by Calculated Risk on 7/30/2008 11:27:00 AM

*** The post title is from Tanta.

President Bush signed the housing bill this morning. One of the provisions is for the elimination of Down-payment Assistance Programs (DAPs) for FHA loans.

The WSJ has some stats on how widespread DAPs had become: Builders Feel Pinch of Key Omission From the Housing Bill

[F]or the builders, the bill's elimination of seller-funded down-payment assistance on mortgages backed by the Federal Housing Administration is a big loss -- one that could eliminate as many as one in 10 home buyers from the market ... Starting in October, buyers using FHA loans can no longer accept down-payment "gifts" that are ultimately funded by the home seller, often a builder.
...
Miami-based Lennar Corp. used down-payment assistance on 33% of the mortgages it originated in the second quarter, while Ryland Group Inc. said 18% to 20% of its buyers used down-payment assistance during the first half of the year.
...
"There will undoubtedly be some impact, but we believe the buyers will adjust and the market will adjust," says Tim Eller, the chief executive of Centex Corp, which said that 25% of its sales in its fiscal year ended March 31 involved down-payment assistance.

Eliminating DAPs is a positive for the economy and housing. FHA loans using DAPs had significantly higher default rates than when the buyers actually made a down-payment.

"One in 10 home buyers". Wow. Not all of these buyers will disappear. Some buyers had the ability to make a down-payment, but used a DAP instead simply because they were available. Other buyers will borrow from parents and friends or will wait until they save the 3.5% down-payment.

The good news is default rates should decline on FHA loans.

by Calculated Risk on 7/23/2008 09:47:00 AM

Note: Down Payment Assistance Programs (DAPs). Tanta and I have written extensively (and negatively) about DAPs for years.

From the WaPo: Congress Is Set to Limit Down-Payment Assistance (hat tip Bob_in_MA)

[T]he FHA said seller-funded down payments present the single biggest challenge to its solvency. Borrowers who take part in these arrangements go to foreclosure at nearly three times the rate of borrowers who put their own money down, according to the agency.

The fate of these seller-funded down-payment-assistance programs has been in limbo for weeks. The Senate version of the housing bill would have banned them. The House version would not. Negotiators crafting a compromise bill have agreed to the Senate's position, which also is supported by the Bush administration.

"We're going to yield to the Senate on that," said Rep. Barney Frank (D-Mass.)

Good riddance.

A few of our previous posts:

FHA Going After DAP Again? Tanta, June 10, 2008

DAP for UberNerds, Tanta, Oct 19, 2007 **** READ this one for nerdy details! ****

FHA to Ban DAPs, CR, Sept 29, 2007

Housing: IRS Raps DAPs, June 2, 2006

More on Housing, CR, Feb 24, 2005

by Calculated Risk on 6/23/2008 09:30:00 PM

When I first heard of Down-payment Assistance Programs (DAPs), I knew we would see higher default rates on FHA loans. Heck, the IRS has called DAPs a "scam". The FHA has vowed to eliminate DAPs ... and yet, amazingly, the percent of FHA loans using DAPs is still increasing.

DAPs simply will not die.

To understand DAPs in nerdy detail, see Tanta's DAP for UberNerds.

From the WSJ: Government Mortgage Program Fuels Risks

The offers -- including "100% financing" -- are made possible due to down-payment assistance programs run by nonprofit organizations. These programs are funded largely by home builders and also by private homeowners desperate to sell. The seller-funded groups provide enough down-payment money to buyers that they can qualify for a mortgage backed by the Federal Housing Administration, which requires at least a 3% down payment.

These are not real down-payments from disinterested third parties. These programs are designed to have the seller (including home builders) funnel money to the buyer through a "nonprofit" to get around the FHA down-payment requirements. The buyer still has no skin in the game.

The FHA estimates that down payments provided by nonprofit groups account for 34% of all 200,000 loans backed by the FHA so far this year, up from 18% in all of 2003 and less than 2% in 2000. And the agency says that borrowers are two to three times as likely to default on their payments when they receive a down payment from a nonprofit.

D.R. Horton Inc., the nation's largest home builder by volume, is touting "100% financing" for its two- and three-bedroom condominiums near the beach in Maui, Hawaii, which start at $498,000. In the Seattle area, local builder Quadrant Corp. is advertising townhouses that can be purchased with as little as $500 down. "Use your coffee budget to move into a new home," says an online promotion.

Here are some previous posts by Tanta and I about DAPs:

FHA Going After DAP Again? Tanta, June 10, 2008

DAP for UberNerds, Tanta, Oct 19, 2007 **** READ this one for nerdy details! ****

FHA to Ban DAPs, CR, Sept 29, 2007

Housing: IRS Raps DAPs, June 2, 2006

More on Housing, CR, Feb 24, 2005

by Tanta on 6/10/2008 11:28:00 AM

Well Glory Be. FHA Commissioner Brian Montgomery, that well-known Ownership Society Koolaid drinker, went before the National Press Club yesterday and made noises to the effect that FHA will resurrect its efforts to rid the world of the DAP scourge:

The Federal Housing Administration expects to lose $4.6 billion because of unexpectedly high default rates on home loans, officials said Monday.

Brian D. Montgomery, the F.H.A. commissioner, attributed the unanticipated losses primarily to the agency’s seller-financed down payment mortgage program, which has suffered from high delinquency and foreclosure rates in recent years. . . .

But Mr. Montgomery warned that the F.H.A. would have to renew its efforts to end the seller-financed down payment program, which accounted for 35 percent of its loans in 2007.

He said the mortgages had foreclosure rates three times those of traditional loans and would push the F.H.A. to the brink of insolvency.

