by Calculated Risk on 2/06/2008 01:55:00 AM

From the WSJ: A Year of Reckoning

In a closely watched report to be released today, finance professor Edward Altman projects that high-yield, or "junk," bonds will default by a rate of 4.64% this year. That would be the highest rate since 2003 and a nine-fold increase from the 0.51% rate in 2007, which was the lowest rate since 1981. High-yield debt is typically used by lower credit-quality companies to fund operations and acquisitions.

Mr. Altman, whose so-called Altman-Z score is the market standard for predicting bankruptcy, sees as much as $53 billion in high-yield debt defaulting in 2008, up from $5.5 billion in 2007.

And in a related story from the WSJ: 'Anyone for Some Used Corporate Debt?'

The loans of First Data Corp., which was taken private in September by Kohlberg Kravis Roberts & Co. for about $28 billion, were sold into the market this past fall at a 4% discount to their par value; they now trade in the market at a steep 11.5% discount to par value, according to Reuters LPC.

Loans of Freescale Semiconductor Inc., taken private by a consortium of private-equity firms in December 2006 for about $28 billion, are trading at a 15.5% discount to their original value; Tribune Co., which was taken private in April by investor Sam Zell for $8.2 billion, issued loans now trading a 26% discount.

With rising defaults, and limited demand for leveraged loans, the banks will have difficulty syndicating all the $152 billion in LBO debt still in the pipeline.

by Calculated Risk on 2/02/2008 01:35:00 PM

Via Housing Wire: Fitch Places $139 Billion of Subprime RMBS on Negative Watch, Cites ‘Walk Aways’

It’s worth noting some of the language in Fitch’s press statement — because it’s the first time any of the rating agencies have lended credence to the idea that borrowers are walking away from their homes [emphasis added]:

In Fitch’s opinion the contraction in the mortgage markets has contributed to an acceleration and deepening of home price declines, and has eliminated the option to sell or refinance a home to avoid foreclosure for many borrowers. Additionally, the apparent willingness of borrowers to ‘walk away’ from mortgage debt has contributed to extraordinarily high levels of early default, which is particularly noticeable in the 2007 vintage mortgages. As Fitch has described in recent research reports, this behavior appears to be largely attributable to the use of high risk mortgage products such as ‘piggy-back’ second liens and stated-income documentation programs, which in many instances were poorly underwritten and susceptible to borrower/broker fraud.

A combination of falling prices (with millions of homeowners upside down on their homes), and changing social norms, could lead to staggering losses for lenders and investors.

by Calculated Risk on 2/01/2008 02:50:00 AM

From the Financial Times: Last year’s model: stricken US homeowners confound predictions

“There has been a failure in some of the key assumptions which supported our analysis and modelling,” [Ray McDaniel, president of Moody’s] admits. “The information quality deteriorated in a way that was not appreciated by Moody’s or others.” Mortgage borrowers, in other words, did not behave as expected.
...
One possible explanation is that it has become culturally more acceptable this decade for people to abandon houses or stop paying in the hope of renegotiating their home loans. The shame that used to be associated with losing a house may, in other words, be ebbing away – particularly among homeowners who took out subprime loans in recent years, as underwriting standards were loosened....

... people with high loan-to-value mortgages no longer felt as strong an incentive to maintain payments when house prices started to fall – even if they were able to. This is because of the negative equity phenomenon – where house prices have fallen below the value of the loan or will soon do so.

There is much more in the article, but people are recognizing the change in homeowner attitude towards foreclosure. One of the greatest fears for lenders (and investors in mortgage backed securities) is that it has become socially acceptable for upside down middle class Americans to walk away from their homes.

A few recent quotes from lenders:

"There's been a change in social attitudes toward default. We're seeing people who are current on their credit cards but are defaulting on their mortgages. I'm astonished that people would walk away from their homes."
Bank of America CEO Kenneth Lewis, December 20, 2007

“Part of one of the challenges is, and we've mentioned this before, a lot of this current losses have been coming out of California and it's -- they've been from people that have otherwise had the capacity to pay, but have basically just decided not to because they feel like they've lost equity, value in their properties, and so in a way, we may have -- it's hard to know right now, but we may have seen somewhat of an acceleration problem loans as people have reached that conclusion and we're just going to have to see how the patterns unfold here.”
Wachovia, Jan 22, 2008
emphasis added

"Another effect we are seeing has been ... consumers willingness just to walk away from homes. We haven't seen anything like this since Texas during the oil bust and people just willing to declare bankruptcy and walk away. We are seeing a lot of that similar type social phenomenon occurring, especially in California. And that is concerning to us."
Mark Hammond, CEO, Flagstar Bancorp, January 30, 2008

by Calculated Risk on 1/31/2008 02:15:00 PM

From the Comptroller of the Currency John C. Dugan: Comptroller Dugan Expresses Concern About Commercial Real Estate Concentrations

Comptroller of the Currency John C. Dugan told a bank conference today that the OCC is focusing increased attention on problems arising from high community bank concentrations in commercial real estate (CRE) at a time of significant market disruptions and declining house and condominium sales and values.

“The combination of these conditions is putting considerable stress on one particular category of commercial real estate lending: residential construction and development – and other categories of CRE loans will feel similar stress if general economic activity slows materially,” Mr. Dugan said in a speech before a meeting of the Florida Bankers Association.

In the area of construction and development (C&D) loans, nonperforming loans in community national banks amounted to 1.96 percent of the total at the end of the third quarter, double the rate of the year before.

“Although starting from an admittedly very low baseline, an increase like this – over 100 percent in a single year – is clearly a trend that we need to monitor closely,” Mr. Dugan said.
...
In recent years, the Comptroller said, banks had become too complacent regarding the potential for significant stresses in these markets, and CRE concentrations rose significantly in many banks. The ratio of commercial real estate loans to capital has nearly doubled in the past six years, he said.

