by Calculated Risk on 3/23/2009 11:57:00 PM

On existing home sales, here are a few posts:

Existing Home Sales Increase Slightly in February

More on Existing Home Sales

Existing Home Sales: Turnover Rate

News Hour - Paul Krugman & Donald Marron discuss Geithner's plan Part I

Part II:

by Calculated Risk on 3/23/2009 10:19:00 PM

Austan Goolsbee, of the White House Council of Economic Advisers responds to Paul Krugman on Hardball. (ht David)

A couple of comments: Goolsbee claims "if the private guy makes money, the government makes money. If the private guy loses money, the government loses money." Goolsbee is correct on an individual pool, but investors can buy multiple pools and Nemo has an excellent example of how the investors can make money, and the government lose money.

Goolsbee should read that example.

At 4:40 Goolsbee essentially agrees with Krugman's column:

[T]he Geithner scheme would offer a one-way bet: if asset values go up, the investors profit, but if they go down, the investors can walk away from their debt. So this isn’t really about letting markets work. It’s just an indirect, disguised way to subsidize purchases of bad assets.

It's not a complete one-way bet on any individual pool because the investors do put a small amount of money down - and that small amount is at risk. But Krugman was referring to the non-recourse debt and he is correct.

BTW, Tanta once ripped Goolsbee - very funny: Dr. Goolsbee: I’ll Stop Impersonating an Economist If You Quit Underwriting Mortgage Loans

by Calculated Risk on 3/23/2009 08:11:00 PM

Update: here is the essay in English (ht Comrade Coinz)

From the Financial Times: China calls for new reserve currency

China’s central bank on Monday proposed replacing the US dollar as the international reserve currency with a new global system controlled by the International Monetary Fund.

In an essay posted on the People’s Bank of China’s website, Zhou Xiaochuan, the central bank’s governor, said the goal would be to create a reserve currency “that is disconnected from individual nations and is able to remain stable in the long run, thus removing the inherent deficiencies caused by using credit-based national currencies”.
...
To replace the current system, Mr Zhou suggested expanding the role of special drawing rights ... Today, the value of SDRs is based on a basket of four currencies – the US dollar, yen, euro and sterling ... China’s proposal would expand the basket of currencies forming the basis of SDR valuation to all major economies and set up a settlement system between SDRs and other currencies so they could be used in international trade and financial transactions.

This is just a suggestion for the long term ...

by Calculated Risk on 3/23/2009 05:27:00 PM

From Mark Thoma at Economist's View: Which Bailout Plan is Best?

... I prefer nationalization because it provides a certainty in terms of what will happen that the other plans do not provide, the Geithner plan in particular, but it also appears to suffer from the political handicap of appearing (to some) to be "socialist," and there are arguments that the Geithner plan provides better economic incentives than nationalization (though not everyone agrees with this assertion). The Geithner plan also has its political problems, problems that will get much worse if the loans that are part of the proposal turn out to be bad as some, but not all, fear.
...
I am willing to get behind this plan and to try to make it work. It wasn't my first choice, I still think nationalization is better overall, but I am not one who believes the Geithner plan cannot possibly work. Trying to change it now would delay the plan for too long and more delay is absolutely the wrong step to take. There's still time for minor changes to improve the program as we go along, and it will be important to implement mid course corrections, but like it or not this is the plan we are going with and the important thing now is to do the best that we can to try and make it work.

I tend to agree with Mark on this. The Geithner plan is suboptimal, but it is probably the best we can get in the current environment. I'd add a caveat: this plan is easy for the banks to game or arb - and if a bank is caught gaming this plan, the AIG bonus flap will seem like a light Summer breeze.

From Matt Padilla: Economists mostly bullish on $500 billion toxic asset plan

An excerpt:

“My gut reaction is that this is an excellent plan. This plan will go a long way toward getting banks in better position to lend more aggressively and break the deleveraging feedback loop that is now in place."
Scott Anderson, senior economist, Wells Fargo

I think this is a myth that banks will lend "more aggressively" once the toxic assets are off their balance sheets. To whom? Perhaps Anderson is making the moral hazard argument here - maybe he is saying since the banks (and their investors) are being bailed out with above market prices for toxic assets that they will once again engage in risky lending. I hope that isn't his argument.

