by Calculated Risk on 6/27/2009 09:37:00 PM

Yesterday I posted a graph of the Freddie Mac delinquency rate by month since 2005. I was asked if I could add the unemployment rate ... so by request ...

Click on graph for large image.

This graph shows the Freddie Mac single family delinquency rate and the unemployment rate since 2005.

Note that the unemployment rate y-axis starts at 4% to match up the curves.

Here is the Freddie Mac portfolio data.

There are many reasons for the rising delinquency rate. Earlier today we discussed some new research suggesting a number of homeowners with negative equity are walking away from their homes ("ruthless default"). There are also negative events that can lead to delinquencies - like death, disease, and divorce - but one of the main drivers is probably loss of income.

by Calculated Risk on 6/26/2009 02:02:00 PM

Click on graph for large image.

This graph shows the Freddie Mac single family delinquency rate since January 2005.

Here is the Freddie Mac portfolio data.


From Reuters: Freddie Mac May portfolio shrank annualized 9.9 pct (ht Ron)

Freddie Mac ... said its mortgage investment portfolio shrank by an annualized 9.9 percent rate in May, while delinquencies on loans it guarantees accelerated.

The portfolio decreased to $823.4 billion, for an annualized 5.6 percent increase year to date, the McLean, Virginia-based company said in its monthly volume summary.

In May 2008, the portfolio was $770.4 billion.

Delinquencies ... jumped to 2.62 percent of its book of business in May from 2.44 percent in April and 0.86 percent in May 2008.
...
Freddie Mac said refinance-loan purchase volume was $40.3 billion in May, down from April's $43.3 billion. March's $52 billion was its largest refinance month since 2003.

by Calculated Risk on 5/12/2009 06:25:00 PM

From MarketWatch: Freddie reports quarterly net loss of $9.9 billion

Freddie's first-quarter loss widened to $9.85 billion ... Freddie set aside $8.8 billion in provisions to cover credit losses during the first quarter. That's up from $7 billion in the final three months of 2008. The rise was driven by increases in the number and rate of delinquent mortgages and the rising severity of losses from foreclosures, Freddie explained.

Freddie also invests in mortgage-backed securities and is suffering as rising delinquencies and foreclosures cut into the value of these holdings. The company recorded $7.1 billion in impairments on securities that are available for sale.
...
Freddie Mac said its conservator asked for $6.1 billion in extra funding from the Treasury Department.

From the SEC filing:

Home prices nationwide declined an estimated 1.4% in the first quarter of 2009 based on our own internal index, which is based on properties underlying our single-family mortgage portfolio. The percentage decline in home prices in the last twelve months has been particularly large in the states of California, Florida, Arizona and Nevada, where we have significant concentrations of mortgage loans.
...
While temporary suspensions of foreclosure transfers reduced our charge-offs and REO activity during the first quarter of 2009, our provision for credit losses includes expected losses on those foreclosures currently suspended. We also observed a continued increase in market-reported delinquency rates for mortgages serviced by financial institutions, not only for subprime and Alt-A loans but also for prime loans, and we experienced an increase in delinquency rates for all product types during the first quarter of 2009. This delinquency data suggests that continuing home price declines and growing unemployment are significantly affecting behavior by a broader segment of mortgage borrowers. Additionally, as the slump in the U.S. housing market has persisted for more than a year, increasing numbers of borrowers that began with significant equity are now “underwater,” or owing more on their mortgage loans than their homes are currently worth. Our loan loss severities, or the average amount of recognized losses per loan, also continued to increase in the first quarter of 2009, especially in the states of California, Florida, Nevada and Arizona, where home price declines have been more severe and where we have significant concentrations of mortgage loans with higher average loan balances than in other states.
emphasis added

There are several key points:

Although the foreclosure moratorium "reduced REO activity" in Q1, Freddie did take provisions for the expected losses.

The loss severities are increasing.

Falling prices are "significantly affecting behavior by a broader segment of mortgage borrowers."

Sounds like walking away ... in prime time!

by Calculated Risk on 2/13/2009 05:18:00 PM

From Freddie Mac: FREDDIE MAC EXTENDS MORATORIUM ON FORECLOSURE SALES

Freddie Mac (NYSE: FRE) today announced it is immediately suspending all foreclosure sales involving occupied single family and 2-4 unit properties with Freddie Mac-owned mortgages through March 6, 2009. The suspension does not apply to vacant properties.

