by Calculated Risk on 2/29/2008 10:51:00 AM

From Bloomberg: MBIA Writing `Very Little' New Business Amid Scrutiny

MBIA Inc. is writing ``very little'' new bond insurance business as borrowers balk at buying a guarantee from a money-losing company without stable AAA credit ratings.

MBIA, whose AAA ratings were under scrutiny by Moody's Investors Service and Standard & Poor's until this week, said losses on mortgage-backed securities will probably increase this year and expand beyond subprime mortgages.

From the MBIA SEC from 10-K.

In the fourth quarter of 2007, the Company observed deterioration in the performance of several of its prime and near prime home equity transactions and established $614 million of case basis reserves for future payments. During the fourth quarter of 2007, the Company paid $44 million in claims, net of reinsurance, on seven credits in this sector. Additionally, in the fourth quarter of 2007, the Company established $200 million of non-specific unallocated loss reserves to reflect MBIA’s estimate of probable losses as a result of the adverse developments in the residential mortgage market related to prime, second-lien mortgage exposure, but which have not yet been specifically identified to individual policies. The Company expects that loss payments on its prime, second-lien mortgage exposure during 2008 will amount to a significant portion of its current reserves for such exposure.

by Calculated Risk on 2/29/2008 10:36:00 AM

More great analysis from Professor Jim Hamilton at Econbrowser: Bernanke's tightrope act

Some analysts are saying that Fed Chair Ben Bernanke is walking a tightrope-- if he does not drop interest rates quickly enough, the U.S. will be in recession, but if he goes too far, we'll see a resurgence of inflation. I am increasingly persuaded that's not an accurate description of the situation.

See Hamilton's excellent analysis. He concludes:

The Fed chief must be worried that a recession in the present instance would precipitate major financial instability, in which case perhaps the choice between paying now and paying later argues in favor of latter.

In any case, the tightrope analogy seems a misleading way to frame the issue, in that it presupposes that there exists a choice for the fed funds rate that would somehow contain both the solvency and the inflation problems. In my opinion, there is no such ideal target rate, and the notion that we can address the difficulties with a sagely chosen combination of monetary and fiscal stimulus and regulatory workout is in my mind doing more harm than good. Better for everyone to admit up front just how bad the problem is, and acknowledge that there is no cheap way out.

No, I don't believe that Bernanke is walking a tightrope at all. But I do hope he's checked out the net that's supposed to catch him if he falls.

I also think Bernanke has chosen a little more inflation: Inflation is Your (Ben's) Friend

by Anonymous on 2/29/2008 07:18:00 AM

There has been some concern in our comments and on other blogs about this bit in Fannie Mae's 10-K published Wednesday:

Beginning in November 2007, we decreased the number of optional delinquent loan purchases from our single-family MBS trusts in order to preserve capital in compliance with our regulatory capital requirements. Although this change in practice may affect our cure rates, it has had no effect on our loss mitigation efforts and, based on current market conditions, is not expected to materially affect the “Reserve for guaranty losses.” We continue to purchase delinquent loans from MBS trusts primarily to modify these loans as part of our strategy to mitigate credit losses and in circumstances in which we are required to do so under our single-family MBS trust documents. Because we are continuing our loss mitigation efforts for delinquent loans, with a primary goal of permitting borrowers to avoid foreclosure, we do not intend to defer purchases of delinquent loans until we are required by our MBS trust documents to purchase the delinquent loans from our MBS trusts. Although we have decreased the number of our optional loan purchases, the total number of loans purchased from MBS trusts may increase in the future, which would result in an increase our SOP 03-3 fair value losses. The total number of loans we purchase from MBS trusts is dependent on a number of factors, including management decisions about appropriate loss mitigation efforts, the expected increase in loan delinquencies within our MBS trusts resulting from the current adverse conditions in the housing market and our need to preserve capital to meet our regulatory capital requirements. For example, we recently introduced a new HomeSaver Advance(tm) initiative, which is a loss mitigation tool that we began implementing in the first quarter of 2008. HomeSaver Advance provides qualified borrowers with an unsecured personal loan in an amount equal to all past due payments relating to their mortgage loan, allowing borrowers to cure their payment defaults under mortgage loans without requiring modification of their mortgage loans. By permitting qualified borrowers to cure their payment defaults without requiring that we purchase the loans from the MBS trusts in order to modify the loans, this loss mitigation tool may reduce the number of delinquent mortgage loans that we purchase from MBS trusts in the future and the fair value losses we record in connection with those purchases. The credit environment remains fluid, and the number of loans that we purchase from our MBS trusts will continue to be affected by events and conditions that occur nationally and in regional markets, as well as changes in our business practices to respond to the current adverse market conditions.

