by Calculated Risk on 3/04/2008 09:50:00 AM

Fed Chairman Bernanke today called for lenders to reduce principal on homeowners with negative equity. He also noted that for properties foreclosed in the fourth quarter, the estimated total losses exceeded 50% percent of the principal balance. Bernanke argued this gives lenders significant incentive to avoid foreclosure and write-down principal.

From Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke: Reducing Preventable Mortgage Foreclosures

This situation calls for a vigorous response. Measures to reduce preventable foreclosures could help not only stressed borrowers but also their communities and, indeed, the broader economy. At the level of the individual community, increases in foreclosed-upon and vacant properties tend to reduce house prices in the local area, affecting other homeowners and municipal tax bases. At the national level, the rise in expected foreclosures could add significantly to the inventory of vacant unsold homes--already at more than 2 million units at the end of 2007--putting further pressure on house prices and housing construction.

Bernanke notes that temporary measures just postpone foreclosure, and he urges lenders to consider reducing principal for homeowners underwater:

Measures that lead to a sustainable outcome are to be preferred to temporary palliatives ...

In cases where refinancing is not possible, the next-best solution may often be some type of loss-mitigation arrangement between the lender and the distressed borrower. Indeed, the Federal Reserve and other regulators have issued guidance urging lenders and servicers to pursue such arrangements as an alternative to foreclosure when feasible and prudent. For the lender or servicer, working out a loan makes economic sense if the net present value (NPV) of the payments under a loss-mitigation strategy exceeds the NPV of payments that would be received in foreclosure. Loss mitigation is made more attractive by the fact that foreclosure costs are often substantial. Historically, the foreclosure process has usually taken from a few months up to a year and a half, depending on state law and whether the borrower files for bankruptcy. The losses to the lender include the missed mortgage payments during that period, taxes, legal and administrative fees, real estate owned (REO) sales commissions, and maintenance expenses. Additional losses arise from the reduction in value associated with repossessed properties, particularly if they are unoccupied for some period.

A recent estimate based on subprime mortgages foreclosed in the fourth quarter of 2007 indicated that total losses exceeded 50 percent of the principal balance, with legal, sales, and maintenance expenses alone amounting to more than 10 percent of principal. With the time period between the last mortgage payment and REO liquidation lengthening in recent months, this loss rate will likely grow even larger.
...
To date, permanent modifications that have occurred have typically involved a reduction in the interest rate, while reductions of principal balance have been quite rare. The preference by servicers for interest rate reductions could reflect familiarity with that technique, based on past episodes when most borrowers' problems could be solved that way. But the current housing difficulties differ from those in the past, largely because of the pervasiveness of negative equity positions. With low or negative equity, as I have mentioned, a stressed borrower has less ability (because there is no home equity to tap) and less financial incentive to try to remain in the home. In this environment, principal reductions that restore some equity for the homeowner may be a relatively more effective means of avoiding delinquency and foreclosure.

Of course, if it becomes common for lenders to reduce principal, their phones will be ringing off the hook!

by Anonymous on 3/04/2008 09:30:00 AM

She's at it again.

Now, listen: this post isn't about defending actual incidents of fee-gouging. It isn't clear to me that the article in question has its hands on a case of actual fee-gouging. This post is about the idea that while people can write stuff for the NYT that makes no sense and get it published, the rest of us don't have to buy it.

It's a story that makes a claim:

Every home foreclosure is different, of course. But the Wellmans’ case shows the uphill battle facing many troubled borrowers who believe that they are losing their homes for questionable reasons, like onerous fees.

At minimum, I would expect a story about the reason for a foreclosure being onerous fees. I would also expect a story about how hard it is for borrowers to get a day in court ("an uphill battle").

What we got is a jumbled, fragmented narrative, told out of order, which is fashionable in the newspapers these days. I tend to suspect that this is because told in order, with full details, the story doesn't back up the headline. But I am cynical. Perhaps the real reason is that everyone else likes Faulkneresque conventions of narrative dislocation and evocative allusion rather than declarative sentences and Aristotelian unity. Stranger claims have been made before.

