by Calculated Risk on 7/09/2015 10:57:00 AM

Here is a new paper from FHFA Senior Economist Saty Patrabansh: The Marginal Effect of First-Time Homebuyer Status on Mortgage Default and Prepayment

During the housing bubble, there an increase in first time buyers as shown in the first graph below (from paper).

Also first time homebuyers defaulted at a higher rate than repeat buyers.

Patrabansh shows that the higher default rate for first-time homebuyers is related to borrower differences, and, after adjusting for these differences, first-time hombuyers defaulted at the same rate as repeat homebuyers.

 From the conclusion:

First-time homebuyer mortgages acquired by the Enterprises generally performed worse than repeat homebuyer mortgages. But fi rst-time homebuyers are also inherently diff erent from repeat homebuyers. For example, they are younger, and have lower credit scores, lower home equity, and less income and therefore are less likely to withstand fi nancial stress or take advantage of financial innovations available in the market than repeat homebuyers. In other words, in terms of many borrower, loan, and property characteristics that can be determined at the time of loan origination, the distributional make-up of fi rst-time homebuyers is somewhat weaker than that of repeat homebuyers.

Click on graph for larger image.

This graph from the paper shows the surge in first-time homebuying during the housing bubble.

Note: As I've noted before, this is one of the tragedies of the housing bubble - many people were lured into buying before they were really ready, and have soured on the homebuying experience.

Patrabansh presents several charts on the differences between first-time homebuyers and repeat buyers (see paper Appendix A). First time homebuyers are younger than repeat buyers, have lower monthly income, lower FICO scores, have a higher percentage of one borrower mortgages, took out higher LTV loans, and had a higher payment-to-income and debt-to-income ratios.

From the paper:

Once these distributional di fferences are accounted for in an econometric model, however, there appears to be virtually no di fference between the "average" first-time and repeat home- buyers in their probabilities of default. Therefore the di fference in the first-time and repeat homebuyer loan performance is due to the diff erence in distributional make-up of the two groups in terms of borrower, loan, and property characteristics and not because fi rst-time homebuyers are an inherently riskier group. As long as the borrower, property, and loan characteristics known at the time of origination are able to determine a borrower's ability to repay well and risk is priced accordingly, there should not be a concern that the average first-time homebuyer mortgages are inherently any riskier than the average repeat home- buyer mortgages once those characteristics are taken into account. Both types of mortgages can be expected to default at a similar rate if borrowers, loans, and properties are similar in all other regards.

by Calculated Risk on 7/09/2015 08:33:00 AM

The DOL reported:

In the week ending July 4, the advance figure for seasonally adjusted initial claims was 297,000, an increase of 15,000 from the previous week's revised level. The previous week's level was revised up by 1,000 from 281,000 to 282,000. The 4-week moving average was 279,500, an increase of 4,500 from the previous week's revised average. The previous week's average was revised up by 250 from 274,750 to 275,000.

There were no special factors impacting this week's initial claims.

The previous week was revised up by 1,000.

The following graph shows the 4-week moving average of weekly claims since 1971.

Click on graph for larger image.


The dashed line on the graph is the current 4-week average. The four-week average of weekly unemployment claims increased to 279,500.

This was above the consensus forecast of 275,000, however the low level of the 4-week average suggests few layoffs.

by Calculated Risk on 7/08/2015 08:04:00 PM

From the Financial Times: Lew and Lagarde raise pressure on EU to avoid Grexit.  Both the US and the IMF are pushing for debt relief, but it doesn't seem like anyone is listening.

From the WSJ: Greece Requests Three-Year Bailout in First Step Toward Meeting Creditors’ Demand

The government in Athens formally asked for a three-year bailout from the eurozone’s rescue fund on Wednesday and pledged to start implementing some economic-policy overhauls by early next week, according to a copy of the request seen by The Wall Street Journal.

But whether European leaders accept the application for more emergency loans at a crisis summit on Sunday still depends on Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras making a drastic turnaround on pension cuts, tax increases and other austerity measures after five months of often-acrimonious negotiations.

From the NY Times: Greek Debt Dispute Highlights Prospect of a Euro Exit

“We have a Grexit scenario prepared in detail,” Jean-Claude Juncker, the president of the European Commission, said on Tuesday, using the term for a Greek exit from the euro. On the other side, Greece’s leaders have decried similar comments as “blackmail.”

A grim situation - and Greece is already in a Great Depression size slump.

by Calculated Risk on 7/08/2015 04:30:00 PM

Click on graph for larger image.

This graph shows heavy truck sales since 1967 using data from the BEA. The dashed line is the June 2015 seasonally adjusted annual sales rate (SAAR).

Heavy truck sales really collapsed during the recession, falling to a low of 181 thousand in April 2009 on a seasonally adjusted annual rate basis (SAAR). Since then sales have more than doubled and hit 450 thousand SAAR in June 2015 - even with weakness in the oil sector.

The level in June 2015 was the highest level since February 2007 (over 7 years ago).  Sales have been above 400 thousand SAAR for 12 consecutive months, are now above the average (and median) of the last 20 years.

by Calculated Risk on 7/08/2015 02:06:00 PM

From the Fed: Minutes of the Federal Open Market Committee, June 16-17, 2015 . Excerpts:

While participants generally saw the risks to their projections of economic activity and the labor market as balanced, they gave a number of reasons to be cautious in assessing the outlook. Some pointed to the risk that the weaker-than-anticipated rise in economic activity over the first half of the year could reflect factors that might continue to restrain sales and production, and that economic activity might not have sufficient momentum to sustain progress toward the Committee's objectives. In particular, they were concerned that consumers could remain cautious or that the drag on sectors affected by lower energy prices and the higher dollar could persist. Others, however, viewed the strength in the labor market in recent months as potentially signaling a stronger-than-expected bounceback in economic activity. Several mentioned their uncertainty about whether Greece and its official creditors would reach an agreement and about the likely pace of economic growth abroad, particularly in China and other emerging market economies. Other concerns were related to whether the apparent weakness in productivity growth recently would be reversed or continue. On the one hand, a rebound in productivity growth in coming quarters might restrain hiring and slow the improvement in labor market conditions. On the other hand, if productivity growth remained weak, the labor market might tighten more quickly and inflation might rise more rapidly than anticipated.
...
During their discussion of economic conditions and monetary policy, participants commented on a number of considerations associated with the timing and pace of policy normalization. Most participants judged that the conditions for policy firming had not yet been achieved; a number of them cautioned against a premature decision. Many participants emphasized that, in order to determine that the criteria for beginning policy normalization had been met, they would need additional information indicating that economic growth was strengthening, that labor market conditions were continuing to improve, and that inflation was moving back toward the Committee's objective. Other concerns that were mentioned were the potential erosion of the Committee's credibility if inflation were to persist below 2 percent and the limited ability of monetary policy to offset downside shocks to inflation and economic activity when the federal funds rate was at its effective lower bound. Some participants viewed the economic conditions for increasing the target range for the federal funds rate as having been met or were confident that they would be met shortly.
emphasis added