The key problem with the Geithner plan is that it incentivizes investors to pay more than market value for toxic assets by providing a non-recourse loan and with below market interest rates. (See Krugman on the price impact of a non-recourse loan). The investors do not receive this incentive, the banks do. And the taxpayers pay it, so this is a transfer of wealth from taxpayers to the shareholders of the banks.

This can be thought of as a European style put option - it can only be exercised at expiration. The taxpayers will pay the price of the option in the future, the investors receive any future benefit, and the banks receive the current value of the option in cash. Geithner apparently believes the future value will be zero, and that is a possibility. If so, this is a great plan - if not, the taxpayers will pay that future value (and it could be significant).

Still I agree with Mark Thoma:

[T]his is the plan we are going with and the important thing now is to do the best that we can to try and make it work.

Oh well, Paul Kedrosky quotes T. Boone Pickens today:

My dad said a fool with a plan can beat a genius with no plan.

by Calculated Risk on 3/23/2009 04:00:00 PM

An amazing day ...

DOW up 6.8% (about 500 points)

S&P 500 up 7.1% (54 points)

NASDAQ up 6.8% (almost 100 points)

Click on graph for larger image in new window.

The first graph is from Doug Short of dshort.com (financial planner): "Four Bad Bears".

This is the 2nd worst S&P 500 / DOW bear market in the U.S. in 100 years.

Note that the Great Depression crash is based on the DOW; the three others are for the S&P 500.

The second graph shows the S&P 500 since 1990.

The dashed line is the closing price today.

If you bought in May 1997 - congratulations - you are now even (not counting inflation and dividends).

by Calculated Risk on 3/23/2009 01:56:00 PM

Here is a quote from the Real Time Economics blog at the WSJ: Economists React: Housing Offers ‘Some Encouragement’

Existing home sales peaked during the summer of 2005 and have fallen fairly steadily since then. However, the rate of decline has slowed in recent months, suggesting a bottom may be near.

It is correct that sales peaked in 2005, and have fallen steadily since then. And it is also correct that the rate of decline has slowed. However this doesn't suggest to me that "a bottom may be near" for existing home sales.

The opposite it true. I think existing home sales will fall further. (note: much of this post is an update from earlier posts)

This was an important disclosure in the National Association of Realtors (NAR) Existing Home Sales report:

Lawrence Yun, NAR chief economist, said ... "[D]istressed sales accounted for 40 to 45 percent of transactions in February.”

This is another reminder that the only reason existing home sales appear to have "stabilized" is because of the high number of REO sales. Sales excluding REOs have plummeted.

I've argued before that REO resales are real sales and should be included in the NAR statistics, but I suspect these REO buyers might hold these properties longer than recent turnover would suggest. If these are owner occupied buyers, they have probably been waiting to buy, and they have saved a down payment and qualified under the tighter lending standards. They probably won't sell until they can make a reasonable profit to buy a move up home - and it will probably be a number of years before prices recover.

If they are investors, they are likely buying REOs for cash flow - not appreciation, unlike the speculators in recent years - and these investors will probably hold the properties for a number of years too.

This suggests to me that the turnover rate will slow further.

Click on graph for larger image in new window.

This graph shows existing home turnover as a percent of owner occupied units. Sales for 2009 are estimated at the February rate of 4.7 million units.

I've also included inventory as a percent of owner occupied units (all year-end inventory, except 2009 is for February).

The turnover rate during the housing bubble was boosted by:

Speculative buying by flippers.

Speculative buying by homeowners (using excessive leverage).

Move up buying, especially by Baby Boomers.

