by Calculated Risk on 3/23/2010 11:59:00 PM

Note: This index is a leading indicator for Commercial Real Estate (CRE) investment. Any reading below 50 indicates contraction.

The WSJ reports that the American Institute of Architects’ Architecture Billings Index increased to 44.8 in February from 42.5 in January.

The ABI press release is not online yet.

Click on graph for larger image in new window.

This graph shows the Architecture Billings Index since 1996. The index has remained below 50, indicating falling demand, since January 2008.

The second graph compares the Architecture Billings Index with the year-over-year change in non-residential structure investment.

Historically, according to the AIA, there is an "approximate nine to twelve month lag time between architecture billings and construction spending" on non-residential construction. This suggests further significant declines in CRE investment through all of 2010, and probably longer.

Note: Nonresidential construction includes commercial and industrial facilities like hotels and office buildings, as well as schools, hospitals and other institutions.

by Calculated Risk on 3/23/2010 08:03:00 PM

From the Mercury News: Gas tax deal comes with goodies for California home buyers and green-tech manufacturers

The deal reached Monday provides $200 million in new tax credits for homebuyers, to be split evenly among those buying a home for the first time and anyone buying a newly constructed home. Anyone qualified who makes a purchase between this May and August 2011 will receive a credit for 5 percent of the home's purchase price, up to $10,000 over three years.

Dumb. Not that there is budget problem in California ...

by Calculated Risk on 3/23/2010 03:43:00 PM

From San Francisco Fed President Janet Yellen: The Outlook for the Economy and Inflation, and the Case for Federal Reserve Independence

Some excerpts on housing (Note: Yellen is likely to be nominated as the next Fed Vice Chairman):

It was housing of course that led the economy down. The great bust wiped out some $7 trillion in home values. In the second half of 2009 though, housing showed signs of stabilizing and I became hopeful that the sector would provide a significant boost to the economy this year. Now the market seems to have stalled. Home prices have been more or less stable since the middle of last year, but new home sales have resumed a downward slide and are at very low levels. Existing home sales spiked towards the end of last year in response to the homebuyer tax credit and have receded markedly since then. The credit expires this spring, removing an important prop. With sales still weak, builders have little incentive to ramp up home construction.

The continued high pace of foreclosures also creates risks to the recovery of the housing sector. Mortgage delinquencies and foreclosures are still rising as a consequence of the plunge in house prices over the past few years combined with high levels of unemployment. Despite the return to growth of the broader economy, we’ve seen no let-up in the pace at which borrowers are falling behind in their loans. Further additions to the already swollen stockpile of vacant homes represent a threat to house prices and new home construction activity.

It’s not always easy to understand the dynamics of the housing sector. Last year, for example, the share of mortgages that was 30 to 89 days past due declined. On the face of it, that looked like a hopeful sign. Unfortunately, when my staff examined the numbers more closely, it turned out that the drop actually represented a worsening of mortgage market conditions. What you want to see is delinquent borrowers becoming current. Instead, what happened was that delinquent mortgages moved in the other direction to an even poorer performance status. Many wound up in foreclosure. All in all, I expect that the share of loans that are seriously delinquent will continue to move higher. I am also concerned that we had a temporary reprieve in new foreclosures as the federal government’s trial modification program got under way. But not all of these modifications will stick, which means that some borrowers in the program could find themselves facing foreclosure again.

At the end of this month, the Fed will complete a large-scale program of purchases of mortgage-backed securities issued by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. Lenders sell mortgages to these two agencies, which package them as securities sold to investors. Last year, the Fed began buying these securities as part of a series of extraordinary measures to promote recovery. At the time the program was announced, mortgage spreads over yields on Treasury securities of comparable maturity were very high, reflecting in part the disruptions that had occurred in financial markets. I believe that our program worked to narrow those spreads, bringing mortgage rates down and contributing to the stabilization of the housing market. Financial markets have improved considerably over the last year, and I am hopeful that mortgages will remain highly affordable even after our purchases cease. Any significant run-up in mortgage rates would create risks for a housing recovery.

