by Anonymous on 9/05/2007 08:10:00 AM

The Chicago Tribune tells a story about borrowers facing foreclosure.

PITTSBURGH - For Donna and Steve Love, the plan seemed perfect.

Priced out of the Boston-area housing market, where 2-bedroom homes can cost about $500,000, the working-class couple thought it was time to head to a more affordable market.

They chose Pittsburgh. They liked the city, thought they could get jobs there and were sure they could afford a home without having to win the lottery.

After finding their home -- a $59,000, 3-bedroom, brick row house near the city's downtown that they paid for with a subprime loan -- they moved in June of 2006 and tried to settle into their new life.

But within a year, they were facing foreclosure. . . .

In March 2006, they reached what they thought were final terms for the loan: $5,000 down, a 7.75 percent interest rate, fixed for two years and then adjustable for the remaining 28 years, with a cap of 14.75 percent.

The $429 mortgage payments would be higher than they expected, but still within their budget -- equal to less than one week of Steve's salary with CVS. Plus, it was still cheaper than their $700-a-month rent in a suburb of Boston.

Then, on April 20, two weeks before the May 3 closing date, they said they got mortgage documents in the mail with a letter that said they should sign all the papers and return them as soon as possible.

But they quickly noticed the final contract listed a higher interest rate of 12.125 percent, with a cap of 19.125 percent. That pushed the monthly mortgage payments up more than $200 to $692 a month.

"We both said, 'Oh my God!' and started reading page by page," recalled Steve Love.

They called Countrywide and talked to several representatives who told them "that the fluctuating market went up and investors had asked for a higher percentage rate on the loans, and this was the best they could do," he said.

So, the CFC flack quoted says there's more to the story than that. I'm sure there is. There is always more to most stories.

However, I'm having a hard time figuring out what could possibly be the story that would justify a 12.125% start rate on a 2/28 ARM in April of 2006. The 6-month LIBOR, the index for this loan, was 5.2879% in April 06. That means these borrowers were paying 6.8371% over the index for two years' worth of "rate protection." That's why they aren't having a "reset" payment shock problem; their payment was not discounted in the least in the initial fixed period of the loan.

I for one do not remember the major credit market crisis of April 2006 that suddenly required subprime borrowers to get premium ARMs. I cannot think of anything that might "change" between original underwriting and closing of the loan that would move the borrower's interest rate from 7.75% to 12.125%. Even if they didn't have a rate lock agreement.

But notice the situation these borrowers were in: they had already left their jobs and given up their apartment in preparation for moving, and they had a deposit on the home at stake. Allow me to observe that we lenders have known, since dirt, that this happens frequently on purchase money loans. People make hard-to-revoke decisions based on the commitment letters we send out. We therefore took great care to make the terms of the commitment letter accurate. You simply do not pull the rug out from under a relocating borrower unless you're a predator trying to squeeze someone who has no negotiating position. (I don't think you ought to do this with anyone, of course; I'm simply pointing out that lenders understand how the purchase-relocation process works. It might be a new thing to some consumers, but not to us.)

And all of this over a $59,000 120-year-old home in Pittsburgh for borrowers who can find work at the going rate for Pittsburgh, but are being charged a mortgage interest rate as if they worked in Boston. CFC would rather own that REO than give up some of 12.125%.

I don't think any purpose is served by turning this into an argument over who "deserves" sympathy. I think a good purpose is served by looking at the economics of the thing and asking how this could possibly make any sense. If Donna and Steve's credit history or employment prospects or debt load was "so bad" that they "deserved" a rate of 12.125% (but CFC didn't notice that until the second set of paperwork got drawn up), then they simply should have been denied a loan: they can't afford 12.125%. CFC extended a loan knowing that the borrower couldn't afford it. Now they refuse to play ball on a workout?

by Calculated Risk on 9/05/2007 02:14:00 AM

From Mathew Padilla at the O.C. Register: First American CFO sees weakness in commercial real estate

Frank McMahon, chief financial officer of The First American Corp. in Santa Ana, said during a conference call today that the market for securities backed by commercial loans dropped dramatically in August.

He said it’s natural for borrowing costs to rise and price appreciation to slow on commercial real estate as a result.

