by Calculated Risk on 9/28/2008 12:58:00 PM

As we discussed last night, B&B will be nationalized. It looks like U.K. officials have learned about bank runs from the Northern Rock collapse, and will announce some sort of plan to protect savers.

From the Telegraph: Financial crisis: Bradford & Bingley savers told money is safe

Yvette Cooper, the minister, confirmed that the Government was “stepping in” to rescue the bank, Britain’s eighth biggest mortgage lender.

"We are very clear that depositors and ordinary savers must be properly protected and they will be as part of the arrangements we will set out," Ms Cooper told the BBC.
...
A full statement will be made by Alistair Darling, the Chancellor, either late on Sunday or early on Monday morning before the stock market opens.

by Tanta on 7/17/2008 08:43:00 AM

We had so much fun--I use this word advisedly--with IndyMac and moral hazard yesterday that I have to return to the well. It's a nice deep one.

From Bloomberg this morning:

July 17 (Bloomberg) -- IndyMac Bancorp Inc.'s collapse may spur withdrawals from banks ranging from First BanCorp in Puerto Rico to Los Angeles-based Nara Bancorp Inc. as customers trim accounts below the $100,000 limit on deposit insurance, according to Sandler O'Neill & Partners LP.

``IndyMac's failure has people worried about others,'' Mark Fitzgibbon, a principal at Sandler O'Neill, said in an interview. Fitzgibbon told clients in a report this week that signs of weakness may prompt customers ``to more actively move deposits to banks that are perceived to be healthier.''

The result could be a liquidity squeeze at banks that rely on ``jumbo'' deposits, Fitzgibbon said. His report, published July 15, included more than 50 companies with jumbo time accounts, typically certificates of deposit, that exceeded 25 percent of first-quarter deposits.

Topping the list was First BanCorp at 72 percent. Puerto Rico-based Doral Financial Corp. had 60 percent and Nara Bancorp had 53 percent, according to Sandler. Bank of America Corp., the biggest U.S. consumer bank, stood at 12 percent at the end of 2007; the report didn't have more recent data.

If any of you would like my personal opinion, for what it is worth, I wouldn't put $12.72 in a bank with 72% jumbo deposits. Certainly not after this:

Alan Cohen, senior vice president of marketing at First BanCorp, said in an interview that Fitzgibbon's report contained ``grave inaccuracies.'' In an e-mailed statement, the company said Sandler should have excluded brokered CDs, ``a stable source of funding.'' Without those, jumbo time deposits equal about 8 percent of total deposits, the bank said.

Whoa, Nellie.

Really, the issue with "jumbo" deposits is, precisely, the extent to which such large deposits are "brokered" versus "core." A bank's "core deposits" are those made by individuals and businesses in the bank's local market areas who have some retail relationship with the bank--checking accounts, loans, what have you. Brokered deposits are also frequently referred to as "hot money," and the idea that First BanCorp considers them a "stable source of funding" ought to raise a few eyebrows. Here's the federal regulators' take on the subject:

Deposit brokers have traditionally provided intermediary services for banks and investors. Recent developments in technology provide bankers increased access to a broad range of potential investors who have no relationship with the bank and who actively seek the highest returns offered within the financial industry. In particular, the Internet and other automated service providers are effectively and efficiently matching yield-focused investors with potentially high-yielding deposits. Typically, banks offer certificates of deposit (CDs) tailored to the $100,000 FDIC deposit insurance limit to eliminate credit risk to the investor, but amounts may exceed insurance coverage. Rates paid on these deposits are often higher than those paid for local market area retail CDs, but due to the FDIC insurance coverage, these rates may be lower than for unsecured wholesale market funding.