As Yellen notes, one of the defining characteristics of this housing bust is how few mortgage delinquencies are cured. Of course when a borrower has equity in their home, they can cure the delinquency by selling. And this time many borrowers have negative equity and can't sell.

I think Yellen is a little too optimistic on the overall economy - she is forecasting 3 1/2% GDP growth this year. And on unemployment:

I was heartened when the unemployment rate dropped in January to 9.7 percent from 10 percent the month before. I was further encouraged when the rate remained at 9.7 percent in February, suggesting it was not just a flash in the pan. In the months ahead, we could get a bump in employment from census hiring. But that, of course, would be temporary. Given my moderate growth forecast, I fear that unemployment will stay high for years. The rate should edge down from its current level to about 9 1/4 percent by the end of this year and still be about 8 percent by the end of 2011, a very disappointing prospect.

I think that is a little optimistic too - although the next few months will see a slight decline because of Census hiring (but that will be unwound later in the year).

by Calculated Risk on 3/23/2010 01:23:00 PM

CR Note: The following is from long time reader Shnaps. Shnaps has been working in the mortgage industry in various capacities "since people were extending the antennas on their mobile phones". Shnaps currently serves in a key role related to HAMP at one of the largest non-prime mortgage servicers in the Nation.

Shnaps writes:

One aspect of the Making Home Affordable loan modification program known as ‘HAMP’ is almost always taken for granted in its wide reporting – that the borrowers in fact need ‘help’. Moreover, it is generally taken for granted that those seeking modification under HAMP simply cannot afford their monthly mortgage payment. It is assumed that they have made great sacrifices, assumed they have already cut back drastically on discretionary expenses, assumed that they have already gone over their monthly budgets with a fine-toothed comb to eliminate all but the most necessary expenditures in an effort to keep their home. So prepare to be shocked – shocked! – as I share with you that I have seen first-hand that this assumption is oftentimes greatly, seriously flawed.

Let me begin with a word to the wise for HAMP applicants: unless you believe Snooki is now in charge of approving HAMP applications, it might be a good idea to cut back a bit on some of the creature comforts to which you have become accustomed at least a month before submitting your HAMP modification application.

Allow me to explain. The guidelines for servicers participating in HAMP stipulate that the borrower must submit a “hardship affidavit”. This, ostensibly, is to serve as their sworn testimony that they have been driven into default due to some particular hardship they encountered, and despite making every possible sacrifice, they can no longer “maintain payment on the mortgage and cover basic living expenses at the same time". (see HAMP Directive)

To demonstrate this, applicants are required to submit recent paystubs and bank statements. The statements are to help further corroborate the income they report (lest they forget to include all of their paystubs) and also to demonstrate that their monthly expenses are as described on their application. Which is to say that they have already ‘cut back to the bone’ and STILL are unable to make ends meet.

So how do these look in practice? The very first ‘HAMPlication’ that your correspondent pulled up recently showed a wanton disregard for minimizing spending. On the contrary, it looked like “cutting back” for this applicant does not involve such Draconian cuts as eliminating:

• visits to the tanning salon
• the nail spa
• some kind of gourmet produce market (have you seen the price of arugula?)
• various liquor stores
• A DirecTV bill that must involve some serious premium programming or pay-per-view events (or both?).
• And over $1,700 in retail purchases, including: Best Buy, Baby Gap, Brookstone, Old Navy, Bed, Bath & Beyond, Home Depot, Macy’s, Pac Sun, Urban Behavior, Sears, Staples, and Footlocker.

And that was just in one month! They were seeking to reduce a $1,880 mortgage payment that had just gotten to be a real cramp to their ability to keep a roof over their heads.

I’d like to say this is the exception, but it’s much closer to the norm. Many people who request HAMP modifications submit bank statements that demonstrate little if any “belt-tightening” going on.

Somehow, we now expect the same people who asked for ‘liar’s loans’ to be truthful on when it comes to ‘hardship affidavits’?

by Calculated Risk on 3/23/2010 11:22:00 AM

Earlier the NAR released the existing home sales data for February; here are a couple more graphs ...