This seems to have a bunch of folks concerned that what Fannie Mae is doing is making unsecured loans to borrowers just so that Fannie doesn't have to buy the loan out of the pool and take a fair value write-down. What it says, of course, is that Fannie Mae certainly intends this program, if it is successful, to reduce the number of mortgages that have to be bought out of the MBS, because the point of the program is to avoid having to do a formal modification of mortgage. If that is successful, it should, in fact, reduce the number of loans Fannie buys out of pools for loss-mitigation purposes.

It does not say that the sole intent of the program is to avoid fair-market write-downs on loans bought out of pools. This mention of this program just appears in the part of the 10-K that deals with pooled loan repurchases. I see nothing here that says that the HomeSaver Advance loans do not involve an increase in reserves for guaranty losses or an increase in the fair value of guaranty obligations (see page 54ff for an explanation of how accounting for credit losses, actual and expected, on MBS loans is handled), instead of an FMV adjustment to an owned loan. Perhaps the question came up in the conference call; I didn't listen to it. I would certainly expect that these loans can be expected to result in higher guaranty costs in the future, and should be accounted for accordingly. The point is simply that as the loans remain in the MBS, they do not appear in the category of loans bought out of MBS and therefore requiring an FMV adjustment under the infamous SOP-03. The reduction to income (increase in reserves) would happen elsewhere in the financials, under guaranty costs.

All that may be too geeky for you; if so I congratulate you on being a normal human being. Getting beyond the GAAP issues here, I think people just really want to know what this HomeSaver Advance thingy is. According to Fannie Mae's website,

HomeSaver Advance, an unsecured personal loan, is a new loss mitigation alternative available to approved Fannie Mae servicers for eligible borrowers designed to bring a delinquent loan current without a formal loan modification. It provides funds to cure arrearages of principal, interest, taxes, and insurance (PITI), as well as other advances and fees as listed in the Highlights section below. HomeSaver Advance is documented by a borrower-signed promissory note, payable over 15 years at a fixed rate of 5% with no payments or interest accrual for the first six months.

HomeSaver Advance is designed for qualified borrowers who have fallen behind on their mortgage, but are able to resume timely payments once their loan is brought current by the advance. It helps simplify and streamline the workout process for applicable loans, as it provides an option for earlier resolution of delinquent loans.

HomeSaver Advance Highlights

*Loan amount up to the lesser of $15,000 or 15% of the original UPB for delinquent PITI, escrow advances, and advances for attorney fees and costs and up to 6 months of unpaid HOA fees (12 months, where the HOA fee is paid once per year)
*Advances may not include late charges or other ancillary fees and costs
*The full loan amount is applied directly to arrearage (borrower never receives funds in hand)
*Truth in Lending Statement and unsecured promissory note are executed at time of agreement with borrower
*Note rate at a fixed rate of 5% with 6-month no-interest/no-payment period
*Amortization period of 14.5 years after the conclusion of the 6-month no-interest/no-payment period
*Workout fee paid to servicer is $600
*Fannie Mae will contract with a third party to service HomeSaver Advance promissory notes

The general rules for borrower eligibility:

• The mortgage is delinquent in an amount equal to or greater than two full payments of principal, interest, taxes and insurance;
• The mortgage must be seasoned with a minimum of six monthly payments made since the date of loan closing;
The mortgage may secure a principal residence, second home, or investment property—owner occupancy is not required; and
• The mortgage may generally be any type of loan (i.e., fixed-rate, adjustable-rate, interest-only, bi-weekly or daily simple interest).

HomeSaver Advance does not have a loan-to-value restriction or property valuation requirement.

Borrower Eligibility

Servicers must also ensure their borrower meets the following qualifications:
• The borrower has successfully resolved the reason for delinquency;
• The borrower demonstrates a long -term financial capacity to resume making the payments on the first mortgage loan and all other debts, including any subordinate mortgage loans (verbal confirmation of financial capacity is acceptable);
• The borrower has surplus income to support an additional monthly payment of at least $200 but does not have the ability to cure the arrearage using a repayment plan within a period of not more than nine months;
• The borrower is willing to participate in HomeSaver Advance; and
• The borrower does not currently have an outstanding HomeSaver Advance note; the HomeSaver Advance option may only be used once during the life of the particular first mortgage loan.