Customers who focus exclusively on rates are highly rate-sensitive and provide less stable funding than do those with local retail deposit relationships. These rate-sensitive customers have easy access to, and are frequently well informed about, alternative markets and investments, and may have no other relationship with or loyalty to the bank. If market conditions change or more attractive returns become available, these customers may rapidly transfer their funds to new institutions or investments. Rate-sensitive customers with deposits in excess of the insurance limits also may be alert to and sensitive to changes in a bank's financial condition. Accordingly, these rate-sensitive depositors, both under and over the $100,000 FDIC insurance limit, may exhibit characteristics more typical of wholesale investors.

It was, after all, one of Senator Schumer's biggest complaints about IndyMac in his famous letter to the regulators that, as of June 2008, 32% of IndyMac's total deposits were brokered and that the bank was insufficiently capitalized to withstand that risk.

We had a number of folks arguing yesterday that the $100,000 insurance limit should be raised to account for inflation. Atrios suggested that yesterday. Part of my own wariness over that stems from the fact that so many of the "jumbo deposits" of these banks are, indeed, "hot money," not your basic middle-class family with $250,000 in the local bank in nice stable core deposits. At First BanCorp, it appears that only a shade over 10% of jumbo deposits are core deposits.

Of course, it's hard to say how stable core depositors are, these days. The trouble with trying to assess the risk of bank runs or deposit destabilization is that people are, well, people, and they can respond very differently to the same situation. From Bloomberg:

Martha Duran made the 75-mile drive from Running Springs, California, to close her CDs. She waited from 8:30 a.m. to 4 p.m. on July 14, ending up with sunburn on her neck and an appointment for noon on July 15.

``This is a scare of a lifetime,'' said Duran, a 70-year-old retired office administrator. ``I worked hard for my money. I may not be a millionaire, but every little bit counts.''

Not everyone visiting the bank was there for withdrawals. Sanford Mazel, a 74-year-old retired U.S. Postal Service employee from Altadena, California, came to make a deposit, saying he was reassured by the government protection.

``It's FDIC, so who gives a damn?'' Mazel said. ``Let the world go to hell. The money will be there.''

I think it would be hard to write any banking policy that would discourage Martha from being part of a bank run or encourage Sanford to panic.

by Tanta on 7/16/2008 08:14:00 AM

And the results are, of course, ugly. The LAT reports on police calls to restore order to lines outside some IndyMac branches yesterday. The surliness seems to have stemmed from actual or perceived instances of someone cutting in line.

And why are all these people spending days in line at a bank already operated by the FDIC? More than a few of them appear to have accounts over the insured limit. Perhaps. Sort of.

Take Mr. Bash (no, really, that's his name):

Todd Bash, a 43-year-old teacher from San Gabriel, was worried about IndyMac's viability after reading about its woes in the media, so he had gone into his branch in West Covina on July 8 -- three days before regulators seized the bank. He had two certificates of deposit, a savings account and a checking account, totaling more than $180,000.

Bash said he had been ready to pull his funds, but the teller told him that he could add beneficiaries to get extra insurance. He added his mother to one account and his sister to another.

But after IndyMac was seized, an FDIC hotline operator said the extra insurance wasn't necessarily valid, Bash said. That landed him in line Monday. After eight hours, the bank closed and he went home.

He went on the FDIC website again and used the system's deposit insurance calculator, which said all of his deposits were fully covered.

Bash returned to the bank Tuesday more confident, but when he finally talked to a teller, she showed him that more than $80,000 was missing from one account. Why? The teller didn't know. She referred him to an FDIC official in the branch, who also couldn't tell him what happened, he said.

"One person finally suggested that maybe there was a hold on my account, but when I asked if it was a hold, why wouldn't they just say there was a hold? . . . Nobody could give me any answers," he said.

FDIC spokesman David Barr said most of the problems stemmed from trust accounts that have been put on hold until the agency determines that beneficiaries have been properly named. In most cases, those funds will be released in full after the depositor confers in person with the FDIC, he said.

Frozen trust accounts also caused tellers to fail to credit interest payments to some borrowers. "We apologize for that," Barr said, adding that the FDIC is checking accounts where that may have occurred and will mail missing interest to depositors. "It may take us a few days, but we will get it out."

