by Tanta on 9/10/2008 08:24:00 AM

This headline in the WSJ caught my eye this morning. "Retailers Reprogram Workers In Efficiency Push." Do tell:

LANGHORNE, Pa. -- Retailers have a new tool to turn up the heat on their salespeople: computer programs that dictate which employees should work when, and for how long. . . .

AnnTaylor calls its system the Ann Taylor Labor Allocation System -- Atlas for short. It was developed by RedPrairie Corp., a retail-operations software firm based in Waukesha, Wisc. "We liken the system to an airplane dashboard with 100 different switches and levers and knobs," said AnnTaylor's Mr. Knaul. "When we launched that, we messed with five of them." Giving the system a nickname, Atlas, he said, "was important because it gave a personality to the system, so [employees] hate the system and not us."

But maybe Mr. Knaul should worry a bit more about what those other 95 switches and knobs do:

Mr. Knaul said the new system exceeded the company's targets for converting more browsers into buyers. He said that AnnTaylor hopes to refine the system, possibly with features that rank employees based on skills other than their sales proficiency, such as how well they operate cash registers.

Another option, Mr. Knaul added, was to begin using the system to more efficiently schedule managers.

I haven't been in an Ann Taylor store in several years. Last time I wandered into one, about 75% of the clothing was one of three shades of the same bright pink that every other retailer was loading up on, all slacks and trousers had the same super-low-rise waists that I don't wear, and anything I might have worn to work, like simple linen skirts or blouses, were dry-clean-only, which isn't my idea of what "business casual" dressing is all about. Either that, or the only sizes on the rack were fours or twelves. I didn't notice anyone having problems operating the cash registers, but then again I didn't get that far, given that if I want badly-fitting clothes in a ubiquitous color and style I can get them cheaper than Ann Taylor's prices. But I can certainly see why that chain needs aggressive salespeople to push the merchandise.

by Tanta on 9/05/2008 08:24:00 AM

Well, actually, it appears we've all been fraudulently induced for a long time but just didn't catch on until recently. Dear reader East Northport Slob sent me the link to this Village Voice article, which you think when you start reading it is just another one of those "lenders hose up foreclosure paperwork" things we've been reading for a long time, but then suddenly gives you this:

Catherine Austin Fitts, former Assistant Secretary of Housing and Urban Development, adds a new twist: She believes that borrowers can fight foreclosure because "most mortgages issued in this country from 1996 on were fraudulently induced."

Fitts said in cases of fraudulently induced loans lenders "knew they were issuing mortgages that were not affordable to the borrower," and the borrower "may not owe the money back because they essentially failed to disclose something about [the borrowers]' financial situation that they knew and the borrower didn't."

I'm sure we all have the same questions here: Who the hell is Catherine Austin Fitts? Why 1996? And how do you fraudulently induce people to sign a mortgage by failing to disclose to people some fact about their own financial situation?

I don't think I can help you with the last two, but I did some checking with Dr. Google on the first one. Let's let Ms. Fitts introduce herself:

In 1989, I was serving as Assistant Secretary of Housing. The housing bubble of the 1990’s had burst, and foreclosures were rising.

The "housing bubble of the 1990's" burst in 1989? Is there a wrinkle in the time-space continuum? Is The Truth Out There?

The mortgage insurance funds of the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) were experiencing dramatic losses. We were losing $11 mm a year in the single-family fund. All funds had lost $2 billion in the southwest region the year before.

My staff and I did an analysis of what had caused the losses. What were the actions that we could take?

Fraud aside, the single biggest cause of losses in the FHA portfolio was a falling Popsicle Index – an index that we coined as a rule of thumb to express the health of the living equity within a place.

The Popsicle Index is the percent of people who believe that a child can leave their home, go to the nearest place to buy a popsicle, and come home alone safely. It’s an expression of the sense of intimacy and well being in a place.

Not surprisingly, there is a correlation between the financial equity or wealth in a place and the living equity or human and natural wealth. Where the people, living things and land are happy, businesses thrive, and the value of real estate is good.

This seems to imply that if we could just cheer up our shrubberies, real estate values would improve substantially. I confess to wondering what could cause a "bubble" under this conception of things, but this may be because I'm still stuck in the wrong paradigm:

The Popsicle Index is the % of people who believe a child can leave their home, go to the nearest place to buy a popsicle or snack, and come home alone safely. For example, if you feel that 50% of your neighbors believe a child in your neighborhood would be safe, then your Popsicle Index is 50%. The Popsicle Index is based on gut level feelings of the people who have intimate knowledge of a place, rather than facts and figures.

I'm pretty sure that I feel that at least 50% of my neighbors believe that granite countertops are like a retirement account you can put hot pans on, but certain ugly facts and figures keep intruding on the conversation. Or, well, maybe not, given that since 1996 most of us weren't told the facts and figures about our financial situation in order to fraudulently induce us to buy homes with borrowed money. Or something like that.

Frankly, the Village Voice reporter should have hung up the phone here and gone out for a Popsicle. In fact, I suggest we all go out for a Popsicle. I for one feel safer out on the streets than indoors reading the news some days.

by Tanta on 9/02/2008 09:01:00 AM

Every time I observe that something or other is the dumbest thing I've ever heard of, something even dumber comes along. You'd think I'd have learned by now. But this is the dumbest thing I've ever heard of:

Here’s a bold idea: Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac should merge.

No; having Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac open a counter-cyclical side line of business mowing lawns on each other's REO would be a "bold" idea. This is just another Wall Street plan to solve all of our problems by laying off highly skilled employees with long institutional memories and a high degree of loyalty to their company in order to goose the damned share price. Oh, and it's easier to do that if you make these costly employees sound like fat cats:

Yes, the big benefits of a merger would come at the expense of some the 6,400 employees at Fannie and nearly 5,000 employees at Freddie. And frankly, that’s one reason, among many, such a scenario may not be palatable to folks in Washington — where, it should be noted, many of Fannie and Freddie employees work and live, some as the neighbors of politicians and their friends.

Yeah, right. All those mortgage quality control analysts and remittance accounting clerks live next door to a Senator and hobnob with the K-Street Boyz. Especially all the ones who work in the regional field offices.

Fannie and Freddie have, in fact, historically paid decent salaries for skilled workers, and their benefit packages tend to be excellent. They are known for having diverse workforces and for recruiting and promoting women. They even offer family leave and flexible work hours and child-care plans and pinko crap like that. Obviously someone needs to teach these people the real meaning of capitalism, which is that we do not deal with big, structural, complicated problems. We "downsize" and collect bonuses in the M&A houses:

By merging them, they would really become too big to fail. And sometimes size can be a strength.

A merger wouldn’t undo the mess that these two companies have made, nor does it erase the billions of dollars in potentially toxic loans they own or have guaranteed. Nor would it address the question of whether these companies deserve the implicit backing of the government in the future. . . .

But let’s get real: no matter what solution is chosen for Fannie and Freddie, pink slips are bound to be a part of any fix.

"Getting real" like this is what happened to the non-GSE part of the mortgage business over the last several years. Wall Street firms bought up mortgage companies, slashed back rooms and highly-paid experts, offshored collections and account management and swarmed all over the "wholesale" model that substituted "independent" brokers for origination employees whose long-term financial best interests were aligned with the company. The synergy, dude. It was really something.

