by Calculated Risk on 7/11/2009 10:52:00 PM

For a little Saturday night amusement ...

From FoxBusiness: Wells Fargo Bank Sues Itself (ht Rama)

... I could not resist asking Wells Fargo Bank NA why it filed a civil complaint against itself in a mortgage foreclosure case in Hillsborough County, Fla.
...
In this particular case, Wells Fargo holds the first and second mortgages on a condominium, according to Sarasota, Fla., attorney Dan McKillop, who represents the condo owner.

As holder of the first, Wells Fargo is suing all other lien holders, including the holder of the second, which is itself.

... court documents clearly label "Wells Fargo Bank NA" as the plaintiff and "Wells Fargo Bank NA" as a defendant.

Wells Fargo hired Florida Default Law Group., P.L., of Tampa, Fla., to file the lawsuit against itself.

And then Wells Fargo hired another Tampa law firm -- Kass, Shuler, Solomon, Spector, Foyle & Singer P.A. -- to defend itself against its own lawsuit, according to court documents.

Wells Fargo's defense lawyers even filed an answer to their client's own complaint.

"Defendant admits that it is the owner and holder of a mortgage encumbering the subject real property," the answer reads. "All other allegations of the complaint are denied."

Your TARP money hard at work ...

by Calculated Risk on 7/11/2009 07:24:00 PM

From Manuel Adelino, Kristopher Gerardi, and Paul S. Willen writing at the Boston Fed: Why Don’t Lenders Renegotiate More Home Mortgages? Redefaults, Self-Cures, and Securitization

(ht Holden Lewis, Mortgage Matters at Bankrate.com)

One of the key questions these researchers ask is: Why don't lenders renegotiate¹ with delinquent borrowers more often?

If a lender makes a concession to a borrower by, for example, reducing the principal balance on the loan, it can prevent a foreclosure. This is clearly a good outcome for the borrower, and possibly good for society as well. But the key to the appeal of renegotiation is the belief that it can also benefit the lender, as the lender loses money only if the reduction in the value of the loan exceeds the loss the lender would sustain in a foreclosure.
all emphasis added

Just last week, Gretchen Morgenson at the NY Times made this argument: So Many Foreclosures, So Little Logic

[T]he most fascinating, and frightening, figures in the [subprime loan] data detail how much money is lost when foreclosed homes are sold. In June, the data show almost 32,000 liquidation sales; the average loss on those was 64.7 percent of the original loan balance.

Here are the numbers: the average loan balance began at almost $223,000. But in the liquidation sale, the property sold for $144,000 less, on average. ...

Given losses like these, [Alan M. White, an assistant professor at the Valparaiso University law school in Indiana] said he was perplexed that lenders and their representatives were resisting reducing principal when they modify loans. His data shows how rare it is for lenders to reduce principal. In June, for example, 3,135 loans — just 17.2 percent of the total modified — involved write-downs of principal, interest or fees. The total loss from these write-downs was just $45 million in June.

And yet, the losses incurred in foreclosure sales involving loans in the securitization trusts were a staggering $4.59 billion in June. “There is 100 times as much money lost in foreclosure sales as there was in writing down balances in modifications,” Mr. White said. “That is not rational economic behavior.”

If banks have written down the value of these loans to the 40 cents on the dollar that they are fetching on foreclosures — the only true value for these homes right now — then why don’t they bite the bullet and reduce the loan amount outstanding for the troubled borrowers?

And the Fed economists respond:

We argue for a very mundane explanation: lenders expect to recover more from foreclosure than from a modified loan. This may seem surprising, given the large losses lenders typically incur in foreclosure, which include both the difference between the value of the loan and the collateral, and the substantial legal expenses associated with the conveyance. The problem is that renegotiation exposes lenders to two types of risks that can dramatically increase its cost. The first is what we will call “self-cure” risk. As we mentioned above, more than 30 percent of seriously delinquent borrowers “cure” without receiving a modification; if taken at face value, this means that, in expectation, 30 percent of the money spent on a given modification is wasted. The second cost comes from borrowers who redefault [30 and 45 percent]; our results show that a large fraction of borrowers who receive modifications end up back in serious delinquency within six months. For them, the lender has simply postponed foreclosure; in a world with rapidly falling house prices, the lender will now recover even less in foreclosure. In addition, a borrower who faces a high likelihood of eventually losing the home will do little or nothing to maintain the house or may even contribute to its deterioration, again reducing the expected recovery by the lender.

