by Calculated Risk on 8/31/2012 03:54:00 PM

LPS released their First Look report for July this week. LPS reported that the percent of loans delinquent decreased in July from June.

LPS reported the U.S. mortgage delinquency rate (loans 30 or more days past due, but not in foreclosure) decreased in July to 7.03% from 7.14% in June. The percent of delinquent loans is still significantly above the normal rate of around 4.5% to 5%. The percent of delinquent loans peaked at 10.57%, so delinquencies have fallen over half way back to normal.

The following table shows the LPS numbers for July 2012, and also for last month (June 2012) and one year ago (July 2011).

LPS: Percent Loans Delinquent and in Foreclosure Process
	July 2012	June 2012	July 2011
Delinquent	7.03%	7.14%	7.90%
In Foreclosure	4.08%	4.09%	4.12%
Number of loans:
Loans Less Than 90 Days	1,960,000	2,012,000	NA
Loans 90 Days or more	1,560,000	1,590,000	NA
Loans In Foreclosure	2,042,000	2,061,000	NA
Total	​5,562,000	5,663,000	NA

The total number of delinquent loans, and in foreclosure, dropped about 100 thousand in July from June.

The percent of loans less than 90 days delinquent is close to normal, but the percent (and number) of loans 90+ days delinquent and in the foreclosure process are still very high.

by Calculated Risk on 8/31/2012 01:54:00 PM

Fannie Mae reported that the Single-Family Serious Delinquency rate declined in July to 3.50% from 3.53% June. The serious delinquency rate is down from 4.08% in July last year, and this is the lowest level since April 2009.

The Fannie Mae serious delinquency rate peaked in February 2010 at 5.59%.

Freddie Mac reported that the Single-Family serious delinquency rate declined in July to 3.42%, from 3.45% in June. Freddie's rate is only down slightly from 3.51% in July 2011. Freddie's serious delinquency rate peaked in February 2010 at 4.20%. This is the lowest level for Freddie since August 2009.

These are loans that are "three monthly payments or more past due or in foreclosure".

Click on graph for larger image

In 2009, Fannie's serious delinquency rate increased faster than Freddie's rate. Since then, Fannie's rate has been falling faster - and now the rates are at about the same level.

Although this indicates some progress, the "normal" serious delinquency rate is under 1% - and it looks like it will be several years until the rates back to normal.

by Calculated Risk on 8/31/2012 12:33:00 PM

First from Jon Hilsenrath and Kristina Peterson at the WSJ: Bernanke Signals Readiness to Do More

Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke offered a robust defense of the effectiveness of the central bank's easy-money policies in his speech Friday at the Fed conference here, and left little doubt that he is looking toward doing more to give the economy a lift at the Fed's next policy meeting in September.

As Hilsenrath notes, Bernanke argued: 1) QE has been effective, 2) Additional QE would be helpful, 3) the costs of additional QE "appear manageable", and 4) the economy is "far from satisfactory.

• In Bernanke's view, QE has been effective. From his speech:

How effective are balance sheet policies? After nearly four years of experience with large-scale asset purchases, a substantial body of empirical work on their effects has emerged. Generally, this research finds that the Federal Reserve's large-scale purchases have significantly lowered long-term Treasury yields. ... These effects are economically meaningful.

... a study using the Board's FRB/US model of the economy found that, as of 2012, the first two rounds of LSAPs may have raised the level of output by almost 3 percent and increased private payroll employment by more than 2 million jobs, relative to what otherwise would have occurred. The Bank of England has used LSAPs in a manner similar to that of the Federal Reserve, so it is of interest that researchers have found the financial and macroeconomic effects of the British programs to be qualitatively similar to those in the United States.

To be sure, these estimates of the macroeconomic effects of LSAPs should be treated with caution. ... Overall, however, a balanced reading of the evidence supports the conclusion that central bank securities purchases have provided meaningful support to the economic recovery while mitigating deflationary risks.

• The costs of additional QE are "manageable":

[T]he costs of nontraditional policies, when considered carefully, appear manageable, implying that we should not rule out the further use of such policies if economic conditions warrant.

• The economy is still very weak:

[T]he economic situation is obviously far from satisfactory ... The unemployment rate remains more than 2 percentage points above what most FOMC participants see as its longer-run normal value ... Further, the rate of improvement in the labor market has been painfully slow. I have noted on other occasions that the declines in unemployment we have seen would likely continue only if economic growth picked up to a rate above its longer-term trend. In fact, growth in recent quarters has been tepid, and so, not surprisingly, we have seen no net improvement in the unemployment rate since January.
Unless the economy begins to grow more quickly than it has recently, the unemployment rate is likely to remain far above levels consistent with maximum employment for some time.

