by Calculated Risk on 10/07/2010 10:23:00 PM

From Andrew Martin and David Streitfeld at the NY Times: Flawed Foreclosure Documents Thwart Home Sales

[A]s a scandal unfolds over mortgage lenders’ shoddy preparation of foreclosure documents, the fallout is beginning to hammer the housing market, especially in states like Florida where distressed properties are abundant. ... the agents are being told the freeze will last 30 to 90 days ...

[One Florida] agency had 35 deals that were supposed to close this month. As of Thursday, Fannie had postponed 11 of them.

This will probably just be a delay. And the delays will mostly be in the judicial foreclosure states, although the story has one example of a house withdrawn from the market in California.

by Calculated Risk on 10/07/2010 08:00:00 PM

Here is the video of Professors Paul Krugman and Martin Feldstein (former Reagan advisor and NBER president), and Jan Hatzius, chief economist of Goldman Sachs:

The Economic Policy Institute conference on October 5, 2010

I'm not sure who is the most pessimistic.

by Calculated Risk on 10/07/2010 05:09:00 PM

CR Note: This is from economist Tom Lawler, who joked today: Maybe large servicers should be forced to put up billions in "claims fund," like BP? (the latter "caused" slime, while the former are just "slimy"!)

The mortgage-foreclosure debacle, which started with a story about a GMAC “technicality” (and included a “GMAC denies foreclosure moratorium” story) but which quickly “ballooned” as more mortgage servicers were “implicated,” has now exploded into a full-blown “issue” of unknown proportions. One thing is pretty clear – many larger mortgage servicers simply “screwed up” by trying to deal with the surge in foreclosures by taking shortcuts to keep costs down, and this mistake has blown up in their faces.

But … is it just “their” faces?

It seems pretty clear that one of the outcomes of the recent “revelations” is that many foreclosures will be postponed; there will be more “refilings” of foreclosure petitions that will cost money; more borrowers facing foreclosures will hire lawyers, and servicers will have to reimburse more borrowers for legal fees; and some foreclosures could be delayed for quite a while. It is unclear at this point whether there will be any significant number of completed foreclosures that might be reversed, but if so that’s gonna cost! Net, there are going to be significant costs that someone is going to have to bear.

But who will bear those costs? Will it be mortgage servicers? Well, if they also own the mortgage, sure. But what about for loans they service for others (including private-label securities, Fannie, Freddie, FHA, VA, …)? Who’s a’ gonna’ pay?

From a “who should” perspective, any increase in losses associated with mistakes made by mortgage servicers, especially if those mistakes involved not following state foreclosure laws, which is a “violation” of most servicing contracts, the answer is crystal clear – the mortgage servicers. But how easy is it going to be to determine losses associated with mistakes by mortgage servicers? What are the “rules” on what a servicer can “recoup” in terms of costs associated with foreclosure when a servicer makes a mistake in private-label deals? With loans serviced for Fannie and Freddie, or FHA? What about delays in foreclosures clearly associated with servicer mistakes, which generally result in increased loss severities? Mortgage investors shouldn’t bear those costs, but how can they be sure they won’t?

What if there is a national “foreclosure moratorium” triggered by mortgage servicer mistakes that ultimately increase the severity of losses? Who “pays the price” in reality, as opposed to who “should?” Will there be lawsuits from mortgage investors whose loans and/or loans backing securities they own find that their incidence and/or severity of loss was adversely impacted by servicers mistakes, and will they be able to ensure that servicers who “screwed up” bear those losses instead of them?

I don’t know the “technically right” answers to any of the above questions, but it is crystal clear that the “right” answer should be that mortgage servicers who messed up should bear all of the costs associated with their mess up.

CR Note: This is from economist Tom Lawler

by Calculated Risk on 10/07/2010 03:19:00 PM

The Federal Reserve reports:

In August, total consumer credit decreased at an annual rate of 1-3/4 percent. Revolving credit decreased at an annual rate of 7-1/4 percent, and [Non] revolving credit increased at an annual rate of 1-1/4 percent.

Click on graph for larger image in new window.