And since that worked so well at outfits like Countrywide or the Street-owned firms, let's try it again on the GSEs? I have had a theory for a long time that the very subject of the GSEs just makes a whole lot of people utterly insane, pretty much regardless of what they do or what the context of the conversation is. Being a hybrid of a private corporation and a government agency, they will always be ideologically intolerable to purists on one or the other side of any of the more annoying political arguments of our time. But this kind of thing is beyond the usual sloganeering about private vs. government sectors and competition and monopoly and so on. This is just a naked appeal to the Street's desire to eliminate skilled jobs to enrich consultants and executives. If you thought they learned anything by the fiasco of the mortgage securitization machine--put any dumb old loan in the deal because someone's got a spreadsheet showing hockey sticks on it--think again.

by Tanta on 8/02/2008 09:01:00 AM

It took approximately twelve minutes for some of the bigger economic illiterates in Congress to sponsor a bill to reauthorize FHA DAPs--a form of money-laundering in which property sellers can inflate their sales prices by funneling money to a "non profit" which then "gifts" the funds to the buyer of the property.

Not content merely to pander to the most naive of their constituents by lining first-time homebuyers up to face foreclosure at three times the rate of those who don't get these generous "gifts," the sponsors of this bill, Representatives Al Green (TX-09), Gary Miller (CA-42), Maxine Waters (CA-35), and Christopher Shays (CT-4), would also like to redefine the very nature of the FHA mortgage insurance program, so that insurance premiums paid by those borrowers who do not default are not used to cover the losses on those who do default. Presumably, the funds to cover the losses on those borrowers who do not make their payments would come from the premiums that people who do not make their payments are not paying. Here's the draft bill:

Section 2133 of the FHA Modernization Act of 2008 is amended by adding at the end the following new subsection:

(c) AUTHORIZATION FOR RISK-BASED PRICING.—
(1) AUTHORITY. —Notwithstanding subsections (a) and (b), the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development may implement a risk-based premium product for borrowers with lower credit or FICO scores, to facilitate the availability of insurance for mortgages for such borrowers, through the establishment and collection of adequate premiums to cover the risks of such loans.

(2) REFUND OF PREMIUMS. —The Secretary shall provide for a refund of a portion or all of the higher premiums paid at the time of insurance by borrowers with lower credit or FICO scores as a result of risk-based pricing pursuant to this subsection, except that such refund shall be limited to only borrowers with a history of at least a specified number of years of on-time mortgage payments. Such refund shall be made upon payment in full of the obligation of the mortgage.

Apparently, it's not good enough for Congress that any borrower who makes two years or so worth of on-time mortgage payments (and, um, isn't upside down) can qualify for a streamlined standard FHA refinance that would lower the monthly insurance premium to the level of a "good credit" borrower. Now we have to reimburse those borrowers for the higher premiums they paid during the term of the original loan.

This is certainly a curious view of what "insurance" is. Apparently the sponsors of this bill think of mortgage insurance premiums as a kind of escrow: what you pay in is "dedicated" to covering only your own potential default, and if you don't default you get it back. Of course, there's no provision here for requiring deficiency judgments against borrowers who do default, in the highly likely event that the premiums those borrowers paid from inception to default isn't enough to cover FHA's loss. So you know who's going to pay for that.

But don't let me give you the impression the bill proposes no safeguards against risk: the bill requires that these DAP programs offer optional "homebuyer counseling" to all borrowers prior to closing, and it requires that if the borrower opts for counseling, the DAP must provide that counseling. If the borrower blows you off, you just close the loan. I suppose it is obvious to Congress that a borrower who declines counseling knows what he or she is doing. Now that I think about it, though, a borrower who scorns being counseled by the seller's money launderer is probably smarter than a box of rocks.

Perhaps the FDIC could ignore bloggers for a while and just keep its eyes on Congress.

(Thanks, Chad!)

by Tanta on 7/22/2008 09:07:00 AM

UPDATE: Please see the end of the post for a marvelous blast from the Brooks past.

I have never actually gone out of my way to read a David Brooks column; this one was directed to my attention by a reader (thanks, Pat!).

It takes on the same Morgenson article I went after on Sunday. In the process of doing so it makes a series of claims that are, I think, way more preposterous than Morgenson's tendency to see borrowers as primarily hapless, passive victims of predatory lenders:

[W]hat happened to McLeod, and the nation’s financial system, is part of a larger social story. America once had a culture of thrift. But over the past decades, that unspoken code has been silently eroded.

This nostalgia for the lost "culture of thrift" always gets on my nerves. America has always had both a "culture of thrift" and a "culture of conspicuous consumption." We have had our Gilded Ages before the year 1992. The "BankAmericard" (which became the Visa) was invented back in the "thrifty fifties," about ten years after economist James Duesenberry first popularized the phrase "keeping up with the Joneses." Collapsing the history of America into a lost golden age of thrift contrasted to a degenerate present of consumption excess is a reliable sign you're in the presence of ideology. Like this:

Some of the toxins were economic. Rising house prices gave people the impression that they could take on more risk. Some were cultural. We entered a period of mass luxury, in which people down the income scale expect to own designer goods. Some were moral. Schools and other institutions used to talk the language of sin and temptation to alert people to the seductions that could ruin their lives. They no longer do.

Norms changed and people began making jokes to make illicit things seem normal. Instead of condemning hyper-consumerism, they made quips about “retail therapy,” or repeated the line that Morgenson noted in her article: When the going gets tough, the tough go shopping.

McLeod and the lenders were not only shaped by deteriorating norms, they helped degrade them.

Reactionaries and moral scolds have been carping about working people aspiring to "mass luxury" since at least the time of Adam Smith. Anyone who has ever read a nineteenth century novel has encountered the ubiquitous scenes of upper-class women bemoaning the increasing availability of inexpensive machine-made ready-to-wear clothing, which--horrors!--allowed the servant class to wear dresses and suits that were increasingly hard to distinguish from the clothing of their middle-class betters. Or the apocalyptic brooding over the sudden availability of affordable washing machines and gas ranges, which would lead to nothing but demands for female suffrage and public schools for the servant class. (Yep. They were right about that.)

And just when did the schools used to talk about the "sin and temptation" of shopping, and just when did they stop? Diane McLeod, the woman featured in Morgenson's story, is 47. She would have been only an impressionable teenager when Tammy Faye Bakker was all over the TV, preaching about sin and temptation and also appearing every week in a different outfit and shoes, not to mention the make-up and hair. If Tammy Faye was mostly concerned with keeping young women out of the perdition of spending Saturdays at the mall, I don't remember that part. I do remember first hearing that stupid line about the tough going shopping during the great moral awakening of the Reagan years.

Of course, "McLeod and the lenders" and those dratted secular schools weren't exactly the only parties involved in the rather complex dynamic of establishing the social respectability of recreational or "therapeutic" consumption. Brooks, writing in that influential arbiter of taste the New York Times, somehow fails to notice the role of the media in constructing popular standards for "risk" and "normal" consumption patterns. In Brooks' weird little world, Americans responded to "rising home prices" that they apparently directly perceived, without media intervention. It was those house prices that "gave people the impression that they could take on more risk," not the reporting on house prices or the columnists who solemnly opined that these prices meant that people weren't taking on more risk by buying or refinancing. How incredibly convenient that line is.

Some of us can have grave concerns about consumerist culture and excessive household debt without telling ourselves that "capitalism" is about to erase a couple hundred years of history and bring back Puritanism. We can also object to the way in which writers like Morgenson seem to want to erase the extent to which real people like McLeod are active participants in their own lives--in favor of seeing them as mere passive victims of lenders--without having to drag Calvinist notions of "sin and temptation" out of the cultural closet. But at least Morgenson's little secular morality plays do try to ground themselves in a set of empirical facts about lender practices as they exist today. Brooks' reductive fantasies about American history and the equation of spending and sin leave the world of empirical fact far, far behind.