Whatever. To aid us old farts, I tried to put together all the actual facts reported in chronological order. This is what I got:

Our borrower, Wellman, built the house himself. He started in 1990 and finished in 1992.

In 1996 Wellman lost his job and got behind on "the mortgage." I don't know when the mortgage was made. I don't know who made it. Between 1996 and today, at some point, the Wellmans have filed BK five times. Have they ever completed one? Beats me.

In 2002, Nat City started foreclosure against the Wellmans. Apparently there was a problem with the assignment of mortgage having been filed subsequent to the FC filing. The judge seems to have slapped Nat City around a little, but did not dismiss the FC filing.

Apparently it got straightened out who owns the loan, because in 2003 the Wellmans signed a "forbearance agreement" with Nat City, the terms of which are undisclosed.

In 2004, Wellman asked a local accountant to look over his loan records, and the accountant said Nat City was off by $38,612. Wellman stopped making payments and got a lawyer.

It went to court, and in 2006 the accountant testified that the charges were improper. Nat City apparently testified that the charges were proper. The judge "found that the Wellmans were bound by the agreement they signed in 2003." It isn't spelled out what that means; I can only assume it means that agreement signed stipulated that the Wellmans would pay these charges that they subsequently objected to. I suspect it also means that the folderol about who really owns the note is no longer an issue, since signing an agreement to repay Nat City would mean the borrowers acknowledged that they owe Nat City. But we don't get that spelled out.

The thing apparently went to an appellate court, who apparently also found in favor of Nat City.

As of today, it appears that Mrs. Wellman has a job and Mr. Wellman is a self-employed inventor.

As of today, Gretchen Morgenson is still worried about the fact that a person testified to something in 2006, and the trial court didn't buy it. I'm wondering how often that happens.

So, anyway. The Wellmans have a history of financial distress going back for more than ten years. They got an accountant to work for them, and they have had a lawyer working for them for free for three years. They got a day in trial court and a day in appellate court. It appears that they have not made any mortgage payments--even regular payments, ignoring those contested fees--since 2004.

What is the obvious conclusion to draw?

Okay, now you can read the appellate decision.

A note to anyone in trouble with a mortgage: if you are asked to sign something, read it. If it stipulates that you have been represented by an attorney, don't sign it unless you are really represented by an attorney. If it has a dollar amount on it you are agreeing to repay, demand an itemization before you sign, not afterwards. If you really aren't sure that the other party to the agreement owns your loan, don't sign it. If it says that foreclosure will commence if you stop paying, it means it.

Best possible thing you can do: see a lawyer.

Worst possible thing you can do: read the New York Times.

by Calculated Risk on 3/04/2008 12:58:00 AM

From the WSJ: Building Slowdown Goes Commercial. A few excerpts:

In the past few years, builders aggressively put up stores and strip malls amid easy financing and resilient consumer spending. Spending on construction of shopping centers leapt 67% in 2007 from 2005 levels.

Last year, developers built 144 million square feet of retail projects in the top 54 U.S. markets and are slated to build another 131 million square feet this year, according to Property & Portfolio Research Inc., a Boston research company. Property & Portfolio Research calculates that demand justified 36% of the new space built last year and will support 15.7% of the space slated to be completed this year.

A sign that construction is about to cool off, perhaps sharply: The American Institute of Architects' monthly index of billings at architecture firms was down 14% in January from its peak in July. That means fewer construction projects will start this year, said AIA Chief Economist Kermit Baker.

There are many other details in the story - it definitely appears the CRE slump has started.

by Calculated Risk on 3/03/2008 04:39:00 PM

Warren Buffett was interviewed for three hours on CNBC today. Here is the transcript and a brief excerpt on housing prices (hat tip cord):

LIESMAN: One of the most striking things in this poll is for the first time--we've done this for four quarters now--Americans now look for a decline in their home values. What's the significance of that from an economic point of view, Mr. Buffett?

