by Calculated Risk on 7/09/2010 01:38:00 PM

The following article confuses "liar loans" with underwriting based on the "Three C's": creditworthiness, capacity, and collateral.

From Forbes: 'Liar Loans' Make a Comeback

Did you think the housing collapse killed off "liar loans"--those infamous bubble-era mortgages for which people were allowed to get creative in portraying their ability to make the payments? Well, they're back, and that may be a good thing.

First, this article doesn't provide evidence that liar loans have made a comeback, although low-doc loans based on collateral are being offered. And, second, if "liar loans" were coming back that would be a BAD BAD thing.

From the article:

Case in point: One of [Dave] Dessner's people is toiling now on a loan application from a hedge fund manager wishing to borrow $800,000 against a $4 million home purchase. The hedge's fund did poorly last year, so as a sign of good faith for his investors he's drawing no salary. Good for his business, perhaps, but rotten for a conventional mortgage application.

This guy made $5 million in 2007 and 2008. He's liquid for $10 million, and he's borrowing 20% LTV (loan-to-value)," says Dessner. A no-doc loan to that kind of borrower shouldn't be political dynamite ...

This is not stated income (liar loan) or even no-doc. The lender has apparently verified the borrower's collateral (a 20% LTV), and has verified the borrower's capacity ("liquid for $10 million"), and I assume the borrower's credit is solid.

The above example sounds like solid underwriting.

Tanta explained why there is no need for stated income better than I can (see below), but low-doc based on collateral are not "liar loans". The article even quotes Dessner on this distinction:

Dessner insists it would be a mistake to associate the loans GuardHill and its bank network are originating with the doomed liar loans ... "I'd be on my soapbox railing against those loans," says Dessner. "The people in government who are now screaming about liar loans aren't looking at the quality of the loans we're making."

He isn't making stated income loans, so I'm not sure why the headline and lead paragraph are so misleading.

From Tanta:

Just Say No To Stated Income

Reflections on Alt-A

by Calculated Risk on 7/06/2009 04:49:00 PM

From Reuters: S&P raises loss expectations for risky US mortgages

Standard & Poor's on Monday boosted its expectations for losses on risky loans backing U.S. mortgage securities ... [this] "significantly impact" bonds originally carrying AAA ratings, S&P said in a report.
...
S&P boosted loss projections for subprime loans made at the peak of the market in 2006 and 2007 to 32 percent and 40 percent from 25 percent and 31 percent, respectively. For 2005 loans, loss projections rose to 14 percent from 10.5 percent.

For Alt-A loans ... loss projections for 2006 and 2007 mortgages rose to 22.5 percent and 27 percent from 17.3 percent and 21 percent, respectively. S&P expects Alt-A loans from 2005 to post losses of 10 percent, up from its previous estimate of 7.75 percent.

Loss severities ... are expected to rise to 70 percent for 2006 and 2007 subprime bonds and 60 percent for Alt-A bonds issued in those years, S&P added.

According to the article, S&P noted a surge in the inventory of bank-owned properties. Here is the S&P report.

Update: From the S&P report: Standard & Poor's Chief Economist David Wyss expects "home prices will decline by an additional 5%-7% from the 2006 peak before residential real estate prices start to stabilize in the first half of 2010, marking an overall decline of approximately 37% from the July 2006 peak."

by Calculated Risk on 5/31/2009 03:30:00 PM

The Press Democrat: Alt-A loans: Second wave of foreclosures ahead (ht Atrios) reports that there are 18,000 Alt-A mortgages in Sonoma County (about 18 percent of all mortgages). This is a larger percentage of mortgages in Somona County than for subprime - which accounted for about 10 percent of all mortgages in the county at the peak.

According to the story - using First American CoreLogic as a source - about two-thirds of these Alt-A loans will see a significant payment increase over the next few years, with recasts peaking in 2011.