The extension will provide servicers with more time to help troubled borrowers find an alternative to foreclosure.

Freddie Mac gives lenders servicing its mortgages broad authority to provide forbearance to borrowers facing financial difficulties, and permanent rate reductions, mortgage term extensions, forbearance of principal or other modifications to borrowers who are already delinquent.

From Fannie Mae: Fannie Mae Suspends Foreclosure Sales Pending Administration Announcement

Fannie Mae (FNM/NYSE) today announced it is suspending all foreclosure sales and evictions of occupied properties through March 6 in anticipation of the Administration's national foreclosure prevention and loan modification program.

The company had previously put in place a suspension of foreclosure sales through January and had previously suspended all evictions through the end of February. In addition, the company adopted a national Real Estate Owned (REO) Rental Policy that allows renters in Fannie Mae-owned foreclosed properties to remain in their homes or receive transitional financial assistance should they choose to seek new housing.

by Calculated Risk on 1/26/2009 06:31:00 PM

From the Fannie Mae 8-K SEC filing today:

Fannie Mae (formally, the Federal National Mortgage Association) is in the process of preparing its financial statements for the fourth quarter of 2008 and the year ended December 31, 2008. Based on preliminary unaudited information concerning its results for these periods, management currently expects that the Federal Housing Finance Agency, acting in its capacity as conservator of Fannie Mae (the "Conservator"), will submit a request to the U.S. Department of the Treasury ("Treasury") to draw funds on behalf of Fannie Mae under the $100 billion Senior Preferred Stock Purchase Agreement entered into between Treasury and the Conservator, acting on behalf of Fannie Mae, on September 7, 2008, and subsequently amended and restated on September 26, 2008 (the "Purchase Agreement"). Although management currently estimates that the amount of this initial draw will be approximately $11 billion to $16 billion, the actual amount of the draw may differ materially from this estimate because Fannie Mae is still working through the process of preparing and finalizing its financial statements for the fourth quarter of 2008 and the year ended December 31, 2008.

Under the terms of the Purchase Agreement, Treasury committed, upon the request of the Conservator, to provide funds to Fannie Mae after any quarter in which Fannie Mae has a negative net worth (that is, the company’s total liabilities exceed its total assets, as reflected on the company’s balance sheet prepared in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles).
emphasis added

This follows the SEC filing from Freddie Mac outlining the request of up to $35 billion from the Treasury. These are the first requests to use the $200 billion emergency fund set up by Treasury in September.

No word if we all get Free Ice Cream!

by Calculated Risk on 11/20/2008 04:43:00 PM

Press Release from Fannie Mae (no link yet): Fannie Mae to Suspend Foreclosures Until January

In order to support the streamlined modification program announced on November 11, 2008, Fannie Mae (NYSE: FNM) today issued a notice to its loan servicing organizations and retained foreclosure attorneys directing them to suspend foreclosure sales on occupied single-family properties as well as the completion of evictions from occupied single-family properties scheduled to occur from November 26, 2008 until January 9, 2009.

The temporary suspension of foreclosures is designed to allow affected borrowers facing foreclosure to retain their homes while Fannie Mae works with mortgage servicers to implement the streamlined modification program scheduled to launch December 15.

Freddie Mac also announced they are suspending foreclosures.

by Calculated Risk on 11/14/2008 10:13:00 AM

From Reuters: Record loss forces Freddie Mac to tap $100 bln fund

Freddie Mac reported a $25.3 billion quarterly loss on Friday as the housing slump worsened, forcing the second-largest provider of U.S. home loan funding to draw on a $100 billion Treasury Department lifeline.

The company attributed much of the record loss to a write down of tax-related assets ...

Freddie Mac said ... [housing market] conditions worsened "dramatically" during July through September.

The companies' regulator has submitted a request for the Treasury Department to provide $13.8 billion for Freddie Mac to erase the shareholder equity deficit.

