by Calculated Risk on 8/28/2009 09:19:00 PM
Friday, August 28, 2009
Bank Failure #84: Affinity Bank, Ventura, California
Affinity burned brightly
Extinguished today
by Soylent Green is People
From the FDIC: Pacific Western Bank, San Diego, California, Assumes All of the Deposits of Affinity Bank, Ventura, California
Affinity Bank, Ventura, California, was closed today by the California Department of Financial Institutions, which appointed the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) as receiver. ...A quarter of billion here, a quarter of a billion there ...
As of July 10, 2009, Affinity Bank had total assets of $1 billion and total deposits of approximately $922 million. ...
The FDIC and Pacific Western Bank entered into a loss-share transaction on approximately $934 million of Affinity Bank's assets. ...
The FDIC estimates that the cost to the Deposit Insurance Fund (DIF) will be $254 million. ... Affinity Bank is the 84th FDIC-insured institution to fail in the nation this year, and the ninth in California. The last FDIC-insured institution closed in the state was Vineyard Bank, National Association, Rancho Cucamonga, on July 17, 2009.
Bank Failure #83: Mainstreet Bank, Forest Lake, Minnesota
by Calculated Risk on 8/28/2009 07:10:00 PM
Chance favors the prepaired mind
not so for Mainstreet.
by Soylent Green is People
From the FDIC: Central Bank, Stillwater, Minnesota, Assumes All of the Deposits of Mainstreet Bank, Forest Lake, Minnesota
Mainstreet Bank, Forest Lake, Minnesota, was closed today by the Minnesota Department of Commerce, which appointed the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) as receiver. ...Two down today.
As of June 30, 2009, Mainstreet Bank had total assets of $459 million and total deposits of approximately $434 million. ...
The FDIC and Central Bank entered into a loss-share transaction on approximately $268 million of Mainstreet Bank's assets. ...
The FDIC estimates that the cost to the Deposit Insurance Fund (DIF) will be $95 million. ... Mainstreet Bank is the 83rd FDIC-insured institution to fail in the nation this year, and the second in Minnesota. The last FDIC-insured institution to be closed in the state was Horizon Bank, Pine City, on June 26, 2009.
Bank Failure #82: Bradford Bank, Baltimore, Maryland
by Calculated Risk on 8/28/2009 06:10:00 PM
Three...four hundred...one thousand???
Bradford bank now toast.
by Soylent Green is People
From the FDIC: Manufacturers and Traders Trust Company, Buffalo, New York, Assumes All of the Deposits of Bradford Bank, Baltimore, Maryland
Bradford Bank, Baltimore, Maryland, was closed today by the Office of Thrift Supervision, which appointed the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) as receiver. ...It is Friday.
As of June 30, 2009, Bradford Bank had total assets of $452 million and total deposits of approximately $383 million. ...
The FDIC and M&T entered into a loss-share transaction on approximately $338 million of Bradford Bank's assets. ...
The FDIC estimates that the cost to the Deposit Insurance Fund (DIF) will be $97 million. ... Bradford Bank is the 82nd FDIC-insured institution to fail in the nation this year, and the second in Maryland. The last FDIC-insured institution closed in the state was Suburban Federal Savings Bank, Crofton, on January 30, 2009.
Misc: Cerberus, Flippers and Market
by Calculated Risk on 8/28/2009 04:00:00 PM
While we wait for the first bank failure of the day, here is the Problem Bank List (Unofficial) Aug 28, 2009 .
And a few interesting notes ...
From the WSJ: Cerberus Holders Elect to Leave Core Funds
Cerberus Capital Management's investors overwhelmingly want out of the firm's core hedge funds, asking for the return of more than $5.5 billion, or almost 71% of the fund assets, according to people familiar with the matter.And see Tanta's first post on CR in 2006: Tanta: Let Slip the Dogs of Hell (T wrote under her own byline soon after).
"We have been surprised by this response," Cerberus chief Stephen Feinberg and co-founder William Richter wrote in a letter delivered to clients late Thursday.
I still haven’t gotten over the fact that there’s a “capital management” group out there having named itself “Cerberus”. Those of you who were not asleep in Miss Buttkicker’s Intro to Western Civ will recognize Cerberus; the rest of you may have picked up the mythological fix from its reprise as “Fluffy” in the first Harry Potter novel. Wherever you get your culture, Cerberus is the three-headed dog who guards the gates of Hell. It takes three heads to do that, of course, because it’s never clear, in theology or finance, whether the idea is to keep the righteous from falling into the pit or the demons from escaping out of it (the third head is busy meeting with the regulators). Cerberus is relevant not just because it supplies me with today’s metaphor, but because it was the Biggest Dog of three (including Citigroup and Aozora, a Japanese bank) who in April bought a 51% stake in GMAC’s mega-mortgage operation, GM having, of course, once been renowned as one of the Big Three Automakers until it became one of the Big Three Financing Outfits With A Sideline In Cars. I tried to find a link for you to Aozora Bank’s announcement of the purchase, but the only press release I could find for that day involved the loss of customer data. They must have been so busy letting GMAC into the underworld that the dog head keeping the deposit tickets from getting out got distracted.Read the entire post ... Tanta wouldn't have been "surprised" by the "response" of Cerberus' investors. BTW, Tanta and I first started talking about bagholders in early 2005 - and we both agreed it would largely be the U.S. taxpayer.