First, I strongly recommend everyone read Tanta's Reflections on Alt-A

Alt-A is sort of a weird mirror-image of subprime lending. If subprime was traditionally about borrowers with good capacity and collateral but bad credit history, Alt-A was about borrowers with a good credit history but pretty iffy capacity and collateral. That is to say, while subprime makes some amount of sense, Alt-A never made any sense. It is a child of the bubble.
...
Alt-A ... overwhelmingly involved the kind of "affordability product" like ARMs and interest only and negative amortization and 40-year or 50-year terms that "ramps" payment streams. But it doesn't do this in order to help anyone "catch up" on arrearages; people with good credit don't have any arrearages. Alt-A was and has always been about maximizing consumption, whether of housing or of all the other consumer goods you can spend "MEW" on. If subprime was supposed to be about taking a bad-credit borrower and working him back into a good-credit borrower, Alt-A was about taking a good-credit borrower and loading him up with enough debt to make him eventually subprime.

There is much more ...

Second, most of those Alt-A loans were in mid-to-high priced areas. So the foreclosure crisis will now be moving up the value chain. But unlike the low priced areas where there are more potential first time buyers and cash flow investors waiting for prices to fall, demand in mid-priced areas usually comes from move up and move across buyers. Since a majority of the sellers in low priced areas are lenders (DataQuick reported 57.1 percent of sales in Sonoma in March were foreclosure resales), there will be few buyers for these Alt-A foreclosures.

by Calculated Risk on 3/09/2009 10:37:00 PM

From the WSJ: S&P Puts Mortgage-Backed Securities on Downgrade Watch (ht Bob_in_MA)

Standard & Poor's Ratings Service on Monday placed its ratings on $552.8 billion worth of U.S. first-lien Alt-A residential mortgage-backed securities issued between 2005 and 2007 on watch for downgrade, saying it sees an increase in losses from the transactions issued in those years.
...
S&P said it believes continued foreclosures, distressed sales, an increase in carrying costs for properties in inventory and more declines in home sales will further depress prices and lead to higher losses.

The beat goes on.

by Calculated Risk on 12/15/2008 01:55:00 PM

From HousingWire: Fitch: Alt-A Mortgages Deteriorating More Rapidly than Expected

Citing “a rapid deterioration of U.S. Alt-A RMBS performance,” Fitch Ratings again took the hatchet to its previous assumptions for Alt-A mortgages on Monday morning, revising its surveillance methodology and updating loss projections for all U.S. Alt-A RMBS.

Hoocoodanode?

by Calculated Risk on 12/08/2008 06:19:00 PM

In a research note titled "Foreclosure Update: over 8 million foreclosures expected" (no link, hat tip Frank) updated last week, Credit Suisse analysts are now forecasting 8.1 million homes will be in foreclosure by the end of 2012, representing 16% of all households with mortgages.

The analysts projected this could be as low as 6.3 million in a mild recession, with a somewhat successful loan modification program (re-default rates at around 40%), and as high as 10.2 million in a more severe recession. Note: the Comptroller of the Currency John C. Dugan noted this morning that re-defaults rates appear to be well in excess of 50% for recent mods, much higher than the hoped for 40%.

What really stood out in the forecast was the shift from mostly subprime foreclosures to non-subprime (Alt-A and Prime) foreclosures. This fits with some of the housing themes we've been discussing - that foreclosures will now be moving up the price chain.

Click on graph for larger image in a new window.

This graph shows the Credit Suisse estimate of loans in Foreclosure and REO as of Sept 2008 (in blue) and their base forecast for new foreclosures by the end of 2012, for both subprime and other mortgages (Alt-A and Prime).

Credit Suisse believes 2008 will be the peak year for subprime foreclosures, although subprime foreclosures will remain elevated over the next few years. However they are forecasting a significant increase in foreclosures over the next couple of year for non-subprime loans.