I'd argue for a third reason: If it became widely known that lenders routinely reduce the principal balance for delinquent borrowers with negative equity, this would be an incentive for a large number of additional homeowners to stop paying their mortgages.

These economists would argue that the lenders are behaving rationally and that foreclosure - when all costs are considered - is frequently the least costly alternative.

¹ The economists define “renegotiation” as "concessionary modifications that serve to reduce a borrower’s monthly payment. These may be reductions in the principal balance or interest rate, extensions of the term, or combinations of all three." Under this definition, they do not include the most common modification: capitalization of late payments and fees.

by Calculated Risk on 7/11/2009 05:50:00 PM

The WSJ Real Time Economics blog mentioned Okun's law yesterday (a relationship between changes in GDP and unemployment): Job Losses Outpace GDP Decline (ht Bob_in_MA)

In a research note, [Alliance Bernstein economist Joseph] Carson says job losses in prior downturns have been roughly proportional to the decline in gross domestic product. But in the current recession, the proportion of jobs lost is running about a third greater than the drop in real GDP.

The correlation between GDP growth and unemployment is called Okun’s Law, after the late economist Arthur Okun who documented it in the 1960s. But the numerical relationship that Okun estimated – and other economists have since refined – has broken down. His original estimate suggested about a 3% decline in GDP for every 1% increase in unemployment. Before joining the Fed, Ben Bernanke, working with Andrew Abel, figured more recent suggested about a 2% decrease in output for every 1% increase in unemployment.

Click on graph for larger image.

This graph shows the quarterly change in real GDP (annualized) vs. the change in unemployment rate. The red markers are for 2008 and Q1 2009.

Usually the trend line is drawn as linear, but I made it a 2nd order polynomial here.

The red markers are above the trend line, but within the normal scatter.

For Q2 the unemployment rate increased 1.2% (from Q1, quarterly average), and the annualized real GDP change will probably be in the -1% to -2% range - so that is also above the trend (a larger than expected change in unemployment based on the change in real GDP).

Okun's law is just a general relationship, and the relationship appears to have changed over time (as mentioned in the WSJ).

Note: the graph shows the quarterly change in real GDP annualized (the way it is reported by the BEA each quarter). In the WSJ post, they mentioned "a 2% [or 3%] decrease in output for every 1% increase in unemployment". A 2% decrease in quarterly output would be reported by the BEA as over 8% annualized for the quarter.

by Calculated Risk on 7/11/2009 01:41:00 PM

From the SF Gate: State leaders talking again - budget woes go on

California's fiscal crisis continued unabated Friday with most major banks refusing to cash the state's IOUs starting today, the state controller delaying $4 billion in payments to public schools ...

State Controller John Chiang and state Superintendent of Instruction Jack O'Connell said $4 billion in payments to local school districts that were supposed to go out on Friday will be delayed until July 30. The move will conserve cash for the state, which has been issuing IOUs since July 2. ...

As of Friday morning, the state controller had mailed 101,930 IOUs covering more than $389 million in payments, said Hallye Jordan, a spokeswoman for Chiang.

And despite a plea from state Treasurer Bill Lockyer that banks extend their Friday deadline to accept the IOUs, most refused to do so.

Citibank agreed to a one-week extension, while Bank of the West said it will accept IOUs until further notice. The banks that rejected extension requests include Bank of America, Wells Fargo, JPMorgan Chase and Union Bank ...