Borrowers involved in an active bankruptcy proceeding or who have had the debt previously discharged in a bankruptcy action are not eligible for this loss mitigation option.

So what does all that mean? First, it doesn't mean that this is how Fannie will handle all troubled loan workouts; it is one possibility. The rationale for this kind of thing--which isn't unheard of, by the way, for banks and other portfolio lenders, although it's new as far as I know for Fannie Mae--is that if you have a borrower with a fairly modest past-due amount ($15,000 or less) and you have determined that the cause of the delinquency was short-term and is now fixed (like temporary job loss), you could find that the effort and expense of buying a loan out of a pool and doing a formal modification of mortgage to add this modest amount can cost you almost more than it's worth. An alternative is just to make an unsecured loan for the past-due amount, while leaving the existing loan's terms unchanged.

It's risky, of course, because you aren't securing the make-up loan amount; that means that you can't take that amount out of foreclosure recoveries, and if the borrower declares bankruptcy your make-up loan just gets tossed into the unsecured bucket with the credit cards and such. The idea is that you would only do this if the amount in question were modest enough that it's not worth the expense to secure it. It seems completely obvious to me that it's not always worth rewriting a $200,000 loan to secure another $1,000. Another $15,000? That seems rather high to me as a ceiling for this program. But cost-effectiveness is the idea here.

I would also have tightened up the verification requirements for this deal. I realize that Fannie Mae clearly has some ability to collect from servicers if they misrepresent on the borrower's situation; I am, however, getting more and more jaded by the minute about conducting these things on a rep-and-warranty basis. I'd want written documentation of the borrower's cause of delinquency and financial condition, not verbal.

However, I don't necessarily think this is a terrible idea, with the above caveats in mind. Of course it all depends on how good you are at targeting it to borrowers whom it will truly benefit. (Do remember that these are Fannie Mae loans, not those horrible subprime exploding ARMs and stuff. They aren't perfect, but they're not the worst loans in the bunch to start with.) A couple of our commenters have suggested that it seems like no more than a way to throw away $15,000 on every delinquent loan you have. I don't think it's that bad, so I thought maybe we could go through an example--and it's just an example, not a prediction--of how the math would work in deciding to offer a program like this.

Let's start by assuming we have a pool of 100 loans that are eligible for this treatment. We'll assume the average loan amount is $200,000, the average interest rate is 6.50%, and the loans are all interest only (mostly so I don't have to keep amortizing balances, but also because that gives you a slightly worse case in recovery from future foreclosure, and I'm not trying to build an optimistic scenario). I'll assume that the servicer waives all attorney's fees and there's no HOA looking for money, so all we have to work with is past-due interest payments and escrow account contributions. The average monthly interest payment on these loans is $1083, and we'll say the average monthly escrow payment is $417, since that gives us a nice round $1,500 monthly payment to play with.

If all the borrowers are six months past due--which is a lot--then the unsecured loan amount for each loan would be $9,000. Plus Fannie Mae pays $600 a pop to the servicer for the workout fee, so if we did this on all 100 loans, we'd end up with $900,000 unsecured money at risk on a $20,000,000 pool at a cost of $60,000. You can, if you want, assume that all of these loans are underwater--the math works the same way--but for convenience I will assume that the $200,000 balance represents 100% LTV (the property is valued today at $200,000).

Therefore, if we had added the $9,000 to the loan amount via a formal modification, we'd have ended up with an LTV of 104.5%. Because we didn't secure the loan, our LTV stays 100%. Remember that since the additional money is unsecured, there is less disincentive for the borrower to sell the property at break-even; the lien can be released without the additional loan amount being paid in cash at the closing table. So from a voluntary prepayment perspective, these loans should perform just like any other once-delinquent loan at 100% LTV.

Let's further assume that our estimated losses on this pool (net of mortgage insurance and including FC expenses), if we foreclosed today instead of doing this workout, are 30%. That means that foreclosing them all right now would cost us $6,000,000. If you assumed that 100% of these loans would be permanently cured and all those borrowers would pay back all of the unsecured as well as secured money, it's obviously a deal to do this.