Credit crunches and economic crises are bad enough, without having to put up with the endless cheap moralizing that always seems to accompany them. Unfortunately, we're going to have to put up with a lot of cheap moralizing from the media. At least this time around we've got the Internet and the blogs to make fun of it.

UPDATE: our 12th Percentile leaves us this jewel in the comments:

I would like to present David Brooks from 2004 arguing against David Brooks in 2008. From his NY Times article on suburbia, which has to be read to be believed:

These criticisms don't get suburbia right. They don't get America right. The criticisms tend to come enshrouded in predictions of decline or cultural catastrophe. Yet somehow imperial decline never comes, and the social catastrophe never materializes. American standards of living surpassed those in Europe around 1740. For more than 260 years, in other words, Americans have been rich, money-mad, vulgar, materialistic and complacent people. And yet somehow America became and continues to be the most powerful nation on earth and the most productive. Religion flourishes. Universities flourish. Crime rates drop, teen pregnancy declines, teen-suicide rates fall, along with divorce rates. Despite all the problems that plague this country, social healing takes place. If we're so great, can we really be that shallow?

The internet really does make it easy to show what idiots these people are.

by Tanta on 7/15/2008 10:05:00 AM

CR Update: In the title, Tanta used the term "infomercial" to suggest that the article read like an infomercial to her. In no way did Tanta mean to imply that the author was paid to write the article by any of the companies or individuals mentioned.

Just the other day an email message from a reader on the subject of short sales put me in the mind of this post from back in March, wherein we saw a New York Times reporter using an operator I politely called a "bucket of scum" as a source on state anti-deficiency statutes--when a quick perusal of the guy's website verified that he knows about as much about anti-deficiency law as I do about football (that's the one with the kind of pointy ball, right?). Even worse, the guy's website contained all kinds of tips for doing "creative" RE transactions that smelled to high heaven. At the time I was a bit amazed that a so-called legitimate news outlet could have spent more than 30 consecutive seconds with that dude's website and failed to conclude that he wasn't the kind of expert you quote in the Times.

So this morning I run across this John Wasik column from Bloomberg yesterday, which simply goes to show that no one ever learns anything.

*************

July 14 (Bloomberg) -- Where politicians and bankers see vexing liabilities in defaulted mortgages and foreclosures, Robert Lee sees opportunities as he picks up the pieces of the housing bust.

His company, Foreclosure Trackers Inc., which he co-founded with President David Phelps, is based in Huntington Beach, California, in a bank office building where some of the first subprime loans were created.

Buying defaulted mortgages at a discount, Lee encourages and enables owners to stay in their properties and avoid foreclosure. His company buys the loans, not the homes, then employs a ``work- out, not kick-out'' approach in working with homeowners.

Unless a comprehensive federal bailout reduces foreclosures, areas with the highest defaults will continue to show dramatic price declines as more properties fall into the hands of lenders and courts. The idea of discounting notes to reflect realistic market values may be the key to getting the market on its feet.

Please note that this column is not just some report on some entrepreneur who (claims to be) profiting big time from the bust. Wasik is trying to get us to believe that this is some signficant and important process for clearing the RE market.

Fortunately we get an example of how this deal works:

Say he finds a property with a $750,000 mortgage, but his broker opinion determines that the property is worth only $510,000 in the current market. He offers $255,000 for the note.

Conditions Attached

If his bid is accepted, Lee becomes the owner of the mortgage. He then contacts the homeowner and offers to cut the principal owed to $408,000 ``on the condition the homeowner is able to refinance with another lender within 60 days.''

If the borrower can refinance, the new lender pays off Lee's outstanding mortgage lien, netting him a profit of $153,000.

What if refinancing isn't an option? Lee may offer a loan modification, reducing the principal and interest payments.

He also provides services to improve credit scores so that borrowers can eventually refinance. Through his efforts in working directly with homeowners, he says less than 15 percent of defaulted first mortgages end up in foreclosure.

And we know that this example is realistic--that there are all of these lenders out there happy to take 30 cents on the dollar for a mortgage loan rather than just writing it down to 54 cents themselves and letting the borrower refi into an FHA program--because, um, this Lee character implies as much.

John Wasik, were you born yesterday? You see the term "credit repair" in the same sentence with "investing in defaulted mortgages," and you don't realize what kind of company you're keeping? How, exactly, are we going to get the RE market back on its feet if the elementary social compact among lenders--that you report accurately and fully on the repayment history of a loan you make, so that anyone asked to refinance it can know what it's getting into--is tossed away? This is what Mr. Lee's website says about "credit repair":

At Foreclosure Trackers, Inc. ("FTI"), we know the importance of a legitimate repair service to people who want to improve their credit scores. If you have had your credit damaged by foreclosures, bankruptcies, collection agencies, or inaccuracies on your report, you know how difficult it can be to remove these items and get back on your feet.

That is why FTI has gone to great lengths to affiliate ourselves with the best credit repair service. Both FTI and our members have tested the service, and everyone has come to the same conclusion: the service works with amazement to improve your credit score by removing disputed items, such as foreclosures. [Effusiveness in original]

"Inaccuracies"? "Disputed items"? If someone is willing to sell you a mortgage loan for 30 cents on the dollar, just how much "dispute" do you think there might be about its foreclosure status? What this is implying to me is that Lee's strategy is to 1) convince the original noteholder to remove the prior derogatory history from its credit bureau reporting and 2) fail to report derogs during the time Lee owns the loan so that 3) the borrower can get a refi with an artifically inflated FICO that doesn't give the new lender a true sense of the borrower's past performance. So, Mr. Wasik, who do you think ought to be the lucky take-out lender in this little scheme? FHA? Your tax dollars at work?

I don't even really see from my (admittedly rather dazed) perusal of this outfit's website where they really are the ones investing money in buying these defaulted loans. I see a lot about how they want to sell you, the gullible public, the secrets of how to do this yourself. Even if you don't, um, have any money to invest.

"How To Earn HUGE PROFITS In Defaulted Mortgages"

That would be font size, text color, and quotation marks used for emphasis in the original. It continues:

You can have success in this business, even if:

You've Never Heard of Defaulted Mortgages
You Have No Money To Invest
You Have No Experience Investing

Sounds like the kind of thing highly likely to save the economy: ignorant broke inexperienced people leaping into another Git Rich Kwik scheme. Who, you have to ask, are these people selling this dream?

The website helps us with that:

Robert Lee, CEO: Born in Los Angeles and raised in Orange County, Lee's invitation to the world of real estate can only be described as a happy accident. While visiting a friend in Seattle, Lee happened across a for sale sign listing a house for $33,000. Lee couldn't believe the asking price—at first, he thought it was the down payment. Knowing a good deal when he saw one, Lee purchased the house on a simple owner finance and was required to put 10% down, with no credit or income verification. Lee sold the property two years later for a $27,000 profit at the age of 24. He couldn't believe how easy it was. . . .

David Phelps, President: A lifelong resident of Orange County, Phelps began working in the financial sector in 2000. In spite of a rewarding career as a licensed acupuncturist and herbalist, Phelps decided to pursue his interest in real estate by plunging into the industry head first. Phelps almost immediately discovered a new set of talents as a loan officer and licensed real estate agent.

The website doesn't tell us how long, exactly, it has been since Mr. Lee was 24 years old, but judging by the second video on this page, it doesn't seem that long ago.

So does Wasik display any sense of skepticism at all in this column? Not exactly. There is this mention at the very end of "some pitfalls":

Many homes have never been occupied by owners or have been boarded up or damaged. Some mortgages were obtained fraudulently.