Remember Fannie and Freddie have much lower default rates than the loans packaged by Wall Street. If conditions worsened dramatically for Freddie and Fannie, imagine how bad it is for Wall Street MBS and loans held by lenders like Wachovia (Wells Fargo) and WaMu (JPMorgan Chase).

by Calculated Risk on 11/11/2008 12:19:00 PM

From the WSJ: Fannie, Freddie Work on Mass Loan Modification Plan

Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and U.S. officials are expected to announce plans Tuesday to speed up the modification of hundreds of thousands of loans ... The streamlined effort will target certain loans that are 90 days or more past due ... The program will aim to bring the ratio of mortgage payments for these homeowners to 38% of their income by modifying interest rates and in some cases forgiving portions of principal debt ...

The announcement is expected to come at a press conference at 2 p.m. at the Federal Housing Finance Agency ...

by Calculated Risk on 11/04/2008 04:46:00 PM

From Bloomberg: Fannie Mortgage-Bond Spreads Fall to Lowest in Almost Two Weeks (no link yet)

Yields on Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and Ginnie Mae mortgage bonds tumbled to the lowest in almost two weeks relative to U.S. government notes, potentially lowering home-loan rates.

The difference between yields on Washington-based Fannie's current-coupon 30-year fixed-rate mortgage securities and 10-year Treasuries fell about 23 basis points to about 183 basis points ...

A little more progress.

by Calculated Risk on 9/11/2008 03:04:00 PM

From Bloomberg: Senators Ask Fannie, Freddie to Freeze Foreclosures

U.S. Senate Banking Committee members urged Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the mortgage lenders placed under federal control this week, to freeze foreclosures on loans in their portfolios for at least 90 days.

I suppose the goal is work out more modifications ... nothing else will change in 90 days.

by Calculated Risk on 9/10/2008 09:12:00 AM

“We missed a golden opportunity that would have avoided a lot of the problems we’re facing now, if we hadn’t had such a firm ideological position at the White House and the Treasury and the Fed [in 2005].
...
All the handwringing and bedwetting is going on without remembering how the House stepped up on this. What did we get from the White House? We got a one-finger salute.”
former Congressman Mike Oxley (R-Ohio), Sept 9, 2008

From the Financial Times: Oxley hits back at ideologues (hat tip Paul Krugman)

Note: Greenspan was at the Fed. John Snow was the Treasury Secretary.

by Calculated Risk on 9/09/2008 04:50:00 PM

This is an hour show with guests: NY Times Floyd Norris, PIMCO's Mohamed El-Erian, NY Times Gretchen Morgenson and New York University Professor Nouriel Roubini. (hat tip Michael)

by Tanta on 9/09/2008 10:53:00 AM

People keep sending me this article or bringing up this "fact" in the comments. Because it is such a fine example of a "fact" that isn't actually a fact, but is apparently becoming an article of quasi-religious faith in some quarters, I shall make the attempt to slap it down. I have no particular illusions about how well this will work, but there may be a handful of people who actually care about accuracy and good faith, even (!) when the subject is Freddie Mac. I'm talkin' to you.

*********************

Let me start out with a couple of general observations. This post is about financial accounting matters. If you are one of those people who drove us insane in the comments to yesterday's post on "assets" versus "liabilities" by arguing that "assets" are "really" "liabilities" because you, like Humpty Dumpty, are The Master, then you will find this post unsatisfactory. Tell it to the Marines. The habit of refusing to use standard accounting terms in preference to sloppy "synonyms" is what got these two reporters in trouble in the first place. I'm not going to pander to anyone by doing it myself.

Second, we basically went through a nearly identical version of this brouhaha last November with Fannie Mae. It's deja-vu all over again.

The offending "fact" comes from this article by the world-renowned Gretchen Morgenson and Charles Duhigg, whose willingness to believe anything any unnamed source says about Freddie Mac, whether it makes sense or not, has been documented before on this blog.

Finally, regulators are concerned that the companies may have mischaracterized their financial health by relaxing their accounting policies on losses, according to people familiar with the review. For years, both companies have effectively recognized losses whenever payments on a loan are 90 days past due. But, in recent months, the companies said they would wait until payments were two years late. As a result, tens of thousands of loans have not been marked down in value.

The companies have injected their own capital into pools of securities containing these loans, arguing that their new policies are helping more borrowers. Under conservative accounting methods, changing these policies would not have any impact on the companies' books. However, people briefed on the accounting inquiry said that Freddie Mac may have delayed losses with the change.