“Let me repeat: F.H.A. is solvent,” Mr. Montgomery said on Monday in a speech at the National Press Club. “However, no insurance company can sustain that amount of additional costs year after year and still survive. Unless we take action to mitigate these losses, F.H.A. will soon either have to shut down or rely on appropriations to operate.”

The Times writer notes that FHA has tried for years on end to get rid of this practice without success. However, the explanation of what these programs really do isn't very helpful. I call them "DAP" (Downpayment Assistance Program) because that's the term HUD uses, and the term you will find in the HUD-sponsored research on the performance of these loans. The term "seller financed" isn't exactly helpful; if we are to use our own term for these deals, I'd suggest "seller money laundered" instead.

I have written about DAP loans and the effort to get rid of them before. Here's an UberNerdly post explaining how the loans work. Here's a post from a year ago summarizing the long tedious and ultimately unsuccessful efforts of the HUD Inspector General to get rid of the program. Let us all devoutly hope that it will work this time.

by Tanta on 5/19/2008 10:28:00 AM

Ken Harney reports in the LAT:

The FHA, which for decades has used a one-size-fits-all approach to pricing its insurance on home loans, plans to shift to a "risk-based" system keyed to FICO scores and down payments, beginning as early as mid-July. Private-sector lenders and insurers have priced interest rates and premiums using sliding scales of FICO scores and down-payment amounts since the mid-1990s.

The agency's move, which will cover new applications including "jumbo" loans up to $729,750 in high-cost markets through December, will bring the FHA in line with the private sector's main approach. . . .

Under the old approach, [Montgomery] noted, buyers with stellar FICO scores paid the same premiums as borrowers with poor scores. That amounted to a pricing inequity for applicants who presented a low risk of default on loans and an inappropriate subsidy of applicants who were likely to default.

A study of an entire year's applications turned up the additional fact that the FHA's lower-income borrowers typically had higher FICO scores than those with larger incomes.

"Is it counterintuitive? Yes," Montgomery said.

According to the study, applicants with FICO scores of 680 to 850 had a median income of $48,756 last year, while those with low scores of 500 to 559 had a median income of $53,388. Fair Isaac Corp.'s FICO scores range from about 300 to 850 -- the higher, the better -- and are predictive of future defaults and foreclosures. Even at rock-bottom down payments of 3%, applicants with lower incomes had higher credit scores than applicants with bigger incomes making similar-size down payments.

I would like to get my hands on that study, which I haven't yet found online. (If any of you have a link, please drop it in the comments.) I did locate this HUD document that outlines the actual premium schedule currently proposed; it provides only one chart with aggregated information on income/FICO breakouts for 2007 FHA applicants in the Appendix. You might be interested to know that the original proposal for risk-based premium pricing distinguished between source of downpayment funds, with borrowers using such things as the notorious DAP (seller-funded "assistance") paying higher premiums than borrowers making downpayments from their own funds or a gift from relatives. That provision has been eliminated.

As far as I know, there is better data on relative performance of FHA loans with or without DAP than there is on relative performance of FHA loans with FICOs just over or just under 600. But HUD is forging ahead with FICO-based pricing while pulling back on downpayment-source-based pricing. I'm having some problems with that.

I think it's important to concede that FICOs do indeed have an established track record of establishing relative default probabilities. The trouble we have had recently with FICOs is mostly, in my view, that they were relied on to offset extremely high risk characteristics in loans with a lot of "risk layering." The problem is not that a 90% LTV loan with a 720 FICO won't outperform, statistically, a 90% loan with a 620 FICO. It will, although it isn't always clear that the difference in performance is all that substantial. The problem is that a 100% loan with a 720 FICO will not necessarily outperform a 90% loan with a 620 FICO. The idea that a high(er) FICO offsets lack of downpayment or high DTI is currently dying a painful death.

The difficulty, however, with deciding that a (theoretical) 90% loan with a 720 should pay a lower risk premium than a 90% loan with a 620 (all other things being equal) is the problem of calibration. How significant is the difference in default probability? Of course, with the FHA premiums the question is how significant the difference in default probability is in some pretty small FICO buckets that are already well within the "subprime" or high-default-probability range. For instance, in the highest-LTV group of loans, the new upfront premium is 200 bps for FICOs from 560 to 599 and 225 bps for FICOs from 500 to 559. But is there really a significant difference in default probabilities in these two FICO buckets? Enough to warrant 25 bps in premium? I would really like to see more information on how HUD calculated all this.

Part of what is bothering me is this set of charts provided in a recent Moody's investor presentation. These numbers are based on a representative sampling of loans closed between the first quarter of 2006 and the second quarter of 2007.

This is of course only one data point, but it certainly raises a question in my mind about making FICO-based premium distinctions within the general category of subprime FICOs, particularly since in the new premium scheme a loan with a downpayment made by the builder gets treated the same as a loan with a downpayment coming from the borrower's own funds. I would really like to see the work on this one.

It gets Nerdier from here . . .

by Tanta on 4/13/2008 08:50:00 AM

A long piece from the Washington Post, which I recommend reading in its entirety.

In late 2006, as economists warned of an imminent housing market collapse, housing Secretary Alphonso Jackson repeatedly insisted that the mounting wave of mortgage failures was a short-term "correction."

He pushed for legislation that would make it easier for federally backed lenders to make mortgage loans to risky borrowers who put less money down. He issued a rule that was criticized by law enforcement authorities because it could increase the difficulty of detecting and proving mortgage fraud.

As Jackson leaves office this week, much of the attention on his tenure has been focused on investigations into whether his agency directed housing contracts to his friends and political allies. But critics say an equally significant legacy of his four years as the nation's top housing officer was gross inattention to the looming housing crisis. . . .

In speeches, he urged loosening some rules to spur more home buying and borrowing. "I'm convinced this spring we will see the market again begin to soar," Jackson said in a June 2007 speech at the National Press Club to kick off what HUD dubbed "National Homeownership Month." He also told the audience that he had no specific laws to recommend to prevent a repeat of the lending abuses that caused the mortgage crisis.

