improve its leverage.

Federal Reserve Revolving Credit Facility
The Federal Reserve will take several actions relating to the $60 billion Revolving Credit Facility for AIG established by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (New York Fed) in September 2008, to further the goals described above.

[see statement for more details]

by Calculated Risk on 3/01/2009 10:25:00 PM

From AIG:

American International Group, Inc. (AIG) will report its fourth quarter and full year 2008 results on Monday, March 2, 2009 at approximately 6:00 a.m. EST. AIG’s earnings release and financial supplement will be available in the Investor Information section of www.aigcorporate.com following the filing of AIG’s Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 2008.

AIG Chairman and Chief Executive Officer Edward M. Liddy will host a conference call, broadcast live over the Internet, on Monday, March 2, 2009 at 8:30 a.m. EST to discuss AIG’s fourth quarter results.

The audio webcast of the conference call can be accessed at www.aigwebcast.com.

From the WSJ: U.S. Revamps Bailout of AIG

The new deal, the government's fourth for AIG, represents a nearly complete reversal from the one first laid out in mid-September. Back then, federal officials acted as a demanding lender, forcing the insurer to pay a steep interest rate for what was expected to be a short-term loan. Now the government is relaxing loan terms by wiping out interest in hopes of preserving AIG's value over a longer period.

With the latest move, AIG will have the benefit of up to $70 billion from the TARP program; it got a $40 billion TARP investment in November. The total amounts to 10% of the $700 billion financial-sector rescue fund, money that most lawmakers did not expect would go toward propping up a troubled insurer. Officials believed they had little choice but to use the TARP money, particularly because they lack the authority to unwind a troubled firm such as AIG the way the government can do now with failing banks.

AIG: a black hole.

by Calculated Risk on 3/01/2009 10:50:00 AM

First a repeat of Eric's great AIG cartoon! Click on cartoon for larger image in new window. Cartoon from Eric G. Lewis

From the WSJ: Rating Agencies Endorse Revised AIG Bailout

Major credit rating agencies have signed off on the latest revamp of American International Group Inc.'s $150 billion government rescue package ... Both Standard & Poor's and Moody's Investors Services have quietly endorsed the terms of the revised bailout ...

The agreement clears the way for the insurer's board to give its final approval when it meets on Sunday. AIG's latest restructuring ... is expected to be announced with the insurer's results on Monday.

... Many details of the new plan aren't clear but ... it will result in a complete reconfiguration of AIG. ... The revised plan relies on a series of complicated financial maneuvers that will reduce AIG's interest and debt burdens, while also deepening government involvement and taxpayer exposure.

One aspect of the plan is clear - taxpayers will be more exposed.

by Calculated Risk on 3/01/2009 02:08:00 AM

From Reuters: Exclusive: AIG near deal on new terms of bailout (ht Brad)

American International Group Inc is close to a deal with the U.S. government ... The revised AIG agreement is expected to include an additional equity commitment of about $30 billion, more lenient terms on an existing preferred investment, and a lower interest rate on a $60 billion government credit line ...

AIG will also give the U.S. Federal Reserve ownership interests in American Life Insurance (Alico), ... [and] American International Assurance Co (AIA) in return for reducing its debt ... The board ... is due to meet on Sunday to vote on the deal ...

It sounds like the deal will be announced on Monday.

by Calculated Risk on 2/26/2009 12:59:00 PM

From CNBC: Troubled Banks Could Get $250 Billion More in Budget

President Barack Obama penciled into his budget on Thursday the possibility that he may request an additional $250 billion to help fix the troubled U.S. financial system.

The figure, described as a "placeholder" and not a specific funding request, would support asset purchases of $750 billion via government financial stabilization programs, administration officials said.

Any additional request to Congress would come on top of the $700 billion financial bailout program enacted last year ...

"Additional action is likely to be necessary to stabilize the financial system and thereby facilitate economic growth," the White House said in budget documents released on Thursday.

What a surprise ...

by Calculated Risk on 2/26/2009 01:09:00 AM

From the Financial Times: AIG considers break-up in bid to stay afloat

AIG and the US authorities are in advanced discussions over a radical restructuring that would split the stricken insurer into at least three government-controlled divisions in an attempt to keep it afloat...

Under the plan, the government would swap its current 80 per cent holding in the insurer for large stakes in three units – AIG’s Asian operations, its international life insurance business and the US personal lines business. A fourth unit, comprised of AIG’s other businesses and troubled assets, could also be formed.