“Even more significant than this overall industry statistic is the number of individual banks that have especially large concentrations,” Mr. Dugan added. “Over a third of the nation’s community banks have commercial real estate concentrations exceeding 300 percent of their capital, and almost 30 percent have construction and development loans exceeding 100 percent of capital.”
...
“In terms of asset quality, our horizontal reviews have indeed confirmed a significant increase in the number of problem residential construction and development loans in community banks across the country,” the Comptroller added.

As I noted last week, with the failure of Douglass National Bank in Kansas City, the housing bust hasn't hurt most small banks and institutions because the banks didn't hold many of the residential mortgages they originated. Instead the small to mid-sized institutions focused on commercial real estate (CRE) and construction and development (C&D) loans, so rising CRE and C&D defaults will impact community banks much more than rising residential mortgage defaults.

Note: Dugan was one of the first regulators to express concern about non-traditional mortgages, especially Option ARMs.

by Calculated Risk on 1/30/2008 02:56:00 PM

"Another effect we are seeing has been a challenge with the media and consumer groups; and with consumers willingness just to walk away from homes. We haven't seen anything like this since Texas during the oil bust and people just willing to declare bankruptcy and walk away. We are seeing a lot of that similar type social phenomenon occurring, especially in California. And that is concerning to us."
Mark Hammond, CEO, Flagstar Bancorp conference call. (hat tip Scott)

Hammond also expressed concern that a larger percentage of homeowners - as compared to previous housing busts - that go delinquent, don't cure. They just "go under" in Hammond's words.

Here is what Hammond means: Say a homeowner misses a payment and becomes delinquent. Historically most homeowners try to make future payments - even if they stay 30 days late. Now, according to Hammond, once they go 30 days late, many homeowners just give up and keep missing all payments; they go 60 days late, 90 days late, and on to foreclosure.

Also, there was some concern expressed about CRE loan concentrations and delinquencies.

by Tanta on 1/29/2008 11:02:00 AM

One of the hot topics of conversation lately is the idea of a mortgage “put option.” There seem to be more than a few people—including those who don’t exactly use the language of options contracts, like that weird couple featured recently on 60 Minutes—who are slightly confused about what the “optionality” of a mortgage contract is. There are also lots of folks who are wondering what will happen to mortgage pricing in general should a substantial number of folks decide to “exercise the put” on their mortgages. It seems wise to me to try to tease out what’s going on here.

First, mortgage contracts in the U.S. are not, actually, options contracts. You may peruse your note and mortgage at length now, if you didn’t do so when you signed them, and you will not find any “put” or “call” in there. Your note is a promise to pay money you have borrowed, and your mortgage or deed of trust is a pledge of real estate you own (or are buying with the borrowed money) as security for that note. That means, in short, that if you fail to keep your promise to pay the loan in cash, the lender can force you to sell your property at auction (to produce cash with which to pay the loan in full). Because the mortgage instrument gives your lender a “lien,” any sales proceeds are first applied to the mortgage debt before you get any of it.

People get very confused about this because it is often the lender who ends up buying the property at the forced auction. When that happens, it is basically because the lender simply wants to put a “floor” bid in the auction: the lender bids an amount based on what it is willing to lose (if any). Typically, the lender bids its “make whole amount” or the loan amount plus accrued interest and expenses. If someone else bids more than that, the lender is happy to let the property go to the higher bidder.

The lender might bid less than its make-whole amount; it might bid its “probable loss” amount. If the lender is owed $300,000 and doesn’t think it could ever end up recovering more than $200,000, it might bid $200,000 at the FC auction. The lender doesn’t actually want to win the auction; lenders are not really in the business of real estate investment or property management. However, the lender would rather buy the home at the auction and pay itself back eventually by re-selling the property later (as a listed property in a private sale instead of a courthouse auction) than let the property go for $50,000 (meaning the lender would recover only $50,000 on a $300,000 loan instead of $200,000). Nothing ever stops any third party from bidding $1 more than the lender’s bid and winning the auction (except, of course, any third party’s own inclinations).

We need to remember, then, right away, when anyone talks about “giving the house back to the bank” or “mailing in the keys,” we are already in the land of metaphorical language. The only situation in which “giving the house back to the bank” would literally be possible is if you bought the house from the bank (say, it was REO) and the contract explicitly gave you an option to sell it back to the bank, whenever you wanted to, at a price equal to your loan balance. Nobody writes REO sales contracts that way. In most cases, of course, you bought the house from someone other than a bank. You have no option to “put the house back” to the seller. You win only if it's "heads."

A “put option,” in the financial world, is a contract that gives the buyer of the put the right, but not the obligation, to sell something (a commodity, a stock, a bond, etc.) in the future at a predetermined price. On the other side of the deal, the “writer” of the put is obligated to buy the thing in question if the put buyer exercises the option. Some of you may already be a bit confused about “buyer” and “seller” here, but that’s an important point. You don’t get “free puts.” You buy puts. There is a fee or a “premium” that you pay for the option contract. If you do not exercise the option, the put-writer pockets that fee. If you do exercise your option, the put-writer pockets that fee (to offset his loss on the deal) and your gains on the ultimate sale of the thing are net of the option premium.

The point of a put is that you buy them when you want to be protected from falling prices: if you think there is a good chance that the value of something will fall in the future, buying a put that allows you the option of selling it next month at this month’s price might well be worth paying that option premium. But you do always pay an option premium and you do not get it back.

The opposite of the put option is the call option: it is the option to buy something in the future at a predetermined price. You buy calls when you think the value of the thing is likely to rise. You also always pay some premium or fee for a call.

Residential real estate sales and mortgage loans do not, actually, literally, have puts and calls in them. If you buy a home today, you assume the risk that its price may fall in the future. Your contract does not include an option for you to sell the house at the price you paid for it. Nor does the seller of the house have a “call”; the seller cannot force you to sell the house back to him at the original price if its value rises.