Of course we won't assume for a moment that these will be 100% successful. Fannie Mae reported in the 10-K that of the loans it has done modifications on that have a 2-year history since the modification was put in place, going back to 2001, 60% were performing or paid in full 24 months later, and 9% had been foreclosed 24 months later (the rest were still on the books but had become delinquent again, just apparently not delinquent enough to mean foreclosure yet). We are going to assume that that is much better performance than our workouts are likely to get, even though, if the program requirements are truly fulfilled, these HomeSaver Advance deals ought to perform better than your average workout (because they're supposed to involve true "temporary" situations and clear financial capacity to carry the payments).

We will assume that after two years, only 20% of our loans are either still cured and paying as agreed, or paid in full including the unsecured amount. We'll assume another 10% of the loans paid in full (the borrower sold the home or refinanced), but the borrower stiffed us on the unsecured amount and we have to write it off.

Of the remaining 70%, we will assume that 50% end up in foreclosure after 12 months, and the other 20% end up in foreclosure after 24 months. We do that because we want to take into account the possible costs of delaying foreclosure. That is always the problem with workout calculations. It's one thing to compare the cost of a workout to the cost of foreclosure today, but if the loan re-defaults, it may end up costing you more, because foreclosure losses next year might well be worse than they are this year. For our example, we'll assume that losses in a foreclosure would be 30% today, 40% in 12 months, or 50% in 24 months. (This is an example, not a prediction, remember. I'm not building in any positive effect of my workout efforts, although logically I should; the more loans I can permanently cure, the better the recovery should be on the ones I do foreclose because it means less REO inventory.)

That gives us 20 loans with no losses except our $600 fee to the servicer or $12,000. The 10 loans that paid in full on the mortgage but stiffed us on the unsecured loans generated a $96,000 loss. The 50 loans we had to foreclose after a year generated a $4,480,000 loss ($200,000 times 50 times 40% plus $9,600 times 50). The 20 loans we had to foreclose after two years generated a $2,192,000 loss ($200,000 times 20 times 50% plus $9,600 times 20). Total losses: $6,780,000, or 34% loss severity after two years instead of 30% loss severity by foreclosing them all today.

I think it's fair to say that it doesn't take much to think we could break even here. For one thing, it's probably not likely that all loans would be six months past due; if you figured only 4 months past due, which is still severely delinquent, you get 33% loss severity after two years (because the unsecured loan amount is smaller). Add 10 loans to the mortgage paid but unsecured loan written off group and take 10 out of the foreclosure after 12 months group, and you've actually got losses at 24 months at 29%, or just slightly better than foreclosing today.

My point is that you have to remember with workout calculations that while delaying foreclosure might increase the severity of loss on the foreclosures, you do save a lot of money on the ones you cure, and that offsets the calculations on an aggregate level. In practical terms, a program like this is just a lot faster and easier than the buy-loan-out-of-pool-modify-mortgage thing, and it's fair to count in the plus column the extent to which that frees up resources to work with the loans that don't qualify for this kind of deal (the ones that you'll have to do a full-blown mod on). Of course, you have to add back the fact that anything that's faster and easier is going to suffer from adverse selection problems--it does tend to be the lazy, cheapskate servicer's first choice of loss mit options even if it shouldn't be.

At the end of it, I think I'd say this isn't a terrible way to handle the workouts for those borrowers who were tight on mortgage affordability but not impossibly over their heads--say originally qualified at 42% DTI--and who therefore ended up several months past due after an incident (cut back on work hours, unforeseen medical expenses, that kind of thing) that would, in a less expensive relative to income housing cost environment, probably have been tolerable. As long as those borrowers are working with the servicer and want to hang onto the home, this gets them over the rough patch without raiding their retirement accounts or borrowing from the local loan shark, and I can get behind the wisdom of that, at least.

I don't think most troubled borrowers are necessarily in that situation--too many, sadly, are really in over their heads. But if you limit the HomeSaver Advance thing to the salvageable borrowers, you salvage those borrowers quickly and fairly cheaply, freeing up your real effort and expense for dealing with the much more troubled cases. So if that's what they're up to, I guess it's OK with me--not like they asked my opinion--but I do hope OFHEO is keeping an eye on this kind of thing for us, and that we all get to see some periodic reporting about how well this initiative is working out.