I love this little anecdote. It has everything in it.

The big moral hazard problem that existed back when deposit insurance was first invented was, of course, the nasty information asymmetry between depositors and the banks. The banks knew what ridiculous risks they might be running with your savings account, but you didn't. "Bank runs" start because the information about risk gets out suddenly (and often incompletely) to depositors at the moment of crisis, leading to depositor panic.

In the New Era here, Mr. Bash actually got information from the media about the riskiness of his bank before it managed to create widespread depositor panic. So he goes to the bank to withdraw his money--or at least that part of it over the $100,000 deposit insurance limit--but when the helpful teller points out to him that he can make perfectly meaningless changes to names on his accounts and get more "free insurance," he decides that makes more sense. His concern about the management of his bank and its risk tolerance does not extend to looking that gift horse in the mouth.

Then IndyMac compounds the "problem" by, you know, having to treat this sham transaction (adding names to an account just to get around insurance limits) by, you know, having to pretend like it's really a transfer of ownership of funds and putting the old perfectly usual "hold" on the account until . . . well, you know. Until the bank has verified that this is not a "fraudulent" transaction. Whatever that means in the current environment.

Mr. Bash is quite upset that the price of nearly doubling his deposit insurance coverage at no monetary cost to him is several days worth of red tape. Defeating the purpose of deposit insurance limits should, we all know, be smooth and flawless. For heaven's sake, this is 2008. Can't someone just type in some numbers and hit the "enter" key? It's one thing to read in the WSJ that your bank's lending activities may be jeopardizing its safety and soundness--to the point of Congress asking some nasty questions about it in public--and to remain calm enough to believe that the teller can fix your problem by adding your mother's name to an account. It is another thing entirely to get cruddy customer service from the damned FDIC.

Of course all the FDIC can do is abjectly apologize and pretend like anybody should really care about Mr. Bash's tribulations at this point. It has to: the rule of the day is No More Panic and FDIC officials and staffers manning those teller lines will have to play the whole "customer service" game until their back molars grind down to stumps and they've emptied all the bottles of Pepcid they keep next to the check printers. One cannot lecture people like Mr. Bash about moral hazard and the costs of free insurance in the middle of a bank takeover.

Not when the other "overinsured" are out front starting to throw their lawn chairs at each other, you can't.

by Calculated Risk on 7/14/2008 02:11:00 PM

From CNBC: A look at the IndyMac failure and whether more banks will follow, with CNBC's Jane Wells.

Update: From Mary Ann Milbourn at the O.C. Register: Hundreds wait in lines as IndyMac reopens. There are several photos from Register photographer Eugene Garcia. Here is one (used with permisssion):

by Calculated Risk on 7/03/2008 01:28:00 AM

From the LA Times Money & Co: Regulators to Schumer on IndyMac: Please shut up

From a letter to Schumer today, John M. Reich, director of the Office of Thrift Supervision wrote:

"Dissemination of incomplete or erroneous information can erode public confidence, mislead depositors and investors, and cause unintended consequences, including depositor runs and panic stock trades. Rumors and innuendo cause damage to financial institutions that might not occur otherwise and these concerns drive our strict policy of privacy."

The LA Times also quotes John D. Hawke, the U.S. comptroller of the currency (regulator of national banks) from 1998 to 2004:

"If Schumer continues to go public with letters raising questions about the condition of individual institutions, he will cause havoc in the banking system," Hawke said.

"Leaking his IndyMac letter to the press was reckless and grossly irresponsible. I don't see how he can be trusted with confidential information in the future. What this incredibly stupid conduct does is put at risk the willingness of regulators to share any information with the [congressional] oversight committees. After this, you'd be crazy to share information with Schumer."