Your mortgage loan contract does not give you the right to simply substitute the current value of the house for the current balance of the loan: you do, in fact, risk being “upside down.” (The only time this isn’t true in the U.S. is with a reverse mortgage; those are written explicitly to have this kind of a feature, where the balance due on the loan can never exceed the current market value of the property. But of course reverse mortgages aren’t purchase-money loans.) Nor does the mortgage contract give your lender the right to buy your house from you for the “price” of the loan amount when that is less than its value. Mortgage lenders never do better than paid back. If the real estate securing your loan increases in value, that appreciation belongs to you (as long as you make your loan payments).

So why is it that people keep talking about “puts” and “calls” in terms of mortgage loans? That’s because mortgage contracts have features that can affect their value to the writer of the contract (the lender or investor) in a way that is analytically comparable, in some ways, to classic options. Options theory is applied to mortgages in order to price them as investments. (Strictly speaking, this is a matter of analyzing them so that a price can be determined.) The interest rate, then, that you get on a mortgage loan will depend, in part, on how the lender/investor “priced” the implied options in the contract.

The “implied put” in a mortgage contract is the borrower’s ability to default (walk away, send jingle mail, whatever you want to call it). We do not, generally, consider “distress” (that’s actually the formal term in the literature, for you Googlers) as an “implied put.” Some borrowers will fall on hard times and be unable to fulfill their mortgage contracts. This is a matter of “credit risk” and it is, analytically, a different matter of mortgage contract valuation. The “implied put” analysis is trying to capture the possible cost to the lender/investor of what we call the “ruthless” borrower. “Ruthless” isn’t really intended to be a casual insult; it is in fact the term we use to describe borrowers who can pay their debts but choose not to, because there is a greater financial return to that borrower in defaulting as opposed to not defaulting. It is “ruthless” precisely because there is not a contractual option to do this: the only way you can exercise the “implied put” is to default on your contract.

Many many people are very confused about this. When we talk about the “social acceptability” of jingle mail, what we are talking about is at some level the extent to which there is or ought to be some rhetorical or social “fig leaf” over ruthlessness. It seems to be true, after all, that most people are more likely to behave ruthlessly if they can call it something other than ruthlessness. (There are always people who have no trouble with ruthlessness; they often get the CEO job. Most of us have at least moderately strong inhibitions about ruthless behavior.) There is, therefore, a process in which the ruthless put is re-described in various alternative terms, or has alternative narrative contexts built up around it, such that it no longer “feels” ruthless. The borrower was victimized (by the lender, the original property seller, the media, the Man). The put premium was actually paid (“they charge me so much they can afford this”). The ruthless borrower is actually the distressed borrower (redefining what one can “afford” or what is necessary expense so that a payment you can make becomes a payment you “can’t” make).

Before anyone starts in on me, let me note that these fig leaf mechanisms are effective precisely because victimization, predatory interest rates, and truly distressed household budgets do really exist. They wouldn’t be very convincing otherwise. (Very few ruthless borrowers will claim it’s because of, say, alien abduction or something equally implausible.) I am not, therefore, asserting that all claims of predation or distress are “false.” I am simply pointing out that it is, after all, a hallmark of the not-usually-ruthless person who is nonetheless acting ruthlessly to rationalize his conduct.

I don’t offer that as some startling insight into human psychology. I offer it as an attempt to get some analytic clarity. When CR talks about lenders fearing that jingle mail will become socially acceptable, he’s not exactly saying that lenders fear that society will no longer stigmatize financial failure (“distress”). They are afraid that rationalization mechanisms will become so effective that true ruthlessness (which is historically pretty rare in home mortgage lending) will become a significant additional problem (in addition to true distress). And they fear this because, delusions to the contrary, those loans did not have enough of a “put premium” priced into them to cover widespread “ruthless default.”

In fact, the very language of options theory can function, for a certain class of ruthless borrowers, as the fig leaf. To say “Hey, I’m just exercising my put” is a retroactive reinterpretation of your mortgage contract to “formalize” the “implied put” so that you do not have to describe what you’re doing as “defaulting.” This strategy is apparently popular with folks who have some modest exposure to financial markets jargon and an unwillingness to lump themselves in with the “riffraff”—victims of predators and financially failing households and other “weaklings.” (Sadly, a lot of people who have a very high degree of exposure to financial markets jargon don’t need no steenkin’ rationalization. Like most sociopaths, they don’t understand why “ruthless” would be considered insulting or what this term “social acceptability” might mean. So if you’re hearing the “put” excuse, you are probably in the presence of a relative amateur.)

The other side of the problem in valuation of mortgage loans and mortgage securities is the “implied call.” The “call-like feature” in a mortgage contract is the right to prepay. In the U.S., all mortgage contracts have the right to prepay. (Some, but not all, have a “prepayment penalty” in the early years of the loan, but “penalty” here means a prepayment fee, not an actual legal prohibition on prepayment.) The reason the right to prepay functions like an implied call is that it gives the borrower the right to “buy” the loan from the lender at “par,” even if the value of the loan is much higher than “par.” If you refinance your mortgage, you are required only to pay the unpaid principal balance (plus accrued interest to the payoff date) to the old lender in order to get the old lien released. Unless the loan specifically has a prepayment penalty, you are not required to further compensate the old lender for the loss of a profitable loan. So a loan with a prepayment penalty has an implied call and a real call exercise price. A loan without a prepayment penalty, or past the term of its prepayment penalty, has a “free call.” (In the original lender’s point of view. There is always some price to be paid to get a new refinance loan; the borrower’s calculation of the value of refinancing always has to take that into account. Among other things, this fact results in mortgage “call exercise” being much less “efficient” than it is on actual call contracts, which makes the call much more difficult to value, analytically, for mortgages.)

While ruthless default might, historically, be rare, refinancing has been ubiquitous for decades now. It wasn’t always so easily available; your grandparents might never have refinanced a loan not because their existing interest rates were never above market, but just because there weren’t lenders around offering inexpensive refinances. In fact, refinances have been so ubiquitous for so long now that many people have come to think of the availability of refinancing money as somehow guaranteed. This isn’t just a naïveté about interest rate cycles, although it is that too. It is a belief that credit standards and operating costs of lenders never change, so that if someone thought you were “creditworthy” once, they’ll automatically think of you as creditworthy again, and that lenders can always afford to refinance you without charging you upfront fees.