"When Congress calls up and asks us, we'll give them advice," he said. "You have 534 massive egos up there, so unless they ask you, you don't volunteer anything."

HUD spokesperson D.J. Nordquist defended Jackson's record in pushing for more flexibility in government-backed loans. "Secretary Jackson is a big believer in the U.S. housing market and won't apologize for saying so," Nordquist said. . . .

I once opined that it would take Armageddon to get Jackson's attention. It turns out I was wrong; all it took was a shrimp buffet.

by Tanta on 3/14/2008 10:37:00 AM

Barney Frank has released draft details of a new plan for FHA to insure "short refis," or refinances that involve the old lender accepting less than full payoff. I know you mortgage junkies are on the edge of your seats, so here's the dirt.

A draft proposal of the plan is available here. According to Rep. Frank's website, comments and suggestions are being solicited, so consider yourself encouraged to look it over and let Rep. Frank know what you think.

The proposal is to allow FHA to insure up to $300 billion in refinance "Retention Mortgages" in the next two years that involve lender write-downs of principal ("short refis"). In the context of FHA, $150 billion a year is a very large number: it is nearly double FHA's volume for 2006. In the context of loans that are now or will be underwater in the next two years, it's as little as 10% of distressed mortgage loans. (That depends on whose estimates of price declines you use, and also whose estimates of the eligible borrower universe you choose.) So it's either a deluge or a sizable drop in the bucket; take your pick.

How it works:

1. The new mortgage may have an LTV of no more than 90%, and no subordinate financing (all existing subordinate liens must be extinguished). If I am reading the draft correctly (page 4), the new mortgage LTV includes financed allowable closing costs, as well as the special one-time up-front mortgage insurance premium (UFMIP).

2. All loans require a UFMIP of 5.00% of the new loan amount, in addition to an annual mortgage insurance premium (MIP) of 1.50% (which is added to the interest rate) and the "exit premium" (see below). The 5.00% UFMIP is essentially paid by the old lender in the form of principal write-down.

3. The old mortgage lender must therefore accept payoff proceeds (as "payment in full") that allow the new mortgage amount to be 90%. For example: assume an existing $110 loan on a property with a current valuation of $100. The maximum new loan amount is $90. Out of that $90, $4.50 (5.00% of $90) must be paid to HUD for the up-front insurance premium. Assuming 5.00% in allowable closing costs and prepaid items (escrow funding and per-diem interest), another $4.50 is paid at closing of the new loan. There is therefore $81 left to satisfy the old lender, and so the payoff amount is written down to $81. The old lender's loss is $29 ($110 minus $81, or 26%). Any and all prepayment penalties or fees related to prior delinquency or default must be waived (written off) by the old lender.

4. Some kind of principal reduction of an existing first mortgage is required under this loan program in the draft bill; any refinance that could achieve a 90% LTV without principal reduction of the first mortgage would presumably be processed under a standard FHA program, without the additional premia. It appears, then, that if a current loan had both a first and a second mortgage, with the current LTV of the first being 85-90%, the first mortgage could be refinanced into a standard FHA or FHASecure, with the existing second lien extinguished or subordinated. This would be a better deal for borrowers than the Retention Mortgages, since the MIP would be less expensive (5.00% is a giant UFMIP in FHA terms; the current maximum UFMIP is 1.50-2.25%). Loans fall into the Retention Mortgage bucket when necessary write-offs get to the first lien.

5. When the new loan is originated, HUD gets a second lien that involves no payments or interest. It is designed to recapture an "exit premium" of at least 3.00% of the original mortgage amount, up to as much as 100% of the property appreciation. Upon sale or refinance of the loan, the borrower must pay HUD the greater of 3.00% of the original loan loan amount or a share of appreciation. The appreciation is adjusted for capital improvements (as defined in section 1016 of the IRS code). The shared-appreciation provisions (although not the 3.00% exit premium) phase out after five years, so the amount due is the greater of 3.00% of net proceeds or

100% during the first year
80% during the second year
60% during the third year
40% during the fourth year
20% during the fifth year
0% thereafter

What this appears to mean is that the borrower cannot "cancel" this provision by doing a rate/term refinance of the loan into a conventional mortgage, although it isn't exactly clear to me how the actual calculation works in a refinance. Presumably, a refinance would be treated for calculation purposes like a sale, meaning that the borrower would have to refinance for a high enough loan amount to pay HUD the forgiven principal according to the schedule above.

6. All new mortgages must be fixed rate, and are subject to whatever loan limits are currently in place at the time of refinance. (This draft does not commit to the new higher limits within the two-year period of the program.)

Eligibility for the program is as follows:

7. Owner-occupied principal residences only

8. The borrower must establish lack of capacity to pay existing mortgage or mortgages: the borrower must "certify" that default on existing mortgage has not been "intentional," and must demonstrate that as of March 1, 2008 the borrower's mortgage debt to income ratio on all existing mortgages is greater than 40%.

9. The existing first mortgage must have been originated on or after January 1, 2005 and before July 1, 2007.

10. The mortgage debt ratio must be "meaningfully reduced" from the existing first mortgage. This devil will undoubtedly get worked out in the details of HUD guidelines promulgated to implement this program. It isn't clear to me, for instance, what one would do with an existing interest-only mortgage, which, even with principal reduction, could result in a higher payment, since the new loan must be an amortizing fixed rate loan. The bill clearly requires that the base interest rate on the new loan be a "market rate," but with the 1.50% annual MIP added, the rate on the new loans may be not that far under what a subprime borrower is currently paying. (The draft clearly states that there must be a reduction in debt load in terms of the first mortgage, so elimination of a second lien payment would not "count" here.) The draft mentions that the reduction in payment can come from extending the mortgage term, although I see nothing here specifically authorizing terms on the new mortgage of greater than 35 years (what I believe to be the current limit, although 40 years is in the currently proposed "modernization" bill).