It can be even more complicated to locate, acquire and discount the notes, since only properties are typically advertised for sale. It's also essential to obtain the true market value of a home. Lee relies upon appraisals that give him a down-to-earth ``quick sale'' price, something you may not get from the average real-estate agent. There's a lot of complex paperwork involved.

Once courts get involved, it becomes even more difficult. Lee avoids buying notes in states such as Indiana, Ohio, Michigan and Pennsylvania, where, unlike California, foreclosures quickly enter the judicial system.

Oh. So Mr. Lee makes sure to buy notes only in states where FC is fast and cheap and doesn't get bogged down in the courts. Right. The states where current noteholders would be most motivated to accept 30 cents on the dollar. Sure.

Memo to the media: a great deal of the problem we have right now is the result of people who didn't know nuthin' about nuthin' deciding to make a killing flipping real estate. We will not solve that problem with an small army of people who don't know nuthin' about nuthin' deciding to make a killing flipping defaulted mortgage loans.

Oh yeah, and will you all just try to spend a little bit of time looking into these people before you decide to give them more free publicity? You can click on these links and read these websites for free!

All Bloomberg just did was give these dudes another press clipping to add to their "testimonials" page. I do indeed call that "journalistic malpractice."

OK, I put my drink down. I want to read more.

by Tanta on 7/01/2008 10:02:00 AM

New-Old meme: FAS 157 is ruining the financial industry. Barry Ritholtz knocks this point of view around, as reported in the New York Times:

Some blame the rapacious lenders. Others point to the deadbeat borrowers. But Stephen A. Schwarzman sees another set of culprits behind all the pain in the financial industry: the accountants.

You see, the magic of securitization during the boom was that it created obscure instruments like CDOs that were "worth" more than the underlying collateral (absurd mortgage loans). Now that the magic of securitization during the bust is that it has left behind obscure instruments--those pesky CDOs--that may well be "worth" less than the underlying collateral, if you can imagine that, foul is cried:

Of course, the purpose of FAS 157 was to make the market more transparent and efficient, which Mr. Schwarzman doesn’t take issue with.

“The concept of fair value accounting is correct and useful, but the application during periods of crisis is problematic,” he said. “It’s another one of those unintended consequences of making a rule that’s supposed to be good that turns out the other way.”

In other words, mark-to-market is great on the way up, but it's not fair to have to mark on the way down.

by Tanta on 6/25/2008 08:12:00 AM

As usual, I can't tell if this sounds a little absurd because the complaint is this weak or because all I have to go on is the Gretchen Morgenson Version of the complaint.

The Illinois complaint was derived from 111,000 pages of Countrywide documents and interviews with former employees. It paints a picture of a lending machine that was more concerned with volume of loans than quality.

For example, former employees told Illinois investigators that Countrywide’s pay structure encouraged them to make as many loans as they could; some reduced-documentation loans took as little as 30 minutes to underwrite, the complaint said.

Volume-based compensation structures? There have been volume-based compensation structures in this business since long before Tanta got into it. Does it create perverse incentives? Sure. Do we have to like it? No. Has it operated all these years in plain sight of regulators, investors, and the public? Yes. Is CFC's pay structure all that different from anyone else's? I profoundly doubt it.

And if anyone who has ever underwritten a loan in 30 minutes has to go to jail, the jails will be full indeed. I wonder if they'll let me take my new Kindle. Jesus H. Christ on a Process Re-engineering Consultant Binge, folks, anybody who didn't tell the analysts on the conference calls that they'd got their average underwriting time down to 30 minutes was Nobody back in 2000. Not to mention the AUS side of the business where underwriting had gotten down to 30 seconds.

The lawsuit cited Countrywide documents indicating that almost 60 percent of its borrowers in subprime adjustable rate mortgages requiring minimal payments in the early years, known as hybrid A.R.M.’s, would not have qualified at the full payment rate. Countrywide also acknowledged that almost 25 percent of the borrowers would not have qualified for any other mortgage product that it sold.

It is now grounds for a lawsuit that you have borrowers in your lowest credit quality product who do not qualify for any alternative product? Um. We used to think that if borrowers in your lowest credit quality product could have qualified for an alternative product, you might be guilty of predatory "steering." Now you're also guilty of predatory lending if indeed the borrowers at the bottom of the pile only qualify there? Every lender has borrowers in, say, its FHA product who could not not qualify for any other mortgage product it sells. Are we going to call that a problem? That'd get pretty interesting pretty fast.

Even more surprising, Ms. Madigan said, was her office’s discovery of e-mail messages automatically sent by Countrywide to its borrowers offering complimentary loan reviews one year after they obtained their mortgages from the company.

“Happy Anniversary!” the e-mail messages stated. “Many home values skyrocketed over the past year. That means that you may have thousands of dollars of home equity to borrow from at rates much lower than most credit cards.”

Ms. Madigan said, “I was just struck that on the first anniversary of these people’s loans they would get these e-mails luring them into a refinance, into another unaffordable product to generate more fees and originate more loans.”

Lisa Madigan cannot be such a Pangloss as to be bowled over by the idea that lenders solicit their current loan customers for refinances. She can't.

Nobody has to like any of these business practices. But they have been hiding in plain sight for a long, long time. This ginned-up outraged innocence--all directed at Countrywide, as if everyone else in the industry had never heard of any of this--is truly getting on my nerves.

by Tanta on 5/28/2008 08:18:00 AM

As a general rule I do not recommend reading "Realty Times" at 6:00 a.m., but I'm blaming twist.

It's not that people don't want homes, it's that they can't buy them under the stricter lending standards. . . .

Lenders are turning the clock back to 1975, requiring larger downpayments and higher credit scores to qualify for low interest rates. That's only prudent, but what they're also doing is tightening appraisals on properties that are being sold or refinanced.

In 1975, it was not unknown--it was in fact only made illegal that year by the Equal Credit Opportunity Act--to inquire about a married woman's future childbearing plans, her use of contraception, and her religion before deciding whether to "count" any income she might produce for purposes of qualifying for a loan. (If she said "Catholic," forget it.) If you think we are experiencing 1975 mortgage loan underwriting, you were born yesterday.

So why is it "prudent" to require larger downpayments and higher credit scores, but another thing entirely to tighten up on appraisals? And how is this nefarious appraisal tightening preventing people from buying homes?

*****************

There must be an anecdote, and we actually get a twofer:

Dallas Realtor Mary O'Keefe was hit with the new lending realities in a double whammy just this week.

"I had a closing that was delayed because the lender wanted a second appraisal," says Mary O'Keefe, a Dallas broker. "I told my clients absolutely no way would they pay for a second appraisal."

That deal finally closed, but O'Keefe lost another. A client wanted to take out some equity on her townhome, buy another property to live in, and save the townhome for mailbox money. The client had an 800-plus credit score, was approved by a lender, but went to her personal banker for the HELOC. She had an appraisal from the year before for $467,000 giving her about $155,000 in equity.

Because banks want to use appraisals no less than six months old, the personal banker called for a drive-by appraisal, which came in at $400,000, more than $20,000 below the lowest priced home in the community, and $75,000 below a home that sold a year ago three doors down.

So the purchase transaction actually did close, although it was--gasp!--"delayed," but this poor lady who wanted to cash out the "equity" in a townhome she was not going to occupy was stymied by some evil bank who--get this--wouldn't use a year-old appraisal. Turn on the disco ball and haul out your lava lamps! It's the seventies!

I confess to being somewhat alarmed, by the way, about a Realtor who tells a buyer that "no way" are they going to pay for a second appraisal. You would not, in the current environment, even consider paying another $350-$400 to assure yourself that you are not overpaying for your property by thousands of dollars?