People who price mortgage-backed securities have always known that the prepayment behavior of mortgage loans is impacted not just by prevailing interest rates, but also by the borrower’s creditworthiness, the lenders’ risk appetites, and the cost (time and money) of the refinance transaction. We were talking the other day about the prepayment characteristics of jumbo loans in comparison to conforming loans; the fact is that people who have the largest loans are the most likely to refinance at any given reduction in interest rate, since a reduction in interest rate produces more dollars-per-month in savings on a larger loan than it does on a smaller loan. Considering these types of things is very important to people who price MBS, because in fact prepayment behavior is both hard to “price” and absolutely critical to “pricing” mortgages as an investment.

MBS, unlike other kinds of bonds, are “negatively convex.” I have been threatening to talk about convexity for a while and I keep chickening out. It’s actually useful to understand it if you want to understand why mortgage rates (and the value of servicing portfolios) behave the way they do. The trouble is that convexity involves a whole bunch of seriously geeky math and computer models and normal people probably don’t want to go there. (I don’t even want to go there.) So as a compromise, this is a very quick and simple explanation of convexity.

The convexity of mortgages is a result of the “implied options” in them. Most people understand intuitively that the higher the interest rate on a loan, the more an investor would pay for that loan: if you had the choice today of buying a bond that paid you 6.00% and one that paid you 6.50%, you would probably not offer the same price for each of them. With a classic “vanilla” bond, the price you would offer would be a matter of looking at the term to maturity, the frequency of payments, the interest rate, and some appropriate discount rate.

The trouble with mortgages is that while they have a maximum legal term to maturity, they have an unpredictable actual loan life, because they have the prepayment “calls” implied in the contracts. The return on a mortgage is uncertain, because you might get repaid early, forcing you to reinvest your funds at a lower rate. On the other hand, the loans might just stay there until legal maturity, at an interest rate that is now below the market rate on a new investment. The problem, obviously, is that borrowers refinance most often when prevailing market rates have dropped (right when the investor might want the loans to be long-lived) and don’t refinance when prevailing rates have risen (right when the investor would like to see you go away). “Vanilla” bonds don’t behave this way. Vanilla bonds, like Treasury bonds and notes, are “positively convex.” Mortgages are “negatively convex.”

Here’s a comparative convexity graph prepared by Mark Adelman of Nomura (do pursue the link if you want more detailed information about MBS valuation). This graph plots three example instruments all with a face value of $1,000 and a price of par ($1,000) at 6.00%. The vertical axis reflects the change in price of the bond. The horizontal axis reflects the change in prevailing market yields. As you move to the left of 6.00%, you see that the price of the bond increases (it has an above-market yield); as you move to the right it decreases.

However, the three instruments do not increase or decrease in price in the same way. The 30-year bond has a steeper curve than the 10-year note, which is a function of the difference in maturities of the two instruments. The MBS isn’t just not as steep; it is a different shape. The 30-year bond and the 10-year note price functions create an upward-curving slope when you plot them against price/yield changes like this, and the MBS price functions create a downward-curving slope. The term “negative convexity” means, exactly, that downward curving slope.

What’s going on here is that when market yields fall (moving to the left in the graph), average loan life in an MBS pool will shorten markedly, as borrowers are “in the money” to refinance. At a relatively modest fall in market yields, the price of the MBS does increase (but the increase is much less than the increase in the other bonds). At a larger drop in market yields, the MBS price gets as high as it will ever get and then stops increasing at all. What happens here is that the underlying mortgage loans have become so “rate sensitive” that any additional decrease in market yield (increase in the spread between the bond’s coupon of 6.00% and current market coupons) is entirely offset by shortened loan life: loans will pay off so fast at this point that this “officially” 30-year bond really returns principal to the investor the way a 1-year or even 6-month Treasury bill would. No investor is going to pay more for the MBS at this point than it would for the very shortest-term alternative.

On the other side of the graph, you see that the MBS price declines more slowly than the vanilla bonds, although its curvature at this point is very like the 10-year. At this side of the chart, average loan life is increasing. (Mortgage bonds never go to zero prepayments or actual average loan life = 30 years.)

What all this implies is that, analytically, mortgages do have some sort of “option price” built in. (There is actually a name for this, the OAS or Option Adjusted Spread, a method of comparing cash flows of a mortgage bond across multiple interest rate and prepayment scenarios. It’s heavy math and modeling.) In the case of voluntary prepayment (refinancing or selling your home, basically), your “call” option has, in fact, been priced—it’s in the interest rate/fees you pay to get a refinanceable mortgage loan. Investors accept the uncertainty of mortgage duration by (attempting to) price it in.

All that, however, is about trying to price the full return of principal (which, in the case of a mortgage loan, is also the point at which interest payments cease). It isn’t trying to model the return of less than outstanding principal, which is what the “put” or ruthless default is. A refinancing borrower pays you back early at par. A defaulting borrower pays you back early at less than par. Standard MBS valuation models that were developed for GSE or Ginnie Mae securities (that are guaranteed against credit loss) do not “worry” about ruthless puts in terms of principal loss, since that loss is covered by the guarantor. What is causing some trouble these days with the “ruthless put” in the prepayment models is simply that this is an unexpected source of prepayment that isn’t correlating with “typical” interest rate scenarios. (We are seeing increased defaults in a very low-rate environment, because of the house price problem, which isn’t built into the prepayment models for guaranteed securities. Historically, prepayment models “expect” non-negligible numbers of ruthless puts only in higher-rate environments.)