As far as the cynical view that this is just a way for Fannie Mae to avoid buying mortgages out of MBS? Doesn't everyone want them to limit their portfolio expansion? As long as they're accounting properly for the increased guaranty obligation here, why not leave the loans on the MBS's books?

by Calculated Risk on 2/29/2008 01:35:00 AM

Here are a couple of interesting articles on "walking away", aka jingle mail, or more technically "ruthless defaults".

From Ruth Simon and Scott Patterson at the WSJ: Borrowers Abandon Mortgages as Prices Drop

As home prices plummet, growing numbers of borrowers are winding up owing more on their homes than the homes are worth, raising concerns that a new group of homeowners -- those who can afford to pay their mortgages but have decided not to -- are starting to walk away from their homes.
...
A rise in the number of people choosing to default on their mortgages would represent a significant departure from past behavior of American homeowners, who during past housing downturns tended to walk away only as a last resort, often because they couldn't afford to pay because of unemployment, illness, divorce or other life-altering changes that reduce income.
...
What's different now, analysts and economists say, is that home prices have fallen so far so quickly that some homeowners in weak markets are concluding that house prices won't recover anytime soon, and therefore they are throwing good money after bad. Also, many borrowers who bought in recent years have put down little if any equity. "If they haven't lived in [the home] very long and haven't put any cash in it, it's a lot easier to walk away," says Chris Mayer, director of the Milstein Center for Real Estate at Columbia Business School.

From John Leland at the NY Times: Facing Default, Some Walk Out on New Homes

You Walk Away is a small sign of broad changes in the way many Americans look at housing. In an era in which new types of loans allowed many home buyers to move in with little or no down payment, and to cash out any equity by refinancing, the meaning of homeownership and foreclosure have changed, economists and housing experts say.
...
“I think I could make a case that some borrowers were ‘renting’ (with risk), rather than owning,” Nicolas P. Retsinas, director of the Joint Center for Housing Studies at Harvard University, said
...
“When people don’t have skin in the game, they behave like they don’t have skin in the game,” said Karl E. Case, a professor of economics at Wellesley College

Unfortunately these articles don't really advance the ball. Tanta did an excellent job of suggesting some question the MSM media could ask: Let's Talk about Walking Away

What we have, so far, is a series of industry insiders making a general claim that "ruthless default" is on the rise. What we do not have, so far, is any rigorous quantification of the extent of this problem, or even any really detailed definition of what "a borrower who could afford to pay" is. We have no one offering baseline measures (what, for instance, a lender's analytical models might have predicted is the "normal" level of walking away), and hence no clear sense of the magnitude of the "change" in borrower behavior and attitudes (not to mention much rigor in distinguishing between the two). Hence, we don't yet really know if it's a change in borrower behavior as much as a change in definitions, servicer data collection and interpretation, or media exposure. Or a handful of anecdotes that are being pluralized into "data."

by Calculated Risk on 2/28/2008 08:05:00 PM

From Bloomberg: AIG Posts Biggest Loss, Misses Analysts' Estimates

American International Group Inc., the world's largest insurer by assets, posted its biggest quarterly loss as a publicly traded company after an $11.1 billion writedown of guarantees sold to fixed-income investors.

The fourth-quarter net loss of $5.29 billion, or $2.08 a share, compared with profit of $3.44 billion, or $1.31, a year earlier, New York-based AIG said today in a statement.

... AIG guaranteed $62.4 billion in collateralized debt obligations that included subprime mortgages as of Nov. 25, securities that led to fourth-quarter losses for MBIA Inc. and Ambac Financial Group Inc., the largest bond insurers.

The losses keep adding up. The confessional is very busy.

by Calculated Risk on 2/28/2008 04:25:00 PM

Blown Mortgage has the details: Wells Fargo Names Most of California Severely Distressed

Wells Fargo has named nearly every California county a “Severely Distressed Market” which requires LTV reductions of 5% for any conforming loan over 75% LTV and also eliminates financing over 75% LTV for any non-conforming loan. The Wells Fargo Mortgage Express product (which is Wells Fargo’s stated income/stated asset program) is also not permitted in “Severely Distressed Market” areas.

Look for the rest of the market leaders to quickly follow suit. This immediately puts a huge swath of the state with increasingly limited refinance options. A huge portion of California loans are of the non-conforming variety and well over the 75% LTV mark ...