When I spoke at the Inman Real Estate conference in July 2008, I suggested that real estate agents should expect increasing foreclosures in high end areas. As I've previously mentioned, my comments were greeted with incredulity. I wonder if views have changed? We're all subprime now!

by Calculated Risk on 10/15/2008 05:26:00 PM

From Bloomberg: S&P Reviews $280.1 Billion of Alt-A Mortgage Debt

Standard & Poor's said it may downgrade $280.1 billion of Alt-A mortgage securities, the most that the ratings company has identified in a single announcement for bonds backed by the loans.

The debt may be cut in part because S&P has boosted estimates for losses on each foreclosure on Alt-A loans with at least five years of fixed rates to 40 percent, from 35 percent ...

``There has been a persistent rise in the level of delinquencies among the Alt-A mortgage loans supporting these transactions,'' S&P analysts Scott Davey and Ernestine Warner said in the statement.

The beat goes on.

by Calculated Risk on 8/27/2008 03:56:00 PM

From the WSJ: Delinquencies, Losses Continue to Rise On Loans Backing Residential MBS

Delinquencies and losses on pools of loans backing U.S. residential mortgage-backed securities issued in 2006 and 2007 continued to weaken through the first half of the year, according to Moody's Investors Service. ... Deals backed by subprime, Alt-A and jumbo loans have all weakened compared with prior years. ... The agency is now reviewing for potential downgrade all jumbo transactions originated in 2006 and 2007.

Alt-A and Jumbo; the new subprime. Also the article describes the outlook for HELOC pools as "daunting".

by Calculated Risk on 8/21/2008 03:26:00 PM

Dow Jones reports (no link yet): Most Home-Loan Delinquencies Kept Rising In July

S&P said as of the July distribution date, delinquencies on subprime deals ... for 2006 and 2007 ... were up 2% to 7% compared with June.

For jumbo loans ... delinquency rates were up 5.6% to 13% from June, with the biggest increase from the 2006 vintage. Delinquency rates also increased for Alt-A deals, led by those originating in 2007.

Also Housing Wire reports on the Clayton InFront numbers for July: Subprime Delinquencies Surge in July

An early look at subprime RMBS performance in July, courtesy of Clayton Fixed Income Services, Inc., suggests that a recent lull in subprime delinquencies may be coming to an end. The percentage of subprime borrowers 60 or more days in arrears at the end of last month surged for both the 2006 and 2007 vintages, up nearly 7 and 11 percent compared to June, respectively.
...
Part of the reason, sources told HW Thursday morning, is a that a large volume of repayment plans put into place earlier this year for troubled subprime borrowers are now failing ...

And on Alt-A:

Alt-A delinquencies continued to worsen in July as well. The 2005 vintage — which should be seasoned by now — saw delinquencies jump an eye-opening 29 percent to 9.72 percent of remaining loans in the vintage ...

by Tanta on 8/12/2008 05:00:00 PM

Clayton has kindly given us permission to excerpt some information from their monthly RMBS performance newsletter, InFront. Clayton's report suggests that we may have now seen the beginning of the end of the subprime meltdown, but we are only at the end of the beginning of the Alt-A wave that is following it.

According to Clayton, subprime delinquencies appear to have peaked in December of 2007, and subprime foreclosure starts may have peaked in January of 2008. The volume of foreclosures in process will remain elevated for a long time as these things work their way through lengthy foreclosure timelines, but the peak in FC starts is good news.

Unfortunately, Alt-A seems nowhere near its peak yet. Clayton's report, based on May data, indicates that both new delinquencies and foreclosure starts in Alt-A pools are still rising. Fannie Mae's recent conference call suggesting that Alt-A deteriorated even more sharply in July is yet more evidence that the Alt-A mess is still ramping up.

These two charts from Clayton, on subprime and Alt-A ARM resets, tell the same tale.

Click on graph for larger image in new window.

Based on remaining active loans, we are at about the peak for subprime rate resets. However, Alt-A is a different picture:

As Housing Wire reported yesterday:

When it comes to RMBS, it’s not about the sheer volume of securities issued; it’s about the credit enhancement that exists to protect investors once collateral defaults occur. And comparing Alt-A issues to subprime, it’s no contest: Alt-A is so much thinner in its padding for losses that a lower default rate could hurt investors in Alt-A deals far worse than anything we saw in subprime. The only saving grace here is reach; because Alt-A deals didn’t yield what subprime did, fewer got pulled into CDO issues.