The real problem here is that Realty Times wants to continue to perpetrate the view that establishing reliable appraised values is not in a homebuyer's best interest as well as a lender's. For some reason this reminded me of a story we posted just a year ago, in which the Wall Street Journal waxed outraged about some poor rich doctor who was having trouble getting his loan approved to buy a property for $1.05 million when the lender had gotten a broker price opinion stating that it was only worth $750,000. I did a bit of looking in the county real estate records, and it appears that our man did indeed buy the home on April 17, 2007 for $1.05 million. On April 27, 2007, the county assessed the property for tax purposes at $793,400. Per the WSJ he borrowed $885,000. I wonder if he still feels ripped off by the lender who told him he was overpaying for that home.

OK, I'm game. How?

by Tanta on 4/25/2008 06:55:00 AM

Well, no, they're "affluent." And they're not like us.

From "Pain of Foreclosure Spreads to the Affluent," in the ever-dependable NYT:

“We never had a case that had gone through three separate sales attempts,” he said, still dazed that the auction failed to take place. “Greenwich being Greenwich, foreclosures are a rare occurrence.”

Rare, perhaps, but not unheard-of, as the housing industry collapse starts to claim victims among the affluent. Personal traumas like business reversal, illness and divorce play a role. There’s no real pattern, with people as diverse as builders, restaurateurs and poker players at risk of losing their homes.

And us plebes outside of Greenwich, on the other hand, fit into nice neat categories? I see.

Well, I for once have seen this "real pattern" before:

As for the four-bedroom colonial that just avoided going on the block, Zbigniew Skwarek, the 41-year-old owner, came up with his own money to postpone the auction. Court records show he stopped paying on his mortgage on Feb. 1, 2007. But three days before the scheduled auction, he said, he gave his lender a check for $50,000.

Mr. Skwarek may not live in one of Greenwich’s most coveted neighborhoods. But like many residents here, he owns other properties, including an apartment in Greenwich and a home in Florida, and he can tap into that equity.

“I don’t want to lose this house,” Mr. Skwarek said in a telephone interview.

Mr. Skwarek rented out the house after he divorced his wife, Renata, in 2004, because, he said, it felt too big to live in alone. But last year, he said, his renters, John and Arline Josephberg, stopped paying their monthly rent of $10,000.

While living there, Mr. Josephberg — who previously ran the financial firm Josephberg Grosz & Company — was put on trial, accused of not paying his taxes for 29 years. He was sentenced to 50 months in prison. By the time the couple moved out in January, they owed Mr. Skwarek $90,000. Calls made to Mrs. Josephberg and to the couple’s daughter were not returned.

But public records show that Mr. Skwarek had trouble paying his bills even before he rented out his home. Court documents show that he also owes construction and supply companies more than $200,000 for unpaid bills on his home.

In the past four years, he has been in court several times over unpaid bills. He has a felony conviction for not paying wages to his workers and a misdemeanor for issuing a bad check. He was sued in small claims court for not paying his divorce lawyer. His former wife said that his money troubles contributed to the end of their marriage.

“I was sick about how he took care of the bills,” Ms. Skwarek said. “He didn’t change.”

I am not sure we have established that Mr. Skwarek is "affluent," but he is clearly "subprime." He just has a rather larger subprime loan than us average Joes and Joettas--you know, the kind Mr. Skwarek failed to pay wages to, the kind who may have needed those wages to make their own mortgage nut. This does, though, create one difference--unlike your run of the mill subprime borrower, Mr. Skwarek fervently believes in the kindness and decency of lenders:

Mr. Skwarek has still not figured out how he will hold on to his home. He will try to rent it again, he said. If that doesn’t work, he plans to move in and rent out his apartment. He remains optimistic that foreclosure will never happen and that his lender will help him find a way to escape his financial trap.

“They want to work with people like me,” he said.

I'll bet they do.

by Tanta on 4/11/2008 09:05:00 AM

To summarize this MarketWatch article: the parties who are actually in first loss position--whose money is on the table if these things go south--have learned their lesson about no-down financing. The parties who just like to party haven't gotten the memo yet.

Mortgage Guaranty Insurance Corp., for example, changed its guidelines last week to exclude coverage of 100% mortgages. At a minimum, borrowers need a 3% down payment and a credit score of at least 680 to be eligible for coverage. In selected markets where home prices are declining, a 5% down payment is the minimum required. . . .

"It's obvious why they're making these changes," [Broker*] Brown said of the insurance companies. "They have to eliminate the losses they're taking." Mortgage insurance companies have been hit hard by the increasing number of defaults and foreclosures, he pointed out.

At MGIC, the changes to underwriting of low loan-to-value loans -- as well as increases to the pricing on some products -- were made due to the recent performance of loans with those characteristics, said Michael Zimmerman, senior vice president of investor relations. But the changes, he said, also reflect a return to more historically normal underwriting standards.

"The more equity that a borrower has -- or, if you will, skin in the game -- in any investment, the more likely they are to have a higher degree of responsibility toward it," he said.

Goldhaber [of Genworth] said that those in the mortgage industry also have a responsibility to put homeowners into the proper mortgage product. These days, it's irresponsible to give people a loan for 100%, he added.

"In soft markets like we have today, with declining home-price appreciation, to put someone in a zero down is really inappropriate," he said. "It's the kind of product choice that gets consumers in trouble."

Let us pause just for a moment to reflect on a distinction I haven't posted jillions of words on for a least a year, probably, but that is really crucial here: loss frequency versus loss severity. Requiring a 5% down payment from a borrower is not really about substantially lowering a lender's or insurer's loss severity, or how much you will lose if the thing defaults. It is about substantially lowering loss frequency, or how often defaults occur. This is what the concept of "skin in the game" means: it means having a borrower with a first-loss stake in the deal that is significant, in dollars, to the borrower. A borrower who does not wish to lose a 5% investment in the property, the logic goes, is less likely to "ruthlessly default" immediately should home prices drop; that borrower has some motivation to hang in there until they recover. (And if current prices are still so high that they have a long way to fall and little likelihood of ever recovering, whatever are you doing putting a borrower into such a loan with only 5% down? That's asking for "ruthless default.")

But the idea here is that the "skin in the game" is significant to the borrower, not representative of the lender's likely loss. If a 95% financed loan defaults tomorrow, even with no change in the home's value, the lender/insurer is still going to lose somewhere in the neighborhood of 20% of the loan amount. Default servicing and foreclosure and resale of REO is expensive, more expensive than that 5% down is going to cover. Down payments in this view of the world are set to "what the borrower can't afford to lose," not "what the lender can't afford to lose." Or again, it is about making defaults less frequent--because borrowers are motivated not to default "optionally"--than about making defaults less severe, although they surely do mitigate severity.

Try telling these mortgage brokers that:

That said, while the conventional no-down-payment products may have disappeared, there are still ways to buy a home without a down payment, said A.W. Pickel, CEO of LeaderOne Financial in Overland Park, Kan., and former president of the National Association of Mortgage Brokers.

"You have to broaden your definition of no-down payment," he said, adding that loan options are available, if not in the form they were in before.

A gift from a family member or a community grant can take the place of a down payment, for example, he said. And down-payment assistance programs are available to help those seeking loans backed by the Federal Housing Administration, he added. . . .

"You will see more unique products coming out," he said, as companies search for ways to help down-payment challenged buyers get into a new home.

But as of now, there are fewer options than there were before for would-be buyers who don't have ample cash reserves. And Brown sees that as an overreaction.

