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Showing posts with label Yikes. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Yikes. Show all posts

Friday, October 10, 2008

Market Take from Cartoonist Eric G. Lewis

by Calculated Risk on 10/10/2008 10:34:00 AM

Cartoon Eric G. Lewis

Click on cartoon for larger image in new window.

Here is a grim take on the markets from from Eric G. Lewis, a freelance cartoonist living in Orange County, CA.

Tuesday, September 09, 2008

Freddie Mac and the "Two Year Rule"

by Tanta on 9/09/2008 10:53:00 AM

People keep sending me this article or bringing up this "fact" in the comments. Because it is such a fine example of a "fact" that isn't actually a fact, but is apparently becoming an article of quasi-religious faith in some quarters, I shall make the attempt to slap it down. I have no particular illusions about how well this will work, but there may be a handful of people who actually care about accuracy and good faith, even (!) when the subject is Freddie Mac. I'm talkin' to you.

*********************

Let me start out with a couple of general observations. This post is about financial accounting matters. If you are one of those people who drove us insane in the comments to yesterday's post on "assets" versus "liabilities" by arguing that "assets" are "really" "liabilities" because you, like Humpty Dumpty, are The Master, then you will find this post unsatisfactory. Tell it to the Marines. The habit of refusing to use standard accounting terms in preference to sloppy "synonyms" is what got these two reporters in trouble in the first place. I'm not going to pander to anyone by doing it myself.

Second, we basically went through a nearly identical version of this brouhaha last November with Fannie Mae. It's deja-vu all over again.

The offending "fact" comes from this article by the world-renowned Gretchen Morgenson and Charles Duhigg, whose willingness to believe anything any unnamed source says about Freddie Mac, whether it makes sense or not, has been documented before on this blog.

Finally, regulators are concerned that the companies may have mischaracterized their financial health by relaxing their accounting policies on losses, according to people familiar with the review. For years, both companies have effectively recognized losses whenever payments on a loan are 90 days past due. But, in recent months, the companies said they would wait until payments were two years late. As a result, tens of thousands of loans have not been marked down in value.

The companies have injected their own capital into pools of securities containing these loans, arguing that their new policies are helping more borrowers. Under conservative accounting methods, changing these policies would not have any impact on the companies' books. However, people briefed on the accounting inquiry said that Freddie Mac may have delayed losses with the change.
What follows is my best effort to discover what the hell these people are talking about. I must disclose to you all that I am really just making an educated guess here. If you possess any expertise at all in financial accounting in general and Freddie Mac's business operations in particular, the foregoing paragraphs do not make any sense whatsoever. (It's like talking to people for whom "asset" "really" means "liability.") So I could be wrong, and they could be talking about some entirely different part of the balance sheet. Anyone with a better guess than mine is hereby invited to share.

My theory is that they are talking about optional repurchases of MBS loans. I cannot think of or find any other part of Freddie's financial statements in which that "two-year rule" or this thing about "injecting capital" would fit. And if they are talking about optional repurchases, they're guilty of terrible reporting. Either their sources are badly informed or they didn't understand what their sources told them or both.

To review the basics of what Freddie does: they buy mortgage loans on the secondary market. These purchases of loans result in two different "portfolios" of loans: the "retained portfolio" and the "guarantee portfolio." The retained portfolio consists of loans and MBS that are owned outright by Freddie. That means Freddie's capital is invested in these loans. Freddie gets the capital to invest in the retained portfolio in large part by issuing notes and bonds--what everyone calls "agency debt." The retained portfolio constitutes an "asset" on Freddie Mac's books (net of the loss reserves), and the debt-funding constitutes a "liability" thereon.

The "guarantee portfolio" consists of various MBS that Freddie guarantees the credit risk of, but does not invest the capital in. The capital to fund these securities is provided by investors who buy MBS. Therefore, the total principal amount of the guarantee portfolio is not an asset on Freddie's books (it is an asset on the MBS investors' books). What shows up on Freddie's balance sheet is the "guarantee asset," which is the fair value of the guarantee fees received, and the "guarantee obligation" (over on the liability side) which reflects the fair value of the projected credit losses.

This distinction between retained and guaranteed portfolios is one reason why Freddie's (and Fannie's) financial statements are complex; each part of the "total portfolio" has different accounting treatment. If you read through these financial statements or any reports having to do with portfolio balances or loan purchase volume, you simply need to pay attention to when a number is given for the "total portfolio" versus one or the other parts thereof. To answer a question that may arise at this point, as of June 30 the principal balance of Freddie's retained portfolio was $792 billion and the guarantee portfolio balance was $1.410 trillion, making a total portfolio of $2.202 trillion (see Table 49 of the 10-K).