I agree. Naming an individual institution was reckless and irresponsible. I was very surprised that a letter like Schumer's was made public.

by Tanta on 3/25/2008 08:42:00 AM

Yves at naked capitalism had a good post yesterday on the infamous Bear Stearns Ten Buck Rechuck, that I think needs repeating:

According to Sorkin, the $2 price for Bear was the Fed's and Treasury's idea; JP Morgan was prepared to pay more, but they nixed the idea, saying they did not like the "optics" of the deal. The implication is that the officials overstepped their bounds. That is a pretty outrageous spin when the government is putting up taxpayer money.

Had it been an option, the Fed should have nationalized Bear. It was going to declare bankruptcy Monday if there was no deal; its shareholders would have been wiped out. Why am I so confident of this view? If bondholders, as rumored, were buying shares to make sure the JPM deal went through (and thus would take losses on their stock purchases when the deal closed), that meant that they thought their bonds were worth well under 100 cents on the dollar in a bankruptcy. Shareholders are subordinate to bondholders, so equity owners would have gotten zilch.

I can think of a host of reasons, however, why the Fed did not go the nationalization route, the biggest being that it lacked clear authority (it couldn't declare Bear to be insolvent, as it could a member bank). And letting Bear fail (and having accounts frozen) was what the Fed was trying to avoid, so letting it fail and then seizing control (even assuming it could do that) was never an option. No doubt, the central bank also did not want to assume administrative control of an entity that it had never regulated (ie, its supervisors had never kicked its tires) that dealt actively in markets in which the Fed has little expertise. Even in an orderly liquidation scenario, that it a lot to take on.

Sorkin nevertheless argues that the Fed did Bear a dirty because:

.....the night that Bear signed the original bid, the Fed opened what’s known as the discount window to companies like Goldman Sachs and Lehman Brothers — oh, yes, and to Bear, too. Except that the Fed didn’t tell Bear that it planned to open the window when it was signing its deal with JPMorgan.

This verges on being revisionist history. First and most important, the discount window was opened to keep the panic about Bear from spreading to other firms, most notably Lehman. It almost certainly would not have happened then if Bear was not on the verge of imploding. Remember, a mere week and a day ago, there was pervasive fear that the wheels were about to come off the financial system, particularly if counterparties started getting leery of dealing with Lehman.

Moreover, usage of the new discount window the first week was light due to worries about stigma. If Bear had gone and used it aggressively, it may well have reinforced rather than allayed fears about the trading firm's health. If other firms continued to refuse to deal with Bear, its collapse was assured. There was a very real possibility that even if Bear had remained independent and used the window, its bankruptcy merely would have been delayed a day or two. And it would have been well nigh impossible to put together a three party takeover deal between the close of business in New York and market opening in Asia on a weekday.

But the most appalling aspect of Sorkin's account: he acts as if Bear had the right to be informed of the Fed's plans. Sorkin seems to have forgotten the golden rule: he who has the gold makes the rules. The Fed had every right to be calling the shots. They were taking the biggest risk in this transaction. The notion that a firm about to fail is entitled to be treated as a being on an equal footing with its rescuers is absurd. And the fact that Sorkin (and presumably others on Wall Street) sympathize with this view says the industry badly needs to be leashed and collared.

This, frankly, is the reason why I am so incredibly appalled by this:

Wells Fargo CEO John Stumpf said the financial crisis is presenting the bank with more acquisition opportunities.

"I would not be averse to a Fed-assisted transaction," Stumpf said in a recent interview with the San Francisco Business Times. "Fixer-uppers don't bother us."

The San Francisco banker said any deal would have to meet the company's traditional acquisition targets and benefit the bank's acquired customers.

To even mention, in public, that one "wouldn't be averse to a Fed-assisted transaction" is to hint that the acquisition targets you are looking at are in as dire straits as Bear Stearns. What is Stumpf trying to do, start a run on an insured bank? Or, well, the other option is that Stumpf doesn't believe that Bear was such a mess--that, precisely, it is "on an equal footing with its rescuers."