Click on graph for larger image in new window.

This graph shows NSA monthly existing home sales for 2005 through 2010 (see Red columns for 2010).

Sales (NSA) in February 2010 were 7.9% higher than in February 2009, and 3.2% lower than in February 2008.

We will probably see an increase in sales in May and June because of the tax credit, however I expect to see existing home sales below last year later this year.

The second graph shows the Year-over-year change in reported existing home inventory.

There was a rapid increase in inventory in the 2nd half of 2005 (that helped me call the peak of the bubble), and the YoY inventory has been decreasing for the last 19 months. However the YoY decline is getting smaller - even with a large reported inventory (and probably more shadow inventory). This is something to watch.

This slow decline in the inventory is especially concerning with 8.6 months of supply in February - well above normal.

by Calculated Risk on 3/23/2010 10:00:00 AM

The NAR reports: February Existing-Home Sales Ease with Mixed Conditions Around the Country

Existing-home, which are finalized transactions that include single-family, townhomes, condominiums and co-ops, slipped 0.6 percent nationally to a seasonally adjusted annual rate of 5.02 million units in February from 5.05 million in January, but are 7.0 percent higher than the 4.69 million-unit pace in February 2009.
...
Total housing inventory at the end of February rose 9.5 percent to 3.59 million existing homes available for sale, which represents an 8.6-month supply at the current sales pace, up from a 7.8-month supply in January. Raw unsold inventory is 5.5 percent below a year ago.

Click on graph for larger image in new window.

This graph shows existing home sales, on a Seasonally Adjusted Annual Rate (SAAR) basis since 1993.

Sales in February 2010 (5.02 million SAAR) were 0.6% lower than last month, and were 7.0% higher than February 2009 (4.69 million SAAR).

Sales surged last November when many first-time homebuyers rushed to beat the initial expiration of the tax credit. There will probably be another increase in May and June this year, although that will be probably be smaller than the November increase. Note: existing home sales are counted at closing, so even though contracts must be signed in April to qualify for the tax credit, buyers have until June 30th to close.

The second graph shows nationwide inventory for existing homes.

According to the NAR, inventory increased to 3.59 million in February from 3.27 million in January. The all time record high was 4.57 million homes for sale in July 2008.

Inventory is not seasonally adjusted and there is a clear seasonal pattern - inventory should increase further in the spring.

The last graph shows the 'months of supply' metric.

Months of supply increased to 8.6 months in February.

A normal market has under 6 months of supply, so this is high - and probably excludes some substantial shadow inventory.

I'll have more later ...

by Calculated Risk on 3/23/2010 08:21:00 AM

From Bloomberg: Treasury’s Geithner Urges End to Fannie, Freddie ‘Ambiguity’

U.S. Treasury Secretary Timothy F. Geithner said the government should end the “ambiguity” over its involvement in mortgage finance companies Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.

“Private gains can no longer be supported by the umbrella of public protection, capital standards must be higher and excessive risk-taking must be appropriately restrained,” Geithner said in testimony prepared for the House Financial Services Committee that was obtained by Bloomberg News. The hearing is scheduled for today at 10 a.m. in Washington.

Here is Geithner's testimony (ht TD) Some excerpts (note: Embargo was broken by the Financial Services Committee and several web sites):

The Administration has defined a framework of objectives for reform of the mortgage finance system. A reformed housing finance system should deliver stability and efficiency to the housing market, while minimizing the risks and costs borne by the American taxpayer.

Objectives of Reform

In considering reform, the Administration will be guided by the view that a stable and wellfunctioning housing finance market should achieve the following objectives:

Widely available mortgage credit. Mortgage credit should be available and distributed on an efficient basis to a wide range of borrowers, including those with low and moderate incomes, to support the purchase of homes they can afford. This credit should be available even when markets may be under stress, at rates that are not excessively volatile.

Housing affordability. A well-functioning housing market should provide affordable housing options, both ownership and rental, for low- and moderate-income households. The government has a role in promoting the development and occupancy of affordable single- and multi-family residences for these families.