11. Full verification of income is required.

12. The borrower's current FICO, or any prior delinquency of the old loan, is not counted against the borrower in qualifying for the new loan.

13. The new loan may not have a total debt to income (DTI, which includes debt other than the mortgage payment) of more than 40%, if the lender expects immediate endorsement (FHA insurance certification) of the loan. New loans may be made with a DTI of up to 50% or 55%, but in those cases the loan remains uninsured until the first six mortgage payments are made on time. This means that the originating lender holds the default risk on those loans until they have performed for six months.

My thoughts on this so far:

I give points for attempting to balance incentives and protect against abuse. The draft bill does not come right out and limit this explicitly to subprime loans, but in practice it would probably do so, since it limits the program to high-rate existing loans. If the new loan payment has to be an improvement over the old loan payment, and the new loan requires a 1.50% MIP, it would be difficult for a borrower with a prime loan that does not carry private mortgage insurance to be "in the money." Even an existing prime loan with mortgage insurance would probably have a current rate less than the rate offered on these Retention Mortgages. I would still like to see clarification of the maximum loan term allowed here. If the maximum term on the new loan is 40 years, then borrowers with an existing 30-year loan at a relatively lower interest rate may still qualify under the "reduced debt load" guideline.

I hope I am correct about financed closing costs being included in the maximum LTV, since this would have an important impact on preventing "fee loading" on the new originations. That is, the new lender may want to lard the loan up with origination fees, but if those are essentially being paid by the old lender in the form of reduced payoff, then the old lender exerts some counter-pressure on closing costs and fees. (I am simply assuming that eligible borrowers are unlikely to be able to pay their closing costs in cash.) I would like, however, to see an explicit provision in this bill for no premium rate/YSP deals (where the borrower is charged a higher interest rate on the loan, with the "yield spread premium" paid by the wholesaler for the higher-rate loan used to pay closing costs instead of financing them into the loan). It isn't necessarily likely that a premium-rate/YSP deal could work out anyway, given the requirement that the payments on the new loan be lower than the payments on the existing first lien, but it's possible if the rate on the old loan was high enough and market rates in the next two years are low enough. If you remove the possibility of paying closing costs with premium, then you're making the old lender pay them, and that will exert downward pressure on what the new lender will charge. If you don't do that, this can turn into just another fee-extraction opportunity for the slimier mortgage brokers. If HUD allows premium pricing here, it needs to hold the line very firmly on what fees can be charged and put into place strict quality-control measures for making sure that the YSP does not exceed allowable fees.

The shared-appreciation provision seems reasonable enough to me, given that it exempts appreciation due to improvements made by the borrower, which removes a major disincentive of shared-appreciation provisions (the borrower's failure to maintain or improve the property).

I certainly like the idea that lenders wishing to write high-DTI loans have to carry the risk for the first six payments. I suspect we would see, after passage of this, just how much lenders really do believe that high DTIs are sustainable.

As far as HUD's risk, there is certainly always the risk that values will continue to decline, although having 5.00% of the loan amount up front as a loss reserve, in addition to the MIP and the "exit premium," will certainly help. This certainly doesn't seem any riskier to me than HUD's current willingness to insure 97-100% LTV purchase-money loans.

Whether lenders will go for it--or be allowed to go for it--is the real question. The draft bill says that "The Secretary (of HUD) may take such actions as may be necessary and appropriate to facilitate coordination between the holders of the existing senior mortgage and any existing subordinate mortgage to comply with the requirements." It doesn't say what necessary actions might be to force second lien holders to roll over and die--threats? bullying? shunning at cocktail parties?--but that's likely to be a sticking point given current second lien holder behavior. The problem for first lien lenders comes back to the issue of what securitizations do or do not allow. A separate bill is on the table in Congress (Castle-Kanjorski) that gives a legal "safe harbor" to servicers who write down principal on a loan, as long as the net present value of the write-down is greater than the NPV of foreclosing. If that is enacted and clearly applies to short refi payoffs as well as modifications, then it would certainly encourage more servicers of securitized loans to participate.

The final question of how much of that $300 billion could get used in two years is, then, hard to gauge at this point. There are undoubtedly going to be trillions of dollars worth of underwater loans in the next two years, but I'm certainly not convinced that all of them would meet the 40% DTI requirement or, if so, involve borrowers willing to sign that shared-appreciation agreement.

As far as mortgage relief proposals go, this isn't anywhere near as dumb as most. It puts the up-front loss on the existing lender, it is fairly careful to exclude outright speculators, flippers, and abusers, and it limits the outsized-profit potential of the originators of the new loans. It is hardly the dumbest kind of loan FHA insures (see the 97% purchases with "down payment assistance" for the ultimate in dumb). I therefore expect that lenders won't like it much, but perhaps I am just cynical.

by Tanta on 2/27/2008 09:06:00 AM

This is what the Financial Times is reporting:

A leading Democratic lawmaker on Tuesday called for $20bn in public funds to be made available to the Federal Housing Administration to purchase and refinance pools of subprime mortgages. . . .

Mr Frank said “we can do it through an existing vehicle rather than a new vehicle”. But the underlying logic of the two proposals is similar.

Mr Frank said that under his plan, the FHA would “buy up packages of mortgages but at a substantial discount”. It would then refinance the loans.

This would require about $20bn up front, but Mr Frank stressed that “the FHA would be repaid” as the loans were refinanced. The ultimate cost of the scheme to US taxpayers, under Congressional scoring practices, would probably be about $3bn to $4bn.