It may help you to understand that we have been talking about how an investor might price an MBS coupon, which isn’t the same thing as the interest rate on a loan. In a Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac MBS, the “coupon” or interest rate paid to the investor might be, say, 6.00%. That means that the weighted average interest rate on the underlying loans in the pool is substantially more than 6.00%. There is the bit that has to go to the servicer, and there’s the bit that has to go to the GSE to offset the credit risk. The mortgages must pay a high enough rate of interest to provide 6.00% to the investor after the servicing and guarantee fees come off the top. In essence, then, MBS traders set the “current coupon” or the coupon that trades at par, the GSEs set the guarantee fee and/or loan-level settlement fees that cover the credit risk, the servicer sets the required servicing fee, and all that adds up to the “market rate” for conforming mortgage loans (plus mortgage insurance, if applicable, which is conceptually an offset to the guarantee fee).

One way of describing the situation we’re currently in is that borrowers are continuing the short loan life of the boom (which was made possible by easy refi money and hot RE markets) by substituting jingle mail for refinancing. That increases credit losses to whoever takes the credit loss (the GSEs and the mortgage insurers), decreases servicer cash flow (a refi substitutes a new fee-paying loan for the old loan; a default substitutes a no-fee-paying problem for the old loan), and makes everyone’s prepayment models go whacky-looking. This is one reason why it obviously wasn’t a good time for MBS traders to be told they’d be suddenly getting jumbos in their conforming pools; at some level the response to that could be summed up as “we don’t need one more thing that defies analysis.”

Ultimately, there is no way anyone can mobilize “social acceptability” as a defense against the ruthless put (even if you wanted to). The industry has, in fact, created the conditions in which it’s rational, and as long as it’s rational it will go on. Just as it was rational to buy at 100% LTV. The only possible way to get back to an environment in which ruthless default is rare is to abandon the “innovations” that give rise to them: no-down financing, wish-fulfillment appraisals, underpriced investment property loans, etc. The administration is currently pushing for increasing the FHA loan amounts and the FHA maximum LTV up to 100%. This is not likely to remove the incentive to take another reckless loan on a still-too-high-priced house. If we aren’t going to ration credit with tighter guidelines and loan limits, then it will have to be rationed with pricing: eventually the models will “solve” the problem by increasing the costs of mortgage credit. You cannot simply keep writing “free puts.”

by Calculated Risk on 1/28/2008 08:50:00 PM

Countrywide sent out a letter on Jan 18th with their new Soft Market policies (hat tip ck).

... 2008 is forecasted to be a challenging year for the mortgage industry, characterized by a declining Housing Price Index in a wide variety of metropolitan markets. In the context of the prominent threat to our industry of collateral values falling below outstanding loan balances, mortgage professionals must strive to ensure that borrowers do not take on loans that they do not have the ability or economic interest to repay.

Note that last phrase: "borrowers do not take on loans that they do not have the economic interest to repay". Countrywide is clearly concerned about the new trend of buyers "walking away" from their mortgages.

The policy basically reduced the maximum LTV for various loans based on the county risk level. Countrywide's ranking of risk, by county, is available online Countrywide Soft Market County Index.

by Calculated Risk on 1/27/2008 12:23:00 PM

From CBS: New Trend In Sacramento: 'Intentional Foreclosure' (hat tip Shawn)

Linda Caoli helps lots of families on the verge of losing their homes, including a single mom working two jobs to pay her mortgage.

"She says Linda the house across the street, same model, with more upgrades sold in foreclosure for $315,000!" explains Linda.

Her client isn't the only one thinking about ditching her house to buy the better deal across the street. A number of realtors CBS13 talked to say it's already happening.

This is similar to Peter Viles' story in the LA Times: A tipping point? "Foreclose me ... I'll save money".

Wachovia is seeing this too (from their Jan 22nd conference call):

“... people that have otherwise had the capacity to pay, but have basically just decided not to because they feel like they've lost equity ...”

And from BofA CEO Kenneth Lewis in December:

"There's been a change in social attitudes toward default. We're seeing people who are current on their credit cards but are defaulting on their mortgages. I'm astonished that people would walk away from their homes."

This change in social attitudes could lead to a flood of foreclosures. The following is from my post last December: Homeowners With Negative Equity

The following graph shows the number of homeowners with no or negative equity, using the most recent First American data, with several different price declines.

At the end of 2006, there were approximately 3.5 million U.S. homeowners with no or negative equity. (approximately 7% of the 51 million household with mortgages).

By the end of 2007, the number will have risen to about 5.6 million.

If prices decline an additional 10% in 2008, the number of homeowners with no equity will rise to 10.7 million.

The last two categories are based on a 20%, and 30%, peak to trough declines. The 20% decline was suggested by MarketWatch chief economist Irwin Kellner (See How low must housing prices go?) and 30% was suggested by Paul Krugman (see What it takes).

Intentional foreclosure. Jingle Mail. Negative Equity. All terms that could be common in 2008.

by Calculated Risk on 1/22/2008 12:24:00 PM

From the Wachovia conference call:

“Part of one of the challenges is, and we've mentioned this before, a lot of this current losses have been coming out of California and it's -- they've been from people that have otherwise had the capacity to pay, but have basically just decided not to because they feel like they've lost equity, value in their properties, and so in a way, we may have -- it's hard to know right now, but we may have seen somewhat of an acceleration problem loans as people have reached that conclusion and we're just going to have to see how the patterns unfold here.”
emphasis added

This echoes the comments of BofA CEO Kenneth Lewis last month:

"There's been a change in social attitudes toward default," Mr. Lewis says. ... "We're seeing people who are current on their credit cards but are defaulting on their mortgages," Mr. Lewis says. "I'm astonished that people would walk away from their homes."

In a previous post, I calculated that somewhere between 10 million and 20 million U.S. homeowners will owe more on their homes, than their homes will be worth, over the next couple of years. (See Homeowners With Negative Equity)

As I've noted before, one of the greatest fears for lenders (and investors in mortgage backed securities) is that it will become socially acceptable for upside down middle class Americans to walk away from their homes. These are homeowners with the "capacity to pay, but have basically just decided not to".