He believes consumers should have the option of financing their entire purchase -- even if it comes with extra fees or higher rates. Someone who doesn't have a lot of cash, but is a good credit risk, for example, should have that option, he said.

To quote Professor Krugman, "gurk." It's as if this "conversation" between mortgage insurers and mortgage brokers is happening on two different planets. I have gone on record as being a bit skeptical that "ruthless default" is as widespread as some breathless media stories want to imply--mostly because I suspect that the borrowers in question really can't afford their mortgage payments--but only a fool (which I try not to be) would claim it has never happened and won't keep happening if you put people into "free put option" contracts where there is no financial downside to just walking away from a loan.

And yet here we are, treated to brokers discussing ways borrowers can use OPM (Other People's Money) to leverage 100% financing, even in a falling market, because we can declare them "good credit risks" at the same time we put them in loans that offer no downside to default. What kind of "good credit risks" are these people? Folks who will continue, doggedly, to make mortgage payments on an upside-down property for years and years, unable to move, unable to refinance, all in the name of the sanctity of debt obligations? How, exactly, would any lender or insurer measure this kind of "willingness to repay"? With a FICO? Now that we're being told that many borrowers are keeping up the MasterCard payments--they don't want the downside of having the card cut off--while missing the mortgage payment, because there's little downside there?

There is, of course, one possibility here: we could measure "willingness to repay" by a kind of proxy measure, like, um, "willingness to put one's own money on the table in the form of a down payment." This, however, would involve all of us being on the same planet. And clearly we aren't all there yet.
____________

*Actual title is "a certified mortgage planning specialist"

by Tanta on 3/19/2008 09:55:00 PM

No.

by Tanta on 3/13/2008 10:41:00 AM

I was challenged the other day to defend my claim that the Feldstein Plan (stay above water by repaying your loans faster!) was "teh dumbest" plan I'd seen so far. I should have known that the rhetorical mobilization of hyperbole is an act with karmic consequences.

Via Mish, I bring you Complete CRAP (the Congressional Realtors Appropriation Proposal):

As a longtime realtor in Cobb County, Sen. Johnny Isakson has seen housing downturns before. "We had recessions in 1968, 1974, 1982, and 1991, by every measurement, this is going to be a deeper and bigger recession in residential housing. It's a significant event."

Isakson is pitching an idea to his colleagues in Congress: a $15,000 tax rebate check to anyone who agrees to buy a home. Congressional budget analysts project the program would cost $14 billion over the next few years. But Isakson said the rebate checks are well worth the hefty price tag. "If we can convince buyers to come back to the marketplace and buy these houses, then the houses aren't vacant. It's replaced by an owner-occupant, who is there making payments on a loan and helping all of the other houses around."

I suggest, as an alternative, that members of Congress donate their evenings and weekends, from now until November, appearing gratis at open houses throughout their districts. What better way to convince people to buy homes than to offer them the chance to meet a lawmaker in person, right in the proposed kitchen? Senator Iskason could demonstrate the correct use of granite countertops, while extolling the virtues of free-market capitalism and owner-occupied housing.

Plus it would keep them off the teevee.

by Tanta on 3/08/2008 04:25:00 PM

Via Housing Wire, I just read Teh Dumbest mortgage-related proposal I think I have yet seen.

The federal government would lend each participant 20% of that individual's current mortgage, with a 15-year payback period and an adjustable interest rate based on what the government pays on two-year Treasury debt (now just 1.6%). The loan proceeds would immediately reduce the borrower's primary mortgage, cutting interest and principal payments by 20%. Participation in the program would be voluntary and participants could prepay the government loan at any time.

The legislation creating these loans would stipulate that the interest payments would be, like mortgage interest, tax deductible. Individuals who accept the government loan would be precluded from increasing the value of their existing mortgage debt. The legislation would also provide that the government must be repaid before any creditor other than the mortgage lenders.

Although individuals who accept the loan would not be lowering their total debt, they would pay less in total interest. In exchange for that reduction in interest, they would decrease the amount of the debt that they can escape by defaulting on their mortgage. The debt to the government would still have to be paid, even if they default on their mortgage.

Participation will therefore not be attractive to those whose mortgages that already exceed the value of their homes. [sic] But for the vast majority of other homeowners, the loan-substitution program would provide an attractive opportunity.

Although home owners may recognize that the national average level of house prices has further to fall, they do not know what will happen to the price of their own home. They will participate if they prefer the certainty of an immediate and permanent reduction in their interest cost to the possible option of defaulting later if the price of their own home falls substantially.

The loan-substitution program would decrease the number of homeowners who would come to have negative equity as house prices decline. That reduces the number of homeowners who will have an incentive to default, thereby limiting the risk of a downward spiral of house prices.

Since individuals now have the right to prepay any part of their mortgage debt, the 20% reduction in the mortgage balance would not violate mortgage creditors' rights. Creditors should welcome the mortgage paydowns, because they make the remaining mortgage debt more secure. The 20% repayments to creditors would also create a major source of funds that should stimulate all forms of lending.

The simplest way to administer the new loans would be for the current mortgage servicer to collect on behalf of the government and remit those funds to Washington. There would be no need for a new government bureaucracy, for new appraisals, or for negotiations in bankruptcy. The program could be up and running within months after the legislation is passed.

OK, so we are going to ignore piggybacks (people do have more than one mortgage, you know), so we don't have to ask whether the second lien lender gets all the repayment, or what. We are going to ignore prepayment penalties that apply to substantial partial prepayments. We are going to ignore those sacred contractual rights lenders have to require you to continue to make the payment specified in your loan documents even if you make a partial prepayment (it takes a modification agreement to change the contractual payment). We are going to ignore the lack of a credit risk premium.

We are not going to ignore the elementary math of amortization. Not today.

Let's just pretend we have a single lien mortgage loan. The original loan amount was $200,000 at 8.5% for 30 years, and just for entertainment purposes we'll say the loan has been amortizing and it is now two years old. It's either a fixed rate or a "frozen teaser," so the rate is still 8.5% going forward. The original P&I was $1,537.83 and the current loan balance is $196,842.51.

We turn that into a 28-year 8.5% loan for $157,474.01, plus a 15-year 1.6% loan for $39,368.50. That gives us a first mortgage payment of $1,230.26 and a second mortgage payment of $246.15. Firing up my trusty 10-key, I see that totals to $1,476.42, or a 4% reduction in the total monthly payment.

A monthly savings of $61.41! Oh Lord, they'll flock to this! Non-dischargeable full recourse debt that prevents you from ever cashing out if home values do ever recover, until you've paid off that low-rate loan! Plus the new loan is an ARM, so it can get worse in two years! In fact, it only has to adjust up to 5.00% for the total payment to be higher than what you started with, given a 15-year amortization! But that's not a problem, because we know people will think about the lower interest costs over decades, not the higher monthly payment today! And besides that, when the hell has a 2-year Treasury note ever been five percent, huh? Oh, sure, if you're going to worry about some kind of a doomsday scenario . . .

Well, wait, you say. This proposal isn't aimed at those high-rate subprime borrowers who get so easily confused about the difference between the monthly payment and the total interest paid, because they're probably upside down anyway. This proposal is for us responsible types. Let's say we started with the $200,000 30-year at 6.00%, with a P&I of $1,199.10. Two years later we strip that into a $155,949.18 28-year loan at 6.00% ($959.28) and a $38,987.29 15-year loan at 1.6% ($243.77) giving us a new payment of $1,203.05! Cool! Economic stimulus! That $3.95 a month that would have been blown at Starbucks going to debt reduction! Just what we need in a recession!