And from the BizJournals.com: Wells Fargo tightens mortgage guidelines (hat tip Michael)

The tougher lending standards take effect Feb. 29 ...

Twenty counties in California, including Los Angeles County and Orange County, are on the severely distressed markets list. At-risk markets around the country include 33 in Florida, 15 each in Michigan and Virginia, and 13 each in Maryland and Ohio. Many other states, including Arizona, Colorado, Connecticut, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New York, Nevada, New Jersey, Washington and Wisconsin had markets on the list.

by Calculated Risk on 2/28/2008 03:12:00 PM

From Dr. Tim Duy at Economist's View: This Train Doesn’t Stop

A choice has to be made in the short run. Focus on inflation, and hold policy relatively tight? Or focus on growth, hoping that soft economic growth will tame inflationary pressures? The Fed continues to choose the latter path.
...
The die is cast. Look for another 50bp in March and then two more 25bp cuts at subsequent meetings to bring the Fed Funds rate to 2%.

And on inflation:

Inflationary pressures are building globally (note that China is completing the chain that leads to an inflationary spiral, setting the expectation that high inflation will be matched by higher wages), reflected in surging commodity prices and the freefall of the dollar. The former is weighing heavily on US consumers. Indeed, I am amazed that this story is only starting to capture the attention of the press. So much attention is placed on the housing market as the source of declining consumer confidence, but over the last three months, headline CPI has surged 6.8% annualized. Sure doesn’t look like nominal wages gains are keeping up. No wonder confidence is collapsing.

And I sense it’s going to get worse ...

Tim Duy is very good at looking inside the Fed's thinking. Unfortunately, the situation isn't pretty.

by Calculated Risk on 2/28/2008 11:48:00 AM

From Bankrate.com: Fixed Mortgage Rates at 4-Month High

Fixed mortgage rates increased for the third week in a row, with the average conforming 30-year fixed mortgage rate now 6.41 percent.

(graphic from Bankrate.com)

Holden Lewis at Bankrate.com writes: Fixed rates up, ARMs decline

ARMs are becoming more compelling each week, and this week is no exception, as the most popular fixed rate went up while adjustable rates went down.

The benchmark 30-year fixed-rate mortgage rose 4 basis points, to 6.41 percent, according to the Bankrate.com national survey of large lenders. A basis point is one-hundredth of 1 percentage point. The mortgages in this week's survey had an average total of 0.4 discount and origination points. One year ago, the mortgage index was 6.2 percent; four weeks ago, it was 5.88 percent.

From Chairman Bernanke yesterday: Bernanke says 'we have a problem' controlling long-term mortgage rates

'We have a problem, which is that the spreads between the Treasury rates and lending rates are widening, and our policy is essentially, in some cases just offsetting the widening of the spreads, which are associated with signs of illiquidity,' Bernanke told the House Financial Services Committee.

'So in that particular area, it's been more difficult to lower long-term mortgage rates through Fed action,' he said.

The Bernanke conundrum: In the short term, the more he cuts short rates, the more certain long rates may rise.

by Calculated Risk on 2/28/2008 10:43:00 AM

From MarketWatch:

Housing downturn leads to Freddie Mac losses The weakened U.S. housing market took a toll on Freddie Mac's bottom line in the fourth quarter and for 2007 as a whole, the mortgage-finance giant said Thursday as it reported worse-than-expected financial results.

Richard Syron, Freddie Mac's chief executive, also said the company's "extremely cautious" as 2008 moves forward.

McLean, Va.-based Freddie posted a quarterly net loss of $2.5 billion ...

The company is "extremely cautious" just as everyone is calling for an expanded role in mortgage lending for Freddie and Fannie. I expect more visits to the confessional.

by Anonymous on 2/28/2008 08:17:00 AM

To refresh memories: Last fall, New York AG Andrew Cuomo sued an outfit called eAppraiseIt and its parent company, First American, for conspiring with WaMu to pressure appraisers to produce inflated appraised values. WaMu was not part of the suit, since for legal reasons state AGs can't sue federally-chartered thrifts in state court. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were not being sued either, but they were quickly served with subpoenas for documentation involving inflated appraisals on loans they may have purchased. The GSEs quickly agreed to appoint independent examiners to review appraisal practices, with the direct threat that lenders would be forced to buy back loans that failed to meet existing GSE rules.