Wachovia is seeing that happen now. Imagine what will happen as house prices fall this year and next.

by Calculated Risk on 1/12/2008 11:32:00 PM

First a couple of excerpts:

From MarketWatch: B. of A. gets a bargain in Countrywide deal

Bank of America is getting Countrywide for less than a third of book value (the mortgage company's assets minus its liabilities) and roughly 2.9 times forecast 2009 earnings, Chief Financial Officer Joe Price said. Lenders typically change hands for at least one times book and seven times estimated future earnings.
...
But the bank has also taken on a huge chunk of new credit risk ... How big a bargain the deal ends up being will depend on how badly Countrywide's mortgage portfolio performs as house prices fall and foreclosures climb.

How big is that credit risk? From the WSJ: Behind Bank of America's Big Gamble

As of Sept. 30, Countrywide's savings bank held about $79.5 billion of loans as investments. Three-quarters of these loans were second-lien home-equity loans ... or option adjustable-rate mortgages...

Just using BofA CFO Joe Price's numbers, if Countrywide didn't have the credit risk, Price suggests a good price would have normally been about one times book value or about $12 billion (the article states that $4 billion is less than one third book value). So basically - in the simplest view - BofA is gambling that the losses on that $80 billion portfolio are $8 billion or less ($12 billion minus the $4 billion BofA is paying).

Even without the actual details of Countrywide's mortgage portfolio, a $8 billion write down might be optimistic. According to another WSJ article:

...Countrywide has $32 billion in second-lien, home-equity loans. Of these, 44% have a loan-to-value ratio over 90%.

This suggests there are about $28 billion in option ARMs in the portfolio. When a house goes into default, the loss on the 2nd lien is frequently 100%. For homes in foreclosure with option ARMs, a 50% loss might be common.

Much depends on how far house prices fall, and how many homeowners with negative equity walk away from their homes. We can be pretty sure that house prices will fall significantly, but no one knows how homeowners will react to owing significantly more than their homes are worth.

Although we don't know all the details, it is possible to imagine scenarios with losses of more than $10 billion on this mortgage portfolio (we really haven't seen the pain from the option ARMs yet, but it is coming).

As an example, if 25% of the second liens go into default, the losses would be $8billion ($32 billion X 0.25 X 100% loss rate). And if 15% of the first lien Option ARMs go into default, add another $2.1 billion in losses ($28 billion X 0.15 X 50% loss rate). These default rates might seem too high right now, but no one is really sure how many homeowners will default when house prices fall 15%, 25% or more over the next few years.

This does look like a good strategic fit for BofA, but I agree with Robert Shiller:

``There's a tendency for people to underappreciate the risk of the housing market,'' Shiller said. ``I might have a lower valuation of Countrywide than Bank of America does.''
...
``Maybe Countrywide and Bank of America are going to have some problems going forward,'' he said. ``When people see that their houses are worth a lot less than their mortgage balance, they have an incentive to default. The troubled mortgages that Countrywide already has will be followed by even more troubled ones.''

by Calculated Risk on 1/11/2008 04:09:00 PM

From Bloomberg: Shiller Says Bank of America May `Have Some Problems'

``There's a tendency for people to underappreciate the risk of the housing market,'' Shiller said. ``I might have a lower valuation of Countrywide than Bank of America does.''
...
``Maybe Countrywide and Bank of America are going to have some problems going forward,'' he said. ``When people see that their houses are worth a lot less than their mortgage balance, they have an incentive to default. The troubled mortgages that Countrywide already has will be followed by even more troubled ones.''

How far will prices fall? How many homeowners will be upside down? Will it become socially acceptable for upside down homeowners to walk way from their homes? What will be the impact on Countrywide (and BofA) if house prices fall 20%? If prices fall 30%? What if 10 million homeowners default over the next few years?

Those are some of the questions I'd be asking if I was at BofA. I've tried to quantify some of these numbers, and the downside risks are huge. From the earlier post:

The following graph shows the number of homeowners with no or negative equity, using the most recent First American data, with several different price declines.

At the end of 2006, there were approximately 3.5 million U.S. homeowners with no or negative equity. (approximately 7% of the 51 million household with mortgages).

By the end of 2007, the number will have risen to about 5.6 million.

If prices decline an additional 10% in 2008, the number of homeowners with no equity will rise to 10.7 million.

The last two categories are based on a 20%, and 30%, peak to trough declines. The 20% decline was suggested by MarketWatch chief economist Irwin Kellner (See How low must housing prices go?) and 30% was suggested by Paul Krugman (see What it takes).

I think Shiller is correct; the risks from housing are still underappreciated.

by Tanta on 1/05/2008 07:45:00 AM

Hat tip to Disempowered Paper Pusher (the backbone of our industry!) for this excellent BusinessWeek piece on homes abandoned by both borrower and lender, "Dirty Deeds."

An anecdote with all the right motifs:

In 1998, Elizabeth M. Manuel obtained a $34,500 mortgage on the property from IMC Mortgage (since acquired by Citibank). By 2002, the loan had been sold into a securitization trust administered by Chase Manhattan (now JPMorgan Chase) as trustee. It also went into default, and Chase began foreclosure proceedings. In a court filing, Manuel (who could not be located for comment) said she left the home while the foreclosure action was pending. More than five years later, though, the title remains in her name. The house, although still standing, has become a fire-gutted wreck.

In May 2007, Nowak issued a default judgment against Chase for $9,000. But these cases can be notoriously difficult to untangle. Thomas A. Kelly, a spokesman for the bank, notes that Chase sold its trustee business to the Bank of New York Mellon (BK) in October, 2006, and couldn't locate anyone at Chase able to comment. But he reiterates the industry view that Chase can't be held responsible for maintaining a property it never owned. He acknowledges that if a home didn't seem worth taking as collateral, the bank may have made a decision to "just walk away."

Besides amusing myself by trying to figure out just what documents I'd have to give Judge Boyko to prove standing to foreclose in this case, I am of course deeply impressed by the social acceptability of "just walking away."

My guess is that Chase never completed the foreclosure precisely because it never wanted to held accountable for taxes, insurance, and maintenance on a nearly worthless property; the "tangle" of securitization and trustee swaps and so on undoubtedly contributes to the mess but at some level that's smoke. So the city of Buffalo is working out a new process to tie those properties around the lenders' necks precisely to forestall this game. It will certainly be interesting to see whether it catches on elsewhere.