There are large chunks of Alt-A that didn’t get securitized, but instead were held in portfolio for the interest income benefits: and that would be your option ARMs. Which means that while mushrooming defaults may not hit RMBS investors, they will hit the loan portfolios of more than a few commercial banks.

If the "subprime crisis" was about "exotic securities," the "Alt-A crisis" is going to be about bank balance sheets. And the fun is only beginning.

by Calculated Risk on 8/11/2008 09:59:00 PM

For our late night readers, please don't miss Tanta's post today: Reflections on Alt-A. A brief excerpt:

"Residential mortgage lending never, of course, limited itself to considering creditworthiness; we always had "Three C's": creditworthiness, capacity, and collateral. "Capacity" meant establishing that the borrower had sufficient current income or other assets to carry the debt payments. "Collateral" meant establishing that the house was worth at least the loan amount--that it fully secured the debt. It was universally considered that these three things, the C's, were analytically and practically separable.
...
Alt-A is sort of a weird mirror-image of subprime lending. If subprime was traditionally about borrowers with good capacity and collateral but bad credit history, Alt-A was about borrowers with a good credit history but pretty iffy capacity and collateral. That is to say, while subprime makes some amount of sense, Alt-A never made any sense. It is a child of the bubble."

by Tanta on 8/11/2008 03:31:00 PM

If the post below is too much for you, this one's a nice crisp read.

Or check out the post on the Fed's tighter lending standards in July.

by Tanta on 8/11/2008 03:30:00 PM

Since for media and headline purposes "Alt-A" is the new subprime--the most recent formerly-obscure mortgage lending inside-baseball term to become a part of every casual news consumer's working vocabulary--it seems like a good time to pause for some reflection on what the term might mean. Much of this exercise will be merely for archival purposes, as "Alt-A" is now pretty much officially dead as a product offering and is highly unlikely to return as "Alt-A." Eventually, after the bust works itself out and the economy leaves recession and the bankers crawl out from under their desks and stretch out those limbs that have been cramped into the fetal position, a kind of "not quite quite" lending will certainly return. I am in no way suggesting that the mortgage business has entered the Straight and Narrow Path and is going to stay on it forever because we have Learned Our Lessons. Credit cycles--not to mention institutional memories and economies like ours--don't work that way. It's just that whatever loosened lending re-emerges après le deluge will not be called "Alt-A."

*************

Subprime will eventually come back, too. The difference is that it will come back--in some modified form--called "subprime." That term is too old, too familiar, too, well, plain to ever go away, I suspect. "Subprime" is a term invented by wonky credit analysts, not marketing departments. It is not catchy. It is not flattering nor is it euphemistic. You may console yourself if your children "have special needs" rather than "are academically below average." If you get a subprime loan, you may console yourself that you got some money from some lender, but you can't avoid the discomfort of having been labelled below-grade.

Actually, the term "B&C Lending" used to be quite popular for what we now universally refer to as "subprime." (It was also called "subprime" in those days, too. We didn't have to pick one term because nobody in the media was paying any attention to us back then and there were no blogs and even if there had been blogs if you had suggested that a blog would generate advertising revenue by talking about the nitty-gritty of the mortgage business you would have been involuntarily institutionalized.) In mortgages as in meat, "prime" meant a letter grade of A. These were the pre-FICO days, when "credit quality" was determined by fitting loans into a matrix involving a host of factors--whether you paid your bills on time, how much you owed, whether you had ever experienced a bankruptcy or a foreclosure or a collection or charge-off, etc. "B&C lending" encompassed the then-allowable range of sub-prime loans that could be made in the respectable or marginally respectable mortgage business. It was always possible to find a "D" borrower, but that was strictly in the "hard money" business: private rather than institutional lenders, interest rates that would make Vinny the Loan Shark green with envy. "F" was simply a borrower no one--not even the hard-money lenders--would lend to.