Bernanke's comments suggest QE3 will be launched very soon, perhaps on September 13th following the next FOMC meeting.

I thought the odds of QE3 in August were high - and the minutes of the meeting indicated they were very very close. It is possible that the FOMC in September will announce an extension of the extended period until 2015 (from late 2014), and wait again for QE3, but that would seem at odds with Bernanke's comments today.

by Calculated Risk on 8/31/2012 10:06:00 AM

From Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke at the Jackson Hole Economic Symposium: Monetary Policy since the Onset of the Crisis

The potential benefit of policy action, of course, is the possibility of better economic outcomes--outcomes more consistent with the FOMC's dual mandate. In light of the evidence I discussed, it appears reasonable to conclude that nontraditional policy tools have been and can continue to be effective in providing financial accommodation, though we are less certain about the magnitude and persistence of these effects than we are about those of more-traditional policies.
...
In sum, both the benefits and costs of nontraditional monetary policies are uncertain; in all likelihood, they will also vary over time, depending on factors such as the state of the economy and financial markets and the extent of prior Federal Reserve asset purchases. Moreover, nontraditional policies have potential costs that may be less relevant for traditional policies. For these reasons, the hurdle for using nontraditional policies should be higher than for traditional policies. At the same time, the costs of nontraditional policies, when considered carefully, appear manageable, implying that we should not rule out the further use of such policies if economic conditions warrant.
...
the economic situation is obviously far from satisfactory.
...
Early in my tenure as a member of the Board of Governors, I gave a speech that considered options for monetary policy when the short-term policy interest rate is close to its effective lower bound. I was reacting to common assertions at the time that monetary policymakers would be "out of ammunition" as the federal funds rate came closer to zero. I argued that, to the contrary, policy could still be effective near the lower bound. Now, with several years of experience with nontraditional policies both in the United States and in other advanced economies, we know more about how such policies work. It seems clear, based on this experience, that such policies can be effective, and that, in their absence, the 2007-09 recession would have been deeper and the current recovery would have been slower than has actually occurred.

As I have discussed today, it is also true that nontraditional policies are relatively more difficult to apply, at least given the present state of our knowledge. Estimates of the effects of nontraditional policies on economic activity and inflation are uncertain, and the use of nontraditional policies involves costs beyond those generally associated with more-standard policies. Consequently, the bar for the use of nontraditional policies is higher than for traditional policies. In addition, in the present context, nontraditional policies share the limitations of monetary policy more generally: Monetary policy cannot achieve by itself what a broader and more balanced set of economic policies might achieve; in particular, it cannot neutralize the fiscal and financial risks that the country faces. It certainly cannot fine-tune economic outcomes.

As we assess the benefits and costs of alternative policy approaches, though, we must not lose sight of the daunting economic challenges that confront our nation. The stagnation of the labor market in particular is a grave concern not only because of the enormous suffering and waste of human talent it entails, but also because persistently high levels of unemployment will wreak structural damage on our economy that could last for many years.

Over the past five years, the Federal Reserve has acted to support economic growth and foster job creation, and it is important to achieve further progress, particularly in the labor market. Taking due account of the uncertainties and limits of its policy tools, the Federal Reserve will provide additional policy accommodation as needed to promote a stronger economic recovery and sustained improvement in labor market conditions in a context of price stability.

QE has been effective and costs appear manageable.

by Calculated Risk on 8/31/2012 09:51:00 AM

From Chicago ISM: Chicago Business Barometer Anemic

The Chicago Purchasing Managers reported the CHICAGO BUSINESS BAROMETER posted a small gain in August but remained steady for the last four months. Among the Business Activity measures, declines into contraction for both Order Backlogs and Supplier Deliveries offset minor gains in Production, New Orders, and Employment in August.

• EMPLOYMENT recovered more than half of last month's slowing; • PRICES PAID slight gain; • ORDER BACKLOGS lowest since September 2009; • SUPPLIER DELIVERIES lowest since July 2009.

The PMI decreased to 53.0 from 53.7. Expectations were for a decrease to 53.0.

The employment index increased to 57.1 from 53.3, and new orders increased to 54.8 from 52.9.