Reading things like this also always makes me think of the endless complaining you get over FHA appraisal and property inspection practices. Every time you're tempted to think those are silly and bureaucratic--delaying closing for another 30 days while an attic window pane is repaired--and in need of "modernization," remember these properties that were decrepit at the time they were first mortgaged by those modernized conventional subprime lenders, nearly worthless at the point the borrower could no longer carry the payments, and then nothing more than urban blight after years of the lender refusing to take title. FHA, for all its flaws, never walks away from title.

by Calculated Risk on 1/03/2008 05:51:00 PM

From the WSJ Deal Journal: Citi and J.P. Morgan Predict a Buffet of Defaults (hat tip James)

With credit flowing to practically any company in need of cash in recent years, the rate of defaults for U.S. high-yield companies fell to just 0.34% in December, according to a J.P. Morgan Chase analysis. The J.P. Morgan analyst, Peter Acciavatti, predicts that is about to rise drastically, to 4% by the end of 2009 ... Citigroup expects the default rate to surge to 5.5% ...

And from Bloomberg: Buffets Misses Coupon Payment; Bonds Fall to New Low

Buffets Inc., the largest operator of buffet-style restaurants in the U.S., failed to make a coupon payment on $293 million of debt, sending the bond prices plunging to a record low.
...
The missed payment sparked concerns that corporate defaults are starting to escalate as the worst home sales market since 1981 slows the economy. Tousa Inc., the Florida homebuilder that lost 99 percent of its market value in the past year, also missed interest obligations on $485 million in debt, the company said in a regulatory filing yesterday.

by Calculated Risk on 12/28/2007 03:40:00 PM

Update: added comments from Tanta at bottom.

Several recent articles have referenced my post on the possibility of a change in attitude towards foreclosure. I wrote:

One of the greatest fears for lenders (and investors in mortgage backed securities) is that it will become socially acceptable for upside down middle class Americans to walk away from their homes.

Although the purpose of the post was to discuss changing social norms, the primary reason the post was mentioned was because of some pretty big numbers, like the possibility of $1 trillion in mortgage losses based on a few rough assumptions. A couple of quotes:

Australia theage.com: Americans 'walk' from loans

Late last week ... Calculated Risk figured that housing losses might reach $US1 trillion and even $US2 trillion.

WSJ: How High Will Subprime Losses Go?

Back in the U.S., the Calculated Risk blog sidestepped the colorful language and went straight for the big number: “The losses for the lenders and investors might well be over $1 trillion.”

The $1 trillion number is a simple calculation: If prices fall 30%, then approximately 20 million U.S. homeowners will be upside down on their mortgages. If half of these homeowners walk away from their homes, with an average 50% loss to lenders and investors, that is $1 trillion in losses (the average mortgage is just over $200K).

This wasn't a forecast, just a simple exercise to show why changing social norms is very scary for the lenders.

And this isn't just a subprime problem, and these aren't just potential "subprime losses". In the original post I referred to the potential of foreclosures becoming "socially acceptable" for the middle class.

But even though the problems have spread far beyond suprime, some reporters are stuck on the subprime meme. As an example, Bloomberg columnist John M. Berry wrote: Subprime Losses Are Big, Exaggerated by Some

As the U.S. savings and loan crisis worsened in the 1980s, analysts tried to top each other's estimates of the debacle's cost to the federal government.

Much the same thing is happening now with losses linked to subprime mortgages, with figures of $300 billion to $400 billion being bandied about.

A more realistic amount is probably half or less than those exaggerated projections -- say $150 billion. That's hardly chicken feed, though not nearly enough to sink the U.S. economy.

A loss of $150 billion would be less than 12 percent of the approximately $1.3 trillion in subprime mortgages outstanding. About $800 billion of those are adjustable-rate mortgages, the remainder fixed rate.

This is subprime reporting. It's absurd to think that mortgage losses will only come from subprime loans; in fact most of the upside down homeowners will be Alt-A and prime borrowers. By focusing solely on subprime, Berry misses the larger mortgage problem.

And the credit problems extend well beyond mortgages. As an example, from Bloomberg this morning: Citigroup, Goldman Cut LBO Backlog With 10% Discounts

Citigroup Inc., Goldman Sachs Group Inc., Morgan Stanley and JPMorgan Chase & Co. are offering discounts of as much as 10 cents on the dollar to clear a $231 billion backlog of high-yield bonds and loans.

We don't know the exact haircut on each LBO deal, but an average 5% haircut would be over $10 billion in losses. And there are losses coming from corporate debt, CRE loans, and other consumer debt too. As Floyd Norris asked at the NY Times this morning: Credit Crisis? Just Wait for a Replay

"... just how different was subprime lending from other lending in the days of easy money that prevailed until this summer?"

Short answer: not very.

Back to mortgage losses, both Felix Salmon: Are Subprime Losses Being Exaggerated? and Paul Krugman, Jingle mail, jingle mail, jingle mail — eek! bring up a key issue: recourse vs. non-recourse loans. Felix writes:

... no one is going to have a real handle on mortgage losses unless and until someone manages to get a handle on the percentage of mortgage loans which are non-recourse. If your house falls in value and you have a non-recourse mortgage, then it makes perfect economic sense for someone in a negative-equity situation to simply walk away – something known as "jingle mail". But given the amount of refinancing going on during the last few years of the mortgage boom, I suspect that the vast majority of mortgages are not non-recourse. (Refis are never non-recourse.)

This is an important issue. In California, purchase money is non-recourse. If the borrower walks away and mails in the keys (Fleckenstein's "jingle mail"), the lender is stuck with the collateral. However, if the California borrower refinanced, then the lender has recourse, and can pursue a judicial foreclosure (as opposed to a trustee's sale), and seek a deficiency judgment.

The lender can enforce that deficiency judgment by attaching other assets, or by garnishing the borrower's wages. Historically lenders rarely pursued (or enforced) deficiency judgments, but that could change if many middle class borrowers, with solid jobs and assets, resort to jingle mail.