As in the academic world, of course, there was always the problem of grade inflation and too many fine distinctions. You had your "A Minus," which is actually the term Freddie Mac settled on back in the late 90s for its first foray into the higher reaches of subprime. Discussing the difference between "A Minus" and "B Plus" was just one of those otiose pastimes weary mortgage bankers got into over drinks at the hotel bar when the conversational possibilities of angels dancing on the head of a pin or whether "down payment" was one word or two had been exhausted. More or less everyone agreed that there wasn't but a tiny smidgen of difference between the two, except that "A Minus" sounded better. Same with the term "near prime," which wasn't uncommon but never became as popular as "A Minus." "Near prime" is also "near subprime." "A Minus" completed the illusion that it was nearer the A than the B, even if the distances involved were sometimes hard to see with the naked eye.

But all of that grading and labelling was still basically limited to considerations of the credit quality of the borrower, understood to mean the borrower's past history of handing debt. Residential mortgage lending never, of course, limited itself to considering creditworthiness; we always had "Three C's": creditworthiness, capacity, and collateral. "Capacity" meant establishing that the borrower had sufficient current income or other assets to carry the debt payments. "Collateral" meant establishing that the house was worth at least the loan amount--that it fully secured the debt. It was universally considered that these three things, the C's, were analytically and practically separable.

That, I think, is very hard for people today to understand. The major accomplishment of last five to eight years, mortgage-lendingwise, has been to entirely erase the C distinctions and in fact to mostly conflate them. For the last couple of years, for instance, you would routinely read in the papers that "subprime" meant loans made to low-income people. Or it meant loans made to people who couldn't make a down payment or who borrowed more than the value of their property--that is, whose loans were very likely to be under-collateralized. This kind of characterization of subprime always struck us old-timer insiders as bizarre, but it seems to have made sense to the rest of the world and it stuck. After all, the media didn't really care about or even notice this thing called "subprime" until it began to be obvious that it was going to end really really badly. It therefore seemed perfectly obvious to a lot of folks that it must primarily involve poor people who borrow too much.

Those of us who were there at the time tend to remember this differently. In the old model of the Three C's, a loan had to meet minimum requirements for each C in order to get made. We didn't do two out of three. The only lenders who ever did one out of three were precisely those "hard money" lenders, who cared only about the value of the collateral. This was because they mostly planned on repossessing it. Institutional lenders' business plan still involved making your money by getting paid back in dollars for the loans you made, not by taking title to real estate and selling it.

The difference between a prime and a subprime lender was simply how low you set the bar for one of the C's, creditworthiness. Unless you were a hard-money lender, you expected to be paid back, so you never lowered the bar on capacity: everybody had to have some source of cash flow to make loan payments with. Traditional institutional subprime mortgage lenders were even more anal-compulsive about collateral than prime lenders were, a fact that probably surprises most people. Until very recently, historically speaking, institutional subprime lending involved very low LTVs and probably the lowest rate of appraisal fraud or foolishness in the business.

That isn't so surprising if you think about the concept of "risk layering," which is also an industry term. In days gone by, with the three C's, you didn't "layer" risk. If the creditworthiness grade was less than "A," then the capacity grade and the collateral grade had to be "summa cum laude" in order to balance the loan risk. It wasn't until well into the bubble years that anybody seriously put forth the idea that you could make a loan that got a "B" on credit and a "B" on capacity and a "B" on collateral and expect not to lose money.

Of course there has always been a connection between creditworthiness and capacity. Most Americans will pay back their debts as agreed unless they experience a loss of income. People rack up "B&C" credit histories most commonly after they have been laid off, fired, disabled, divorced, or just generally lost income. But this was true at any original income level: upper-middle-class people can lose income and become "B&C" credits. Lower-income folks may well be most vulnerable to income loss--first fired, first "globalized"--but then lower-income folks until recently had smaller debts to pay back out of reduced income, too. What is so dishonest about the association of "subprime" and "poor people" is that it simply erases the fact that a lot of rich people have terrible credit histories and a lot of poor people have never even used credit. The "classic" subprime borrower is Donald Trump as much as it is "Joe Sixpack."

