by Calculated Risk on 10/22/2009 12:08:00 AM

From the Mercury News: Santa Clara County apartment rents plunge

Apartment rents plunged 10 percent in Santa Clara County in the third quarter compared with a year earlier, the biggest decline in any metro area in the Western United States ...

From the Las Vegas Sun: LV apartment rental rates decline in third quarter

RealFacts ... said the average asking price for apartments in the Las Vegas area in the quarter was $837, down 2.1 percent from $855 in the second quarter and down 5.7 percent from $887 one year ago.

From Bloomberg: Apartment Rents Decline in U.S. West as Unemployment Increases

Apartment rents declined throughout the U.S. West and South in the third quarter as rising unemployment made it harder for landlords to raise their rates.

The average asking rent fell to $965 from $1,002 a year earlier, said Novato, California-based RealFacts, which surveyed owners of more than 12,600 complexes. The occupancy rate dipped below 92 percent from almost 93 percent a year earlier.
...
In California’s Oxnard-Thousand Oaks-Ventura region, rents fell 7.4 percent to $1,429, and in the Seattle area they dropped 7.3 percent to $1,036.

Falling rents is great for renters, but it means falling apartment values, more losses for lenders and CMBS investors, more pressure on home prices, and possibly a declining CPI (rent is the largest component).

by Calculated Risk on 10/21/2009 08:22:00 PM

From the Financial Times: Top China banker warns on asset bubbles

The Financial Times quotes Qin Xiao, chairman of China Merchants Bank, arguing that "it is urgent" for China to shift to a neutral monetary policy because of asset price increases.

The stimulus package in China is huge:

... China’s stimulus measures could amount to 15-17 per cent of GDP this year if government-induced bank lending is taken into account – by far the largest among major economies.
excerpted with permission

And from the WSJ: China Gains Confidence in Recovery

China's recovery is becoming broader and potentially more sustainable, a shift that could provide better support for a still-fragile global economy. ... Economic data for the third quarter ... are expected to show that gross domestic product grew by around 9% from a year earlier.
...
As the fastest-growing major economy, China has a key role to play in pulling the world out of the deep slump it fell into last year. But its rebound this year has been so quick, and driven by such a huge flood of money from the state-controlled banking system, that many investors have questioned whether the expansion can continue for much longer.

This is a key point for China and the global economy. If China slows down too quickly, the global recovery could stall.

by Calculated Risk on 10/21/2009 05:13:00 PM

Dave Altig writes at Macroblog: The growing case for a jobless recovery

Dr. Altig reviews several recent Macroblog posts, and adds:

The percentage of employee separations labeled permanent is at a recorded high.

Underneath the usual total unemployment numbers are the reasons an individual is unemployed: You are on temporary layoff; you quit your job; you have reentered the labor market and have yet to find a job; or you are entering the job market for the first time and have yet to find a job. Or, finally, you have been permanently separated from your previous employer, who has no expectation of hiring you back.

The last category is the dominant reason for unemployment at this time. That might not seem surprising, but it actually is. Never, in the six recessions preceding the latest one, did permanent separations account for more than 45 percent of the unemployed. The current percentage stands at 56 percent as of September and appears to be still climbing:


Of course, none of this is proof positive that we are in for a "jobless recovery," but, to me, the odds appear to be increasing.

So far the current recovery is even worse than "jobless"; it is a "job-loss" recovery.

by Calculated Risk on 10/21/2009 03:02:00 PM

From the Fed: Beige Book

Reports from the 12 Federal Reserve Districts indicated either stabilization or modest improvements in many sectors since the last report, albeit often from depressed levels. Leading the more positive sector reports among Districts were residential real estate and manufacturing, both of which continued a pattern of improvement that emerged over the summer. Reports on consumer spending and nonfinancial services were mixed. Commercial real estate was reported to be one of the weakest sectors, although reports of weakness or moderate decline were frequently noted in other sectors.

On real estate:

Most Districts reported that housing market conditions improved in recent weeks, primarily from a pickup in sales of low- to middle-priced houses. Contacts reported that sales were boosted by the government's tax credit for first-time homebuyers. Resale activity also edged up in parts of the New York District, although prices continued to be depressed due to a substantial volume of foreclosures and short sales. New and existing home sales remained flat in the Philadelphia District, and home sales continued to decline throughout the St. Louis District. Sales of higher-priced homes were very slow, according to Philadelphia, Cleveland, and Kansas City. Moreover, real estate agents in the Boston and Cleveland Districts were uncertain about the future of home sales once the tax credit expires. Availability of financing continued to be a concern for potential buyers in the Cleveland and Chicago Districts.
...
Commercial real estate continued to weaken across the 12 Districts, although even this sector had scattered bright spots. Each District indicated that demand for private commercial real estate was weak, with New York, Philadelphia, Cleveland, Atlanta, Chicago, St. Louis, Kansas City, and San Francisco all characterizing activity as declining further since the last report. An inability to obtain credit was often cited as a problem for businesses that wanted to purchase or build space. High vacancy rates were noted as a key concern especially for landlords who were not offering concessions. And, while industrial real estate in the Richmond District was generally weak, renewed interest by retailers to revisit postponed expansion plans was also noted. Finally, public nonresidential construction activity funded by federal stimulus projects was a source of strength in the Cleveland, Chicago, Minneapolis, and Dallas Districts, but gains were often offset by state and local government cutbacks.