Consumer protection. Consumers should have access to mortgage products that are easily understood, such as the 30-year fixed rate mortgage and conventional variable rate mortgages with straightforward terms and pricing. Effective consumer financial protection should keep unfair, abusive or deceptive practices out of the marketplace and help to ensure that consumers have the information they need about the costs, terms, and conditions of their mortgages.

Financial stability. The housing finance system should distribute the credit and interest rate risk that results from mortgage lending in an efficient and transparent manner that minimizes risk to the broader financial and economic system and does not generate excess volatility. The mortgage finance system should not contribute to systemic risk or overly increase interconnectedness from the failure of any one institution.

The housing finance system could be redesigned in a variety of ways to meet these objectives. However, the Administration believes that any system that achieves these goals should be characterized by:

Alignment of incentives. A well functioning mortgage finance system should align incentives for all actors – issuers, originators, brokers, ratings agencies and insurers – so that mortgages are originated and securitized with the goal of long-term viability rather than short term gains.

Avoidance of privatized gains funded by public losses. If there is government support provided, such as a guarantee, it should earn an appropriate return for taxpayers and ensure that private sector gains and profits do not come at the expense of public losses. Moreover, if government support is provided, the role and risks assumed must be clear and transparent to all market participants and the American people.

Strong regulation. A strong regulatory regime should (i) ensure capital adequacy throughout the mortgage finance chain, (ii) enforce strict underwriting standards and (iii) protect borrowers from unfair, abusive or deceptive practices. Regulators should have the ability and incentive to identify and proactively respond to problems that may develop in the mortgage finance system.

Standardization. Standardization of mortgage products improves transparency and efficiency and should provide a sound basis in a reformed system for securitization that increases liquidity, helps to reduce rates for borrowers and promotes financial stability. The market should also have room for innovations to develop new products which can bring benefits for both lenders and borrowers.

Support for affordable single- and multifamily-housing. Government support for multifamily housing is important and should continue in a future housing finance system to ensure that consumers have access to affordable rental options. The housing finance system must also support affordable and sustainable ownership options.

Diversified investor base and sources of funding. Through securitization and other forms of intermediation, a well functioning mortgage finance system should be able to draw efficiently upon a wide variety of sources of capital and investment both to lower costs and to diversify risk.

Accurate and transparent pricing. If government guarantees are provided, they should be priced appropriately to reflect risks across the instruments guaranteed. If there is crosssubsidization in the housing finance system, care must be exercised to insure that it is transparent and fully consistent with the appropriate pricing of the guarantee and at a minimal cost to the American taxpayer.

Secondary market liquidity. Today, the US housing finance market is one of the most liquid markets in the world, and benefits from certain innovations like the “to be announced” (or TBA) market. This liquidity has provided a variety of benefits to both borrowers and lenders, including lower borrowing costs, the ability to “lock in” a mortgage rate prior to completing the purchase of a home, flexibility in refinancing, the ability to pre-pay a mortgage at the borrowers’ discretion and risk mitigation. This liquidity also further supports the goal of having well diversified sources of mortgage funding.

Clear mandates. Institutions that have government support, charters or mandates should have clear goals and objectives. Affordable housing mandates and specific policy directives should be pursued directly and avoid commingling in general mandates, which are susceptible to distortion.

NOTE: 10 AM ET embargo was broken by several web sites before this was posted.

by Calculated Risk on 3/22/2010 11:56:00 PM

"A sampler of versusplus.com musical econoparodies!" (I've posted most of these over the last couple of years):

by Calculated Risk on 3/22/2010 08:45:00 PM

There will be hearing tomorrow about Fannie and Freddie, but the Obama administration will only "outline broad principles".

From Jim Puzzanghera at the LA Times: Pressure rises to overhaul Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac

[I]n a hearing Tuesday, lawmakers will start pressing the Obama administration for an exit strategy [for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac] ...