Although slowing, the turnover rate is still above the median for the last 40 years and substantially above previous troughs. Both types of speculative buying are over for now. And the Baby Boomers have probably bought move up homes, and the next major move for the Boomers will be downsizing in retirement (still a number of years away).

And finally - and probably a very important point - homeowners with negative equity, who manage to avoid foreclosure, will be stuck in their homes for years.

All of the above suggests the turnover rate - and existing home sales - will fall further, perhaps much further.

As I noted earlier today, the key areas to watch for the housing market are declining inventory levels, a bottom in new home sales, and a closing gap between new and existing home sales. It would be a positive, not a negative, for both housing and the economy, if the number of existing home sales declined further - as long as the percent of distressed sales also declined.

by Calculated Risk on 3/23/2009 12:08:00 PM

The evidence suggests there has been a surge in rental units in the U.S. - far exceeding the number of new rental units being built (see: The Residential Rental Market Update). I've argued that the key factors in this surge in supply are "REO sales to cash flow investors, and frustrated sellers putting their homes up for lease".

Here is some evidence of investors buying REOs to rent.

From Jim Wasserman at the Sacramento Bee: Novice investors turn repos into rentals

... Preliminary estimates from researcher MDA DataQuick indicate that 28.4 percent of February buyers in Sacramento County were investors aiming to buy, repair and rent out their new acquisitions.

The numbers confirm a huge shift in the Sacramento housing market in recent months, one that has consumed thousands of foreclosure properties and helped prevent a once-feared pileup of for-sale signs.

Alongside an army of first-time buyers, these investors – many doing cash deals with banks – have fueled growth in home sales for nearly a year. ...

Investor market share in Sacramento County last hit 25 percent in mid-2004, the most frenzied sales year of the region's housing boom. Then it declined by half as the housing market cooled in 2006 and 2007, according to DataQuick.
...
Sacramento County couple Oscar Vargas and Gladys Flores ... bought five houses last year priced between $50,000 and $100,000.

"We buy the repos, and the prices are about what it was 15 years ago," Flores said. "We fix what's wrong with them. We spend a little money and put in new carpets and remodel. We do it ourselves and rent them."

The plan is to hold them for several years to see gains, she said. Flores said it's the same drill as the 1990s downturn. Then, the pair bought houses low and sold them high during the boom that followed. They now own and manage 15 rental homes, she said.

In 2004 the "investors" (really speculators) were betting on appreciation. The current breed of investor is buying for cash flow.

by Calculated Risk on 3/23/2009 10:20:00 AM

Here is another way to look at existing homes sales - monthly, Not Seasonally Adjusted (NSA):

This graph shows NSA monthly existing home sales for 2005 through 2009. Sales (NSA) were lower in February 2009 than in February 2008.

Again - a significant percentage of recent sales were foreclosure resales, and although these are real sales, I think existing home sales could fall even further when foreclosure resales start to decline sometime in the future.

The second graph shows inventory by month starting in 2004.

Inventory levels were flat during the bubble, but started increasing at the end of 2005.

Inventory levels increased sharply in 2006 and 2007, but have been below the year ago level for the last seven months. This might indicate that inventory levels are close to the peak for this cycle. Note: there is probably a substantial shadow inventory – homeowners wanting to sell, but waiting for a better market - so existing home inventory levels will probably stay elevated for some time. There is also the possibility of some REOs being held off the market.

It is important to watch inventory levels very carefully. If you look at the 2005 inventory data, instead of staying flat for most of the year (like the previous bubble years), inventory continued to increase all year. That was one of the key signs that led me to call the top in the housing market!

If the trend of declining year-over-year inventory levels continues in 2009 that will be a positive for the housing market. Prices will probably continue to fall until the months of supply reaches more normal levels (in the 6 to 8 month range), and that might take some time.

A large percentage of existing home sales (40% to 45% according to the NAR) are distressed sales: REO sales (foreclosure resales) or short sales. This has created a gap between new and existing sales as shown in the following graph that I've jokingly labeled the "Distressing" gap.

This graph shows existing home sales (left axis through February) and new home sales (right axis through January).