Plus, we don't need any government agency to handle it! Servicers can do all the work, draw up the docs, execute them all, apply all the funds, modify the payments on the old loans, and then get that $243.77 check every month, which they can just mail to Washington! We don't need no steenkin' bureaucracy on the other side! The receptionist at the Treasury can probably handle it all in her spare time! Sure, she doesn't have any idea how much she's owed for what loan and when any given loan matures and what to do if the payment doesn't show up, but she doesn't have to! Countrywide will keep track of it all for her! There's nothing wrong with their bookkeeping ever! And you know they'll do all that for free, because they're good citizens! So there's no servicing fee eating into that 1.6% the government earns on these loans! No upfront fees to the borrower that offset the interest savings, because loan originators, like loan servicers, also work for nothing! Free lunch!

Sorry about the exclamation points. I should just be kept away from the Wall Street Journal.

UPDATE: Please note that "Marty Feldman" was a gifted comedian. "Marty Feldstein" is a gifted comedian who is also an economist.

by Tanta on 3/07/2008 05:51:00 AM

From the Seattle Times:

WaMu has revised its bonus plan for nearly 3,000 top executives so continuing damage from the subprime-lending collapse won't crimp their annual awards.

The struggling Seattle-based lender said in a regulatory filing Monday it will exclude the cost of soured real-estate loans and foreclosure expenses when it calculates net operating profit, the biggest component of executives' 2008 bonuses.

Other changes to the bonus plan also appear to reduce the impact of troubled parts of its business, while giving a bigger role to factors that are less problematic.

The 2008 bonuses will be based on these criteria:

• Net operating profit, 30 percent — with loan losses and expenses related to foreclosed real estate excluded.

• Noninterest expense, 25 percent — again, excluding expenses related to business restructuring and foreclosed real estate.

• Fees from retail banking — a new factor, weighted at 25 percent. Many banks including WaMu have been increasing fees for services such as ATM withdrawals by noncustomers to compensate for losses in other areas.

• Customer-loyalty performance, 20 percent — an increase from 10 percent in the 2007 bonus plan.

In a prepared statement, WaMu said, "The success with which credit costs are managed will unequivocally continue to be a major part of the board's final deliberations."

Spokeswoman Libby Hutchinson said the bonus plan covers almost 3,000 people in WaMu management, many of whom are not directly involved in lending.

But Fred Whittlesey, a Bainbridge Island compensation consultant, questioned why awards for Killinger and the three other top executives named in the plan aren't tied directly to earnings.

"If (they) are not responsible for bank profitability, who is? There's no reason they should be insulated from expenses they created," he said.

The bank has said bonuses, long-term stock awards and other parts of its compensation plan are important to retaining executives.

In January, WaMu said Killinger would receive 3.2 million stock options to vest in coming years, providing him "a strong incentive to restore shareholder value."

But Cannon said WaMu's highest executives shouldn't require such incentives.

"We are somewhat surprised that top management needs extra compensation in order to be retained," he wrote.

I personally would offer these guys $500 cash for their keys. But I have been known to take a hard line with speculators. As, of course, has our Mr. Paulson. Paging Mr. Paulson!

by Tanta on 2/16/2008 04:00:00 PM

Via Housing Doom, one Blanche Evans, editor of Realty Times:

Despite what Wall Street wants you to believe, owning a home isn’t the same kind of investment as stocks or bonds. What you get is a USE asset that depreciates over time while it grows in market value. All you have to do is keep the home in good repair to maximize your investment.

by Tanta on 2/12/2008 08:35:00 AM

It just looked like it to impartial observers. From IndyMac's shareholder letter:

Who is to blame for the mortgage industry's financial losses and also the record number of Americans losing their homes?

All home lenders, including Indymac, were a part of the problem, and, as Indymac's CEO, I take full responsibility for the mistakes that we made. However, objective reviewers of this mortgage crisis understand that home lenders and mortgage brokers were not the only ones responsible. Systemic problems in our secondary mortgage markets and credit markets, and our government's over-stimulation of the housing market via monetary and tax policies (the capital gains tax break on home sales encouraged speculation), were all major factors that contributed to the problem. Indymac and most home lenders were not "greedy and stupid". Most of us believed that innovative home lending served a legitimate economic and social purpose, allowing many US consumers to be able to achieve the American dream of homeownership ... and we still do.

Homeownership is the main way we Americans accumulate wealth, and, in fact, a recent Federal Reserve Bank study shows that homeowners on average have 46 times the personal wealth of renters. As innovative home lending and loan products became more widespread, the result was more people succeeding (in homeownership) and more people failing (losing their home) than ever before. But everyone, including both the government and consumer advocate groups who encouraged this lending via enforcement of CRA lending requirements, also bought into the concept that, if lenders and investors could properly price this increased risk, the higher number of failures was worth the social and economic goals of expanded homeownership. And it worked for many years; the homeownership rate, which had not moved in several decades, expanded from 64% to 69% from 1994 to 2006, allowing 4 million additional Americans the opportunity to have the American dream and build wealth.

However, in retrospect, like many innovations (e.g., the Internet, railroads, etc.), innovative home lending went too far. The housing bubble, caused primarily by the low interest rates for ARM mortgages fostered by the Fed's accommodative monetary policy and even lower rates for fixed/long-term mortgages due largely to tremendous global liquidity, combined with strong demand by institutional investors for assets with higher yields, resulted in a "systemic" underestimation of credit risk. This systemic underestimation of credit risk was not just for mortgages but for many forms of credit. By way of example, Indymac (and many other major financial institutions) has for years used one of the major credit rating agencies' models to assess and price credit risk on home loans. This model estimates expected lifetime losses on a loan level basis, and we closely monitor these average estimated lifetime losses for all of our loan production (that can be evaluated) on an ongoing basis. This particular rating agency revised its model in November 2007 (from version 6.0 to 6.1). Applying version 6.0 to our Q4-06 production (the version in place at that time) indicated an average expected lifetime loss rate of 0.88%, which we felt was a reasonable level of expected losses at which we could properly and adequately price the loans. However, now applying the updated version 6.1 to this same Q4-06 pool of loans results in an average expected lifetime loss rate of 1.88%, a 114% increase in expected losses in one year. This clearly indicates the extent to which the systemic underestimation of credit risk took place in the mortgage markets. As we began to realize this, we tightened our guidelines throughout the last year, with the result that our average expected lifetime loss rate for Q4-07 declined to 0.45% based on version 6.1, a 76% reduction in credit risk as compared to Q4-06, boding well for the future credit quality and related credit provisions/costs of our new business model.

Why didn't mortgage lenders see that things were going too far?

Lenders didn't see that things were going too far, partly because we were too close to it, but mostly because objective evidence of this credit risk did not show up in our delinquencies and financial performance until it was too late to prevent significant losses. And there were many events along the way that confirmed for those of us who believed that innovative home lending was possibly a paradigm shift (similar to widespread ownership of stocks by consumers) and definitely a legitimate marketplace: major financial institutions were offering these products and spending billions to purchase companies who specialized in these products; Wall Street firms and broker/dealers of major banks were underwriting our and others' transactions and also spending billions as recently as 2006 to buy non-GSE lenders in order to vertically integrate their home lending and securitization activities; major mortgage and bond insurers were insuring individual mortgages and pools of mortgages or bonds created from these mortgages; major credit rating agencies were providing strong ratings on our and others' transactions; and major investors around the world were purchasing these mortgage-backed bonds and even CDOs backed by these bonds (something we home lenders had no involvement in or awareness of). Very few in the private sector or in government predicted that the bursting of the housing bubble would be so severe and would result in the current wave of delinquencies, foreclosures and credit losses and the eventual collapse of the non-GSE secondary market ... even for high credit quality, full-documentation, jumbo home loans.