Traditional subprime lending was what you might think of as "recovery" lending. That is, while the borrower's past credit problems were due to some interruption in income or catastrophic loss of cash assets with which to service existing debts, the subprime lenders didn't enter your picture until you had re-established some income. If you want to know what a "D" or "F" borrower was, it was basically someone still in the financial crisis--still unemployed, still underemployed, still unable to work. "B" and "C" borrowers had resumed income, but they still had a fresh pile of bad things on their credit reports--charge-offs, collections, bankruptcies. Prime lenders wouldn't make loans to these borrowers because even though they had resumed capacity, their recent credit history was too poor. Prime lenders want to you "re-establish" your credit history as well as your income, which pretty much means that those nasty credit events have to be several years old, on average, without recurrence in the most recent years, before you can be an "A" again. Absent subprime lenders, that means going without credit for those years.

This is where the idea came from--much promoted by subprime lenders during the boom--that subprime loans were intended to be fairly short-term kinds of financing that helped a borrower "re-establish" his or her creditworthiness. The whole rationale for the famous 2/28 ARM was that after two years of good payment history on that loan, the borrower could refinance into a prime loan and thus never have to pay the "exploding" interest rate at reset. (If you didn't keep up with the payments in the first two years, you were thus "still subprime" and deserved to pay that higher rate.) That was a perfectly fine rationale as long as subprime lenders used rational capacity and collateral requirements--reasonable DTIs during the early years of the loan, low LTVs--to make those loans. When all the "risk layering" started, it was less and less plausible that these borrowers would ever "become prime" in two years by making on-time mortgage payments, and what we got was a class of permanent subprime borrowers who survived by serial refinancing, each time into a lower "grade" loan product, until the final step of foreclosure.

You're probably still wondering what all this has to do with Alt-A. Alt-A is sort of a weird mirror-image of subprime lending. If subprime was traditionally about borrowers with good capacity and collateral but bad credit history, Alt-A was about borrowers with a good credit history but pretty iffy capacity and collateral. That is to say, while subprime makes some amount of sense, Alt-A never made any sense. It is a child of the bubble.

"Classic" subprime lending worked because, while it always charged borrowers a higher interest rate, it found a way to restructure payments such that the borrower's overall prospects for making regular payments improved. A classic "C" loan, for instance, was also called a "pre-foreclosure takeout." The borrower had had a period of reduced or no income, got seriously behind on her mortgage payment, and was facing loss of the house. Even though income had resumed, it wasn't enough to make up the arrearage while also making currently-due payments. So the subprime lender would refinance the loan, rolling the arrearage into the new loan amount, and offset the higher rate and larger balance with a longer term or some kind of "ramping up" structure. The "ramp-up," by the way, was not, historically, mostly by using ARMs. There were all kinds of old-fashioned exotic mortgages that you don't hear about any more, like the Graduated Payment Mortgage and the Step Loan and the Wraparound Mortgage and so on, all of which involved some way of starting off loans with a lower payment that slowly racheted up over three to five years or so into a fully-amortizing payment. It certainly wasn't always successful, but its intent was exactly to enable people to catch up on an arrearage and then actually begin to retire debt.

Alt-A, we are regularly told, is a kind of loan for people with good credit but weak capacity or collateral. It overwhelmingly involved the kind of "affordability product" like ARMs and interest only and negative amortization and 40-year or 50-year terms that "ramps" payment streams. But it doesn't do this in order to help anyone "catch up" on arrearages; people with good credit don't have any arrearages. Alt-A was and has always been about maximizing consumption, whether of housing or of all the other consumer goods you can spend "MEW" on. If subprime was supposed to be about taking a bad-credit borrower and working him back into a good-credit borrower, Alt-A was about taking a good-credit borrower and loading him up with enough debt to make him eventually subprime.