"It's clear that Fannie and Freddie, as they currently exist, should be put out of existence, which means the important question is what combination of entities public and private will replace them," said Rep. Barney Frank (D-Mass.), chairman of the House Financial Services Committee.

He has called Treasury Secretary Timothy F. Geithner to testify at the hearing before his committee about how to do that.

And from Nick Timiraos and Michale Crittenden at the WSJ: New Plan to Reshape Mortgage Market

The administration will outline broad principles for the future of the mortgage market at the hearing, including stronger consumer protections and explicit guarantees for any government backstop of mortgages.

"The housing-finance system cannot continue to operate as it has in the past," Mr. Geithner says in prepared testimony. The administration won't issue a detailed overhaul proposal until later this year.

Clearly we can't go back to a structure that privatizes profits and socializes losses.

by Calculated Risk on 3/22/2010 05:32:00 PM

From Atlanta Fed President Dennis Lockhart: The U.S. Economy and Emerging Risks. Lockhart reviews his general forecast for a modest U.S. recovery and then discusses risks from Greece (sovereign debt) and fiscal uncertainty - especially for U.S. states and local government:

There are other plausible emerging scenarios that are not factored into my formal outlook. I monitor these for evidence that they're materializing—becoming real—and need to be more formally considered. One such concern is what might be called "fiscal uncertainty."

You've all been reading about Greece and the European Union's handling of the Greek fiscal crisis. At the moment a nexus of fiscal uncertainty is the situation playing out in Greece.

Last October, the government of Greece revised its 2009 fiscal deficit sharply higher to more than 12 percent of GDP. Consequently, the ratio of public debt to GDP was revised up by 17 percentage points this year to 125 percent of GDP.

Investors around the world are concerned about Greece's deficit and rising debt. Market pressures, along with European Monetary Union mandates, have forced the government to present a credible plan to tame its deficit. As of today, how this will play out is not clear.

It's worth considering whether this is just a distant development or one with relevance to us here in the United States. What do fiscal problems in Greece have to do with my economic outlook for the United States?

I see three ways the Greek crisis might directly affect the U.S. economy. First, adjustment across the EU to fiscal problems could dampen euro area growth and constrain U.S. exports to that region. The European Union as a whole is this nation's largest export market. Second, related to this, safe haven currency flows from the euro into dollar assets could cause appreciation of the dollar and hurt U.S. export competitiveness. Third is the possibility that the Greek fiscal crisis could lead to a broad shock to financial markets. This could play out in the banking system or in the form of a general retreat from sovereign debt.

At this point, these possibilities are not factored into my outlook in any way. But developments around the Greek situation deserve rapt attention.

We have our own set of fiscal uncertainties in this country—at all levels of government. The National League of Cities projects that municipal governments will face a shortfall of $56 billion to $83 billion from 2010 to 2012. Local governments in this country are pressured by lower sales tax revenues and shrinking property tax digests along with other demands.

On average, state-level governments began fiscal year 2010 with a revenue-expenditure gap of 17 percent. Three states had expected budget gaps in excess of 40 percent. ...

Across the country, state governments have responded to these strains by drawing down rainy day funds, raising taxes, cutting budgets, and furloughing employees.

To date, some amount of spending cuts and tax increases at the state level have been avoided thanks to the federal stimulus package, but that infusion of money is temporary. It appears state budgets next year will need to shrink considerably to get to balance.

I'm sure you're familiar generally with the situation at the federal level. According to the Congressional Budget Office, under current law federal budget deficits rose from an average of about 2.4 percent of GDP in the period from 1970 to 2008 to 10 percent in 2009. No budget path currently under consideration would keep the public debt from growing relative to gross domestic product. Clearly, an ever-rising debt-to-GDP ratio is unsustainable and a matter of great concern.

Government finances are severely strained at all levels. All of these fiscal pressures represent another downside risk for the broad economy.
emphasis added

Earlier in his speech, Lockhart notes that "stabilization of the housing sector—especially house prices—is likely a precondition for sustained economic recovery". Housing is probably the major risk to Lockhart's view of a modest recovery.