...
I bring all this up not just to stick it to Citicorp, but because we’ve all been asking the question lately of who will be the bagholder when the exotic/subprime mortgage problem finds a home. We have noted in our discussions that credit risk can move in two directions: the wholesaler takes it off the originator and the bond investor takes it off the wholesaler/issuer with the helpful assistance of protection sellers in the hedge fund credit-swap market, but when the “DETOUR” signs pop up, the bond investor can work really hard on forcing it back to the wholesaler/issuer, who can try to put it back to the originator, who gets to try to recover something in a foreclosure sale. If the originator has any financial strength left to buy loans back with, that is; see the sad stories of Ownit, Option One, Fremont, New Century, etc.
[CR: remember T wrote this in 2006]
...
If you thought the only thing that would stop the circle jerk of risk was putting some credit and pricing discipline into the game, I guess you’re just a weenie like me. Anyone who can make sense of this is free to set me straight. And if the answer has “sorting socks” in it, don’t bother. I’ve tried that.
And a market graph from Doug Short.
This matches up the market bottoms for four crashes (with an interim bottom for the Great Depression).
Note that the Great Depression crash is based on the DOW; the three others are for the S&P 500.
And a flipper in 2006 (ht Yal). I believe this is her house today on Zillow, around $650K:
Problem Bank List (Unofficial) Aug 28, 2009
by Calculated Risk on 8/28/2009 01:50:00 PM
This is an unofficial list of Problem Banks.
The list is compiled from regulator press releases or from public news sources (see Enforcement Action Type link for source). The FDIC data is released monthly with a delay (the FDIC July Enforcement Actions were released today). The Fed and OTC data is more timely, and the OCC a little lagged. Credit: surferdude808.
Changes and comments from surferdude808:
The “unofficial Problem Bank list” underwent substantial changes since last week because of failures; new additions, especially from the OCC and FDIC as they released a number of actions for July; and an identification of unassisted mergers during Q2.See description below table for Class and Cert (and a link to FDIC ID system).
This week there are 412 institutions on the “unofficial Problem Bank list” with assets of $252.2 billion compared with 391 institutions with assets of $256.5 billion last week. The failure of Guaranty Bank with assets of $14.4 billion was responsible for the great majority of the asset decline. Another 10 institutions with assets of $2.5 billion were removed because of failure or unassisted merger and there was one action that was terminated.
Additions during the week are 32 institutions with assets of $15.7 billion. Most notable of these additions are the ShoreBank, Chicago, IL with assets of $2.7 billion and three subsidiaries of First National of Nebraska, Inc. (ticker symbol FINN) with assets of $4.5 billion.
Since the FDIC released the latest quarterly data, we were able to update assets for all institutions as of Q2. For the 381 institutions that were on the “unofficial Problem Bank list” at Q1 and Q2, assets declined by $3.3 billion.
With the FDIC Q2 release, we can see how well the “unofficial Problem Bank list” compares with the FDIC’s official Problem Bank list. The FDIC list includes 416 institutions with assets of $299.8 billion at Q2 while for a comparable period the “unofficial Problem Bank list” had 392 institutions with assets of $280 billion; thus, the unofficial list is a reasonable approximation with an acceptable tracking error.
For a full screen version of the table click here.
The table is wide - use scroll bars to see all information!
NOTE: Columns are sortable - click on column header (Assets, State, Bank Name, Date, etc.)
Class: from FDIC
The FDIC assigns classification codes indicating an institution's charter type (commercial bank, savings bank, or savings association), its chartering agent (state or federal government), its Federal Reserve membership status (member or nonmember), and its primary federal regulator (state-chartered institutions are subject to both federal and state supervision). These codes are:Cert: This is the certificate number assigned by the FDIC used to identify institutions and for the issuance of insurance certificates. Click on the number and the Institution Directory (ID) system "will provide the last demographic and financial data filed by the selected institution".N National chartered commercial bank supervised by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency SM State charter Fed member commercial bank supervised by the Federal Reserve NM State charter Fed nonmember commercial bank supervised by the FDIC SA State or federal charter savings association supervised by the Office of Thrift Supervision SB State charter savings bank supervised by the FDIC