This graph shows the increase in consumer credit since 1978. The amounts are nominal (not inflation adjusted).

Revolving credit (credit card debt) is off 15.2% from the peak. Non-revolving debt (auto, furniture, and other loans) is off 1.1% from the peak. Note: Consumer credit does not include real estate debt. This has been very different from previous recessions with the decline in non-revolving debt.

by Calculated Risk on 10/07/2010 01:33:00 PM

From Dallas Fed President Richard Fisher: To Ease or Not to Ease? What Next for the Fed?

I am afraid that despite recent speculation in the press and among market pundits, we did little at that meeting to settle the debate as to whether the Committee might actually engage in further monetary accommodation, or what has become known in the parlance of Wall Street as “QE2,” a second round of quantitative easing. It would be marked by an expansion of our balance sheet beyond its current footings of $2.3 trillion through the purchase of additional Treasuries or other securities. To be sure, some in the marketplace―including those with the most to gain financially―read the tea leaves of the statement as indicating a bias toward further asset purchases, executed either in small increments or in a “shock-and-awe” format entailing large buy-ins, leaving open only the question of when.

Since the FOMC meeting, a handful of my colleagues have fanned further speculation about QE2 by signaling their personal positions on the matter quite openly in recent speeches and interviews in the major newspapers. Hence the headline in yesterday’s Wall Street Journal, “Central Banks Open Spigot,” a declaration that surely gave the ghosts of central bankers past the shivers and sent a tingle down the spine of gold bugs from Bemidji to Beijing.
...
There is a great deal of legitimate debate still to take place within the FOMC on the subject of quantitative easing and the pros and cons and costs and benefits of further monetary accommodation. Whatever we might do, if anything, must be consistent with long-term price stability and not add to the nightmare of confusing signals already being sent to job creators.

What will we likely decide at the next FOMC meeting? ... “You’ll find out soon enough.”

Fisher suggests the debate on QE2 isn't over (he opposes QE2). However he is not a voting member of the FOMC this year (an alternate). He is always fun to read - but barring some upside surprise, I think QE2 will be announced on November 3rd.

by Calculated Risk on 10/07/2010 08:41:00 AM

The DOL reports on weekly unemployment insurance claims:

In the week ending Oct. 2, the advance figure for seasonally adjusted initial claims was 445,000, a decrease of 11,000 from the previous week's revised figure of 456,000. The 4-week moving average was 455,750, a decrease of 3,000 from the previous week's revised average of 458,750.

Click on graph for larger image in new window.

This graph shows the 4-week moving average of weekly claims since January 2000.

The dashed line on the graph is the current 4-week average. The four-week average of weekly unemployment claims decreased this week by 3,000 to 455,750.

The 4-week moving average has been moving sideways at an elevated level since last December - and that suggests a weak job market.

by Calculated Risk on 10/07/2010 02:13:00 AM

Click on graph for larger image in new window.

From Reuters: U.S. mall vacancy rate dips for first time in 3 years

The national vacancy rate for large regional malls fell to 8.8 percent in the third quarter from 9.0 percent in the second ... Asking rents were unchanged at $38.72 per square foot after declining for seven straight quarters ... At the strip malls ... vacancy was 10.9 percent.

"While retail properties were offered a reprieve from massive deterioration, it is too early to say that the market has bottomed," said Victor Calanog, Reis director of research.

Many retailers have long-term leases that expire soon. The weak U.S. economy may prompt retail tenants not to renew, pushing up vacancy again, he said.

At regional malls, the record vacancy rate was 9.0% in Q2 2010 (Reis started tracking regional malls in 2000). The record vacancy rate for strip malls was in 1990 at 11.1%.

by Calculated Risk on 10/06/2010 06:59:00 PM

From MarketWatch: Roubini: 40% chance of double-dip recession

There is a 40% probability of a double-dip recession, but you don't need one for the global economy to feel like it is in a deep, continuing recession, said Nouriel Roubini ... "You don't need another Lehman story, you don't need a major loss," said Roubini at an American Enterprise Institute event. "You can have death by a thousand cuts."