What follows is my best effort to discover what the hell these people are talking about. I must disclose to you all that I am really just making an educated guess here. If you possess any expertise at all in financial accounting in general and Freddie Mac's business operations in particular, the foregoing paragraphs do not make any sense whatsoever. (It's like talking to people for whom "asset" "really" means "liability.") So I could be wrong, and they could be talking about some entirely different part of the balance sheet. Anyone with a better guess than mine is hereby invited to share.

My theory is that they are talking about optional repurchases of MBS loans. I cannot think of or find any other part of Freddie's financial statements in which that "two-year rule" or this thing about "injecting capital" would fit. And if they are talking about optional repurchases, they're guilty of terrible reporting. Either their sources are badly informed or they didn't understand what their sources told them or both.

To review the basics of what Freddie does: they buy mortgage loans on the secondary market. These purchases of loans result in two different "portfolios" of loans: the "retained portfolio" and the "guarantee portfolio." The retained portfolio consists of loans and MBS that are owned outright by Freddie. That means Freddie's capital is invested in these loans. Freddie gets the capital to invest in the retained portfolio in large part by issuing notes and bonds--what everyone calls "agency debt." The retained portfolio constitutes an "asset" on Freddie Mac's books (net of the loss reserves), and the debt-funding constitutes a "liability" thereon.

The "guarantee portfolio" consists of various MBS that Freddie guarantees the credit risk of, but does not invest the capital in. The capital to fund these securities is provided by investors who buy MBS. Therefore, the total principal amount of the guarantee portfolio is not an asset on Freddie's books (it is an asset on the MBS investors' books). What shows up on Freddie's balance sheet is the "guarantee asset," which is the fair value of the guarantee fees received, and the "guarantee obligation" (over on the liability side) which reflects the fair value of the projected credit losses.

This distinction between retained and guaranteed portfolios is one reason why Freddie's (and Fannie's) financial statements are complex; each part of the "total portfolio" has different accounting treatment. If you read through these financial statements or any reports having to do with portfolio balances or loan purchase volume, you simply need to pay attention to when a number is given for the "total portfolio" versus one or the other parts thereof. To answer a question that may arise at this point, as of June 30 the principal balance of Freddie's retained portfolio was $792 billion and the guarantee portfolio balance was $1.410 trillion, making a total portfolio of $2.202 trillion (see Table 49 of the 10-K).

So. How do loans get into the retained portfolio? They are either originally purchased as portfolio investments or, in some cases, they were originally purchased in the guarantor program but had to be repurchased out of the MBS. As I said, the current flap seems to be about repurchases of MBS loans. I am going to quote here from Freddie Mac's 10-K. It will help you to know that "PC" means "Participation Certificate," and is just Freddie-speak for "MBS."

We also have the right to purchase mortgages that back our PCs and Structured Securities from the underlying loan pools when they are significantly past due. This right to repurchase collateral is known as our repurchase option. Through November 2007, our general practice was to purchase the mortgage loans out of PCs after the loans became 120 days delinquent. Effective December 2007, we no longer automatically purchase loans from PC pools once they become 120 days delinquent, but rather, we purchase loans from PCs when the loans have been 120 days delinquent and (a) the loans are modified, (b) foreclosure sales occur, (c) the loans have been delinquent for 24 months or (d) the
cost of guarantee payments to PC holders, including advances of interest at the PC coupon, exceeds the expected cost of holding the nonperforming mortgage in our retained portfolio. Consequently, we purchased fewer impaired loans under our repurchase option for the three and six months ended June 30, 2008 as compared to the three and six months ended June 30, 2007. We record at fair value loans that we purchase in connection with our performance under our financial guarantees and record losses on loans purchased on our consolidated statements of income in order to reduce our net investment in acquired loans to their fair value.

Remember that the "guarantee" on the MBS means that Freddie Mac is responsible for passing through interest payments to bondholders as long as those bondholders have principal invested, whether the borrowers make payments or not. The way this usually works is that for the first 90 days of delinquency (120 days since last payment), the servicer is obligated to advance scheduled interest and principal to Freddie Mac, who passes it through to the bondholders. The servicer makes efforts to collect the past-due payments from the borrowers. Generally at around 90-120 days, if the loan is still delinquent, the servicer's obligation to advance payments stops and Freddie Mac is the one obligated to advance payments to the bondholders. The basic contractual terms of the MBS are that Freddie has the right, but not the obligation, to buy a seriously delinquent loan out of the pool at this point. The repurchase price would always be par, since the bondholder must receive 100% of principal invested per the terms of the guarantee. Obviously, a seriously delinquent loan is likely to have a fair value of much less than par, but Freddie has to take that loss, not the MBS investor.

