by Calculated Risk on 6/29/2010 09:00:00 AM

IMPORTANT: These graphs are Seasonally Adjusted (SA). S&P has cautioned that the seasonal adjustment is probably being distorted by irregular factors. These distortions could include distressed sales and the various government programs.

S&P/Case-Shiller released the monthly Home Price Indices for April (actually a 3 month average).

This includes prices for 20 individual cities, and two composite indices (10 cities and 20 cities).

From S&P: While Most Markets Improved in April 2010, Home Prices Do Not Yet Show Signs of Sustained Recovery According to the S&P/Case-Shiller Home Price Indices

Data through April 2010, released today by Standard & Poor’s for its S&P/Case-Shiller1 Home Price Indices, the leading measure of U.S. home prices, show that annual growth rates of all 20 MSAs and the 10- and 20-City Composites improved in April compared to March 2010. The 10-City Composite is up 4.6% from where it was in April 2009, and the 20-City Composite is up 3.8% versus the same time last year. In addition, 18 of the 20 MSAs and both Composites saw improvement in prices as measured by April versus March monthly changes.

“Home price levels remain close to the April 2009 lows set by the S&P/Case Shiller 10- and 20-City Composite series. The April 2010 data for all 20 MSAs and the two Composites do show some improvement with higher annual increases than in March’s report. However, many of the gains are modest and somewhat concentrated in California. Moreover, nine of the 20 cities reached new lows at some time since the beginning of this year. The month-over-month figures were driven by the end of the Federal first-time home buyer tax credit program on April 30th. Eighteen cities saw month-to-month gains in April compared to six in the previous month. Miami and New York were the two that fared the worst in April compared to March. New York is the only MSA to have posted a new relative index low with April’s report.” says David M. Blitzer, Chairman of the Index Committee at Standard & Poor’s.

“Other housing data confirm the large impact, and likely near-future pullback, of the federal program. Recently released data for May 2010 show sharp declines in existing and new home sales and housing starts. Inventory data and foreclosure activity have not shown any signs of improvement. Consistent and sustained boosts to economic growth from housing may have to wait to next year. ”

Click on graph for larger image in new window.

The first graph shows the nominal not seasonally adjusted Composite 10 and Composite 20 indices (the Composite 20 was started in January 2000).

The Composite 10 index is off 29.7% from the peak, and up 0.3% in April (SA).

The Composite 20 index is off 29.0% from the peak, and up 0.4% in April (SA).

The second graph shows the Year over year change in both indices.

The Composite 10 is up 4.6% compared to April 2009.

The Composite 20 is up 3.8% compared to April 2009.

This is the third month with YoY price increases in a row.

The third graph shows the price declines from the peak for each city included in S&P/Case-Shiller indices.

Prices increased (SA) in 17 of the 20 Case-Shiller cities in April (SA).

Prices in Las Vegas are off 55.9% from the peak, and prices in Dallas only off 5.2% from the peak.

Case Shiller is reporting on the NSA data (18 cities up), and I'm using the SA data. As S&P noted, there probably was a small boost to prices from tax credit related buying, but prices will probably fall later this year.

by Calculated Risk on 6/28/2010 10:41:00 PM

From Liz Alderman in the New York Times: In Ireland, a Picture of the High Cost of Austerity

As Europe’s major economies focus on belt-tightening, they are following the path of Ireland. But the once thriving nation is struggling, with no sign of a rapid turnaround in sight.
...
Rather than being rewarded for its actions, though, Ireland is being penalized. ... Lacking stimulus money, the Irish economy shrank 7.1 percent last year and remains in recession.

Joblessness in this country of 4.5 million is above 13 percent, and the ranks of the long-term unemployed — those out of work for a year or more — have more than doubled, to 5.3 percent.
...
The budget went from surpluses in 2006 and 2007 to a staggering deficit of 14.3 percent of gross domestic product last year — worse than Greece. It continues to deteriorate.

As the Irish government cut the budget, the economy contracted faster and the deficit as a percent of GDP increased.

And how will they break the downward cycle? Export to England and America ...

[T]he government is pinning nearly all its hopes on an export revival to lift the economy. Falling wage and energy costs, and a weaker euro, have improved competitiveness.

