In Depth Analysis: CalculatedRisk Newsletter on Real Estate (Ad Free) Read it here.

Thursday, September 24, 2009

Weekly Unemployment Claims Decline

by Calculated Risk on 9/24/2009 08:33:00 AM

The DOL reports weekly unemployment insurance claims decreased to 530,000:

In the week ending Sept. 19, the advance figure for seasonally adjusted initial claims was 530,000, a decrease of 21,000 from the previous week's revised figure of 551,000. The 4-week moving average was 553,500, a decrease of 11,000 from the previous week's revised average of 564,500.
...
The advance number for seasonally adjusted insured unemployment during the week ending Sept. 12 was 6,138,000, a decrease of 123,000 from the preceding week's revised level of 6,261,000.
Weekly Unemployment Claims Click on graph for larger image in new window.

This graph shows the 4-week moving average of weekly claims since 1971.

The four-week average of weekly unemployment claims decreased this week by 11,000 to 553,500, and is now 105,250 below the peak in April.

Initial weekly claims have peaked for this cycle, however the continuing high level of weekly claims indicates significant weakness in the job market. The four-week average of initial weekly claims will probably have to fall below 400,000 before total employment stops falling.

Wednesday, September 23, 2009

Volcker on Financial Reform

by Calculated Risk on 9/23/2009 11:10:00 PM

Former Fed Chairman Paul Volcker testifies in front of the House Financial Services Committee at 9 AM ET on Thursday about financial reform.

For those interested, here is the webcast.

Here is his prepared statement. A few excerpts:

However well justified in terms of dealing with the extreme threats to the financial system in the midst of crisis, the emergency actions of the Federal Reserve, the Treasury, and ultimately the Congress to protect the viability of particular institutions – their bond holders and to some extent even their stockholders – have inevitably left an indelible mark on attitudes and behavior patterns of market participants.
• Will not the pattern of protection for the largest banks and their holding companies tend to encourage greater risk-taking, including active participation in volatile capital markets, especially when compensation practices so greatly reward short-term success?

• Are community or regional banks to be deemed “too small to save”, raising questions of competitive viability?

• Does not the extension of support to non-banks, and even to affiliates of commercial firms, undercut the banking/commerce divide, ultimately weakening the commercial banking system?

• Will not investors in money market mutual funds find reassurance in the fact that when push came to shove, the Treasury with an extreme interpretation of its authority, took action to preserve those funds ability to meet their declared commitment to pay their investors at par upon demand?
What all this amounts to is an unintended and unanticipated extension of the official “safety net”, an arrangement designed decades ago to protect the stability of the commercial banking system. The obvious danger is that with the passage of time, risk-taking will be encouraged and efforts at prudential restraint will be resisted. Ultimately, the possibility of further crises – even greater crises – will increase.

There is no easy answer, no one-size fits all contingencies. Experience, not only here but in every country with highly developed, inter-connected financial systems and institutions bears out one point. Governments are not willing to withhold financial and other support for failing institutions when there is a clear threat to the intertwined fabric of the financial system. What can be done is to put in place arrangements to minimize the extent of emergency intervention and to damp expectations of government “bailouts”.
Volcker goes on to disagree with the Treasury plan to name banks that are “systemically important” or "too big to fail".
Think of the practical difficulties of such designation. Can we really anticipate which institutions will be systemically significant amid the uncertainties in future crises and the complex inter-relationships of markets? Was Long Term Capital Management, a hedge fund, systemically significant in 1998? Was Bear Stearns, but not Lehman? How about General Electric’s huge financial affiliate, or the large affiliates of other substantial commercial firms? What about foreign institutions operating in the United States?

All hard questions. In practice the “border problem” seems intractable. In fair financial weather, the important institutions will feel competitively hobbled by stricter standards. In times of potential crisis, it would be the institution left out of the “too big to fail” club that will fear disadvantage.
Volcker argues for a more traditional approach that sounds like the return of Glass-Steagall.