However, that is an option, not an obligation. Alternatively, Freddie can allow a seriously delinquent loan to remain in the MBS, while continuing to advance payments to the bondholders, until foreclosure or modification, for up to two years. To my knowledge the two-year limitation has always been part of the MBS rules--it's just the outside limit on how long Freddie (same for Fannie) can keep advancing on delinquent MBS loans before they have to give up and repurchase them. There have never been many loans that are seriously delinquent for two years without ever getting to foreclosure or workout, but in the strange cases (probate, bizarre title problems) it can happen. In no sense is this "two year rule" about letting loans just stay delinquent with no action by the servicer or Freddie Mac, or no effect on the fair value of the guarantee obligation, for two years. It absolutely does not mean that no credit losses are taken until a loan is "two years late." The two years refers to how long a delinquent loan can stay in the MBS, not how many months past-due it can be before it is impaired.

Why would Freddie elect to repurchase a loan when it doesn't have to? Well, if the cost of capital is cheap, but the interest payments you have to advance to the bondholders are not, it generally makes sense to repurchase the loan. The loan balance then comes out of the "guaranteed portfolio" and into the "retained portfolio." The write-down of the asset occurs immediately, given that the purchase price of the loan was par (100% of unpaid principal balance) but the fair value of a seriously delinquent loan is less than par. So a loss is immediately recognized by the retained portfolio. On the other side of the books, the guarantee asset and obligation are adjusted to reflect the fact that this loan is no longer earning a guarantee fee or reflecting guarantee costs. Any final loss taken on the loan in foreclosure is taken on the retained portfolio side, not the guarantee side.

On the other hand, if the cost of capital--Freddie's borrowing cost, including capital reserve requirements--is expensive, but the interest payments to be advanced to bondholders are relatively cheap, then you leave the loans in the MBS unless and until you are obligated to buy them out, which would be when they are delinquent and they are modified, foreclosed, or hit that two-year limit. If the loans stay in the MBS, they rack up those costs that go into the guarantee obligation, but they do not result in a recognized loss to the retained portfolio because they are not in the retained portfolio.

Now, go back and reread the Morgenson/Duhigg version of this and see if it strikes you as a reasonable paraphrase. As you do this, ask yourself if you've read anything lately in the news about Freddie needing to increase its capital reserves and facing much higher borrowing costs than it had previously. Then ask yourself if this all might be about not "injecting capital" into "pools of securities."

Of course this election not to buy out every seriously delinquent MBS loan means that fewer losses have to be recognized in the retained portfolio. The whole damned idea is to keep these loans in the guaranteed portfolio instead of the retained portfolio. However, it certainly doesn't keep Freddie from having to pay interest to bondholders every month, whether paid by the borrower or not. It still has a major effect on credit losses. It simply keeps the loans' principal balance "financed" by MBS bondholders instead of by Freddie Mac.

Has that been a wise move by Freddie? Well, I don't know we could answer that question in Morgenson/Duhigg terms, since they seem to think that the only "losses" that can be taken are in the retained portfolio. You would have to analyze the effect of the interest advances to the guarantee side of the books to see if this was a smart move or not. But of course Morgenson and Duhigg have no intention of doing that--I suspect they fail to grasp how one might do that--because to do so interferes with the narrative of "cooking the books" that they're peddling.

The interesting question that will arise, of course, is what will happen to this repurchase policy post-conservatorship. Will the government order Freddie to start buying out every delinquent MBS loan at 90 days down--knowing that the government might have to provide the capital for them to do that--in order to book retained portfolio losses "promptly," or will it perhaps decide to let the bondholders continue to finance these loans, just as Freddie has done? I'm really looking forward to finding out, myself.

At any rate, if one more person starts bringing up this canard about "no losses until the loan is two years past due" in the comments, those of us who are actually paying attention are going to jump your case for--wittingly or not--spreading stupid. You gotta stop believing everything you read in the paper.

