by Calculated Risk on 12/03/2007 02:54:00 PM

From Bloomberg: WestLB, HSH Nordbank Bail Out $15 Billion of SIVs (hat tip Brian)

WestLB AG ... and Hamburg-based HSH Nordbank AG provided financing to more than $15 billion of troubled investment funds to prevent a fire sale of their assets.

WestLB provided a credit line for its $11 billion structured investment vehicle called Harrier Finance to repay commercial paper, the Dusseldorf-based bank said in an e-mailed statement today. HSH Nordbank said it will provide backup funding to cover all commercial paper issued by its 3.3 billion- euro ($4.8 billion) Carrera Capital SIV, spokesman Reinhard Schmid said in an interview.

To understand these stories, it helps to understand the structure of an SIV (Structured Investment Vehicle). (see SIV Accounting for more)

First an SIV has investors - like hedge funds or wealthy individuals - who invest say $1 Billion in the SIV (the equity). Then the SIV issues commercial paper (CP) and medium-term notes (MTN) that pay slightly higher rates than similar duration paper. The typical SIV, according to Fitch, uses 14 times leverage, so in our example the SIV would sell CP and MTN for $14 Billion.

Now the SIV invests this $15 Billion ($1 Billion equity and $14 Billion borrowed) in longer term notes. The idea is simple: borrow short, lend long, hedge the interest rate and credit risks - and the profits flow to the investors in the SIV.

Back to the story: what happens when the CP comes due and no one wants to buy any more? To cover the CP, the SIV might have to sell the longer term assets at a steep discount, and this would trigger a liquidation of the entire SIV. To prevent this "fire sale", the sponsoring banks stepped up and provided the financing to cover the expiring CP.

Of course this limits the banks ability to make other loans (aka Credit Crunch). Perhaps this story is related: Banks Urge UK Clients To Stop Borrowing (hat tip FFIDC)

The banks are urging some of their biggest clients not to draw on standby credit facilities as the sub-prime crisis and squeeze on interbank lending have affected banks' ability to fund themselves.

by Calculated Risk on 12/03/2007 02:07:00 PM

Ahhh, I'm reminded of Tanta's post in early June: Reelin' In the Suckers

Once again, from David Evans at Bloomberg: Montana, Connecticut Hold SIVs Downgraded, Reviewed by Moody's (hat tip energyecon)

Montana and Connecticut state-run investment funds hold debt tainted by the subprime mortgage collapse that was cut or put under review by Moody's Investors Service, leaving local governments vulnerable to losses.

... Montana owns $50 million of the paper. Moody's put another $105 billion of SIVs on review for a possible downgrade, of which Montana holds $80 million and Connecticut holds $300 million, records show.

``This just reinforces the fact that we have a serious issue,'' said State Senator Dave Lewis, of Helena, Montana, a member of the Legislative Audit Committee.
...
The Montana pool, managed by the Montana Board of Investments, has 25 percent, or $550 million, invested in SIVs, all of which carried top investment ratings when purchased.
...
Connecticut's Short-Term Investment Fund, which invests cash for state agencies and municipalities, is holding $300 million in debt issued by SIVs that may be downgraded by Moody's. The state's $5.8 billion fund held notes issued by SIVs affiliated with Citigroup ...

Connecticut also holds $100 million in defaulted SIV notes issued by Cheyne Finance.

More bagholders found.

by Calculated Risk on 12/03/2007 12:39:00 PM

From the Boston Fed: Subprime Outcomes: Risky Mortgages, Homeownership Experiences, and Foreclosures

... house price appreciation plays a dominant role in generating foreclosures. In fact, we attribute most of the dramatic rise in Massachusetts foreclosures during 2006 and 2007 to the decline in house prices that began in the summer of 2005.

Click on graph for larger image.

From the linked Fed paper, this figure compares the foreclosure rate in Massachusetts with changes in house prices. As prices rise, the foreclosure rate falls, since homeowners in trouble can either sell or refinance their homes. As prices fall, there is no way out - except foreclosure - for homeowners facing difficulties.

Last week I graphed the historical relationship for California: House Prices and Foreclosures. The pattern was the same.

Forget resets (although they are important). As prices fall over the next couple of years (or longer), foreclosures will rise, with or without resets. And a real concern is that it will become socially acceptable for underwater prime borrowers to just mail their keys into their lender (what Fleck calls "jingle mail").

by Calculated Risk on 12/03/2007 10:48:00 AM

Remarks by Secretary Paulson on Actions Taken and Actions Needed in U.S. Mortgage Markets at the Office of Thrift Supervision National Housing Forum

As we are all aware, the housing and mortgage markets are working through a period of turmoil, as are other credit markets, as risk is being reassessed and re-priced. We expect that this turbulence will take some time to work through, and we expect some penalty on our short-term economic growth. ...