by Calculated Risk on 10/21/2009 01:30:00 PM

Yesterday both former Fed Chairman Paul Volcker and BofE Governor Mervyn King argued to break up the big banks. Fed Governor Tarullo disagrees.

From Fed Governor Daniel Tarullo: Confronting Too Big to Fail

One approach suggested by a number of commentators is to reverse the 30-year trend that allowed progressively more financial activities within commercial banks and more affiliations with non-bank financial firms. The idea is presumably to insulate insured depository institutions from trading or other capital market activities that are thought riskier than traditional lending functions. There are, however, at least two reasons why this strategy seems unlikely to limit the too-big-to-fail problem to a significant degree. One is that, historically at least, some very large institutions got themselves into a good deal of trouble through risky lending alone. Moreover, as we have already seen in the experience with Bear Stearns and Lehman, firms without commercial banking operations can now also pose a too-big-to-fail threat.

Another approach would be to attack the bigness problem head-on by limiting the size or interconnectedness of financial institutions. Some observers have even suggested that existing large firms should be split up into smaller, not-too-big-to-fail entities, in a manner a bit reminiscent of the break-up of AT&T in the early 1980s. Of course, the conceptual and practical challenges in breaking up the nation’s largest financial institutions would be considerably more daunting than those faced by Judge Greene in creating four regional operating companies and a long distance carrier out of the old AT&T. Indeed, to my knowledge, no one has offered anything like standards for undertaking this task, much less a blueprint for how it would be accomplished. This is, in other words, more a provocative idea than a proposal. Like many a provocative idea, though, even in an unelaborated form it can focus attention on the relative effectiveness of alternative policy proposals.

The fact that the largest financial firms will account for a significantly larger share of total industry assets after the crisis than they did before can only add to the uneasiness of those worried about the too-big-to-fail phenomenon. It is notable that current law provides very little in the way of structural means to limit systemic risk and the too-big-to-fail problem. The statutory prohibition on interstate acquisitions that would result in a commercial bank and its affiliates holding more than 10 percent of insured deposits nationwide is the closest thing to such an instrument. Policymakers and policy commentators alike might usefully attempt to develop similarly discrete mechanisms that could be beneficial in containing the too-big-to-fail problem. As must be apparent from my remarks today, my strong suspicion is that an effective response to the problem will likely require multiple, mutually reinforcing instruments.
emphasis added

Tarullo suggests:

A regulatory response for the too-big-to-fail problem would enhance the safety and soundness of large financial institutions and thereby reduce the likelihood of severe financial distress that could raise the prospect of systemic effects. Such a response consists of three elements.

First, the shortcomings of the regulations that failed to protect the stability of the firms and the financial system need to be rectified. Regulatory capital requirements can balance the incentive to excessive risk-taking that may arise when there is believed to be government support for a firm, or at least some of its liabilities. There is little doubt that capital levels prior to the crisis were insufficient to serve their functions as an adequate constraint on leverage and a buffer against loss. The Federal Reserve has worked with other U.S. and foreign supervisors to strengthen capital, liquidity, and risk-management requirements for banking organizations. In particular, higher capital requirements for trading activities and securitization exposures have already been agreed. Work continues on improving the quality of capital and counteracting the procyclical tendencies of important areas of financial regulation, such as capital and accounting standards.

These regulatory changes are surely a necessary part of a response to the too-big-to-fail problem, but there is good reason to doubt that they are sufficient. Generally applicable capital and other regulatory requirements do not take account of the specifically systemic consequences of the failure of a large institution. It is for this reason that many have proposed a second kind of regulatory response--a special charge, possibly a special capital requirement, based on the systemic importance of a firm. Ideally, this requirement would be calibrated so as to begin to bite gradually as a firm’s systemic importance increased, so as to avoid the need for identifying which firms are considered too-big-to-fail and, thereby, perhaps increasing moral hazard.
...
A third regulatory change is in some respects the most obvious and straightforward: Any firm whose failure could have serious systemic consequences ought to be subject to regulatory requirements such as those I have just described.