In return, the authorities would relax the terms, or even cancel a large portion, of a $60bn five-year loan to AIG and convert $40bn-worth of preferred stock into shares...

AIG was on track to announce the overhaul on Monday, when it is expected to report a $60bn loss with its fourth-quarter results. The board is due to meet on Sunday.

Citi and AIG are keeping us waiting.

by Calculated Risk on 2/25/2009 08:49:00 PM

Here is our daily "Citi deal is imminent" story.

From the WSJ: Citi Is Near Deal to Boost U.S.'s Stake by Up to 40%

Citigroup Inc. is closing in on an agreement to boost the federal government's stake in the company to as much as 40%, according to people familiar with the situation. A deal could be announced as soon as Thursday.

This could raise some interesting problems in foreign countries:

For example, a Mexican law bars any institution that is more than 10%-owned by a foreign government from running a bank in that country. As a result, some Citigroup executives are worried that an increased U.S. stake might subject the bank to pressure to relinquish some or all of its ownership of Grupo Financiero Banamex ...

UPDATE: This happened twice today. One government release says one thing, another says something different. I noted that the Treasury White Paper on the Capital Assistance Program said:

These shares can convert at the firm’s discretion (with the approval of their regulator) into common equity if needed to preserve lending in worse-than-expected economic environment at a conversion price set at a 10% discount from the prevailing level of the institution’s stock price as of February 9, 2009.

Nemo notes that the Term Sheet says:

Conversion price is 90% of the average closing price for the common stock for the 20 trading day period ending February 9, 2009, subject to customary anti-dilution adjustments.

One release from the FDIC called the program the "Capital Assessment Program" (and I labeled a couple of charts with that name), but the real name is the "Capital Assistance Program".

by Calculated Risk on 2/23/2009 02:42:00 PM

CNBC Headline: AIG Is In Talks With Government To Secure Additional Funds to Keep Operating, CNBC Has Learned Click on cartoon for larger image in new window. Cartoon from Eric G. Lewis

Update from David Faber: AIG Seeks More US Funds As Record Loss Looms

Sources close to the company said the loss will be near $60 billion due to writedowns on a variety of assets including commercial real estate.

That massive loss is likely to spur downgrades in its insurance and credit ratings that will force AIG to raise collateral that it doesn't have.

by Calculated Risk on 2/20/2009 02:42:00 PM

From Bloomberg: U.S. Stocks Pare Drop on Speculation Treasury to Detail Bailout

[CNBC reported] that the Treasury Department will release some details of its plan to rescue the financial system next week.

From the WSJ: White House Says Banks Shouldn't Be Nationalized

Amid fears that Citigroup Inc. and Bank of America Corp. could be on the verge of being nationalized, the White House gave assurances that it prefers banks to remain out of the government's hands.

"This administration continues to strongly believe that a privately held banking system is the correct way to go, ensuring that they are regulated sufficiently by this government," White House spokesman Robert Gibbs said Friday. "That's been our belief for quite some time, and we continue to have that."

The key for Geithner is to explain what "stress test" means, how the stress tests are proceeding, and when the tests will be complete.

If Geithner just talks about the Public-Private Investment Fund his speech will probably not be well received. Three words for Geithner: Stress Test. Explain.

by Calculated Risk on 2/17/2009 01:57:00 PM

From Neil Irwin and Binyamin Appelbaum at the WaPo: Late Change in Course Hobbled Rollout of Geithner's Bank Plan

Just days before Treasury Secretary Timothy F. Geithner was scheduled to lay out his much-anticipated plan to deal with the toxic assets imperiling the financial system, he and his team made a sudden about-face.

According to several sources involved in the deliberations, Geithner had come to the conclusion that the strategies he and his team had spent weeks working on were too expensive, too complex and too risky for taxpayers.
...
As the first week of February progressed, however, the problems with both approaches were becoming clearer to Geithner, said people involved in the talks. For one thing, the government would likely have to put trillions of dollars in taxpayer money at risk, a sum so huge it would anger members of Congress. Officials were also concerned that the program would be criticized as a pure giveaway to bank shareholders. And, finally, there continued to be the problem that had bedeviled the Bush administration's efforts to tackle toxic assets: There was little reason to believe government officials would be able to price these assets in a way that gave taxpayers a good deal.

This is surprising since all these questions were raised when Paulson proposed the original TARP. This approach was unworkable.

