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Saturday, September 12, 2009

Federal Reserve Oversight and the Failure of Riverside Bank of the Gulf Coast

by Calculated Risk on 9/12/2009 10:56:00 PM

From Bloomberg: Fed Failed to Curb Flawed Bank Lending, Inspector General Says (ht Stephen, others)

Federal Reserve examiners failed to rein in practices that led to losses from excessive real estate lending at two banks in California and Florida that later closed, the central bank’s inspector general said.

Riverside Bank of the Gulf Coast in Cape Coral, Florida, “warranted more immediate supervisory attention” by the Atlanta district bank, Fed Inspector General Elizabeth Coleman said in a report to the central bank’s board. In overseeing County Bank in Merced, California, the San Francisco Fed should have taken a “more aggressive supervisory” approach, Coleman said in another report, also dated Sept. 9.
Riverside Bank was closed in February 2009 by the Florida Office of Financial Regulation. The FDIC DIF is estimated to have lost $201.5 million from the failure of Riverside, or about 38.5% of assets (not an unusually high loss percentage in this cycle, see this sortable table).

Here is the report from the Inspector General: Material Loss Review of Riverside Bank of the Gulf Coast

Inspector General Coleman suggested that there should have been "more immediate supervisory attention" in 2007.
Based on our analysis of Riverside-Gulf Coast’s supervision, we believe that emerging problems observed during a 2007 visitation provided FRB Atlanta with an opportunity for a more aggressive supervisory response. Specifically, FRB Atlanta noted a significant decline in the local residential housing market and observed that new appraisals indicated that the value of certain collateral, particularly developed lots ready for construction, declined by as much as 70 percent. In addition, examiners observed that Riverside-Gulf Coast could no longer sell mortgages in the secondary market and, therefore, would be required to hold and service these loans.
"Emerging problems" in 2007? I strongly believe that action should have been taken much sooner - at least by 2005 - because of 1) concerns about the housing market, and 2) the concentration of loans in residential real estate. From the report:
Historically, Riverside-Gulf Coast focused on growth through real estate lending in its local service area, a business strategy that created concentrations in both the type of loans and the geographic location. In general, local real estate concentrations increase a financial institution’s vulnerability to cyclical changes in the local market place and may elevate a bank’s safety and soundness risk. Examiners noted that Riverside-Gulf Coast experienced rapid growth during its first six years when the bank’s total assets grew approximately 40 percent annually, to $275 million as of December 31, 2003.
Riverside-Gulf Coast’s concentration in real estate loans ranged between 92 and 98 percent of total loans during 2003 to 2008. The bank’s real estate portfolio included traditional one-to-four family mortgages and home equity lines of credit. In addition, a substantial number of Riverside-Gulf Coast’s real estate loans, such as those for residential construction, were categorized as CRE because repayment was dependent on the rental income, sale, or refinancing of the underlying collateral.
emphasis added
The signs of excessive risk were apparent in 2003 to 2005. The Fed is aware of the risks, especially of a high growth strategy with a high loan type concentration. If the regulator was unable to step in sooner and evaluate the risk, then the regulatory process is flawed - and the regulator has already failed. It was too late by 2007.

The inability of the Federal Reserve and the Inspector General to recognize the need for tighter supervision in 2005 or earlier is a serious oversight failure.