And as I have said before, the housing market downturn is the biggest challenge to our economy. When home foreclosures spike, the damage is not limited only to those who lose their homes. Homes in foreclosure can pose costs for whole neighborhoods, as crime goes up and property values decline.

... foreclosure is expensive for all participants - lenders and investors – and this expense is an incentive to avoid foreclosure when a homeowner has the financial wherewithal to own a home. ...

And so, Treasury is aggressively pursuing a comprehensive plan to help as many able homeowners as possible keep their homes.

And on the modification plan:

... our plan involves a pragmatic response to the reality that the number of homeowners struggling with their resetting subprime mortgage will increase throughout 2008. As volume increases, we will need an aggressive, systematic approach to fast-track able borrowers into a refinance or mortgage modification. This third element does not, and will not, include spending taxpayer money on funding or subsidies for industry participants or homeowners.

While the reality is a bit more complex, in the interest of simplicity, there are four categories of subprime borrowers. There are those who can afford their adjusted interest rate; these homeowners need no assistance. There are also a substantial number of homeowners who haven't been making payments at the starter rate on their subprime loan and may not have the financial wherewithal to sustain home ownership; some of these homeowners will become renters again. A third category of homeowners might choose to refinance their mortgage - putting them in a sustainable mortgage while keeping investors whole. This is the first, best option. Servicers should move quickly to assist those who can refinance.

And the fourth category is those with steady incomes and relatively clean payment histories who could afford the lower introductory mortgage rate but cannot afford the higher adjusted rate. We are focusing on this group, determining who they are and what steps may appropriately assist them.
...
We are determined to ... develop a set of standards that will be implemented across the industry, from the largest mortgage servicers to the smaller specialty servicers. An industry-wide approach is critical to the effectiveness of this effort.

To speed up the modification process, Treasury is working through the HOPE NOW alliance with the American Securitization Forum to convene servicers and investors so they can develop categories of borrowers eligible for appropriate modifications and refinancings, and an industry-wide solution. This work takes time, as all parties seek to define categories of borrowers for streamlined refinance and modification where that is in the best interest of both the borrower and the mortgage investor. I am confident they will finalize these standards soon. And I expect all servicers will implement them quickly, and create benchmarks to measure their progress along the way. As a result, what was a fragmented, cumbersome process can be a coordinated effort which more quickly helps able homeowners.

Paulson clearly defined the group of borrowers that are being targeted for modifications: Homeowners with "steady incomes and relatively clean payment histories who could afford the lower introductory mortgage rate but cannot afford the higher adjusted rate".

Whenever the freeze ends, most of the homeowners in the defined group will still face foreclosure. So the purpose of this plan is clear - since the industry lacks the infrastructure to handle the work load, this guideline helps decide which loans to foreclose on now, and which loans to foreclose on later.

by Tanta on 12/03/2007 09:19:00 AM

From the San Diego Union-Tribune, a fabulous distillation of bubble-think in the story of Michael and Suzanne, who got Countrywide to modify their ARM.

Details: In around mid-September 2004, Michael and Suzanne borrowed $437,750 to buy a $440,000 condo. The $352,000 first mortgage was an interest-only 3/27 ARM with a start rate of 4.97%, a 3.00% first adjustment cap and 2.00% annual (1.00% every six months) periodic cap after that, with a maximum lifetime rate of 11.97%. It is presumably indexed to the 6-month LIBOR. The $85,750 second mortgage was a fixed rate (of unspecified term) at 8.00%.

The first scheduled adjustment on the first mortgage would have taken the monthly interest payment up by $880. Michael and Suzanne cannot, apparently, afford another $880. Nor is sale or refi a great option, since the value of the condo is apparently now $400,000. Michael and Suzanne did not have $40,000 for a down payment in 2004 and they still don't have $40,000 for a down payment.

They feel a touch let down by the world:

“We understood the situation with loan adjustments to be that after our first three years, our low rate would increase to the rate that everyone else is buying at right now,” said Suzanne, 38. “We didn't realize that we would see an increase of our monthly mortgage payments by several hundred dollars or that we'd now be facing this uphill interest rate climb that we're not going to be able to afford.”

That's an interesting way of thinking of an ARM: it won't hurt you because the rate will only go up to the rate buyers will buy at. This will make that rate adjustment affordable to you because nobody will ever buy in the future at a rate you cannot afford, even though your plan is that everyone will buy in the future at a higher price than you did.

A note to Countrywide: You get the borrowers you deserve in this business.