The real answer is to stress test the banks, and put them in three categories: 1) no additional capital needed, 2) some additional capital needed, and 3) preprivatization.

Hopefully the stress testing is underway - although William Black and Yves Smith say "There Are No Real Stress Tests Going On".

I think this is a misunderstanding of the proposed stress test process (although Geithner wasn't clear). My interpretation was the government will provide the parameters for the test, and the companies will perform the analysis (with a government audit) - so Mr. Black's suggestions about the lack of staff are probably not relevant. But Geithner was vague, and I'd like to hear more from him on the specifics of the tests - including a completion date.

by Calculated Risk on 2/12/2009 12:01:00 AM

From Eric Dash at the NY Times: Bank Test May Expand U.S. Regulators’ Role

Nearly 100 federal banking regulators descended on Citigroup in New York on Wednesday morning. Dozens more fanned out through Bank of America, JPMorgan Chase and other big banks across the nation.
...
[E]xams for 18 or so of the biggest banks are set to begin immediately, and the first results could arrive within weeks. They are not expected to be made public for every institution.
...
Regulators plan to assess the potential losses a bank could face over the next two years, rather than the typical one year ... They are also expected to look at banks’ exposure to derivatives and other assets normally carried off their balance sheets ... Their assumptions will be guided on a “worst case” basis.

It sounds like the stress tests could be completed within "weeks" at some banks, and I think 30 days is sufficient for all 18 or so banks with $100 billion in assets.

The banks will probably fall into one of three categories:

1) No additional assistance required. These banks will definitely want this publicized!

2) The banks in between that will need additional capital. This is where the Capital Assistance Program comes in:

Capital Assistance Program: While banks will be encouraged to access private markets to raise any additional capital needed to establish this buffer, a financial institution that has undergone a comprehensive “stress test” will have access to a Treasury provided “capital buffer” to help absorb losses and serve as a bridge to receiving increased private capital. ... Firms will receive a preferred security investment from Treasury in convertible securities that they can convert into common equity if needed to preserve lending in a worse-than-expected economic environment. This convertible preferred security will carry a dividend to be specified later and a conversion price set at a modest discount from the prevailing level of the institution’s stock price as of February 9, 2009.
emphasis added

3) Banks that will need to be nationalized or sold.

The NY Times article suggests that the results will not be made public for every institution, but that will just lead to rumors and speculation. It would be better to announce the category of all 18+ banks at the same time (in 30 days or so). At that time announce the capital infusions for the category 2 banks, and the nationalization of the category 3 banks.

The sooner the better, although March 12th works for me (30 days from Geithner's speech)! (update: I was just making up a date for fun - this isn't an announced date)

by Calculated Risk on 2/11/2009 03:55:00 PM

Excerpts from Martin Wolf: Why Obama’s new Tarp will fail to rescue the banks

All along two contrasting views have been held on what ails the financial system. The first is that this is essentially a panic. The second is that this is a problem of insolvency.

Under the first view, the prices of a defined set of “toxic assets” have been driven below their long-run value ... The solution, many suggest, is for governments to make a market, buy assets or insure banks against losses. ...

Under the second view, a sizeable proportion of financial institutions are insolvent: their assets are, under plausible assumptions, worth less than their liabilities.
...
Personally, I have little doubt that the second view is correct and, as the world economy deteriorates, will become ever more so. But this is not the heart of the matter. That is whether, in the presence of such uncertainty, it can be right to base policy on hoping for the best. The answer is clear: rational policymakers must assume the worst. If this proved pessimistic, they would end up with an over-capitalised financial system. If the optimistic choice turned out to be wrong, they would have zombie banks and a discredited government. ...

Why then is the administration making what appears to be a blunder? It may be that it is hoping for the best. But it also seems it has set itself the wrong question. It has not asked what needs to be done to be sure of a solution. It has asked itself, instead, what is the best it can do given three arbitrary, self-imposed constraints: no nationalisation; no losses for bondholders; and no more money from Congress. Yet why does a new administration, confronting a huge crisis, not try to change the terms of debate? This timidity is depressing.
...
The correct advice remains the one the US gave the Japanese and others during the 1990s: admit reality, restructure banks and, above all, slay zombie institutions at once. ...

By asking the wrong question, Mr Obama is taking a huge gamble. ... He needs to rethink, if it is not already too late.