For a number of years the ratio between new and existing home sales was pretty steady. After activity in the housing market peaked in 2005, the ratio changed. This change was caused by distressed sales - in many areas home builders cannot compete with REO sales, and this has pushed down new home sales while keeping existing home sales activity elevated.

I think the keys to watch for the housing market are declining inventory levels, a bottom in new home sales, and the gap between new and existing home sales closing.

by Calculated Risk on 3/23/2009 10:00:00 AM

The NAR reports: Existing-Home Sales Rise In February

Existing-home sales – including single-family, townhomes, condominiums and co-ops – rose 5.1 percent to a seasonally adjusted annual rate of 4.72 million units in February from a pace of 4.49 million units in January, but are 4.6 percent below the 4.95 million-unit level in February 2008.
...
Lawrence Yun, NAR chief economist said ... "[D]istressed sales accounted for 40 to 45 percent of transactions in February."
...
Total housing inventory at the end of February rose 5.2 percent to 3.80 million existing homes available for sale, which represents a 9.7-month supply at the current sales pace, unchanged from January.

Click on graph for larger image in new window.

The first graph shows existing home sales, on a Seasonally Adjusted Annual Rate (SAAR) basis since 1993.

Sales in February 2009 (4.72 million SAAR) were 5.1% higher than last month, and were 4.6% lower than January 2008 (4.95 million SAAR).

It's important to note that about 45% of these sales were foreclosure resales or short sales. Although these are real transactions, this means activity (ex-distressed sales) is under 3 million units SAAR.

The second graph shows nationwide inventory for existing homes. According to the NAR, inventory increased to 3.8 million in February. The all time record was 4.57 million homes for sale in July 2008. This is not seasonally adjusted.

Usually inventory peaks in mid-Summer, and then declines slowly through November - and then declines sharply in December as families take their homes of the market for the holidays. Typically inventory starts to increase again in the new year.

Usually most REOs (bank owned properties) are included in the inventory because they are listed - but not all. Recently there have been stories about a substantial number of unlisted REOs - this is possible, but not confirmed.

The third graph shows the 'months of supply' metric for the last six years.

Months of supply was flat at 9.7 months.

Even though the inventory level increased, sales also increased, so "months of supply" was flat.

I'll have more on existing home sales soon ...

by Calculated Risk on 3/23/2009 08:29:00 AM

From the Treasury: Details on Public Private Partnership Investment Program

And some reading material ...

Public Private Investment Program (PPIP)

Fact Sheet
White Paper

Geithner speaks at 8:45 AM. Here is the CNBC feed.

by Calculated Risk on 3/23/2009 12:14:00 AM

Treasury secretary Timothy Geithner writes in the WSJ: My Plan for Bad Bank Assets

... [T]he financial system as a whole is still working against recovery. Many banks, still burdened by bad lending decisions, are holding back on providing credit. Market prices for many assets held by financial institutions -- so-called legacy assets -- are either uncertain or depressed. With these pressures at work on bank balance sheets, credit remains a scarce commodity, and credit that is available carries a high cost for borrowers.

Today, we are announcing another critical piece of our plan to increase the flow of credit and expand liquidity. Our new Public-Private Investment Program will set up funds to provide a market for the legacy loans and securities that currently burden the financial system.

The Public-Private Investment Program will purchase real-estate related loans from banks and securities from the broader markets. Banks will have the ability to sell pools of loans to dedicated funds, and investors will compete to have the ability to participate in those funds and take advantage of the financing provided by the government.

The funds established under this program will have three essential design features. First, they will use government resources in the form of capital from the Treasury, and financing from the FDIC and Federal Reserve, to mobilize capital from private investors. Second, the Public-Private Investment Program will ensure that private-sector participants share the risks alongside the taxpayer, and that the taxpayer shares in the profits from these investments. These funds will be open to investors of all types, such as pension funds, so that a broad range of Americans can participate.

