by Calculated Risk on 4/03/2009 05:20:00 PM
Friday, April 03, 2009
Waiting for the FDIC
If you missed this, here is a story about the FDIC takeover of Bank of Clark County: Anatomy Of A Bank Takeover in January.
Here is the audio from NPR. Click on graph for larger image in new window.
The first graph is from Doug Short of dshort.com (financial planner): "Four Bad Bears".
The rally has taken the S&P up almost 25% from the low - but the market is still off 46% from the high.
Note that the Great Depression crash is based on the DOW; the three others are for the S&P 500. The second graph compares four significant bear markets: the Dow during the Great Depression, the NASDAQ, the Nikkei, and the current S&P 500.
See Doug's: "The Mega-Bear Quartet and L-Shaped Recoveries".
The second graph is Updated! about a week old<, but it still tells the tale.
Now back to waiting for the FDIC ...
Chrysler Pier Loans Still Haunting Banks
by Calculated Risk on 4/03/2009 03:51:00 PM
UPDATE: From the WSJ: Banks Balk at Obama Demand to Cut Chrysler Debt
Banks that loaned Chrysler LLC $6.8 billion are resisting government pressure to swap $5 billion of that for stock to slash the car maker's debt, according to several people familiar with the matter ...The banks still holding Chrysler pier loans are facing even more write-downs. (Pier loans are bridge loans that couldn't be sold and have been stuck on the bank's balance sheet). This was obvious before the Cerberus deal even closed: Chrysler's Bankers: Long Walk, Short Pier?
The lenders, which include J.P. Morgan Chase & Co., Goldman Sachs, Citigroup and Morgan Stanley ... own the rights to take control of Chrysler plants and assets, which were pledged as collateral for the loans, if the company files for bankruptcy protection.
...the Obama administration is demanding that these lenders cut their debt by $5 billion of its face value, or about 75%, said people familiar with the talks.
I'm sure Goldman is happy to have sold some of their loans at 80 cents on the dollar in early 2008.
OCC: More Seriously Delinquent Prime Loans than Subprime
by Calculated Risk on 4/03/2009 12:37:00 PM
From the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency and the Office of Thrift Supervision: OCC and OTS Release Mortgage Metrics Report for Fourth Quarter 2008
The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency and the Office of Thrift Supervision today jointly released their quarterly report on first lien mortgage performance for the fourth quarter of 2008. The report covers mortgages serviced by nine large banks and four thrifts, constituting approximately two-thirds of all outstanding mortgages in the United States.Much of the report focuses on modifications and recidivism (see Housing Wire). But this report also shows - for the first time - more seriously delinquent prime loans than subprime loans (by number, not percentage).
The report showed that credit quality continued to decline in the fourth quarter of 2008. At the end of the year, just under 90 percent of mortgages were performing, compared with 93 percent at the end of September 2008. This decline in credit quality was evident in all loan risk categories, with subprime mortgages showing the highest level of serious delinquencies. However, the biggest percentage jump was in prime mortgages, the lowest loan risk category and one that accounts for nearly two-thirds of all mortgages serviced by the reporting institutions. At the end of the fourth quarter, 2.4 percent of prime mortgages were seriously delinquent, more than double the 1.1 percent recorded at the end of March 2008.
emphasis added
Click on graph for larger image.Note: "Approximately 14 percent of loans in the data were not accompanied by credit scores and are classified as “other.” This group includes a mix of prime, Alt-A, and subprime. In large part, the loans were result of acquisitions of loan portfolios from third parties where borrower credit scores at the origination of the loans were not available."
This report covers about two-thirds of all mortgages. There are far more prime loans than subprime loans - and the percentage of delinquent prime loans is much lower than for subprime loans. However, there are now more prime loans than subprime loans seriously delinquent. And prime loans tend to be larger than subprime loans, so the losses from each prime loan will probably be higher.
We're all subprime now!
Bernanke on Fed's Balance Sheet
by Calculated Risk on 4/03/2009 12:08:00 PM
From Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke: The Federal Reserve's Balance Sheet. In this speech Bernanke discusses the recent Fed initiatives in terms of the impact on the balance sheet.
One key question is how all of this will be unwound. Here are some excerpts from Bernanke's speech:
In pursuing our strategy, which I have called "credit easing," we have also taken care to design our programs so that they can be unwound as markets and the economy revive. In particular, these activities must not constrain the exercise of monetary policy as needed to meet our congressional mandate to foster maximum sustainable employment and stable prices.Not that we have to worry about unwinding any time soon.
...
The large volume of reserve balances outstanding must be monitored carefully, as--if not carefully managed--they could complicate the Fed's task of raising short-term interest rates when the economy begins to recover or if inflation expectations were to begin to move higher. We have a number of tools we can use to reduce bank reserves or increase short-term interest rates when that becomes necessary. First, many of our lending programs extend credit primarily on a short-term basis and thus could be wound down relatively quickly. In addition, since the lending rates in these programs are typically set above the rates that prevail in normal market conditions, borrower demand for these facilities should wane as conditions improve. Second, the Federal Reserve can conduct reverse repurchase agreements against its long-term securities holdings to drain bank reserves or, if necessary, it could choose to sell some of its securities. Of course, for any given level of the federal funds rate, an unwinding of lending facilities or a sale of securities would constitute a de facto tightening of policy, and so would have to be carefully considered in that light by the FOMC. Third, some reserves can be soaked up by the Treasury's Supplementary Financing Program. Fourth, in October of last year, the Federal Reserve received long-sought authority to pay interest on the reserve balances of depository institutions. Raising the interest rate paid on reserves will encourage depository institutions to hold reserves with the Fed, rather than lending them into the federal funds market at a rate below the rate paid on reserves. Thus, the interest rate paid on reserves will tend to set a floor on the federal funds rate.
Report: Banks Considering Gaming PPIP
by Calculated Risk on 4/03/2009 10:42:00 AM
The Financial Times reports: Bailed-out banks eye toxic asset buys (ht Scot)
US banks that have received government aid, including Citigroup, Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley and JPMorgan Chase, are considering buying toxic assets to be sold by rivals under the Treasury’s $1,000bn (£680bn) plan to revive the financial system.This is just a report, and it would appear to be inappropriate for any bank receiving TARP funds to buy "legacy assets" using the PPIP. My suggestion is to explicitly ban this activity to help build confidence in the PPIP.
The plans proved controversial, with critics charging that the government’s public-private partnership - which provide generous loans to investors - are intended to help banks sell, rather than acquire, troubled securities and loans.
...
The government plan does not allow banks to buy their own assets, but there is no ban on the purchase of securities and loans sold by others.
“It’s an open programme designed to get markets going,” a Treasury official said. But he added: “It is between a bank and their supervisor whether they are healthy enough to acquire assets,” raising the possibility regulators may prevent weak banks from becoming buyers.