Mr Frank also called for between $5bn and $10bn in loans to the states, which would be used to purchase and refurbish foreclosed homes, and extra funding for counselling services.

Mr Frank said the “lesser efforts” to tackle the mortgage crisis to date “have not been very successful”. The housing crisis was “getting worse not better”.

The externalities involved in foreclosures justified the commitment of public funds. “We are talking about terrible impact on society.”

The main difference between the Frank plan and some of the other proposals circulating is the scale of the intervention envisaged.

Alan Blinder, a professor of economics at Princeton, has called for a new government vehicle modelled on the Home Owners Loan Corporation of the 1930s to borrow between $200bn and $400bn to buy up and restructure distressed loans.

Mark Zandi, chief economist at Moody’s Economy.com told the House financial services committee that it would take about $250bn in upfront funds to purchase all 2m loans expected to end in foreclosure by the end of this decade.

Mr Frank said “reality constrains” and his plan was limited to $20bn for the FHA because of the budget deficit and the need to meet pay-as-you-go spending rules.

So far this morning, my attempts to find more details on the Frank plan have not succeeded. I did, however, find this recently published statement of priorities for the House Committee on Financial Services, of which Frank is the chair:

The Committee on Financial Services urges the congressional budget resolution to prioritize the following critical issues:

(1) Housing Initiative. Over the last six months, the nation has experienced a significant increase in the number of homeowners facing the risk of foreclosure, with estimates of as many as 2.8 million subprime and “Alt A” borrowers facing loss of their homes over the next five years. We have already experienced declining home prices in many areas of the country, and the physical deterioration of certain communities, as a result of waves of vacant homes that were foreclosed or abandoned.

The Financial Services Committee is developing a number of proposals to address these growing problems. Given the urgency to take action, a significant portion of the cost of such proposals will likely be incurred in the current fiscal year. However, there would be some loan activities, FHA administrative costs, and additional housing counseling funding that would be needed over the period of the Budget Resolution.

First, the Committee is working on a proposal to provide refinancing opportunities to save as many as 1 million distressed homeowners from having their homes go into foreclosure. Such a proposal will likely involve using FHA and may involve the federal government purchasing loans. It would be implemented through separate authorizing legislation. Any proposal will require the existing holder to write down the loan to a level that is consistent with the homeowner’s ability to pay, and would exclude investor-owned and second homes. The estimated credit subsidy cost could be as much as $15 billion over the next five years. The Committee is also exploring options to limit federal government exposure and thus reduce costs. We could, for instance, require a limited soft second mortgage to the government that would enhance recoveries resulting from future property sales.

Second, the Committee is working on a proposal to provide as much as $20 billion in the form of grants, loans, or a combination of the two, for purchase of foreclosed or abandoned homes at or below market value. The purpose would be to help stabilize home prices and to begin to reverse the serious physical deterioration of neighborhoods with high numbers of subprime borrowers, defaults, and foreclosures. The structuring of such an initiative as a loan program would help to minimize the cost of the federal government, through net recoveries from the subsequent sale of properties.

Third, a substantial expansion of FHA to help keep homeowners in their home will require the contracting out by FHA for independent expertise for the development of underwriting criteria for refinanced loans and for quality control of the loans as they are being made, as well as increased FHA personnel costs for such activities as loan processing. This will require additional FHA administrative funding in the Budget Resolution for FY 2009 and possibly in subsequent years, in an estimated range of several hundred million dollars a year.

Finally, it is important for Congress to increase funding over FY 2008 levels by at least an additional $200 million a year for federal housing counseling grants. Such grants would increase capacity, in order to ensure that sufficient numbers of borrowers are assisted in implementing these and other initiatives to keep people in their homes.

I still have no particular idea where the "one million distressed homeowners" figure comes from, but we can, I think, conclude that it would be a total number of all FHA-related initiatives, including FHASecure and other kinds of fairly straightforward refinance programs, not just a program that involves FHA purchasing an existing loan in order to refinance it.

If the FT has the number right, we're looking at $20 billion for loan purchases. It's hard to calculate how many loans that would be without knowing just what kind of a discount is on the table. If you assumed a 10% discount and an average original loan balance of $200,000, you'd get just over 100,000 loans. At a 50% discount you could buy around 200,000 loans. That's a long way from a goal of one million loans, however you slice it.

On the other hand, there's the potential of several hundred million dollars a year on the table for independent experts who want to write FHA's credit guidelines for them. We knew that was coming.

The sanity level of this kind of plan still depends on why it is we want FHA to buy these loans and then refinance them, as opposed to simply refinancing them. The risk in the buyout, of course, is always that FHA pays too much for the loan; if buyer and seller need to do the full loan-level analysis to calculate the amount of the necessary loan balance to write off before establishing a price, then the practical thing to do at that point is simply a refinance, without FHA ever owning the old loan. If the point is that there isn't time or capacity for current loan holders to do that analysis, then the amount of the discounted price FHA would pay is uncertain at best.

I am also still eager to hear how this proposes to work from the perspective, specifically, of buying loans out of REMIC pools--and that is, presumably, where the problem loans in question are likely to be, not in bank whole loan investment portfolios. REMICs just cannot sell loans at less than par under current rules; without a change to those rules, it seems likely to me that in the process of selling defaulted loans to the government at a discount, the sponsors of these securities are committing themselves to bringing the deals onto their balance sheets, and possibly facing taxation of the trust itself (not just the investors receiving pass-through income). This is one of the several important differences between the current situation and the old HOLC situation in the Depression (where loans were being purchased from banks and were not securitized).

At this point I'm tempted to think it's a lot of additional mess for $20 billion. The Securities Lawyer Full Employment Act probably wasn't what anyone had in mind . . .

by Tanta on 1/15/2008 11:34:00 AM

This showed up in my email yesterday:

Is your current mortgage turning out to be too good to be true? Financing your current mortgage into an FHA loan can help save your home. New legislation will allow homeowners in danger of foreclosure to refinance into a low, fixed rate FHA mortgage. To learn more about this new program, give me a call today.