Third, private-sector purchasers will establish the value of the loans and securities purchased under the program, which will protect the government from overpaying for these assets.

The new Public-Private Investment Program will initially provide financing for $500 billion with the potential to expand up to $1 trillion over time, which is a substantial share of real-estate related assets originated before the recession that are now clogging our financial system. Over time, by providing a market for these assets that does not now exist, this program will help improve asset values, increase lending capacity by banks, and reduce uncertainty about the scale of losses on bank balance sheets. The ability to sell assets to this fund will make it easier for banks to raise private capital, which will accelerate their ability to replace the capital investments provided by the Treasury.

This program to address legacy loans and securities is part of an overall strategy to resolve the crisis as quickly and effectively as possible at least cost to the taxpayer. The Public-Private Investment Program is better for the taxpayer than having the government alone directly purchase the assets from banks that are still operating and assume a larger share of the losses. Our approach shares risk with the private sector, efficiently leverages taxpayer dollars, and deploys private-sector competition to determine market prices for currently illiquid assets. Simply hoping for banks to work these assets off over time risks prolonging the crisis in a repeat of the Japanese experience.

The details will be released Monday at 8:45AM ET.

by Calculated Risk on 3/22/2009 10:02:00 PM

From MarketWatch: Geithner to hold briefing Monday on toxic assets plan

The Treasury Department said in a press release that it will hold the briefing at 8:45 a.m. EDT on Monday.

Just wanted to get the time right ...

by Calculated Risk on 3/22/2009 07:54:00 PM

From Kevin Hall at McClatchy Newspapers: Treasury to deliver details of "toxic asset" treatment plan

Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner will meet with reporters shortly before the 9:30 a.m. opening bell for trading on the New York Stock Exchange. ...

Geithner is expected to announce a plan in which Treasury will use $75-100 billion from last year's $700 billion Wall Street bailout. ...

Mark Zandi supports the plan, although I'm not sure what he means by "fair price" since the price will be above market prices (because of the low interest rate, non-recourse loans):

"This plan has a good chance of success; certainly much better than the plan Treasury put forward six weeks ago," said Mark Zandi, chief economist at Moody's Economy.com, a forecaster in West Chester, Pa. "This plan relies much less on private investors and much more on direct government purchases of banks' troubled assets. Only a handful or so of private investors need to participate in this plan to establish workable auctions for the assets and thus determine a fair price for the assets."
...
"The government can then come in and buy these assets on a large scale at these prices. (Roughly) $1 trillion is not enough; it probably needs to be twice that," said Zandi. "But if the plan works well enough, I think Congress will provide more money to solve the problem once and for all. This plan makes me more optimistic about the financial prospects for the financial system and the economy".

Brad DeLong also supports the plan, but thinks much more is needed:

Our guess is that we would need to take $4 trillion out of the market and off the supply that private financial intermediaries must hold in order to move financial asset prices to where they need to be in order to unfreeze credit markets ...

Krugman and Atrios disagree with DeLong.

It is pretty clear the administration opposes nationalizing insolvent large banks, and is instead willing to have taxpayers subsidize shareholders of the banks. So the question isn't "Is this the optimal solution?" (it isn't) but "Will it work?" Maybe, but at what cost?

Oh well, what's a few trillion between friends?

by Calculated Risk on 3/22/2009 12:10:00 PM

From Kenneth Harney at the LA Times: New supply of 'jumbo' financing in pipeline

Bank of America, the country's largest mortgage lender, is rolling out a large program to finance loans between about $730,000 and $1.5 million, with fixed 30-year rates starting in the upper 5% range.
...
The minimum down payment for an ING Direct jumbo is 25%; Bank of America quotes a minimum of 20%.
...
Bank of America's new program requires hefty liquid resources -- six months of principal, interest, property tax and insurance payments in reserve -- plus fully documented income, solid credit scores and a full appraisal.

The lenders are paying attention to the "Three C's": creditworthiness, capacity, and collateral, and requiring a serious downpayment that will keep the homeowners committed.

