by Calculated Risk on 7/07/2009 12:21:00 PM

From HotelNewsNow: Industry enters 20th month of recession

Economic research firm e-forecasting.com, in conjunction with Smith Travel Research, announced HIP edged down 0.7 percent in June, following a decline of 1.2 percent in May. HIP, the Hotel Industry’s Pulse index, is a composite indicator that gauges business activity in the U.S. hotel industry in real-time. The latest decrease brought the index to a reading of 82.5. The index was set to equal 100 in 2000.
...
“This recession continues to drag out, just one month shy of matching the longest one the industry felt back in May ’81 to January ’83, which lasted 21 months,” said Maria Simos, CEO of e-forecasting.com

Click on graph for larger image in new window.

And a quote from The Arizona Republic: Resorts suffer financial strains (ht Jonathan)

Richard Warnick of Warnick & Co. said he'd be surprised if nearly all hotels and resorts, here and across the country, weren't in technical default on their loans, falling below required minimums on debt service coverage, for example, given the sad state of travel. That is often a precursor to more serious financial problems that prompt lenders to foreclose.
...
He and others say hotels have committed economic suicide by slashing rates to levels not seen even in the aftermath of 9/11, and many are concerned it will take years to get back to "normal," or at least the new normal.

Actually the hotel industry has "committed economic suicide" by overbuilding and taking on too much debt.

Smith Travel Research is now forecasting RevPAR (revenue per available room) off 17.1% this year and declining another 3.7% next year.

by Calculated Risk on 7/07/2009 11:04:00 AM

From the WSJ: Big Banks Don't Want California's IOUs

A group of the biggest U.S. banks said they would stop accepting California's IOUs on Friday ... if California continues to issue the IOUs, creditors will be forced to hold on to them until they mature on Oct. 2, or find other banks to honor them.
...
The group of banks included Bank of America Corp., Citigroup Inc., Wells Fargo & Co. and J.P. Morgan Chase & Co., among others.

I guess the banks don't think the 3.75% annual interest rate is worth the risk for a "BBB" rated debtor on the Rating Watch Negative list.

by Calculated Risk on 7/07/2009 09:25:00 AM

From Bloomberg: U.S. Home-Equity Loan Delinquencies Set Record in First Quarter (ht Bob_in_MA)

Late payments on home-equity loans rose to a record in the first quarter ...

Delinquencies on home-equity loans climbed to 3.52 percent of all accounts in the quarter from 3.03 percent in the fourth and late payments on home-equity lines of credit climbed to a record 1.89 percent, the group said. ...

“The number one driver of delinquencies is job loss,” James Chessen, the group’s chief economist, said in an e-mailed statement. “Delinquencies won’t improve until companies start hiring again and we see a significant economic turnaround.”

Update: headline corrected, ABA, not MBA.

by Calculated Risk on 7/07/2009 08:46:00 AM

From the WSJ: Hybrid Securities Doomed Six Banks (ht Brian)

The six family-controlled Illinois banks that collapsed on Thursday were doomed by massive holdings of trust preferred securities, Wall Street instruments that came into vogue during the industry's boom but are now battering a growing number of small banks.

... Wall Street brokerage firms bought the securities from individual banks and packaged them into collateralized-debt obligations. The firms then sold slices of the CDOs to investors, marketing them as lucrative but low risk. Many of the buyers were small and regional banks.

These trust-preferred securities (TPS) were attractive investments for small banks because they have characteristics of both debt and equity. If the securities were issued by a bank holding company (BHC) - with certain characteristics - they were treated as a tier 1 capital by regulators.

One of the big disadvantages for investors (usually small banks) was that the securities were subordinated to all of the issuing BHC's other debt, and the issuer could opt to stop paying dividends on the securities for several years. As the WSJ notes:

When the credit crisis hit, the values of the securities and pools into which they were packaged rapidly lost value, partly because some banks stopped paying dividends on the securities. Under accounting rules, the banks were required to write down the securities to market value. That forced the banks to absorb big losses, winnowing their capital cushions.

From the Philly Fed: Emerging Issues Regarding Trust Preferred Securities

As of December 31, 2008, almost 1,400 bank holding companies had approximately $148.8 billion in outstanding TPS, compared to 110 BHCs with $31.0 billion outstanding in 1999.
...
TPS have proven to be an effective way to bolster a BHC's capital position when financial performance is strong. If a BHC or its subsidiary bank's financial condition (particularly, its capital levels) deteriorates, however, the limitations on including TPS for regulatory capital purposes and the restrictive covenants in the debentures could further exacerbate the institution's financial problems and raise supervisory concerns.
...
Adverse economic and market conditions have resulted in rating downgrades of TPS and significant valuation declines for these securities. For instance, on February 10, 2009, Standard and Poor's Ratings Services lowered its ratings on 35 tranches from 14 U.S. trust preferred CDOs. These downgrades reflect fears that institutions issuing TPS may be more likely to defer interest payments as the current economic crisis continues.
...
Given the interrelated ownership of a financial institution's TPS by another banking organization, the underlying stability and strength of the issuing bank must be considered when assessing the risk associated with holding a security which is currently in the deferral phase of dividend payment. Given the extensive issuance of TPS over the past 10 years and the present danger for bank failures, the potential exists for many of these securities to default permanently.
emphasis added

by Calculated Risk on 7/07/2009 12:14:00 AM

"It's bad. It's decaying and getting worse. Given the depth and magnitude of the recession, you can argue that we are facing a storm of epic proportions and we're only at the beginning."
Victor Calanog, Reis director of research.

Click on graph for larger image in new window.

This graph shows the office vacancy rate starting 1991.

Reis is reporting the vacancy rose to 15.9% in Q2; the peak following the previous recession was 17%.

From Reuters: US office market continues to spiral down--report

The U.S. office market vacancy rate reached 15.9 percent in the second quarter, its highest in four years and rent fell by the largest amount in more than seven as demand from companies and other office renters remained weak, real estate research firm Reis said Inc.

... Factoring in rent-free months and improvement costs to landlords, effective rent -- the net amount of cash landlords take in -- fell 2.7 percent in the quarter to $23.42 per square foot. The second-quarter drop was more severe than the first quarter's 2.3 percent ...

... Reis ... forecast [is] for the U.S. office vacancy rate to top out at 18.2 percent in 2010 and for rent to continue to fall through 2011.

I'll take the over.