Respectfully,
Toby Spangler
TJS Financial LLC
407-733-8962
www.homestarfla.com

So what? So this was the subject line of the email:

Skip your mortgage payment for 3 months

I hereby invite any reader of Calculated Risk, including of course any of you who happen to work for HUD and have enforcement authority, to correspond with Mr. Spangler and explain to him the meaning of the following:

The FHASecure initiative for refinancing borrowers harmed by non-FHA ARMs that have recently reset is not to be used to solicit homeowners to cease making timely mortgage payments; FHA reserves the right to reject for insurance those mortgage applications where it appears that a loan officer or other mortgagee employee suggested that the homeowners could stop making their payments, refinance into a FHA insured mortgage, and keep, as cash, the amount of payments not made on time.

I would of course be happy to forward the original message to anyone with a .gov email address; just drop me a line.

If you, a Calculated Risk reader, do not feel particularly motivated to correspond with Mr. Spangler, perhaps you could give some thought to corresponding with your members of Congress on the subject of "modernizing" FHA to allow more "streamlined" participation by mortgage brokers.

If you happen to be an idiot mortgage broker cruising sites like this one to find email addresses to add your sleazy spam lists, why go right ahead. Add me to your list. I'm here to help you get the recognition you deserve.

by Tanta on 12/09/2007 10:18:00 AM

CR did a wonderful post yesterday clearing up some of the myths and misunderstanding about the Hope Now/"Paulson Plan." I just want to follow up on one of them, the issue of whether this is a "bailout."

We will never establish consensus on that point as long as anyone uses the term "bailout" to mean just any post-hoc action that could benefit someone. CR is using the term somewhat more specifically, in the sense of providing actual taxpayer funds to subsidize mortgagors or make whole mortgagees. In that latter specific sense, the Paulson Plan does not represent a "government bailout."

Several people have noted that it does seem to rely on the availability of government-insured refinance loans (FHA and FHASecure), and it proposes, certainly, the development of government-sponsored bond programs (the "government" in the latter case would be states and counties and cities, not the federal government, as far as I can tell).

I therefore thought it would be helpful to remind everyone what the difference is between a "government-insured" loan and a bond program. FHA does not buy loans. It does not provide capital to make loans with. It is not entitled to any interest income from performing loans. It does not service loans. Ginnie Mae securitizes FHA loans, but Ginne Mae doesn't buy loans either. It "wraps" pools of loans with its guaranty.

So FHA gets nothing out of performing loans except the required insurance premium that the borrower pays. Premiums are held in the MMIF (Mutual Mortgage Insurance Fund) and used to pay out for claims on defaulted loans. We don't need to get into all the technical parts of that today. The point is that the general goal of the FHA MMIF is to be revenue-neutral. Whether it is or not at any given point in time depends on how well the premiums were priced and how well the loans perform. For a long time the MMIF has been a "negative subsidy" on the federal balance sheet, meaning that it actually is in the black. It may well not continue to be in the black, but my point is that what's in the black isn't "profit" from interest payments made by mortgage borrowers. FHA doesn't own any loans. What's in the black is insurance premiums collected in excess of claims paid.

Bond programs are different. There are a jillion flavors of them, but in essence they are public versions of securities: they actually do buy loans, pool them, and issue bonds to investors who receive the principal and interest payments from the loans. Typically, they are set up to buy low-interest (below market) rate loans, because they are issued by governments and everything gets favorable tax treatment. It is possible that the loans in a bond program pool also have some other kind of credit enhancement like FHA insurance, private mortgage insurance, or second liens.

But the bottom line issue here is that insofar as the loans do perform, the bond program's investors do receive the interest income. The bond issuer is ultimately at risk if the loans default and there is not enough principal recovered to make the investors whole.

But in both cases--government-insured loan programs and bond programs--private investors are providing the capital. Of course cities and states and counties can themselves invest in mortgage securities, and we see that they have. But that's hardly the traditional way of doing a mortgage-backed bond issue: the idea there is to get someone else to provide the capital, since the issuer is providing the credit enhancement.

The federal government does not have any program in which it directly buys mortgage loans, or directly invests in mortgage loan pools. The lending capital in this context is always coming from the private sector.

So to get back to the "bailout" question: at the simplest level, what's going on here is that loans that were "insured" (or credit-enhanced) by the private sector are being refinanced into loans that are insured or credit-enhanced by the public sector. Therefore the risk is moving off the private balance sheet and onto the public one. The rewards--such as they are these days--are still firmly in the private sector. In that sense, you could call this a bailout: it's moving the risk of default.

On the other hand, it only works if investors are still willing to buy Ginnie Mae securities or municipal bonds. There has to be some capital supplied. The idea here is that nobody's stupid enough to buy high-risk mortgages right now without government guarantees. So far--and I do stress so far--not even FHA has been willing to go down the road of upside down loans to borrowers who can't qualify with income docs. That's why the whole Paulson Plan is about, in essence, what to do with those loans. So FHA is "taking out" some pretty weak loans, but it isn't taking the weakest ones. The weakest ones get "the freeze" or the foreclosure. That is why this Plan is usefully described as not a government bailout. If FHA or municipalities would take all the toxic waste, we wouldn't need this Plan; servicers would just be busy refinancing. The Plan exists because there is a big pile of loans that do not qualify for any of those refinancing opportunities.

Some people are getting confused by the extent to which The Plan talks about refinances. We already had FHASecure and plain old FHA before this Plan; the Plan did not invent those options. The Plan is about designing rules of thumb for quickly sorting out the loans that don't qualify for refinances, and doing something about them. In that sense it's no more of a "bailout" than what we had before The Plan.