It appears that Fannie Mae has finished or nearly finished its review, and is about to ruin several very large aggregators' and thousands of pissant brokers' day with a new set of rules regarding how appraisals can be obtained and what affiliations between lender and appraiser are acceptable:

Feb. 27 (Bloomberg) -- Fannie Mae, the biggest source of financing for U.S. home loans, told lenders it will probably ban their use of appraisals by in-house employees or those arranged by brokers.

Fannie Mae distributed the proposal, a response to New York Attorney General Andrew Cuomo's yearlong mortgage probe, to lenders in a ``talking points'' memo this week, according to a person familiar with the document. The memo was published on American Banker's Web site yesterday.

``It would be a monumental change because it would require a shift in the way that the lending industry does business,'' said Jonathan Miller, chief executive officer of Manhattan-based appraisal company Miller Samuel Inc. and a longtime proponent of creating a firewall between residential appraisers and mortgage originators. ``I think it would be tremendous.'' . . .

``Fannie Mae wishes to cooperate with the New York AG's investigation and, as part of a cooperation agreement, will likely agree to a number of items,'' according to the memo.

The proposed changes include banning Fannie Mae's partners from using appraisers employed by their wholly owned subsidiaries. Mortgage lenders that own appraisal companies include Countrywide Financial Corp., the nation's largest home- loan originator.

The restrictions would apply to loans acquired after Sept. 1, according to the memo. Fannie also told lenders that an independent appraisal clearinghouse likely would be established.

`Laughable' Practice

About three quarters of residential mortgage appraisals are arranged through brokers who only get paid if a loan closes, Miller said today in a phone interview. He called the practice ``laughable'' because it creates a financial incentive for mortgage brokers to push appraisers toward higher valuations. Higher appraisals also mean more homeowners qualify to refinance their homes and take cash out, he said. . . .

Cuomo spokesman Jeffrey Lerner said today in an e-mail that that Cuomo, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac hadn't reached an agreement.

``We have had ongoing discussions for several months,'' Lerner said. ``At the end of the process, we will either have agreements or we will take other appropriate action.''

Cuomo prefers to pursue cooperative resolutions before litigating, Lerner said.

``We are continuing our discussions and we are making progress,'' said Corinne Russell, spokeswoman for the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight, which oversees Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. . . .

Freddie Mac hasn't sent any memo similar to Fannie Mae's, said company spokeswoman Sharon McHale.

``We are cooperating fully with the attorney general's investigation, but at this point it would be premature to speculate as to what the outcome will be,'' McHale said.

Countrywide spokeswoman Ginny Zoraster declined to comment on Fannie Mae's proposals.

``The company does not believe this case has merit and expects to present a vigorous defense,'' Zoraster said in an e- mailed statement.

My observations:

1. So much for "synergy." I only hope that if this puts a stop to large lenders buying appraisal firms (and destroying appraiser independence), we can next move on to large lenders buying title companies (and destroying escrow officer independence).

2. Insofar as brokering of mortgages is going to survive this bust--and the indications are that any bank with a shred of sense right now is shutting down its wholesale division--they will go back to being application-takers, for which they will earn a modest fee. They will have a hard time maintaining their current pose of a "full-service lender" by also processing loans--including ordering appraisals, selecting a closing agent, etc.--which are a huge source of fees collected from consumers and which tend to give consumers the (false) impression that brokers are actually lenders.

What has been going on for some time now is that the massive failures in the wholesale model have forced the wholesale lenders to, in essence, redundantly process these loans, as everything the broker does has to be checked and rechecked and in some cases simply repeated. (You let brokers order appraisals, and once you get it, you order a second appraisal or field review appraisal or run an AVM in order to reality-check the appraisal you got. The process pretty much ceases to be efficient here.) If the GSEs just come out and force wholesalers to take control of the appraisal process from the very beginning, then the kabuki ends and we stop pretending that brokers are doing anything except bringing in a consumer willing to sign an application. The rest of the loan processing is turned over to the wholesaler.

3. An "independent appraisal clearinghouse" would, presumably, be intended to remove some of the problems I discussed in this post with individual lenders managing approved or excluded appraisal lists. Without details I can't really say what they're doing here, but it sounds like Fannie and Freddie are seriously considering getting into approving or excluding individual appraisers or appraisal firms. FHA has always done that in some fashion or another; the GSEs never have. That's a very substantial change to the way the GSEs do business with lenders.