Either way you slice it, the very fact that he could say such a thing in public tells you how far down the wrong road we've gone. I vote for the leash and collar, pronto.

by Calculated Risk on 3/16/2008 09:25:00 PM

From the WSJ on JPMorgan and Bear Stearns: J.P. Morgan Rescues Bear Stearns

Meanwhile, worries are deepening that other securities firms and commercial banks might be on shaky ground. Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. Chief Executive Richard Fuld, concerned about the markets and possible fallout from Bear Stearns's troubles, cut short a trip to India and returned home Sunday, ahead of schedule, according to people familiar with the matter. The decision came after a series of calls Saturday to both senior executives at the firm and Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson, these people say.

Stock Futures:

Here is a live DOW future (at the CBOT):

Here are a couple of other places to track the futures market:

Added: Live currency quotes. (hat tip central_scrutinizer)

Bloomberg Futures.

Barchart.com Indices

by Calculated Risk on 3/14/2008 10:15:00 PM

The WSJ has several followup articles on Bear Stearns. The first provides an excellent summary of the events leading up to the bailout. See WSJ: Fed Races to Rescue Bear Stearns In Bid to Steady Financial System

The story discusses how Bear Stearns, JPMorgan and the Fed regulators worked around the clock Thursday night to put together the bailout.

At about 5 a.m. Friday, regulators including New York Fed Chief Timothy Geithner, Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke, Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson and the Treasury under secretary domestic finance, Robert Steel, convened by conference call. At the end of the call at 7 a.m., the Fed had decided it would offer the loan.

A fascinating story.

The second key story suggests Bear Stearns will probably be sold within days. See the WSJ: It Is Tough to Value Bear, But It Had Better Sell Fast

by Calculated Risk on 11/30/2007 07:56:00 PM

From David Evans at Bloomberg: Florida Schools Struggle to Pay Teachers Amid Freeze (hat tip Saboor)

School districts, counties and cities across Florida sought to raise cash after being denied access to their deposits in a $15 billion state-run investment fund.

The Jefferson County school district was forced to take out a short-term loan to cover payroll for the 220 teachers and other employees in the system after $2.7 million it held in the pool was frozen yesterday. At least five other districts also obtained last-minute loans, said Wayne Blanton, executive director of the Florida School Boards Association.

``The unthinkable and the unimaginable have just happened here in Florida,'' said Hal Wilson, chief financial officer of the Jefferson County school district, located 30 miles (48 kilometers) east of the state capital Tallahassee. ``What we just experienced here is a classic run-on-the bank meltdown.''

This is the same school disctrict mentioned in David Evans piece on Nov 15th: Public School Funds Hit by SIV Debts Hidden in Investment Pools

Hal Wilson smiles at the blue numbers on his desktop screen. His money is yielding 5.77 percent. For the chief financial officer of Florida's Jefferson County school board, that means the $2.7 million of taxpayer funds he's placed in the state's Local Government Investment Pool is earning more on this October day than it would get in a money market fund.

And Wilson says he knows the Florida officials who manage the funds of the 1,559-student district have invested them wisely.

``We're such a small school district,'' Wilson, 55, says. ``We don't have the time or staff for professional money management. They have lots of investment advisers. It's risk free and easy.''

From "risk free and easy" to "classic run-on-the bank meltdown" in less than two months weeks.

by Calculated Risk on 11/30/2007 01:40:00 PM

From MarketWatch: Florida's investment woes spark subprime fears in other states

Florida halted withdrawals from a $15 billion local-government fund on Thursday after concerns over losses related to subprime mortgages prompted investors to pull roughly $10 billion out of the fund in recent weeks.

Other states are experiencing similar problems on a smaller scale.

The Montana Board of Investments, which manages the state's money, has seen $247 million withdrawn by local governments in the past three days from a $2.5 billion money-market-like fund called the Short Term Investment Pool.

"We've had some local government withdrawals in the past few days because of reports about Florida's problems," Carroll South, executive director at the Montana Board of Investments, said in an interview on Thursday.

Rating agency Standard & Poor's warned last month that it could downgrade a $4.8 billion investment pool run by King County, Wash., because of potential subprime exposures.