The utter fraudulence of the whole idea of Alt-A involves the suggestion that people who have managed debt in the past that was offered to them in the past on conservative "prime" terms must therefore be capable of managing debt in the future that is offered to them on lax terms. FICOs or traditional credit analyses are good predictors of future credit performance, but only if the usual terms of credit-granting are similar in the past and in the future. Think of it this way: subprime borrowers had proven that they couldn't carry 50 pounds, so the subprime lenders found a way to restructure their debts so that they were only carrying 40. Alt-A lenders took a lot of people who had proven they could carry 50 pounds and used that fact to justify adding another 50 pounds to the burden.

This has not worked out well.

The "Alt" in Alt-A is short for "alternative." Alt-A is one of the purest examples of a "new paradigm" thingy you can find. The conceit of Alt-A is that there is another way to approach "prime" lending that is equivalent in risk (assuming risk-based pricing) but--amazing!--way more painless. Toss out verifications of income and assets, and you are no longer evaluating capacity. Toss out down payments and careful formal appraisals and analysis of sales contracts and you are no longer evaluating collateral. But lookit that FICO!

A lot of folks see the failure of Alt-A as a failure of FICO scores. I don't see it that way. FICO scoring is just an automated and much more consistent way of measuring past credit history than sitting around with a ten-page credit report counting up late payments and calculating balance-to-limit ratios and subtracting for collection accounts and all that tedious stuff underwriters used to do with a pencil and legal pad. I have seen no compelling evidence that FICO scoring is any less reliable than the old-fashioned way of "scoring" credit history.

To me, the failure of Alt-A is the failure to represent reality of the view that people who have a track record of successfully managing modest amounts of debt will therefore do fine with very high amounts of debt. Obviously the whole thing was ultimately built on the assumption that house prices would rise forever and there would always be another refi. There was also the assumption that people are emotionally attached to their FICO scores--in more old-fashioned terms, that borrowers care about their "reputation" and don't want to ruin it by defaulting on a loan. The trouble with that assumption was that we were busy building a credit industry in which there was plentiful credit--on easy terms--for people with any FICO, any "reputation." A bad credit history is only a strong deterrent to default when credit is rationed, granted only to those with acceptable reputations, or--as in the case of "classic" subprime--granted only to those with poor reputations but strong capacity and collateral, and at a penalty rate. Unfortunately, the consumer focus (encouraged, of course, by the industry) on monthly payment rather than actual cost of credit meant that for a lot of people the fact of the "penalty rate" just didn't register. In such an environment, the fear of losing your good credit record isn't much of a deterrent to default.

I should point out that besides the "stated income" and no-down junk, the other big segment of the Alt-A pool was "nonstandard" collateral types. One of the biggies in that category were what insiders call "non-warrantable condos." (The warranties in question are the ones the GSEs force you to make when you sell a condo loan; in essence a non-warrantable condo means one the GSEs won't accept.) What was wrong with these condos? Not enough pre-sales. Not enough sales to owner-occupants rather than investors. Inadequately funded HOAs with absurd budgets. Big blocks of units owned by a single entity or individual. In other words, speculator bait. This kind of thing isn't an "alternative" to "A." It is commercial or margin lending masquerading as long-term residential mortgage lending. It may well be "prime" commercial lending. It just isn't residential mortgage lending.

Part of the terrible results of Alt-A lending is that this book took on risks that historically were taken only on the commercial side, where the rates were higher, the cash-flow analysis was better, and the LTVs a lot lower. (Not that commercial real estate lending didn't also have its dumb credit bubble, too.) The thing is, as long as the flipping of speculative purchases worked--and it did for several years--it worked. Meaning, those Alt-A loans prepaid quite quickly with no losses. That masked the reality of Alt-A--that it was largely a way for people to take on more debt than they ever had before--for quite some time.