And Felix Salmon has a nice chart on who gets paid cash, and who gets IOUs: California: The haves and have-nots

And from Controller John Chiang yesterday: Controller Releases Year-End Cash Figures

“California continues to pay for its history of unbalanced budgets. The State spent $10.4 billion more than it collected last year alone, and is now without enough cash to cover all of its payment obligations,” said Chiang.

“Our major sources of revenue have continued their trend downward, leaving no viable option but to craft a new budget that recognizes California’s recovery has yet to begin.”

Personal income taxes in June were $987 million below (-18.0%) estimates in the May Revision, and sales taxes were short by $154 million (-5.8%). Corporate taxes were $1.31 billion above estimates (41.2%). Corporate taxes in May and June were boosted by a surge of payments from corporate taxpayers hoping to avoid a new State penalty.

The State started the fiscal year with a $1.45 billion cash deficit, which grew to $11.9 billion on June 30, 2009. Borrowed money from special funds provided enough cash to fund State operations through June 30. The Controller faced a large cash shortfall at the end of July, forcing his office to begin issuing registered warrants or “IOUs” to any General Fund payment that was not protected by the State Constitution, federal law, or court decision. Without IOUs, the State would have run out of cash and begun missing those protected payments at the end of July.

While updated cash projections show that IOUs will preserve enough cash to make those protected payments through September, the cash shortfall in October will endanger the State’s ability to make those payments.

Many other states have serious budget problems too.

by Calculated Risk on 7/11/2009 09:03:00 AM

A little Saturday morning video ... offered without comment.

Bloomberg - Roubini Says U.S. Recession Will Last Six More Months (Click here for full video)

00:00 Outlook for the U.S. economy, recession
07:07 Reasons for current economic condition
11:50 Unemployment rate; fiscal consolidation
18:29 Case-Shiller Index; green shoots in housing
30:05 Second stimulus package; consumer spending
34:43 Roubini, Shiller respond to questions.

Here is a short preview ...

by Calculated Risk on 7/11/2009 01:09:00 AM

CIT Group (no relation to Citigroup) is like GE Capital. They provide financing for almost 1 million businesses and had about 76 billion in assets as of March 31st.

From the WSJ: Major Lender Faces Crunch

CIT Group Inc ... is preparing for a possible bankruptcy filing ... CIT has retained the law firm of Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP, ...
...
CIT has a $1 billion payment due in mid-August and it is unclear the company "will be able to handle that," said this person. The company will give more guidance when it discusses second quarter earnings in two weeks.
...
A bankruptcy filing by CIT could affect thousands of small borrowers, from Dunkin' Donuts franchisees to restaurant owners and clothing retailers.

... the government has made it clear it doesn't see the company as a systemic risk to the financial system. The people familiar with the matter said the government feels that other lenders, such as J.P. Morgan Chase & Co. or Deutsche Bank AG, can handle many of the same loans that CIT specializes in, such as loans to small retailers or rail-car leasing firms.

Meanwhile, competitors like GE Capital Corp. and GMAC LLC have been able to sell debt with the backing of the government's top credit rating.

Apparently the government thinks CIT's competitors could pick up most or all of their business.

by Calculated Risk on 7/10/2009 10:12:00 PM

Just using Sacramento as an example ... I wish the NAR broke out the data like this!

Click on graph for larger image in new window.

The Sacramento Association of REALTORS® is now breaking out monthly resales by equity sales (normal resales), and distressed sales (Short sales and REO sales). Here is the June data.

They started breaking out REO sales last year, but this is the first monthly report with short sales.

Just over 70% of all resales (single family homes and condos) were distressed sales.

Total sales in June were off 7% compared to June 2008, and that breaks a string of YoY increases.