In addition to potential "bank runs" on these funds, another key concern is if other funds stop investing in asset backed CP - making the credit crunch worse.

by Calculated Risk on 11/29/2007 08:43:00 PM

On Nov 15th David Evans at Bloomberg wrote: Public School Funds Hit by SIV Debts Hidden in Investment Pools

What ... municipal finance managers ... across the country still haven't been told -- is that state-run pools have parked taxpayers' money in some of the most confusing, opaque and illiquid debt investments ever devised.

These include so-called structured investment vehicles, or SIVs, which are among the subprime mortgage debt-filled contrivances that have blown up at the biggest banks in the world.

This story led to a run on the fund, and Evans wrote today: Florida Halts Withdrawals From Local Investment Fund

Florida officials voted to suspend withdrawals from an investment fund for schools and local governments after redemptions sparked by downgrades of debt held in the portfolio reduced assets by 44 percent.

Before the run, the fund had $27 Billion in assets, and the fund was frozen today with $15 Billion remaining.

The Florida LGIP had strict investment guidelines, but unfortunately the guidelines allowed investment in asset backed commercial paper (CP) backed by prime and Alt-A mortgages.

A small percentage of the fund's investments have been downgraded and no longer meet the guidelines of the fund.

Click on chart for larger image.

This chart shows the investments that have been downgraded below the standards of the fund. This chart shows losses of about $45 million; not much for a $27 Billion fund (0.17%). Of course with each redemption at par (the run on the fund), the percentage losses for the remaining funds grow. $45 million for a $15 Billion fund is 0.3%. Considering the fund was paying investors 5.77%, even a 0.3% loss is not horrible.

However there are serious questions about the investment decisions of the pool. And there are other investments that could go bad. As an example the Fund invested $650 million in certificates of deposit in Countrywide Bank - with the recent redemptions that investment now amounts to over 4% of the pool's assets - and there is some risk that Countrywide could go under.

The two main concerns are: 1) Will there be a run on other investment pools? and 2) If other funds stop investing in asset backed CP, this might further the credit crunch and increase spreads for other products.

by Calculated Risk on 11/29/2007 04:16:00 PM

UPDATE: This Bloomberg Special Report has more info: Florida Suspends Withdrawals From Investment Pool (hat tip Andrew)

The pool had $3 billion of withdrawals today alone, putting assets at $15 billion, said Coleman Stipanovich, executive director of the State Board of Administration. The board manages the pool along with other short-term investments and the state's $137 billion pension fund.

``If we don't do something quickly, we're not going to have an investment pool,'' said Stipanovich at the meeting in the state capitol in Tallahassee. The fund was the largest of its kind, managing $27 billion before this month's withdrawals.

Local governments including Orange County and Pompano Beach that use the pool like a money-market fund asked for their money back after the State Board of Administration disclosed in a report earlier this month that holdings in the fund were lowered to below investment grade.
...
The pool has invested $2 billion in structured investment vehicles and other subprime-tainted debt, state records show. About 20 percent of the pool is in asset-backed commercial paper, Stipanovich said at the meeting today.

``There is no liquidity out there, there are no bids'' for those securities, he said.

Original post from the WSJ: Florida Moves to Halt Run on Fund

Florida halted withdrawals from a $15 billion local-government fund Thursday after concerns over losses ... prompted investors to pull roughly $10 billion out of the fund in recent weeks.

The State Board of Administration met Thursday and voted to immediately freeze withdrawals ...

The decision shows how far this year's ... credit crisis has spread. Florida's Local Government Investment Pool, which had more than $27 billion in assets at the end of September, is a money-market fund that's supposed to invest in ultrasafe assets to provide participants with a secure place to stash spare cash. But even these types of funds have been hit by the widening crunch.

by Calculated Risk on 9/17/2007 02:37:00 PM

Note: Video of the Day (bottom of posts) is an interview with customers in a Northern Rock queue this morning.