This approach works for one country - or a few - but not if every country is doing it.

by Calculated Risk on 6/28/2010 07:24:00 PM

From Jeremy Gerst and Daniel Wilson at the SF Fed: Fiscal Crises of the States: Causes and Consequences. Here is their conclusion:

The current fiscal crises that most states are facing are generally the result of a severe macroeconomic downturn combined with a limited ability of the states to respond to such shocks. States are facing increased demand for public services at the same time revenue is falling. Federal stimulus support for state budgets is winding down over the next two years. Rainy-day funds are all but exhausted. Thus, state fiscal crises aren’t likely to go away soon and will probably get worse before they get better. The solutions states employ to close projected budget gaps will have painful effects on state residents and businesses but pose a more modest risk to the national recovery. Historically, the health of the national economy determines the health of state finances, not the other way around. Sustained improvement in the national economy is essential for states to grow their way out of their current problems and improve their fiscal conditions.

Although the authors didn't quantify the impact, Mark Zandi, chief economist at Moody’s Analytics, recently estimated that state and local cutbacks may cut 0.25% from U.S. GDP in 2010 and 2011.

But this is just one drag on the economy. I've been forecasting a 2nd half slowdown in GDP growth based on:

1) less Federal stimulus spending in the 2nd half of 2010. The decline in stimulus will probably be a drag of about 0.5% on GDP growth by Q4.

2) the end of the inventory correction. The inventory adjustment contributed 3.79 percentage points in Q4 2009 of the 5.6% annualized growth rate, and 1.88 percentage points of the 2.7% GDP growth (annualized) in Q1 2010. This will probably fall close to zero in the 2nd half (maybe even slightly negative).

3) more household saving leading to slower growth in personal consumption expenditures. The personal saving rate increased to 4.0% in May, and will probably rise further in the 2nd half.

4) another downturn in housing (lower prices, less residential investment). This might subtract 0.25 to 0.5 percentage points from growth in the 2nd half.

5) slowdown and financial issues in Europe and a slowdown in China,

6) and the cutbacks at the state and local level. According the Mark Zandi, this will subtract about 0.25% from GDP growth.

As I've noted before, a quarter point here, and half point there ... and pretty soon you have some real drag.

by Calculated Risk on 6/28/2010 04:00:00 PM

The 10-year Greece-to-German bond spread has widened to over 800 bps today. This is the highest level since the the EU / ECB policy response when the spread peaked at just under 1000 bps.

And from the Financial Times: Banks in Spain hit by end of ECB offer

Spanish banks have been lobbying the European Central Bank to act to ease the systemic fallout from the expiry of a €442bn ($542bn) funding programme this week ... On Thursday, the clock runs out ... One senior bank executive said: “Any central bank has to have the obligation to supply liquidity. But this is not the policy of the ECB. We are fighting them every day on this. It’s absurd.”
excerpted with permission

This liquidity facility was put in place during the financial crisis. The ECB is offering one week and three month liquidity facilities, so there won't be any short term liquidity crisis - but there are concerns that his could lead to less lending in Spain.

And a market update from Doug Short of dshort.com (financial planner).

Click on graph for interactive version in new window.

The graph has tabs to look at the different bear markets - "now" shows the current market - and there is also a tab for the "four bears".

by Calculated Risk on 6/28/2010 12:48:00 PM

From Fed Governor Kevin Warsh: It's Greek to Me

In my view, any judgment to expand the balance sheet further should be subject to strict scrutiny. I would want to be convinced that the incremental macroeconomic benefits outweighed any costs owing to erosion of market functioning, perceptions of monetizing indebtedness, crowding-out of private buyers, or loss of central bank credibility. The Fed's institutional credibility is its most valuable asset, far more consequential to macroeconomic performance than its holdings of long-term Treasury securities or agency securities. That credibility could be meaningfully undermined if we were to take actions that were unlikely to yield clear and significant benefits.

Indeed, the Federal Reserve should continue to give careful consideration to the appropriate size and composition of its existing holdings. Actual sales will not take place in the near term. But, depending on the evolution of the economy and financial markets, we should consider a gradual, prospective exit--communicated well-in-advance--from our portfolio of mortgage-backed securities. In making this judgment, we should continue to assess investor demand for these assets. Ultimately, in my view, gradual, predictable asset sales by the Fed should facilitate improvements in mortgage finance and financial markets.

Any sale of assets need not signal that policy rates are soon moving higher. Our policy tools can indeed be used independently. I would note that the Fed successfully communicated and demonstrated its ability to exit from most of its extraordinary liquidity facilities over late 2009 and early 2010, even as it continued its policy of extraordinary accommodation.

"Perceptions of monetizing indebtedness"? Although this "perception" is widespread on the internet, it isn't showing up in the bond market.

I definitely agree with Warsh on this point:

"Subprime mortgages were not at the core of the global crisis; they were only indicative of the dramatic mispricing of virtually every asset everywhere in the world."

Tanta said it better a few years ago: "We're all subprime now!"