It is very important that the bank stress tests be completed quickly (within 30 days), and the results made public. This will help remove some of the uncertainty, and might make it clear whether or not the U.S. needs to preprivatize (a kinder term for nationalize) the banks.

by Calculated Risk on 2/10/2009 05:34:00 PM

Terry Moran at ABC News interviewed President Obama today (airs tonight). Here are some excerpts: (hat tip Paul Kedrosky)

TERRY MORAN: There are a lot of economists who look at these banks and they say all that garbage that's in them renders them essentially insolvent. Why not just nationalize the banks?

PRESIDENT OBAMA: Well, you know, it's interesting. There are two countries who have gone through some big financial crises over the last decade or two. One was Japan, which never really acknowledged the scale and magnitude of the problems in their banking system and that resulted in what's called "The Lost Decade." They kept on trying to paper over the problems. The markets sort of stayed up because the Japanese government kept on pumping money in. But, eventually, nothing happened and they didn't see any growth whatsoever.

Sweden, on the other hand, had a problem like this. They took over the banks, nationalized them, got rid of the bad assets, resold the banks and, a couple years later, they were going again. So you'd think looking at it, Sweden looks like a good model. Here's the problem; Sweden had like five banks. [LAUGHS] We've got thousands of banks. You know, the scale of the U.S. economy and the capital markets are so vast and the problems in terms of managing and overseeing anything of that scale, I think, would -- our assessment was that it wouldn't make sense. And we also have different traditions in this country.

Obviously, Sweden has a different set of cultures in terms of how the government relates to markets and America's different. And we want to retain a strong sense of that private capital fulfilling the core -- core investment needs of this country.

And so, what we've tried to do is to apply some of the tough love that's going to be necessary, but do it in a way that's also recognizing we've got big private capital markets and ultimately that's going to be the key to getting credit flowing again.

Kedrosky comments:

[S]aying that Sweden had five banks and the U.S. has thousands, so nationalization can’t happen here, is misleading. It ignores the relative GDPs of the two countries. ...[and] the problem is chiefly in the six largest U.S. banks ...

On the issue of "cultural differences" between the U.S. and Sweden, I've joked that we should call taking over the banks "preprivatization" to avoid the stigma of "nationalization".

But stop and think about what Obama is saying. We know the correct answer, but we are afraid to do it - because of our "culture" - so we are going to follow the Japanese plan.

We should definitely stress test the banks. My suggestion: announce when this will be complete (within 30 days), make the results public, and preprivatize the insolvent ones.

Update: Roubini: It Is Time to Nationalize Insolvent Banking Systems. Excerpt:

[W]hy is the US government temporizing and avoiding doing the right thing, i.e. take over the insolvent banks? There are two reasons. First, there is still some small hope and a small probability that the economy will recover sooner than expected, that expected credit losses will be smaller than expected and that the current approach of recapping the banks and somehow working out the bad assets will work in due time. Second, taking over the banks – call is nationalization or, in a more politically correct way, “receivership” – is a radical action that requires most banks be clearly beyond pale and insolvent to be undertaken. Today Citi and Bank of America clearly look like near-insolvent and ready to be taken over but JPMorgan and Wells Fargo do not yet. But with the sharp rise in delinquencies and charge-off rates that we are experiencing now on mortgages, commercial real estate and consumer credit in a matter of six to twelve months even JPMorgan and Wells will likely look as near-insolvent (as suggested by Chris Whalen, one of the leading independent analysts of the banking system).

Thus, if the government were to take over only Citi and Bank of America today (and wipe out common and preferred shareholders and also force unsecured creditors to take a haircut) a panic may ensue ... Instead if, as likely, the current fudging strategy - of temporizing and hoping that things will improve for the economy and the banks - does not work and in 6-12 months most banks (the major four and the a good part of the remaining regional banks) all look like clearly insolvent you can then take them all over, wipe out common shareholders and preferred shareholders and even force unsecured creditors to accept losses ( in the form of a conversion of debt into equity and/or haircut on the face value of their bond claims) as the losses will be so large that not treating such unsecured creditors would be fiscally too expensive.

So, the current strategy – Plan A - may not work and the Plan B (or better Plan N for nationalization) may end up the way to go later this year. Wasting another 6-12 months to do the right thing may be a mistake but the political constrains facing the new administration – and the remaining small probability that the current strategy may by some miracle or luck work – suggest that Plan A should be first exhausted before there is a move to Plan N. Wasting another 6-12 months may risk turning a U-shaped recession into an L-shaped near depression but currently Plan N is not yet politically feasible.

by Calculated Risk on 2/10/2009 01:53:00 PM

One of the key elements of the Financial Stability Plan is to build "Financial Stability Trust" by conducting "A Comprehensive Stress Test for Major Banks" and providing investors and the public "Increased Balance Sheet Transparency and Disclosure".