Of course we all know now--I happen to think a lot of us knew then--that Alt-A is chock-full o' fraud. My point is that even without excessive "stated income" or appraisal fraud, the Alt-A model was essentially doomed. "Alt-A" is the kind of lending you would only do after a real estate bust, not during a real estate boom--that is, when housing costs and thus debt levels are dropping, not rising. Unfortunately, we're going to have a hard time using something like Alt-A to stimulate our way into recovery once the housing market has actually bottomed out, because Alt-A is too implicated in the bust. I don't think anyone is going to be allowed to get away with moving all that REO off their books by making loans on easy terms to someone who managed to maintain a good FICO during the bust, even though that might actually make some sense.

One of the main reasons we are in a mortgage credit crunch is that two possible models of "recovery" lending--subprime and Alt-A--got used up blowing the bubble. I think it will be a long time before lending standards ease significantly, and I think subprime will come back first. But I do suspect we've seen the last of Alt-A for a much longer time.

I want the rest of a VERY long post! And I want it now!

by Calculated Risk on 8/08/2008 11:04:00 AM

Opening comments from the conference call (hat tip Brian):

“You will recall, by way of background, that even though our second quarter books closed on June 30, subsequent events factor in, and in fact, heavily weight our outlook and our expectations going forward. And those events in July loom significantly in that calculus. That week of July 7 was one of the worst Fannie Mae has experienced in the debt and equity markets. The Treasury-fed backstop plan that was announced on July 13 calmed the market somewhat, and the passage of the Housing bill on the 26th of July added more certainty. But on the downside, July was a tough month for our credit performance. We experienced higher defaults and higher loan loss severities in the markets that were experiencing the steepest home price declines. And that gave us higher charge-offs than we had experienced in any month in the second quarter, and higher than we had expected. We also saw a higher proportion of foreclosures coming from states and products with higher loan balances, which increases the absolute dollar losses. In terms of severity, the loss that we experienced when a loan defaults also increased from 19 basis points in the first quarter to 23 basis points in the second quarter. And that rose again in July to 27 basis points. We are now seeing average initial charge off severities of 40% for loans in California. Home prices have cratered in certain markets since the peak -- Cape Coral, Florida, down 50%; Las Vegas, down 35%; northern Virginia, down 30%; and in California, Modesto, and Stockton, down 50%; Riverside, down 40%. The list goes on. Alt-A foreclosures have doubled in southern California. Our average serious delinquency rate in Florida increased in June to over 3% -- four times the average on our total book of business last year. Almost 2% of the loans in our Florida book are now referred to foreclosure. So, the housing market has returned to earth fast and hard. Some signs do offer rays of positive light. Foreclosures actually fell in Michigan . Same-period home sales were up in California . And as the GSEs provide most of the liquidity to the primary market, that market is functioning, and a safe center of credit risk pricing and product is being restored. All told however, that story all put together led us to again revise our credit loss estimate upward from the year, from 13 to 17 basis points to 23 to 26 basis points. And that, as you will note, commensurately drives our addition to loss reserves of almost $4 billion."
emphasis added

See the previous post from Tanta on Fannie Mae Push Backs. Alt-A lenders are probably pretty nervous.

by Calculated Risk on 8/08/2008 09:42:00 AM

From the WSJ: Fannie Posts Deep Loss, Slashes Dividend Payment

Fannie Mae swung to a second-quarter loss as the largest buyer of home loans booked $5.35 billion in credit-costs from boosting loss provisions and charge-offs. ... eliminating higher-risk loans -- namely newly originated Alt-A acquisitions ... As of June 30, Alt-A mortgage loans represented 11% of Fannie's total mortgage book of business and 50% of its second-quarter credit losses.

And from Bloomberg: Fannie Mae, Battling Losses, to Stop Accepting Alt-A Mortgages

Fannie Mae, the largest U.S. mortgage- finance company, will stop buying or guaranteeing Alt-A home loans, such as those that require little or no documentation of borrower incomes or assets, by yearend.
...
``Over 60 percent of our losses have come from a small number of products, but especially Alt-A loans,'' ... the Washington-based company said in a statement.