The CRE slump may be here.

Also, Padilla notes that First American is cutting 1,300 jobs, and that there are rumors of large layoffs at Countrywide:

National Mortgage News reports that Countrywide Financial Corp. may cut 7,000 to 10,000 jobs, citing “industry officials close to the situation.”

by Calculated Risk on 9/05/2007 01:22:00 AM

From the WSJ: Why Libor Defies Gravity

The Federal Reserve could cut short-term interest rates in the weeks ahead, but right now one key rate is going in exactly the opposite direction, something that could have a big impact on markets and the economy.

That rate is the London interbank offered rate, or Libor. It is an important benchmark for everything from adjustable-rate mortgages in the U.S. to giant floating-rate bank loans taken out by global corporations.

Credit-market turmoil has pushed the Libor higher, even as other short-term interest rates, such as the interest rate on Treasury bills, are falling.
...
U.S.-dollar Libor rates usually closely track the federal-funds rate, which is the overnight lending rate managed by the Federal Reserve. But the two rates are now parting ways, complicating matters for the Fed as it tries to manage the global credit crisis and pushing up many short-term interest rates for borrowers.

For the first eight months of this year, the U.S.-dollar Libor rate for three-month loans between banks nudged between 5.34% and 5.36%. Yesterday, the rate hit 5.7%, marking the rate's fastest rise in several years. ...
...
When Chrysler and its finance unit borrowed $20 billion from banks in July as part of the auto maker's acquisition by Cerberus Capital Management, its loans were indexed to Libor interest rates.

Maybe this is a temporary divergence in rates, but a rising Libor rate will have a negative impact on the economy and housing.

by Calculated Risk on 9/04/2007 04:55:00 PM

Papers to read from the Jackson Hole 2007 Symposium:

The Housing Finance Revolution, Richard K. Green and Susan M. Wachter

Understanding Recent Trends in House Prices and Home Ownership, Robert J. Shiller

Housing and the Business Cycle, Edward E. Leamer

Housing, Credit and Consumer Expenditure, John N. Muellbauer

Housing and the Monetary Policy Transmission Mechanism, Frederic S. Mishkin

Housing and Monetary Policy, Stefan Ingves

Housing and Monetary Policy, John B. Taylor

There will be a quiz later ...

by Anonymous on 9/04/2007 03:50:00 PM

Clyde sent me this jewel this morning: S&P answers its critics in "Don't Blame the Rating Agencies":

The fallout over subprime mortgages has provoked a rush to judgment, and some are now blaming the credit-rating agencies for the recent market turbulence. These charges reflect both a misunderstanding of the work carried out by rating agencies, and a misrepresentation of the overall credit performance of securities backed by residential mortgages

Much of the recent commentary has missed several critical facts. For example, our recent downgrades affected approximately 1% of the $565.3 billion in first-lien subprime residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) that Standard & Poor's rated between the fourth quarter of 2005 and the end of 2006. This represents only a small portion of the mortgage-backed securities market, which in turn represents a very small part of the world's credit markets. Additionally, our recent downgrades included no AAA-rated, first-lien subprime RMBS -- and 85% of the downgrades were rated BBB and below. In other words, the overwhelming majority of our ratings actions have been directed at the weakest-quality subprime securities.

Translation: we only screwed up on the stuff that is obviously risky, and we only misrated the stuff that involves first-loss position. The stuff that is obviously less risky and was never much in danger of taking write-downs is still OK.

Ratings are designed to be stable. Unlike market prices, they do not fluctuate on the basis of market sentiment. But they can and do change -- either as a result of fundamental adjustments to the risk profile of a bond or the emergence of new information.

Translation: ratings don't change with market sentiment because market sentiment changes only when ratings turn out to be unstable. Or something.

As part of the ratings process, we do engage in open dialogue with bond issuers. This dialogue helps issuers understand our ratings criteria and helps us understand the securities they are structuring, so we can make informed opinions about creditworthiness. We strive to make sure issuers and investors are fully aware of how we determine creditworthiness and believe that all parties are better served when the process is open and transparent.

Translation: And we only change our mind when we find out how closed and opaque the process really was, in hindsight.

I can't read any more of this . . .