Now, as I noted last week, Paulson's "total package" includes lobbying for "FHA Modernization," which would certainly increase the number of loans FHA could "take out" and decrease the number of loans the private investors have to live with somehow. There are many reasons not to like that; even if you do like the idea of FHA taking on more of the problems, though, the answer here would be to expand FHASecure, which is a new program specifically designed to refinance troubled loans. Changes to the regular old FHA warhorse program would allow more "take outs," but it would also apply to new loans, and we'd have it forever (because there's never the political will to tighten FHA requirements during the next boom), and so FHA would be in the front of the mess next time, with no "dry powder."

"FHA Modernization" might be a kind of bailout, but it's not, in my view, really much of a bailout of existing, defaulting mortgage securities. It's a "reflation" of the mortgage origination industry and the RE market (existing and new). That's the only rationale for pressing for FHA Modernization rather than pressing for easing restrictions on FHASecure. As I said, there are precious few investors who will put money in mortgages right now without a government (or quasi-government) guarantee. Ignore the spin: FHA Modernization is about making new purchase money loans, not about refinancing old problems. That is not an "investor bailout"; it's life-support for loan originators and builders and sellers of existing homes.

We should, I guess, pause over "sellers of existing homes," because we have a vocal subset of the commenting community who keeps arguing that borrowers in trouble should just be counseled to mail in the keys and be done with it. I take it the idea is not to have the banks and REMICs own that REO forever; the idea is that the REO would be sold at a much lower price to new borrowers. Who quite possibly can't get financing right now because the mortgage market is stalled and all appraisals are now in question. So even at a lower price, you need financing for these new borrowers. Enter "FHA Modernization."

There are many kinds of "bailouts," and they don't all depend on not foreclosing on current owners. I frankly am more worried about FHA Modernization becoming a "bailin" than I am FHASecure being a "bailout."

by Tanta on 12/05/2007 11:17:00 AM

Much has been said and debated about the Hope Now Alliance and Treasury Secretary Paulson’s comments last week thereon. Accrued Interest has a good post on the subject, which I take in part as kind of a nudge to explain some of my discomfort with the proposal. I’m working on a longer post addressing the question that seems to bother people the most, namely the question of the extent to which this involves the government changing the terms of existing contracts, or providing protection from liability for servicers who might be accused of violating contracts. That’s a big issue and in many ways a highly technical one, so it may take me a while to deal with it.

In the meantime, though, I wanted to point out one large problem I have with Paulson’s remarks, and a news item this morning gives me a great excuse to do so:

NEW YORK, Dec 5 (Reuters) - Countrywide Financial Corp's (CFC.N: Quote, Profile , Research) chief executive called on the U.S. Congress to temporarily raise the maximum size of mortgages that Fannie Mae (FNM.N: Quote, Profile , Research), Freddie Mac (FRE.N: Quote, Profile , Research) and the Federal Housing Administration may buy or insure by 50 percent to $625,000.

In an opinion piece in the Wall Street Journal on Wednesday, Chief Executive Angelo Mozilo, whose company is the largest U.S. mortgage lender, said the increase from $417,000 should be implemented for up to a year.

He said this would go a long way toward alleviating a nationwide housing crunch, which analysts expect to pinch borrowers and lenders throughout 2008 and probably beyond.

"It should be enacted as part of a broader package of reforms to ensure that these linchpins of our mortgage system can aggressively support the housing market in a time of need, and that the appropriate controls and oversight are in place to protect taxpayers," Mozilo wrote.

Mozilo had previously called for the cap to be raised to as much as $850,000.

You may recall that Bernanke, in a fit of exuberance, had suggested at one point that the GSE limit be raised to $1,000,000. Like most people, I pretty much instantly discounted that as a real possibility. Apparently even Angelo Mozilo has been forced to back off from $850,000 down to $625,000, and only on a temporary basis, at that. I suggest to the powers that be that continuing to ignore this sort of thing is working: wait til they get down to about $420,000, and then close the deal.

But I do not trust Henry Paulson one little bit when it comes to ignoring this sort of thing. This is from Paulson’s speech to the OTS’s National Housing Forum, part of his remarks on the Hope Now proposals:

We in the federal government are also taking steps. This fall, HUD initiated "FHASecure" to give the FHA the flexibility to help more families stay in their homes, even those who have good credit but may not have made all of their mortgage payments on time. An estimated 240,000 families can avoid foreclosure by refinancing their mortgages under the FHASecure plan.

The Administration is taking action to help homeowners, and Congress must do the same before it leaves for the year. Since August, the President has been calling on Congress to pass his FHA modernization proposal which, by lowering the down payment requirement, increasing the loan limit and allowing risk-based pricing, will make affordable FHA loans more widely available. The Administration's proposed bill would help refinance another estimated 200,000 families into FHA-insured loans.

FHASecure and “FHA Modernization” are horses of a different color. “FHASecure” is HUD’s response to the subprime refinance market meltdown; it is a way to offer refinances for a specific class of borrowers facing exploding ARM resets. It still requires a minimum of 3.00% equity, and it does not involve an increase in the maximum mortgage amount. You can read about the details here.

“FHA Modernization” is the kind of thing that got us into this mess in the first place. It is disingenuous of Paulson to say that Bush has been asking for this “since August”; he has been asking for it as far as I know since his first presidential campaign in 1999 (when the whole “Ownership Society” thing got launched). Only someone drinking too much bongwater, in my view, can think that now is a good time for FHA to start taking the oversized no-down loans (with casual appraisals) that are blowing up in the conventional sector. The Bush administration simply treats “FHA Modernization” like tax cuts: they’re good when the economy is good, they’re good when the economy is bad, they’re good when the economy is indifferent. They’re good; it’s a religion. Using the cover of the current crisis to sneak in permanent changes to the base FHA programs, changes that would allow future purchase transactions of the sort that we need FHASecure to bail out, is playing politics. Bad on Paulson.