For purchase money, state law determines the recourse vs. non-recourse issue. As Felix noted, refis are always recourse, and there was significant refi activity in recent years.

But before we think most loans are recourse, we have to remember that about 22.3 million homes were purchased during the last 3 years (2005 through 2007), and in a period of rising rates, many of these homeowners probably did not refi. It's difficult to estimate the exact losses - since we don't know the percent of recourse loans, we don't know how far prices will fall, and we don't know how homeowners will react to being upside down - but we know the losses will be significant.

Note: I'm trying to find a state by state list of recourse vs. non-recourse for purchase money.

On recourse loans, Tanta adds (via email):

I suspect that you will have some very aggressive lenders and some not very aggressive lenders in that respect.

Which will tell you who thinks it doesn't have a fraud problem and who does.

Back in my day working for a servicer, we never went after a borrower unless we thought the borrower defrauded us, willfully junked the property, or something like that. If it was just a nasty RE downturn, it rarely even made economic sense to do judicial FCs just to get a judgment the borrower was unlikely to able to pay. You could save so much time and money doing a non-judicial FC (if the state allowed it) that it was worth skipping the deficiency. Plus we had a soft spot, I guess.

At any rate, the absolute all time last possible thing you could get me to do is send an attorney barging into court demanding a deficiency judgment if I had any reason whatsoever to fear that my own effing loan officer was implicated in fraud on the original loan application. Any borrower with half a brain will raise that as a defense, and any judge even slightly awake will not only deny the deficiency but probably make the lender pay all costs, or worse. And I'd call that justice.

This goes double if the loan was made as a "stated asset" deal. I can just hear a judge asking me why I deserve to get other assets now when I never bothered to make sure the borrower had any in the beginning.

So yes, some people will get hit with a deficiency. But I'm not sure it will be as many as you might think. T

by Calculated Risk on 12/20/2007 04:00:00 PM

Within the next couple of years, probably somewhere between 10 million and 20 million U.S. homeowners will owe more on their homes, than their homes are worth. (See Homeowners With Negative Equity)

One of the greatest fears for lenders (and investors in mortgage backed securities) is that it will become socially acceptable for upside down middle class Americans to walk away from their homes.

See these comments from Bank of America CEO Kenneth Lewis via the WSJ: Now, Even Borrowers With Good Credit Pose Risks

"There's been a change in social attitudes toward default," Mr. Lewis says. Bankers typically have believed that cash-strapped borrowers would fall behind on their credit cards, car payments and other debts -- but would regard mortgage defaults as calamities to be avoided at all costs. That isn't always so anymore, he says.

"We're seeing people who are current on their credit cards but are defaulting on their mortgages," Mr. Lewis says. "I'm astonished that people would walk away from their homes." The clear implication: At least a few cash-strapped borrowers now believe bailing out on a house is one of the easier ways to get their finances back under control.

... there is a new class of homeowners in name only. Because these people never put up much of their own money, they don't act like owners, committed to their property for the long haul.

If every upside down homeowner resorted to "jingle mail" (mailing the keys to the lender), the losses for the lenders could be staggering. Assuming a 15% total price decline, and a 50% average loss per mortgage, the losses for lenders and investors would be about $1 trillion. Assuming a 30% price decline, the losses would be over $2 trillion.

Not every upside down homeowner will use jingle mail, but if prices drop 30%, the losses for the lenders and investors might well be over $1 trillion (far in excess of the $70 to $80 billion in losses reported so far).

by Calculated Risk on 10/23/2007 10:52:00 PM

From the WSJ: 'Option ARM' Delinquencies Bleed Into Profitable Prime Mortgages

Subprime mortgages aren't the only challenge facing Countrywide Financial Corp. ... Some loans classified as prime when they were originated are now going bad at a rapid pace.

These ... option ARMs ... typically have low introductory rates and allow minimal payments in the early years of the mortgage. Multiple payment choices include a minimum payment that covers none of the principal and only part of the interest normally due. If borrowers choose that minimum payment, their loan balances grow -- a phenomenon known as "negative amortization."

Click on graph for larger image. This chart from Credit Suisse via the IMF shows the heavy subprime resets in 2008, plus it shows the reset problems with Alt-A and Option ARM loans in later years.

... An analysis prepared for The Wall Street Journal by UBS AG shows that 3.55% of option ARMs originated by Countrywide in 2006 and packaged into securities sold to investors are at least 60 days past due. That compares with an average option-ARM delinquency rate of 2.56% for the industry as a whole and is the highest of six companies analyzed by UBS.
...
The deteriorating performance of option ARMs is evidence that lax underwriting that led to problems in subprime loans is showing up in the prime market, where defaults typically are minimal. Challenges could grow, as from 2009 to 2011, monthly payments on some $229 billion of option ARMs will be adjusted to include market-rate interest and principal, according to Moody's Economy.com.
...
It now appears that many borrowers who moved into option ARMs were attracted by the low payments and may have been staving off other financial problems. More than 80% of borrowers who are current on these loans make only the minimum payment, according to UBS. emphasis added

These Option ARMs, especially the low doc, minimal downpayment Option ARMs, are ticking time bombs.

by Calculated Risk on 10/21/2007 06:23:00 PM

From the Financial Times: US loan default problems widen

Poor quarterly results from banks across the US over the past two weeks suggest credit problems once confined to high-risk mortgage borrowers are spreading across the consumer landscape, posing new risks to the economy and weighing heavily on the markets.
...
Banks are adding to reserves not just for defaults on mortgages, but also on home equity loans, car loans and credit cards.

“What started out merely as a subprime problem has expanded more broadly in the mortgage space and problems are getting worse at a faster pace than many had expected,” said Michael Mayo, Deutsche Bank analyst.
...
Dick Bove, analyst at Punk Ziegel, said bank earnings indicated “there are problems with consumer debt that extend beyond the well-known issues in the real estate markets. Auto loans are clearly a new area of concern”.