BUFFETT: Well, it has a huge effect because, you know, with 60 percent-plus of the American people being homeowners, as being a huge asset--and in many cases it's a leverage asset--it obviously is going to be on their mind big time. And I get the figures every month. We have a number of real estate brokerage operations around the country, and I get the--I get the figures from many markets on listings and sales, and I've seen something like Dade and Broward County go from 6,000 listings and 3600 sales a month to where they're now, I think, 82,000 listings and about 1500 sales a month. So unless there's some major intervention by the government in some way, or something of the sort, home prices have not stopped going down. Now, they will at some point.

QUICK: Any of the intervention plans we've seen from the government strike you as being a good idea?

BUFFETT: Well, that--I haven't seen the details on many of them, but I think it's very hard to start interfering with markets without having a whole lot of unintended consequences.

And on a recession:

QUICK: Let's move on to David from Defiance, Ohio. He asks, `How would you define a recession?' This is something we talk an awful lot about on the show, but he says, `I've been listening to a lot of discussions on CNBC, some of which can be very annoying because they tend to be so outrageously vocal and the experts believe two quarters of negative growth qualifies as a recession.' Is that the surest definition of it? Or do you think it's broader than just that?

BUFFETT: Well, it's the standard definition, but if you think about it, population grows 1 percent of year. So you could have growth of GDP of a 1/2 a percent, but GDP per capita would be going down. So the very definition, you might say, is a little bit flawed if it--if it doesn't allow for the fact that GDP per capita can go down while growth GDP's going up. Beyond that, I would say by any common sense definition, we are in a recession. And...

QUICK: You would?

BUFFETT: Yeah, we wouldn't--we haven't had two consecutive quarters of GDP growth, but I will tell you that, on balance, most people's situation, certainly their net worth has been heading south now for a considerable period of time. And if you owned a house, and you had an 80 percent mortgage on it, and so you had 20 percent equity a year ago, you might not have any equity now. And millions of people are in positions somewhat similar to that, and people would--people that own municipal bonds feel poorer today than they did a few months ago.

QUICK: Mm-hmm.

BUFFETT: So business is slowing down. We have--we have retail stores in candy and home furnishings and jewelry; across the board I'm seeing a significant slowdown and, of course...

QUICK: That's the first time I've heard you say you think we're actually in a recession right now.

BUFFETT: Yeah, well, I think, when we talked earlier, I said we might be.

QUICK: Right.

BUFFETT: But it--no, I would--I would say that--but when I say we're in a recession, it doesn't meet the technical definition. We aren't in the second quarter of--we can't be because we don't know what the fourth quarter of last year was. But I think that, from a commonsense standpoint, we're in a recession now.

by Calculated Risk on 3/03/2008 02:21:00 PM

From MarketWatch: GM February U.S. light vehicle sales fall 12.9%

General Motors ... on Monday reported a 12.9% decline in February U.S. light vehicle sales to 308,411 cars and trucks.

Also from MarketWatch: Ford, Toyota sell fewer cars in February

Ford said it sold 196,681 cars and trucks last month, down 6.9% from 211,150 a year earlier.

Toyota ... reported that February U.S. sales fell 2.8% to 182,169 vehicles, down from 187,330 last year.

Maybe Chrysler will save the day ...

Update: Ooops, Guess not (Chrylser saving the day). From MarketWatch:

Chrysler Feb. U.S. sales fall 14% to 150,093 vehicles

by Calculated Risk on 3/03/2008 11:58:00 AM

Remarks from Secretary Paulson:

First, many in Washington and many financial institutions have been floating proposals for a major government intervention in the housing market, with U.S. taxpayers assuming the costs of the riskiest mortgages. Today, 93 percent of American homeowners – 51 million households - pay their mortgages on time. Many are on tight budgets, sacrificing other things in order to make that payment. Only 2 percent are in foreclosure.