This is just a reminder - with 70% distressed sales, there will be few move-up buyers for the higher priced areas.

by Calculated Risk on 7/10/2009 07:16:00 PM

Spirited collapse
A corkscrewed, spiraling fall
Time to drown sorrows.
by Soylent Green is People

From the FDIC: Central Bank & Trust, Lander, Wyoming, Assumes All of the Deposits of Bank of Wyoming, Thermopolis, Wyoming

Bank of Wyoming, Thermopolis, Wyoming, was closed today by the State of Wyoming, Department of Audit, Division of Banking, which appointed the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) as receiver....

As of June 30, 2009, Bank of Wyoming had total assets of $70 million and total deposits of approximately $67 million. ...

The FDIC estimates that the cost to the Deposit Insurance Fund (DIF) will be $27 million. Central Bank & Trust's acquisition of all the deposits was the "least costly" resolution for the FDIC's DIF compared to alternatives. Bank of Wyoming is the 53rd FDIC-insured institution to fail in the nation this year, and the first in Wyoming. The last FDIC-insured institution to be closed in the state was Westland, FS & LA, Rawlins, on July 26, 1991.

It is Friday ...

by Calculated Risk on 7/10/2009 04:53:00 PM

From the San Francisco Business Times: Sellers owe balances after short sales (ht Michael, SocketSite)

The rising tide of “short sales” by troubled home owners facing foreclosure is prompting lenders to become more aggressive in their attempts to pursue former homeowners for their loan losses in a short sale. In a short sale, a house is sold, with a lender’s approval, for an amount that won’t pay off the mortgages on the property.

Often, the troubled home owner assumes the loss will be eaten by the lender. But Bank of America and Chase have quietly added language in their short-sale agreements that require the borrower to sign a promissory note for the shortfall.

A spokesman for the American Bankers Association said this week that he wasn’t aware of the practice, suggesting how little attention has been paid so far to collection of these notes from troubled borrowers.

BofA says its intention is to protect investors holding the mortgages.

This is nothing new. Zach Fox (when he was still at the NC Times) reported in April: Lawyers say lenders set stage to collect on 'short sales'

Lenders appear to be inserting language into short sale contracts that allow them to sue for any "deficiency," or the amount lost by a bank by selling a home for less than the mortgage ---- opening the door to collection agencies and court judgments that can run into the hundreds of thousands of dollars for some North County homeowners.
...
One real estate agent who specializes in short sales, Chris Mackey of Carmel Valley, said about 50 percent of the short sale contracts he has seen include the language before he requests its removal. Banks generally have removed the language, he said.

... the North County Times obtained a short sale contract issued by Countrywide Financial Corp ... The contract warned the homeowner, who owned a house in El Cajon, that Countrywide "may pursue a deficiency judgment for the difference in the payment received and the total balance due ... "

It sounds like the banks will remove the language if asked. I'd suggest having a lawyer review the contract, and make sure "all loans are extinguished and debts forgiven".

by Calculated Risk on 7/10/2009 03:52:00 PM

First the market ...

Click on graph for larger image in new window.

This graph is from Doug Short of dshort.com (financial planner): "Four Bad Bears".

Note that the Great Depression crash is based on the DOW; the three others are for the S&P 500.

And the next two graphs are from the Cleveland Fed.

From Mike Bryan, a vice president and senior economist in the Atlanta Fed’s research department: Economic and financial data, neatly wrapped

We thought if these summaries are useful internally, then a wider audience will also find them valuable. So beginning today we will publish our Economic Highlights and Financial Highlights, exclusive of any proprietary data, on our Web site. We anticipate updating these digests weekly.

From the Financial Highlights on the Fed assets:

While the overall size of the Fed’s balance sheet has been shrinking slightly over the last two months, the composition of the balance sheet has changed.

There have been sizeable declines in short-term lending to financials and lending to nonbank credit markets.

Offsetting these declines have been increases in holdings of agency debt and mortgage backed securities (MBS) as well as increases in holdings of U.S. Treasury securities. Combined, these three categories have increased by about $460 billion since the week ended March 18.

The third graph shows the bank failures by asset size and state.

I'm looking forward to these highlights every week!

Now for this BFF (Bank Failure Friday) ...