I am the kind of person who wants to read a long post about financial accounting issues.

by Calculated Risk on 9/09/2008 09:35:00 AM

From CFO.com: Fannie, Freddie Get Tax Pass, Too (hat tip Alain)

Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson ... had the IRS issue Notice 2008-76, which essentially allows the two government-sponsored enterprises to retain all of their [net-operating losses] NOLs, despite a change of control of ownership, tax expert Robert Willens told CFO.com.

Under the tax code — specifically Section 382 — NOLs are severely limited when there is a change of control. The rule is in place to prevent acquiring companies from buying up targets just to gain access to their NOLs. The NOLs for Fannie and Freddie are substantial. Over the last four quarters, Fannie and Freddie recorded about $14 billion in aggregate losses.

In essence, Paulson changed tax law so that the two lenders aren't paying more in taxes to the government as a result of that same government becoming their controlling investor. ...

"I am not saying that the IRS ruling is a good thing, or a bad thing, it is just unusual," asserts Willens. "Then again, this is a very unusual situation."

Not a big deal - but another interesting aspect of the Paulson Plan.

by Calculated Risk on 9/08/2008 04:23:00 PM

by Calculated Risk on 9/08/2008 09:24:00 AM

Floyd Norris wonders in the NY Times which master the new Fannie and Freddie will serve: The Dilemma of Fannie and Freddie

In recent months, Fannie and Freddie raised the fees they charged to purchase or guarantee loans. ... Now the new managers of Fannie and Freddie will have to decide how they want to run enterprises controlled by the government.

Lowering fees and buying large numbers of mortgages would serve as an economic stimulus, but could increase the ultimate cost to the government if the housing market gets worse. Raising fees, and being cautious in lending, could prolong the housing slump. Being generous in restructuring loans could help borrowers, but cost the enterprises money.

Henry M. Paulson Jr. ... tried to assure the public that the enterprises would follow both courses, an indication that the need to serve multiple masters remains. On one side, he promised that “the primary mission of these enterprises now will be to proactively work to increase the availability of mortgage finance, including by examining the guaranty fee structure with an eye toward mortgage affordability.”

On the other side, he said Fannie and Freddie “will no longer be managed with a strategy to maximize common shareholder returns, a strategy which historically encouraged risk-taking.”

It may not be easy to take less risk while lending more and charging lower fees.

For a discussion of how GSE MBS works (and g-fees) see Tanta's MBS for UberNerds I: GSE Pass-Throughs

by Calculated Risk on 9/07/2008 10:18:00 PM

In three parts (all about 10 minutes each).

"Our economy and our markets will not recover until the bulk of this housing correction is behind us."
Treasury Secretary Hank Paulson, Sept 7, 2008 (see part 2)

by Calculated Risk on 9/07/2008 06:28:00 PM

When the Paulson Plan was announced in mid-July, my initial reaction was:

It seems the plan is bad for equity holders, but good for debt holders ... and potentially bad for taxpayers ...

Nothing has changed.

Although the common shares will continue to trade, they are further behind with new senior preferred shares being issued to the Treasury. And even if the common is worth something again someday (more than the option value they will trade at soon), the Treasury received warrants that will significantly dilute the common.

Warrants for the purchase of common stock of each GSE representing 79.9% of the common stock of each GSE on a fully-diluted basis at a nominal price

On the other hand, the debt holders should see a rally tomorrow since the Treasury has guaranteed they will provide enough capital such "that each enterprise maintains a positive net worth".

Those are the easy calls.

The bigger questions are (in no particular order): 1) How much does this cost taxpayers (if anything)? 2) What happens to treasuries? 3) What happens to the existing preferred? 4) What happens to FDIC insured banks that hold the existing preferred? 5) What happens to the stock market? 6) What happens to mortgage rates? 7) What happens to the housing market and the economy?

These are some of the questions we will be discussing.

Just like with the common, the existing preferred will continue to trade (although the dividend is eliminated).

"The common stock and preferred stock dividends will be eliminated, but the common and all preferred stocks will continue to remain outstanding."

This will have a significant impact on some banks, as the FDIC noted earlier today. Many banks will have to take write-downs (as they mark to market), and some smaller banks will probably fail.