It is also important to understand that the rapid rise in housing prices is one of the key culprits in this current housing and mortgage crisis. In modern times, housing prices have declined in certain regions of the country but never on a nationwide basis. As a result of this fact and the important social and economic benefits that are clearly derived from homeownership, the government (first through FHA/VA programs and then through the GSEs) encouraged a USA mortgage market built upon very high leverage, with LTV ratios nearing 100% for first-time homebuyer programs. However, as home prices decline, either regionally or nationally, the leverage in a home loan, combined with the leverage of a financial institution or securitization structure, can result in significant losses for financial institutions, investors and consumers. Add to this mix a housing market that has not had a single regional market decline in over 15 years and, in fact, had a huge boom in prices from 2003 to 2006, and you can begin to understand how home lending was impacted. Automated risk-based models, on which the entire market relied, replaced portions of traditional underwriting and credit evaluation, and only in retrospect is it now clear that these models did not perform as predicted during a period of severe economic stress. As events unfolded, this proved to be particularly the case with respect to programs such as piggyback loans and high LTV cash-out refinance transactions, including home equity and second mortgages.

I have, of course, never claimed that it was merely the lenders at fault, not Wall Street or the Fed or the rating agencies or other culprits. Nonetheless, I am still capable of being amazed that the party with the most information about the loans is still willing to blame the party with probably the least information (the rating agencies) for the faulty loss estimates. Yes, the rating agencies should have demanded more information. I say this as someone, like Michael Perry, who knows damned good and well that there is much more information to be had.

I'll skip the part about how we didn't know about those CDOs because it's early in the day and I need more coffee before I can wrap my mind around the implications of that.

Otherwise, for practical matters:

In addition, to prevent consumers from making the wrong mortgage choice in the future, Indymac has decided to adopt as our policy that borrowers without $50,000 in demonstrated liquid assets or $250,000 in demonstrated net worth are not eligible for the following products(2):
1. ARM loans with initial fixed terms of less than five years.
2. Loans with negative amortization or prepayment penalties.
3. Limited documentation loans.

"To prevent consumers from making the wrong mortgage choice." God help me.

by Tanta on 2/06/2008 10:08:00 AM

Moody's is throwing out some possibilities for changes to its rating system that would give more information to bond buyers, and is inviting comment from the investment community. Mr. Ritholtz over at Big Picture has a suggestion for a disclosure statement that has too many dirty words in it for me to post on my respectable blog, but here's the link.

Here are the proposed options, from Moodys' request for comment:

1. Move to a completely new rating scale for structured securities, for example, numerical rankings of 1-21. These would continue to contain ordinal rankings of expected credit risk and would probably map to corporate ratings.

2. Add a modifier to all structured ratings utilizing the existing rating scale, e.g., Aaa.sf. This would designate the issue as structured, but add no other additional information.

3. Add a suffix to the existing rating scale for structured ratings that contains additional information – for example, estimates of multi-notch rating transition risk. This could be Aaa.v1, Aaa.v2, etc. We would derive these gradations through an analytical process that would be disclosed to the market.

4. Use the existing rating scale for structured securities, and put additional analytical information in a separate scale that would exist in a separate data field. For example, an issue could have a “Aaa rating, with a ratings change risk indicator of v1”. The added field would be analogous to our existing ratings outlooks and watchlists.

5. Make no changes to the rating scale, but provide additional information and commentary through written research.

I personally like the idea of combining alpha ratings with a suffix code that indicates the assumptions built into the ratings models. For instance, a bond could be rated AAA.PONY, indicating that the assumptions built into the ratings were Prices always rise, Owners occupy all units, Nobody lied, and Your own analysts did all the due diligence.

Is that any more bizarre than giving a rating to a security with a "ratings change risk indicator"? Wasn't there a time when the rating given to a bond was supposed to be the one least likely to have to be changed?

by Tanta on 2/05/2008 08:54:00 AM

P.J. at Housing Wire went to the American Securitization Forum conference because we weren't invited so we don't have to. A miscellaneous gem:

Jon Bottorff, managing director at HSBC Finance, during a session on mortgage origination, on walk-aways: “We’ve attracted a lot of borrowers who are really renters … It is disheartening as a servicer to see the willingness [to walk away] … [borrowers] simply don’t care.” Bottorff wants to see the mortgage industry “get back to the classic homeowner” who has a vested interest in staying in their home.

Yeah, and can we get back to the Classic Mortgage Lender™ who has a vested interest in something other than writing free puts? Just a thought.

Merrill Lynch senior director Sarbashis Ghosh, in a session on RMBS research: “It’s not a subprime problem, it’s a housing leverage problem … we have people with a mortgage who simply cannot afford to make their payments.” Ghosh suggested the solution was “to address the question of leverage,” and went so far as to suggest something like a food stamp program to help borrowers with payments.

And perhaps a Classic Investment Banker™ who understands that loans that are not government-insured are not, um, government-insured while we're at it? Can we have one of those, too? Can we? Can we?

by Tanta on 1/31/2008 12:26:00 PM

So far at least a dozen people have emailed me the link to Jonathan Weil's latest egregiousness in Bloomberg. I have no idea how many times it has come up in the comments. My response?

What P.J. said.

Weil's whole argument rests on the original assumption that pools of mortgage loans can be "wind-up toys" or "brain dead" from a servicing perspective. The reality is that they cannot, they are not, and anyone who pretended otherwise was an idiot (I'm lookin' at you, Wall Street). The prohibition on actively managed pools is there to prevent the issuer or servicer from buying and selling loans in and out of the trust and passing through gain-on-sale to investors while calling it "interest income," or securitizing loans with "putback" provisions that mean the issuer can repurchase loans out of the pools whenever it wants to at a price that is below market in order to take advantage of the bondholders. It was never and is not a prohibition on servicing mortgage loans. That is, in fact, what the SEC just said.

There is and has always been the recognition that mortgage loans, unlike, say, Treasury notes, need to be "serviced." There are therefore long and involved servicing agreements and absolutely not trivial servicing fees specified in all these deals. A couple minutes' worth of reflection would lead you to this: perhaps there is a debate about where you cross the line between servicing a pool and managing it. That would be a debate about when "loss mitigation" (working out a loan in order to minimize loss when loss is inevitable) becomes "loss creation" (a servicer creating a loss to the investor in order to increase servicing income or something like that). But to have that debate you'd have to accept that real loss mitigation is acceptable, and you'd have to look at more facts than just the presence of workouts as such. Such a debate doesn't have jack to do with the SEC handing out "accounting favors" to anyone.

I simply hope that someday Weil wants to drop escrows or make a curtailment and get a payment recast or deed off an easement or something on his home mortgage and he calls his servicer and the servicer says, "Sorry, dood. You're brain dead to us. All we do is collect your payment. Have a nice day. Click."

Maybe that has already happened to him, and it's making him bitter. Beats me. All I know is that a bunch of geniuses on Wall Street did, actually, fall for the idea that residential home mortgages were "wind-up toys," just "asset classes" instead of messy complicated things that involve real people (good, bad, and indifferent, lucky and unlucky, high-maintenance and low-maintenance) on the other side of the cash flow, who don't always behave the way your models said they would. And here we are. Demanding that we continue the delusion in order to make the accounting work out is mind-boggling. Demanding that issuers take it all back onto their balance sheets as punishment for trying to mitigate losses to bondholders is beyond perverse.