Most of the proposals I've seen would do more harm than good --- bailing out investors, lenders or speculators who, instead of getting a free-pass, should be accountable for the risks they took. Let me be clear: I oppose any bailout. I believe our efforts are best focused on helping homeowners who want to stay in their homes.

Second, this is a shared responsibility of industry, government and homeowners. We in government are working to expand options through the FHA, and we've worked with the industry to reach as many homeowners as possible to let them know that help is available. There is more that government and industry can do, and our efforts will continue to evolve. Homeowners have responsibilities as well. If borrowers won't ask about solutions, there is only so much that can be done on their behalf.

Third, the current public discussion often conflates the number of so-called "underwater" homeowners – that is, those with mortgages greater than the value of their house – with projections of foreclosures. Let's be precise: being underwater does not affect your ability to pay your mortgage, nor create a government responsibility for assistance. Homeowners who can afford their mortgage should honor their obligations --- and most do.

Obviously, being underwater is not insignificant to homeowners in that position. But negative equity does not necessarily result in foreclosure. Most people buy homes as a long-term investment, as a place to raise a family and put down roots in a community. Homeowners who can afford their payments and don't have to move, can choose to stay in their house. And let me emphasize, any homeowner who can afford his mortgage payment but chooses to walk away from an underwater property is simply a speculator – and one who is not honoring his obligations.

We know that speculation increased in recent years; a resulting increase in foreclosures is to be expected and does not warrant any relief. People who speculated and bought investment properties in hot markets should take their losses just like day traders who speculated and bought soaring tech stocks in 2000.

by Calculated Risk on 3/03/2008 11:38:00 AM

From OFHEO: OFHEO, NY Attorney General, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac Sign Agreements to Combat Appraisal Fraud

There are many significant provisions in the agreements that are designed to strengthen the independence of appraisers, including eliminating broker-ordered appraisals, prohibiting appraiser coercion, and reducing the use of appraisals prepared in-house or through captive appraisal management companies in underwriting mortgages. The agreements also enhance quality control in the appraisal process and establish a complaint hotline for consumers. The agreements include a Home Valuation Code of Conduct that the Enterprises will apply to lenders selling mortgages to Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac. The Code becomes effective on January 1, 2009.

The parties also agreed to establish and the Enterprises fund an Independent Valuation Protection Institute designed to supplement current efforts to provide an appraisal complaint process, mediation of appraisal disputes, and mortgage fraud reporting.

Tanta had some commentary last week: Fannie Mae New Rules for Appraisals

by Calculated Risk on 3/03/2008 10:07:00 AM

Spending declined in January for both residential and non-residential private construction. This is additional evidence that the non-residential slowdown is here.

From the Census Bureau: January 2008 Construction at $1,121.5 Billion Annual Rate

Spending on private construction was at a seasonally adjusted annual rate of $827.4 billion, 2.2 percent below the revised December estimate of $845.7 billion.

Residential construction was at a seasonally adjusted annual rate of $455.8 billion in January, 3.0 percent below the revised December estimate of $469.7 billion.

Nonresidential construction was at a seasonally adjusted annual rate of $371.6 billion in January, 1.2 percent below the revised December estimate of $376.0 billion.

Click on graph for larger image.

The graph shows private residential and nonresidential construction spending since 1993.

Over the last couple of years, as residential spending has declined, nonresidential has been very strong. This is additional evidence - along with the Fed's Loan Officer Survey and other data - that suggests the slowdown in nonresidential spending is here.

by Anonymous on 3/03/2008 08:34:00 AM

More credit tightening:

Take Robert Whittaker, a Sykesville, Md., homeowner who sought to refinance a $260,000 first mortgage when 30-year rates fell below 6 percent. Whittaker's interest-only adjustable rate loan was scheduled for a hefty payment reset.

Whittaker, who bought his house four years ago, contacted a mortgage broker who was able to arrange a new $260,000 loan at a fixed rate of 5.5 percent for 30 years. All that was needed was for the lender holding a $70,000 second mortgage on Whittaker's house to agree to a routine request that to keep its second lien "subordinated" to the new first mortgage. That would leave the lender in the second payoff position in a foreclosure.