From the Guardian: Government guarantees Northern Rock deposits

The chancellor of the exchequer, Alistair Darling, this evening promised that the government will guarantee all savings deposits at Northern Rock amid concern that Britain is plunging into its worst banking crisis in decades.

The move follows a dramatic last-minute collapse in the share price of Alliance & Leicester, which fell 32% in late trading this afternoon, and sparked fears of "contagion" from Northern Rock to other financial institutions.

Mr Darling said: "I can announce today that following the discussions with the Governor (of the Bank of England) and the Chairman of the FSA, should it be necessary, we, with the Bank of England would put in place arrangements that would guarantee all the existing deposits in Northern Rock during the current instability."

This evening queues were still stretching out of the door at branches of Northern Rock across the country, with more than £2bn already taken out by anxious savers. The value of Northern Rock shares fell sharply again today, down by 35%, but in late trading it was overtaken by a startling drop in the share price of Alliance & Leicester, Britain's seventh largest bank.
...
Northern Rock, in a formal statement issued after the Mr Darlling spoke, said that "The Chancellor's statement makes it clear beyond any doubt that all savings in Northern Rock are safe and secure. Consequently anybody who is in a queue outside a branch, or who is trying to access an online account can be fully reassured that there is no cause for concern whatsoever."

It also promised to refund any penalties that savers may have paid when they withdrew their funds from the bank - so long as they put the money back in by October 5. "Any customer who paid a penalty to withdraw their funds from Northern Rock, due to concern over the current situation, will have the penalty refunded if they reinvest those funds in the same type of account with Northern Rock by 5 October 2007," it said.

These are stunning developments in the UK. Clearly there is concern that the run at Northern Rock will spread to other institutions (like Alliance & Leicester).

The UK version of FDIC insurance actually motivates many depositors to remove their bank deposits. Only the first 2000 pounds is 100% guaranteed, and the next 30,000 (or so) is 90% guaranteed. No one wants a 10% haircut, so it makes sense to remove any deposits over 2000 pounds.

This new guarantee should calm depositor's fears.

by Calculated Risk on 9/17/2007 10:47:00 AM

From Paul in London. Northern Rock branch in Hounsditch, City of London on Monday.

From Paul in London. Northern Rock branch in Hounsditch, City of London last Friday at 3 PM.

From Bloomberg: Lending Rates Surge as Northern Rock Concern Deepens

Photo: Northern Rock customers queue from the banks entrance,left, onto the pavement outside the branch in Golders Green, London, on Sept. 17, 2007. Photographer: Will Wintercross/Bloomberg News

by Calculated Risk on 9/15/2007 09:14:00 PM

From the Telegraph: Angry savers force Northern Rock to be sold (hat tip FFDIC)

Northern Rock, the crisis-hit bank under siege from thousands of its customers, was preparing itself last night for a sell-off, The Sunday Telegraph can reveal.

One plan being worked on by City bankers was to divide the company's £100 billion mortgage portfolio between the other major banks, in what would amount to a private-sector rescue of the lender.

And The Times: Bankers fear £12bn run on Rock (hat tip Barley)

NORTHERN ROCK, the mortgage bank rescued by the Bank of England last week, could see as much as £12 billion - nearly half of its deposits - withdrawn by worried savers, experts say.
...
Senior executives at Northern Rock spent yesterday at its New-castle head office monitoring events, but the lender is seen to have little future as an independent entity. It held talks about a possible takeover by Lloyds TSB before the crisis and is expected to be sold off cheaply to a rival.

The Guardian reports: Fears grow for British economy as panic over Northern Rock spreads

US Treasury Secretary Hank Paulson flies in to London tomorrow to discuss the worsening global credit crisis with Chancellor Alistair Darling, as fears intensify that the lending squeeze could be the last straw for Britain's buy-now-pay-later economy.

by Calculated Risk on 9/15/2007 04:39:00 PM

From the Telegraph: Customers outside a Northern Rock branch in Kingston Upon Thames.

