by Calculated Risk on 10/01/2012 01:05:00 PM

From Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke: Five Questions about the Federal Reserve and Monetary Policy. Here are the five questions Bernanke tried to answer:

1. What are the Fed's objectives, and how is it trying to meet them?
2. What's the relationship between the Fed's monetary policy and the fiscal decisions of the Administration and the Congress?
3. What is the risk that the Fed's accommodative monetary policy will lead to inflation?
4. How does the Fed's monetary policy affect savers and investors?
5. How is the Federal Reserve held accountable in our democratic society?

An excerpt on inflation:

With monetary policy being so accommodative now, though, it is not unreasonable to ask whether we are sowing the seeds of future inflation. A related question I sometimes hear--which bears also on the relationship between monetary and fiscal policy, is this: By buying securities, are you "monetizing the debt"--printing money for the government to use--and will that inevitably lead to higher inflation? No, that's not what is happening, and that will not happen. Monetizing the debt means using money creation as a permanent source of financing for government spending. In contrast, we are acquiring Treasury securities on the open market and only on a temporary basis, with the goal of supporting the economic recovery through lower interest rates. At the appropriate time, the Federal Reserve will gradually sell these securities or let them mature, as needed, to return its balance sheet to a more normal size. Moreover, the way the Fed finances its securities purchases is by creating reserves in the banking system. Increased bank reserves held at the Fed don't necessarily translate into more money or cash in circulation, and, indeed, broad measures of the supply of money have not grown especially quickly, on balance, over the past few years.

For controlling inflation, the key question is whether the Federal Reserve has the policy tools to tighten monetary conditions at the appropriate time so as to prevent the emergence of inflationary pressures down the road. I'm confident that we have the necessary tools to withdraw policy accommodation when needed, and that we can do so in a way that allows us to shrink our balance sheet in a deliberate and orderly way. For example, the Fed can tighten policy, even if our balance sheet remains large, by increasing the interest rate we pay banks on reserve balances they deposit at the Fed. Because banks will not lend at rates lower than what they can earn at the Fed, such an action should serve to raise rates and tighten credit conditions more generally, preventing any tendency toward overheating in the economy.

Of course, having effective tools is one thing; using them in a timely way, neither too early nor too late, is another. Determining precisely the right time to "take away the punch bowl" is always a challenge for central bankers, but that is true whether they are using traditional or nontraditional policy tools. I can assure you that my colleagues and I will carefully consider how best to foster both of our mandated objectives, maximum employment and price stability, when the time comes to make these decisions.

by Calculated Risk on 10/01/2012 11:36:00 AM

Note: There were upward revisions to construction spending for June and July (especially for residential investment). Without the upward revisions, construction spending would have increased in August compared to July.

This morning the Census Bureau reported that overall construction spending decreased in August:

The U.S. Census Bureau of the Department of Commerce announced today that construction spending during August 2012 was estimated at a seasonally adjusted annual rate of $837.1 billion, 0.6 percent below the revised July estimate of $842.0 billion. The August figure is 6.5 percent above the August 2011 estimate of $786.3 billion.

Both private construction spending and public spending declined:

Spending on private construction was at a seasonally adjusted annual rate of $562.2 billion, 0.5 percent below the revised July estimate of $564.8 billion. ... In August, the estimated seasonally adjusted annual rate of public construction spending was $274.9 billion, 0.8 percent below the revised July estimate of $277.2 billion.

Click on graph for larger image.

This graph shows private residential and nonresidential construction spending, and public spending, since 1993. Note: nominal dollars, not inflation adjusted.

Private residential spending is 60% below the peak in early 2006, and up 23% from the post-bubble low. Non-residential spending is 30% below the peak in January 2008, and up about 27% from the recent low.

Public construction spending is now 16% below the peak in March 2009 and near the post-bubble low.

The second graph shows the year-over-year change in construction spending.

On a year-over-year basis, private residential construction spending is now up 18%. Non-residential spending is also up 7% year-over-year mostly due to energy spending (power and electric). Public spending is down 3% year-over-year.

UPDATE: Apparently I wasn't clear - spending in August would have been up compared to July without the upward revision to July spending. With both June and July revised up, this report was decent. Residential construction spending was up in August, and the solid year-over-year increase in private residential investment is a positive for the economy (the increase in 2010 was related to the tax credit).
All Housing Investment and Construction Graphs

by Calculated Risk on 10/01/2012 10:00:00 AM

The ISM index indicated expansion after three consecutive months of contraction. PMI was at 51.5% in September, up from 49.6% in August. The employment index was at 54.7%, up from 51.6%, and the new orders index was at 52.3%, up from 47.1%.

From the Institute for Supply Management: September 2012 Manufacturing ISM Report On Business®

Economic activity in the manufacturing sector expanded in September following three consecutive months of slight contraction, and the overall economy grew for the 40th consecutive month, say the nation's supply executives in the latest Manufacturing ISM Report On Business®.