Although lacking in details, this is a very good idea. A few suggestions:

Provide a timeline for conducting the stress tests of all institutions with more than $100 billion in assets (like 30 days).

Disclose the results with multiple scenarios on the Financial Stability website by bank (yes, name each bank and the future projected losses under each scenario).

A template for this disclosure could be the JPM presentation when they acquired WaMu.

Here is the table JPM provided:

Click on chart for larger image in new window.

JPM presented the WaMu losses from three scenarios: a base case (with national prices falling 25% peak to trough), a deeper recession (28% decline), and a severe recession (37% decline).

Although unemployment will probably exceed the JPM severe recession scenario of 8% - the point is investors now know that! We can see that in the severe recession, JPM expected national house prices to decline 37% and 54% in California. This would lead to an estimate $54 billion in additional losses.

Note: the toxic assets are frequently described as difficult to value, but the real problem is forecasting future defaults. This is why providing different scenarios for the stress test makes sense. No one has a crystal ball. For mortgage related assets, defaults correlate well with house price declines - so the JPM method is very useful. For other assets (like automobiles), unemployment is a better measure.

A table like this would allow investors and the public to understand which institutions are insolvent under different scenarios, and then provide a guide for the Capital Assistance Program (aka more capital injections). If a bank is massively insolvent, then the next step would be preprivatization. At least we would all know.

If JPM could put this data together in fairly short order, the other institutions - under the supervision of the government - could provide this data within 30 days. One of the key roles for the government would be to make sure the analysis is consistent between institutions: same scenarios, same defaults per house price declines, same results for similar securities.

by Calculated Risk on 2/10/2009 11:25:00 AM

From the Federal Reserve:

The Federal Reserve Board on Tuesday announced that it is prepared to undertake a substantial expansion of the Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility (TALF). The expansion could increase the size of the TALF to as much as $1 trillion and could broaden the eligible collateral to encompass other types of newly issued AAA-rated asset-backed securities, such as commercial mortgage-backed securities, private-label residential mortgage-backed securities, and other asset-backed securities. An expansion of the TALF would be supported by the provision by the Treasury of additional funds from the Troubled Asset Relief Program.
emphasis added

Here is the new Treasury website. Geithner says this site will help provide much better transparency.

Here is a Financial Stability Plan Fact Sheet on the new plan (update: now available).

This was just a broad outline of a plan - not a specific plan.

by Calculated Risk on 2/10/2009 10:34:00 AM

The Geithner news conference is scheduled for 11 AM ET.

Here is the CNBC feed.

And a live feed from C-SPAN.

Here is a summary from CNBC: Financial Plan to Focus on Consumer, Business Aid

by Calculated Risk on 2/09/2009 11:18:00 PM

From the NY Times: Geithner Said to Have Prevailed on the Bailout. According to the NY Times, the plan includes:

[T]he creation of a joint Treasury and Federal Reserve program, at an initial cost of $250 billion to $500 billion, to encourage investors to acquire soured mortgage-related assets from banks.

The Fed will use its balance sheet to provide the financing, and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation might provide guarantees to investors who participate in the program, which some people might call a “bad bank.”

A second component of the plan would broadly expand, to $500 billion to $1 trillion, an existing $200 billion program run by the Federal Reserve to try to unfreeze the market for commercial, student, auto and credit card loans.
...
A third component would involve a review of the capital levels of all banks, including projections of future losses, to determine how much additional capital each bank should receive.

The capital injections would come out of the remaining $350 billion in the Troubled Asset Relief Program, or TARP.

Mortgage relief for homeowners will be a separate plan announced next week.

The first and third components are related. The first component sounds like a plan to encourage investors to buy toxic mortgage securities from banks with non-recourse financing from the Fed and possibly some guarantees from the FDIC. One of the keys will be the percent the investors have to put down (skin in the game), but their downside will probably be limited.

This will almost certainly lead to more losses for many banks, and that will require additional capital injections. Apparently Geithner believes the remaining $350 billion in the TARP is sufficient for the capital injections.

Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner will announce the plan at 11 am EST.