I'm not sure how you assign precise odds (yesterday Goldman Sachs put the odds at about 25% to 30%), but I think the most likely outcome is sluggish growth. And that means the economy will remain susceptible to shocks.

And, as Roubini noted, it doesn't matter if the economy is technically in a recession - it will feel like a recession to millions of Americans as long as jobs are scarce and incomes are under pressure.

by Calculated Risk on 10/06/2010 03:30:00 PM

Typically retail companies start hiring for the holiday season in October, and really increase hiring in November. Here is a graph that shows the historical net retail jobs added for October, November and December by year and a forecast for 2010.

Click on graph for larger image in new window.

This really shows the collapse in retail hiring in 2008 and the weak recovery in 2009. This also shows how the season has changed over time - back in the '80s, retailers hired mostly in December. Now the peak month is November, and many retailers start hiring seasonal workers in October.

From Stephanie Clifford and Catherine Rampell at the NY Times: Dim Outlook for Holiday Jobs

As the economy sputters, prospects are dimming for unemployed workers who were banking on a seasonal retail job to carry them through the holidays. ...

The recruiting firm Challenger, Gray & Christmas, forecasts that retailers will add up to 600,000 jobs in October, November and December, compared with a net gain of 501,400 holiday jobs over the same three months in 2009.
...
Challenger Gray expects that companies may wait to hire until November or December — once they have a feel for how much consumers are willing to spend.

Last year - looking at the graph - retailers held back on hiring in October and waited until November (as Challenger Gray expects to happen again this year). The increase to 600,000 is significant, but still below the levels of 1992 through 2007 - except for the recession year of 2001.

This hiring will be watched closely, and I suspect seasonal hiring will be stronger than in 2009, but well below the 700+ thousand jobs in 2004 through 2007.

Note: Clifford and Rampell also note that the supply chain for retailers is long - and many retailers placed orders earlier this year when the outlook seemed brighter to some (not to those paying attention!).

While retailers are just now making plans for Christmas hiring, they had to make plans for Christmas merchandise months ago, and that lag might create some inventory problems.

Last year the retailers ran lean on inventory, but if this year is slow, there will be plenty of discounting.

by Calculated Risk on 10/06/2010 01:49:00 PM

From Treasury Secretary Geithner: Remarks at the Brookings Institution

[F]or the recovery to be sustainable, there must ... be a change in the pattern of global growth. For too long, many countries oriented their economies toward producing for export rather than consuming at home, counting on the United States to import many more of their goods and services than they bought of ours.

The United States will do its part to achieve this adjustment. Private savings have increased significantly, and, as the recovery strengthens, we will bring down our fiscal deficits to a sustainable level.

But as America saves more, countries overly reliant on exports to us for their own growth will need to change their policies, or else global growth will slow and all of us will be worse off. Countries that chronically run large surpluses need to undertake policies that will boost their domestic demand.
...
That brings me to the second policy challenge: we believe it is very important to see more progress by the major emerging economies to more flexible, more market-oriented exchange rate systems. This is particularly important for those countries whose currencies are significantly undervalued.

This is a problem because when large economies with undervalued exchange rates act to keep the currency from appreciating, that encourages other countries to do the same.

This sets off a damaging dynamic, described first by my former colleague Ted Truman, as "competitive non appreciation." Over time, more and more countries face stronger pressure to lean against the market forces pushing up the value of their currencies. The collective impact of this behavior risks either causing inflation and asset bubbles in emerging economies, or else depressing consumption growth and intensifying short-term distortions in favor of exports.

This is a multilateral problem. It is unfair to countries that were already running more flexible regimes and let their currencies appreciate. And it requires a cooperative approach to solve, because emerging economies individually will be less likely to move, unless they are confident other countries would move with them.

This problem exposes once again the need for an effective multilateral mechanism to encourage economies running current account surpluses to abandon export-oriented policies, let their currencies appreciate, and strengthen domestic demand.

This was aimed primarily at China, but also at other countries with export driven economies. Everyone can't devalue at once ...