Whittaker expected no problems: He wasn't seeking to increase his overall debt, his credit scores were solid, Fannie Mae approved the refinance transaction and his appraisal came in at $384,500 -- nearly $55,000 more than his combined mortgage balances.

His broker submitted the request to the second lender, Cleveland-based National City Corp., Feb. 1, expecting quick approval. On Feb. 18, the bank told employees in an internal memo that it was no longer approving requests nationwide for subordinations from second-mortgage customers, such as Whittaker, whose first mortgage was with another firm.

A spokesman for National City, William Eiler, declined to provide the number of loan customers affected and said the bank's reasons were "proprietary." Asked whether blocking customers' ability to refinance could push some of them into foreclosure after payment resets, Eiler said: "We cannot predict that this might occur." The memo, a copy of which was provided to me, acknowledged that the new policy "may not be widely accepted by our customers."

Whittaker's broker, Joseph Liberto, co-owner of Immediate Mortgage Inc. of Ijamsville, Md., called National City's action "outrageous. Here our [federal and state] governments are trying to help people facing big payment increases, and we've got lenders refusing to cooperate -- even when it makes sense for everyone involved."

Nancy Gusman, a real estate lawyer in Prince George's County, Md., outside Washington, D.C., says she is seeing lender roadblocks like Whittaker's every day. "And it's so counterproductive. All the articles you read quote the bank executives saying, 'Contact us. We want to work with you.' Then they turn around and pull stuff like this."

The change at National City illustrates how declining market conditions are affecting borrowers with second liens. Not only are equity credit lines being frozen or reduced, but issues such as subordination stymie borrowers' attempts to refinance.

When property values were soaring during the boom years, requests for subordination were rarely denied if homeowners had decent payment histories. But with prices depreciating in many markets, banks are worried that, even if customers have sterling credit, the bank's security interest in a property may be whittled away.

I'd like to know whether the point of this, for NCC, is to hold out for a pay-down (not necessarily payoff) of that second. (That, frankly, is what I'd be doing if I were National City.) If you assume that the current appraisal is not fantasy, a prime borrower with good credit should be able to get a Fannie Mae cash-out refi at 80% LTV. That would mean the borrower gets a new first lien for $307,600, which pays off the existing $260,000 first lien and leaves $47,600 to pay down the balance of that Nat City second, reducing NCC's exposure from $70,000 to $22,400. In exchange for that, they might be willing to subordinate. Even if this guy could get only a 75% cash-out, that would produce $28,375 to reduce the second lien balance.

Of course the appraisal might be fruitcake on a 1004*, but that's not what this borrower is saying or why all these people are outraged. It would not force this borrower to increase his total indebtedness any, although it would increase the interest rate somewhat on that new first lien, since it's a cash-out instead of a rate/term refi.

If Nat City is really refusing to subordinate in any circumstance, then I would say that's a pretty strange policy. But I really couldn't fault them for trying to negotiate a compromise with this particular borrower, as the details are presented. It means the guy doesn't get his 5.50% rate, but these things happen.

------

*That's insider for "standard appraisal form."

by Calculated Risk on 3/03/2008 12:32:00 AM

From the WSJ: Countrywide's Mortgage Woes Deepen

The ... lender's annual filing with the Securities and Exchange Commission ... showed a big increase in late payments on option adjustable-rate mortgages, known as option ARMs. ...

As of the end of 2007, payments were at least 90 days overdue on 5.4% of option ARMs held as investments by Countrywide's banking arm, up from 0.6% a year earlier. Countrywide held $28.42 billion of such loans as of Dec. 31. The company said 71% of the borrowers were making minimal payments. Only about a fifth of the borrowers were required to document fully their incomes before receiving the loans.
...
Countrywide disclosed that half of the $87.04 billion of mortgage loans held by its bank are backed by homes in California and Florida, two of the states hit hardest by falling home prices.