Jim the Realtor: New Homes in San Diego

by Calculated Risk on 9/23/2009 07:09:00 PM

Just so you know, builders are still building in parts of San Diego (Carmel Valley). Pretty amazing ...

"Completely sold out. Sold out of all available properties. They're still building more. ... how about this, 250 people on the waiting list."

Falling Rents, Credit Card Defaults, and Market

by Calculated Risk on 9/23/2009 04:00:00 PM

Stock Market Crashes Click on graph for larger image in new window.

This graph is from Doug Short of dshort.com (financial planner): "Four Bad Bears".

Note that the Great Depression crash is based on the DOW; the three others are for the S&P 500.

From Bloomberg: Manhattan Apartment Rents Drop as Employers Cut Jobs (ht Mike In Long Island)

Manhattan apartment rents dropped an average of at least 8 percent ...

Rents for studio apartments fell 11 percent to an average of $1,763, according to the broker’s data on deals in May through August compared with the same period a year earlier. The cost of a one-bedroom declined 8 percent to an average of $2,425. Two-bedrooms declined 11 percent to $3,421 and three- bedroom units fell 8 percent to $4,633.
From Reuters: U.S. credit card defaults rise to record: Moody's (ht Ron Wallstreetpit)
The U.S. credit card charge-off rate rose to a record high in August ...

The Moody's credit card charge-off index -- which measures credit card loans that banks do not expect to be repaid -- rose to 11.49 percent in August from 10.52 percent in July.
...
"We continue to call for a recovery of the credit card sector to begin once industry average charge-offs peak in mid-2010 between 12 percent and 13 percent," Moody's said in a report.
And just a note: The consensus estimate for existing home sales tomorrow is 5.35 million SAAR. I'll take the under.

FOMC Statement: Slow MBS Purchases

by Calculated Risk on 9/23/2009 02:15:00 PM

Statement from the FOMC:

Information received since the Federal Open Market Committee met in August suggests that economic activity has picked up following its severe downturn. Conditions in financial markets have improved further, and activity in the housing sector has increased. Household spending seems to be stabilizing, but remains constrained by ongoing job losses, sluggish income growth, lower housing wealth, and tight credit. Businesses are still cutting back on fixed investment and staffing, though at a slower pace; they continue to make progress in bringing inventory stocks into better alignment with sales. Although economic activity is likely to remain weak for a time, the Committee anticipates that policy actions to stabilize financial markets and institutions, fiscal and monetary stimulus, and market forces will support a strengthening of economic growth and a gradual return to higher levels of resource utilization in a context of price stability.

With substantial resource slack likely to continue to dampen cost pressures and with longer-term inflation expectations stable, the Committee expects that inflation will remain subdued for some time.

In these circumstances, the Federal Reserve will continue to employ a wide range of tools to promote economic recovery and to preserve price stability. The Committee will maintain the target range for the federal funds rate at 0 to 1/4 percent and continues to anticipate that economic conditions are likely to warrant exceptionally low levels of the federal funds rate for an extended period. To provide support to mortgage lending and housing markets and to improve overall conditions in private credit markets, the Federal Reserve will purchase a total of $1.25 trillion of agency mortgage-backed securities and up to $200 billion of agency debt. The Committee will gradually slow the pace of these purchases in order to promote a smooth transition in markets and anticipates that they will be executed by the end of the first quarter of 2010. As previously announced, the Federal Reserve’s purchases of $300 billion of Treasury securities will be completed by the end of October 2009. The Committee will continue to evaluate the timing and overall amounts of its purchases of securities in light of the evolving economic outlook and conditions in financial markets. The Federal Reserve is monitoring the size and composition of its balance sheet and will make adjustments to its credit and liquidity programs as warranted.

Voting for the FOMC monetary policy action were: Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman; William C. Dudley, Vice Chairman; Elizabeth A. Duke; Charles L. Evans; Donald L. Kohn; Jeffrey M. Lacker; Dennis P. Lockhart; Daniel K. Tarullo; Kevin M. Warsh; and Janet L. Yellen.
emphasis added