The report was issued today by Bradley J. Holcomb, CPSM, CPSD, chair of the Institute for Supply Management™ Manufacturing Business Survey Committee. "The PMI™ registered 51.5 percent, an increase of 1.9 percentage points from August's reading of 49.6 percent, indicating a return to expansion after contracting for three consecutive months. The New Orders Index registered 52.3 percent, an increase of 5.2 percentage points from August, indicating growth in new orders after three consecutive months of contraction. The Production Index registered 49.5 percent, an increase of 2.3 percentage points and indicating contraction in production for the second time since May 2009. The Employment Index increased by 3.1 percentage points, registering 54.7 percent. The Prices Index increased 4 percentage points from its August reading to 58 percent. Comments from the panel reflect a mix of optimism over new orders beginning to pick up, and continued concern over soft global business conditions and an unsettled political environment."

Click on graph for larger image.

Here is a long term graph of the ISM manufacturing index.

This was above expectations of 49.7% and suggests manufacturing expanded in September. The internals were positive too with new orders and employment increasing.

by Calculated Risk on 9/30/2012 09:07:00 PM

For the economic question contest in September, the leaders were (Congratulations all!):

1st: Andrew Marrinson
2nd: Daniel Brawdy
3rd tie: Billy Forney, Walt Tucker

On Monday:
• At 10:00 AM ET, the ISM Manufacturing Index for September will be released. The ISM index has shown contraction for three consecutive months; the first contraction in the ISM index since the recession ended in 2009. The consensus is for an increase to 49.7, up from 49.6 in August. (below 50 is contraction).

• At 10:00 AM, the Construction Spending report for August will be released. The consensus is for a 0.6% increase in construction spending.

• At 12:30 PM, Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke will speak: "Five Questions about the Federal Reserve and Monetary Policy", At the Economic Club of Indiana, Indianapolis, Indiana

The Asian markets are mixed tonight, with the Nikkei down 0.6%.

From CNBC: Pre-Market Data and Bloomberg futures: the S&P futures are down slightly, and the DOW futures up slightly.

Oil prices are mixed with WTI futures up slightly at $92.19 and Brent down at $112.07 per barrel.

Yesterday:
• Summary for Week Ending Sept 28th
• Schedule for Week of Sept 30th

Five questions this week for the October economic prediction contest (Note: You can now use Facebook, Twitter, or OpenID to log in).

by Calculated Risk on 9/30/2012 12:40:00 PM

Some of Mark Zandi's analysis has been excellent, but I think he is wrong about the housing tax credit and confused about some of the timing of the housing bust.

First, from Mark Zandi, chief economist at Moody’s Analytics in the WaPo: Obama policies ended housing free fall

Temporary tax credits also enticed home buyers to act sooner rather than later, breaking a self-reinforcing deflationary cycle in the housing market. Prospective buyers had remained on the sidelines, waiting for prices to stop falling, and their reluctance caused prices to drop still more.

The tax credits didn’t spark additional home sales so much as pull sales forward from the future; sales weakened sharply as soon as the credits expired. The credits also were expensive, costing the Treasury tens of billions of dollars, and much of the benefit went to home buyers who would have bought homes anyway. But the tax benefit gave buyers a reason to stop waiting, ending the downdraft in prices.

Critics charge that the government’s intervention was costly and ineffective, that the administration should have let the housing market sort things out on its own. This would have been a reasonable position if house prices had been too high when Obama’s policies kicked in; but they weren’t. By the time Obama took office, prices had fallen substantially; with low mortgage rates factored in, homes were as affordable as ever. Investors knew this, and as soon as they saw prices nearing the bottom, they began snapping up distressed properties. These investors weren’t house flippers, like those who fueled the housing bubble, but long-term players seeing bargains. Obama’s efforts to shore up housing were well timed.

First, house prices declined about 7.5% from January 2009 to the recent low earlier this year. In real terms, house prices declined about 16% from January 2009 to the recent low!. How can Zandi say the tax credit ended "the downdraft in prices"? That is incorrect.

Most of the decline in house prices happened before January 2009, but the decline since early 2009 would still have been the largest decline in house prices nationally from the Depression through 2006. Only a few regional house price declines (like California in the early '90s) were larger than the 16% real decline over the last 3+ years!

In fact the housing tax credit was expensive and ineffective. I opposed the tax credit early and often. The tax credit for buying new homes was especially dumb. A key problem during the housing bust was the excess supply of vacant housing units, and incentivizing people to buy new homes (and add to the supply) made no sense at all.

Of course the Obama Administration doesn't deserve all the blame for the housing tax credit blunder; the tax credit was originally proposed by Senators Johnny Isakson (R) and Joe Lieberman (I). 

Zandi makes another mistake when he conflates investor buying and affordability: "with low mortgage rates factored in, homes were as affordable as ever". The buy-and-rent investors really started buying in late 2008 and early 2009 - and those investors paid cash (low mortgage rates were NOT a factor). At that time the private label securities (Wall Street) were dumping foreclosed properties in mostly low priced areas, and investors responded by buying for the cash flow opportunity. It is correct that prices bottomed earlier in many of those areas (the "destickification" of prices due to PLS dumping), but prices declined in most areas for a few more years.

By now I'd hope that everyone would realize 1) that the housing tax credit was a policy mistake, and 2) most house prices declined significantly over the last 3+ years.

Yesterday:
• Summary for Week Ending Sept 28th
• Schedule for Week of Sept 30th