Currently jumbo rates are in the 6.5% range, and rates for these new programs are in the "upper 5% range" - still way above rates on conforming loans, but this will probably help in some markets. Here is an excerpt from DataQuick's report on the California Bay Area:

[U]se of so-called jumbo loans to finance high-end property remained at abnormally low levels. Before the credit crunch hit in August 2007, jumbo loans, then defined as over $417,000, represented 62 percent of Bay Area purchase loans, compared with just 17.5 percent last month.

The difficulties potential high-end buyers have had in obtaining jumbo loans helps explain why sales of existing single-family houses fell to record-low or near-record-low levels for a February in some higher-end communities. They included Orinda, Walnut Creek, San Rafael, San Francisco, Burlingame, San Mateo, Los Gatos, and Los Altos.

“A lot of Bay Area activity is basically on hold, waiting for the jumbo mortgage spigot to reopen.” said John Walsh, MDA DataQuick president.

I'm not sure this will "open the spigot", but it will probably help a little.

by Calculated Risk on 3/22/2009 11:12:00 AM

From Zach Fox at the North County Times: From half a million to under $100K

This two-bedroom, two-bath house was built in 1979 and has 1,230 square feet of living space.

Click on photo for larger image in new window.

Photo by Jamie Scott Lytle, North County Times Staff photographer


September 2005: $469,000

December 2008: $91,000 (foreclosure)

Why did someone pay $469,000 for this house in 2005? Amazing.

by Calculated Risk on 3/21/2009 10:24:00 PM

If you missed this, Zach Fox at the North County Times had an incredible story: HOUSING: Banks selling properties in bulk for cheap

For example, a unit of Citigroup, the troubled financial giant, sold a foreclosure in Temecula to an Arizona investment firm for $139,000 when comparable homes in the area were selling for $240,000 to $260,000.

The firm listed the home for $249,000, received multiple offers and the property has entered escrow, said Amber Schlieder, the real estate agent who handled the listing.

Citi just left $100,000 on the table.

I hear stories like this all the time.

Here is a short video from KCET with a couple more examples (these are short sales):



Clearly the banks are overwhelmed and the process is broken. Maybe there is an opportunity here for added transparency ...

by Calculated Risk on 3/21/2009 08:06:00 PM

Randyl Drummer at CoStar writes: Rising Cap Rates Add to Real Estate Investors' Worries. Here are some stats:

In fourth-quarter 2007, 180 closed transactions of Class A office sales of more than $5 million were recorded, trading at an average actual cap rate of 6.1% nationally. By the last three months of 2008, the average cap rate spiked to 7.6% on just 80 transactions, including a jump of more than 100 basis points between the third and fourth quarters. With sales results for the quarter still being collected, CoStar had recorded 42 closed transactions at an average actual cap rate of 7.9% as of March 18.

Investors closed 279 sales of Class A and B warehouse and distribution property in the fourth quarter of 2007 at an average cap rate of 7.1%. The number of transactions dropped sharply in fourth-quarter 2008, with the cap rate rising 100 bp. First-quarter 2009 is continuing to trend toward a sharp drop in transactions, with the cap rate edging up another 50 bp to a preliminary 8.6% as of March 18.

In the apartment sector, a look at sales totaling $5 million or more shows that 629 Class A properties exchanged hands in fourth-quarter 2007 at an average actual cap rate of 5.9%. For the same period a year later, 355 transactions sold and the average cap rate rose 90 basis point to 6.8%, thanks to a 50-bp jump between the third and fourth quarters. Though deal volume appears to be again dropping sharply in the first quarter, the cap rate for closed transactions was holding steady at 6.8% in the quarter to date -- the only major property category to hold the line on cap rate expansion.

So for Class A office space, average actual cap rates have risen from 6.1% in Q4 2007 to 7.9% currently.

For Class A and B warehouse and distribution properties, cap rates have risen from 7.1% to 8.6% over the same period.

And for Class A apartments, cap rates have risen from 5.9% to 6.8%.