From the Telegraph: Police help to disperse Northern Rock queues (hat tip DannyHSDad)

Northern Rock has apologised to customers who spent a second day queuing to withdraw money after the company asked the Bank of England for emergency funding.

A spokesman has asked customers to remain calm and repeated assurances that money is available.

The bank's website had crashed but is currently running with a message asking users to be patient and claiming that transactions will be dealt with.

Long lines formed at 72 branches across the country even before counters opened this morning.

Here is a Bloomberg article: Northern Rock Experiences Second Day of Withdrawals (hat tip energyecon)

A key question is: Does the UK have something similar to the U.S. FDIC insurance?

I've found this: the Financial Services Compensation Scheme

1. I have my money in a joint account in a High Street bank. How would FSCS pay compensation if the bank failed?

The compensation limit of £31,700 applies to each depositor for the total of their deposits with an organisation, regardless of how many accounts they hold or whether they are a single or joint account holder. In the case of a joint account FSCS will assume that the money in that account is split equally between account holders, unless evidence shows otherwise.

This means that each account holder in a joint account would be eligible for compensation up to the maximum limit.

by Calculated Risk on 9/14/2007 08:35:00 PM

From the FWDailyNews: Midwest commercial real estate index tanks (hat tip vader)

The Midwest led the biggest-ever drop in the national quarterly commercial real-estate index compiled by the Society of Industrial and Office Realtors.

The national index dropped nearly 4.5 points, to 113.7, for the summer of 2007. That is the weakest score since SIOR began compiling the index nearly two years ago.
...
Nationally, the weakness was broad-based, with all 10 components measured in the index down from the spring. The industrial market was the hardest hit, scoring 112.3, down about 7 points. The office market dipped less than 1 point, scoring 114.9.

This article is referring to the August survey. The SIOR puts out a CRE report every quarter (the Q3 report isn't on their website yet), but here is the Q2 report. SIOR is the Society of Industrial and Office Realtors®.

This index might be worth watching.

by Calculated Risk on 9/14/2007 09:01:00 AM

UPDATE: From Paul in London. Northern Rock branch in Hounsditch, City of London 3.12pm today.

Photo from the Guardian, credit Sang Tan/AP.

From Bloomberg: Northern Rock Customers Crowd London Branches, Withdraw Money

Hundreds of Northern Rock Plc customers crowded into branches in London today to pull out their savings after the mortgage-loan provider sought emergency funding from the Bank of England ...

2nd Photo from BBC.

The Bank of England said it will provide emergency cash to Northern Rock, Britain's third-largest mortgage provider, in the nation's biggest bailout of a financial institution in 30 years. The rising cost of credit left the lender unable to make new loans and stoked concern among customers about their money.

It looks like the older customers stand in the queue; there is probably an online bank run too.

by Calculated Risk on 9/13/2007 08:26:00 PM

From AFP: Bank of England to bail out British lender: reports (hat tip Brian jb Carlomagno sk)

According to the BBC and the Financial Times newspaper, Britain's fifth-biggest mortgage lender has struggled with lending since a credit market squeeze over the summer after concern sparked by uncertainty in the US subprime mortgage sector.

They said that the Bank of England (BoE), Britain's central bank, had agreed to provide short-term lending to Northern Rock to help it see out the crisis in what the FT described as the most dramatic development in the UK banking market since the crisis began.
...
John McFall, chairman of the parliamentary committee that oversees financial issues, urged the lender's customers to stay calm.

He said Northern Rock's request for funding should be seen as "reassuring, because it means they think the problems are temporary."

The article notes the letter BoE Governor Mervyn King sent yesterday:

In a letter to McFall's committee on Wednesday, BoE Governor Mervyn King warned that providing short-term liquidity to the financial markets while they were experiencing trouble served to encourage "excessive risk-taking and sows the seeds of a future financial crisis".

"The provision of large liquidity facilities penalises those financial institutions that sat out the dance, encourages herd behaviour and increases the intensity of future crises."

So much for tough talk.