Do note that FHA loan limits are now, and would be under “modernization,” tied to some percentage of the GSE conforming limit. This means that any change to Fannie and Freddie’s loan limits are an automatic change to the FHA limits. The “modernization” proposal would increase “lower cost” area limits from 48% to 65% of the conforming limit, and “higher cost” areas from 87% to 100% of the conforming limit. Therefore, the combination of “modernization” and—should it occur—increases in the conforming limit could very rapidly increase FHA loan amounts, at the same time that it relaxes appraisal requirements and lowers down payments. If Mozilo’s proposal were enacted along with FHA Modernization, the FHA limits would go to $406,000 (lower cost areas) and $625,000 (higher cost areas). Without “modernization,” the FHA limits would still increase to $300,000 and $546,000, respectively, unless there were a specific limitation in the bill holding the line on FHA limits. Those are pretty big loan amounts for a program that currently allows 97% financing and that is lobbying for the ability to offer 100% financing.

So far, cooler heads seem to be prevailing on the question of raising the conforming limits. So far. This is what Lockhart had to say on the subject to American Banker (subscription only):

"From the Fannie and Freddie side at this point, they should really stick to their knitting, given their capital constraints and given their lack of experience in the jumbo market," Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight Director James Lockhart said in an interview last week. "From my standpoint, they have their hands full in the conforming loan market, and they're doing a good job, and if they're going to go anywhere, I think it should be to help out more in the affordable [housing market], because that's part of their mission."

If Fannie and Freddie don’t belong in the jumbo market, then FHA certainly doesn’t.

My position has always been that the only really good thing about a full-blown credit crisis is that it creates a context in which restrictive legislation that would normally get successfully fended off by industry lobbyists can get passed, as part of the price tag of various bailout or pseudo-bailout efforts. In other words, you can kick them while they’re down. Changes to bankruptcy law to allow cram-downs is a great example of this, as are the state laws seriously curtailing or outright prohibiting stated-income lending. Those aren’t the kind of regulations you get when the punchbowl is still full.

Using the current crisis as an excuse to sneak through more irresponsible “innovation” is making a bad situation worse. The best thing you can say about FHA and the GSEs over the last several years is that while they took on some real risk—everyone did—they did not—they could not—participate in the worst of the excesses. It was left to the purely private sector to go where the agencies would not go; they went there; we got a postcard; it’s not a pretty one. So the agencies will have to be part of the cleanup. Programs like FHASecure and the GSEs’ various near-prime or “expanded approval” refinances for troubled loans are out there, and will save as many loans as they can save. I can live with that, personally.

What I don’t intend to live with is changes to the agencies’ statutory and charter limits that put them in the front of the next bubble. Put down your coffee and any sharp objects you happen to be holding, and read this interview from August of 2006 with Brian Montgomery, FHA Commissioner (and former “director of advance” for Bush-Cheney 2000):

Q: When we spoke about a year ago, on your 34th day on the job, you noted your vision for FHA and the things about FHA that you wanted to improve. Has your vision for FHA changed or evolved during your first year as FHA commissioner? What do consider your biggest accomplishment at FHA within the past year?

A: I'll tell you that the vision is pretty much the same, as far as what we need to do to make FHA viable again. I'd even go so far as to say that it's been strongly reinforced by the many speeches that I give around the country and the many home-ownership events and ribbon-cuttings where I'm actually getting to meet some of the families who've been able to purchase their first home because of FHA. Getting to see the excitement on their faces tells us we're doing the right thing.

I'd also say that, speaking relative to the industry, when we embarked on this quest to modernize FHA, we worked closely with many industry partners, including the MBA [Mortgage Bankers Association]--in particular, at their conference [92nd Annual Convention & Expo 2005] down in Orlando.

Kurt [Pfotenhauer, MBA's senior vice president, government affairs] and others had set up a roundtable of about 25 small to medium-sized FHA lenders, and what was going to be about an hour-long sit-down ended up being an hour and 45 minutes where they all gave me their input on how FHA should be.

Every one of them essentially gave me an earful--in a pleasant way, mind you--but every one of them would start off [by saying], "I started out in FHA" and "I cut my teeth in FHA or my partner did."

It was good for me to see--again reinforcing that our industry partners firmly believe that FHA needs to play a large role in today's mortgage marketplace--that we're definitely heading down the right path. I haven't met anyone yet who said, "We think FHA has outlived its usefulness." Quite the contrary--they all tell us we're doing the right things.

As far as a biggest accomplishment, I would say modernizing some of the ways we do our business relative to our procedures and processes. Some of the feedback we've gotten from the industry, because we rely on the industry and we're partners in all of this, [include] improvements in how we do appraisals.

Some previously called [our rules for appraisals] "unique," some called them "onerous" and some [called them] things worse than that, and we just thought maybe in today's hurry-up world it's not so important to go back two or three times to make sure a cracked window pane is fixed or maybe the tear in the carpet has been adequately repaired. Now, if it's something structural, that's a different story.

I think [another accomplishment would be a] lot of those common-sense solutions--the lender insurance initiative [FHA's Lender Insurance Program, introduced by HUD in September 2005], that now about half our loans are using lender insurance, but we were about the last entity out there to send the thick case binders back and forth as our only means of really processing loans.

We decided that it was time for us to come into this century and do what everyone else was doing--just hitting the "send" key.

That's the Bush administration in a nutshell: give happy speeches, see happy faces, hit "send." The fact that they're still pushing hard for this even "post-turmoil" tells me that it has nothing to do with "Hope Now," and everything to do with "Just Keep Hoping."