This is just another way of saying prices have fallen sharply. Most small investors buy Class B or C apartments, and I'd be curious about those cap rates.

by Calculated Risk on 3/21/2009 01:59:00 PM

Earlier I posted the publicly released economic scenarios from the Supervisory Capital Assessment Program (bank stress tests).

The following graphs shows the stress test economic scenarios on a quarterly basis as provided by the regulators to the banks as part of the FAQs (no link). I've also added the most recent forecasts from Paul Kasriel at Northern Trust, and from Goldman Sachs (no link) for comparison.

The first graph is for the unemployment rate through 2010. This is a quarterly forecast - the January unemployment rate was 7.6% and February 8.1%.

Click on graph for larger image in new window.

Although the two private forecasts don't include all of 2010, it appears that both the Kasriel and Goldman forecasts are near the "more adverse" scenario for 2009.

The second graph makes the same comparison for changes in real GDP.

An interesting note: the stress test scenario is using the advanced GDP release estimate for Q4 2008 of -3.8%, as opposed to the revised estimate of -6.2%.

Once again the private forecasts are tracking much closer to the the more adverse scenario than the baseline scenario.

And please don't think Kasriel and Goldman are UberBears. From Paul Kasriel: Light at the End of the Tunnel or an Oncoming Freight Train?

With regard to the economy, we believe there are faint signs of light at the end of the tunnel. Real consumer spending increased by 0.4% in January (and is likely to be revised up) and the decline in February nominal retail sales of 0.1% suggests that the decline in real consumer spending that month will not be severe. For the first quarter as a whole, we now expect a contraction in consumer spending much less severe than last year’s fourth-quarter contraction of 4.3%. Although we do not expect to see outright growth in real consumer spending until the fourth quarter of this year, we believe the deepest quarterly contraction is behind us. With light motor vehicle sales idling just above 9 million units at an annual rate, it appears that for the first time since 1945 there are more used cars and trucks being scrapped than there are new ones getting out on the highways. At some point in the not-too-distant future, the purchases and production of cars and trucks will be stepped up.

These are the points I've been making and I also think there is a good chance (better than a coin flip) that GDP will turn slightly positive later this year. However I also think any recovery will be very sluggish.

Even with these "faint signs of light at the end of the tunnel", it appears the "more adverse" scenario is now the real baseline.

by Calculated Risk on 3/21/2009 05:30:00 AM

The NY Times has some details ...

From Edmund L. Andrews, Eric Dash and Graham Bowley: Toxic Asset Plan Foresees Big Subsidies for Investors

The plan to be announced next week involves three separate approaches. In one, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation will set up special-purpose investment partnerships and lend about 85 percent of the money that those partnerships will need to buy up troubled assets that banks want to sell.

In the second, the Treasury will hire four or five investment management firms, matching the private money that each of the firms puts up on a dollar-for-dollar basis with government money.

In the third piece, the Treasury plans to expand lending through the Term Asset-Backed Secure Lending Facility, a joint venture with the Federal Reserve.

More approaches doesn't make a better plan.

The FDIC plan involves almost no money down. The FDIC will provide a low interest non-recourse loan up to 85% of the value of the assets.

The remaining 15 percent will come from the government and the private investors. The Treasury would put up as much as 80 percent of that, while private investors would put up as little as 20 percent of the money ... Private investors, then, would be contributing as little as 3 percent of the equity, and the government as much as 97 percent.

With almost no skin in the game, these investors can pay a higher than market price for the toxic assets (since there is little downside risk). This amounts to a direct subsidy from the taxpayers to the banks.

Oh well, I'm sure Geithner will provide details this time ...

by Calculated Risk on 3/21/2009 12:14:00 AM

"And for those of you wondering about yours truly — I’m temperamentally unsuited, have never had any desire for the job, and probably have more influence as an outside gadfly than I ever could in DC."
Paul Krugman on the possibility of being appointed Treasury Secretary, Nov 26, 2008