UPDATE: From Fitch: Fitch Affirms Fannie Mae & Freddie Mac's 'AAA' IDR; Lowers Pfd Stock; Sub Debt on Watch Evolving

Fitch has also downgraded FNM and FRE's preferred stock to 'C/RR6' from 'BBB-'. The downgrade of the preferred stock reflects the subordination of the preferred to any Treasury interest and interest payments are unlikely to resume in the foreseeable future. Thus, any recovery is expected to be minimal.
emphasis added

As far as treasuries, I expect a sell-off. This is uncertain, but it would seem investors have a choice between Fannie and Freddie debt and Treasuries (although treasuries are state tax free). The Ten Year closed on Friday with a yield of 3.66%; I expect a sell-off.

I suppose mortgage rates will decline as Fannie and Freddie's borrowing costs decline. Also the Treasury will be buying GSE MBS and that should push down mortgage rates:

Treasury will begin later this month by investing in new GSE MBS, which are credit-guaranteed by the GSEs. Additional purchases will be made as deemed appropriate. Treasury can hold this portfolio of MBS to maturity and, based on mortgage market conditions, Treasury may make adjustments to the portfolio.

I suppose the stock market will rally tomorrow. See Bloomberg Stock Futures. But this is just short term. Longer term, investors will look at the impact of the economic slowdown on earnings - and that picture is still grim.

The cost to taxpayers is also very unclear. It is possible that taxpayers will not be negatively impacted in the long run. This depends heavily on the losses in the retained portfolios of Fannie and Freddie, and the cash flow from the good portion of the portfolio, and also on future defaults and house prices. Even if the Treasury has to purchase $50 billion or $100 billion in senior preferred shares to maintain the positive net worth of Fannie and Freddie, the Treasury will own the first equity in line to be paid off from future profits (assuming future profits). This makes the losses very unclear.

For housing, this doesn't change anything. Housing fundamentals remain the same: excess supply (especially distressed supply), tighter lending standards, and prices are still too high compared to incomes and rents. The possible slightly lower mortgage rates are almost inconsequential compared to supply and price issues.

And the economy is still in recession that will linger for some time.

And finally how, when, and into what do Fannie and Freddie eventually transition? This will be a huge issue for some time.

Just some thoughts ... I'm very open to alternative questions and outcomes.

by Calculated Risk on 9/07/2008 11:08:00 AM

From Treasury: Statement by Secretary Henry M. Paulson, Jr. on Treasury and Federal Housing Finance Agency Action to Protect Financial Markets and Taxpayers

Conservatorship

Preferred Stock Purchase Agreements

Treasury has taken three additional steps to complement FHFA's decision to place both enterprises in conservatorship. First, Treasury and FHFA have established Preferred Stock Purchase Agreements, contractual agreements between the Treasury and the conserved entities. Under these agreements, Treasury will ensure that each company maintains a positive net worth.
...
With this agreement, Treasury receives senior preferred equity shares and warrants that protect taxpayers. Additionally, under the terms of the agreement, common and preferred shareholders bear losses ahead of the new government senior preferred shares.
emphasis added

Important for some FDIC insured institutions:

[C]onservatorship does not eliminate the outstanding preferred stock, but does place preferred shareholders second, after the common shareholders, in absorbing losses. The federal banking agencies are assessing the exposures of banks and thrifts to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. The agencies believe that, while many institutions hold common or preferred shares of these two GSEs, only a limited number of smaller institutions have holdings that are significant compared to their capital.

Secured Lending Facility.

The second step Treasury is taking today is the establishment of a new secured lending credit facility which will be available to Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and the Federal Home Loan Banks.

Treasury to buy GSE MBS

Treasury is initiating a temporary program to purchase GSE MBS.

Fact Sheets from Treasury:

FHFA Director Lockhart Remarks on Housing GSE Actions
Fact Sheet: FHFA Conservatorship
Fact Sheet: Treasury Preferred Stock Purchase Agreement
Fact Sheet: Treasury MBS Purchase Program
Fact Sheet: Treasury GSE Credit Facility

by Calculated Risk on 9/07/2008 10:38:00 AM

From WSJ: Treasury to Outline Fan-Fred Plan

U.S. Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson and Federal Housing Finance Agency Director James Lockhart are expected to release details of the planned conservatorship of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac at an 11 a.m. press conference in downtown Washington.