So. How do loans get into the retained portfolio? They are either originally purchased as portfolio investments or, in some cases, they were originally purchased in the guarantor program but had to be repurchased out of the MBS. As I said, the current flap seems to be about repurchases of MBS loans. I am going to quote here from Freddie Mac's 10-K. It will help you to know that "PC" means "Participation Certificate," and is just Freddie-speak for "MBS."
We also have the right to purchase mortgages that back our PCs and Structured Securities from the underlying loan pools when they are significantly past due. This right to repurchase collateral is known as our repurchase option. Through November 2007, our general practice was to purchase the mortgage loans out of PCs after the loans became 120 days delinquent. Effective December 2007, we no longer automatically purchase loans from PC pools once they become 120 days delinquent, but rather, we purchase loans from PCs when the loans have been 120 days delinquent and (a) the loans are modified, (b) foreclosure sales occur, (c) the loans have been delinquent for 24 months or (d) the
cost of guarantee payments to PC holders, including advances of interest at the PC coupon, exceeds the expected cost of holding the nonperforming mortgage in our retained portfolio. Consequently, we purchased fewer impaired loans under our repurchase option for the three and six months ended June 30, 2008 as compared to the three and six months ended June 30, 2007. We record at fair value loans that we purchase in connection with our performance under our financial guarantees and record losses on loans purchased on our consolidated statements of income in order to reduce our net investment in acquired loans to their fair value.
Remember that the "guarantee" on the MBS means that Freddie Mac is responsible for passing through interest payments to bondholders as long as those bondholders have principal invested, whether the borrowers make payments or not. The way this usually works is that for the first 90 days of delinquency (120 days since last payment), the servicer is obligated to advance scheduled interest and principal to Freddie Mac, who passes it through to the bondholders. The servicer makes efforts to collect the past-due payments from the borrowers. Generally at around 90-120 days, if the loan is still delinquent, the servicer's obligation to advance payments stops and Freddie Mac is the one obligated to advance payments to the bondholders. The basic contractual terms of the MBS are that Freddie has the right, but not the obligation, to buy a seriously delinquent loan out of the pool at this point. The repurchase price would always be par, since the bondholder must receive 100% of principal invested per the terms of the guarantee. Obviously, a seriously delinquent loan is likely to have a fair value of much less than par, but Freddie has to take that loss, not the MBS investor.

However, that is an option, not an obligation. Alternatively, Freddie can allow a seriously delinquent loan to remain in the MBS, while continuing to advance payments to the bondholders, until foreclosure or modification, for up to two years. To my knowledge the two-year limitation has always been part of the MBS rules--it's just the outside limit on how long Freddie (same for Fannie) can keep advancing on delinquent MBS loans before they have to give up and repurchase them. There have never been many loans that are seriously delinquent for two years without ever getting to foreclosure or workout, but in the strange cases (probate, bizarre title problems) it can happen. In no sense is this "two year rule" about letting loans just stay delinquent with no action by the servicer or Freddie Mac, or no effect on the fair value of the guarantee obligation, for two years. It absolutely does not mean that no credit losses are taken until a loan is "two years late." The two years refers to how long a delinquent loan can stay in the MBS, not how many months past-due it can be before it is impaired.

Why would Freddie elect to repurchase a loan when it doesn't have to? Well, if the cost of capital is cheap, but the interest payments you have to advance to the bondholders are not, it generally makes sense to repurchase the loan. The loan balance then comes out of the "guaranteed portfolio" and into the "retained portfolio." The write-down of the asset occurs immediately, given that the purchase price of the loan was par (100% of unpaid principal balance) but the fair value of a seriously delinquent loan is less than par. So a loss is immediately recognized by the retained portfolio. On the other side of the books, the guarantee asset and obligation are adjusted to reflect the fact that this loan is no longer earning a guarantee fee or reflecting guarantee costs. Any final loss taken on the loan in foreclosure is taken on the retained portfolio side, not the guarantee side.

On the other hand, if the cost of capital--Freddie's borrowing cost, including capital reserve requirements--is expensive, but the interest payments to be advanced to bondholders are relatively cheap, then you leave the loans in the MBS unless and until you are obligated to buy them out, which would be when they are delinquent and they are modified, foreclosed, or hit that two-year limit. If the loans stay in the MBS, they rack up those costs that go into the guarantee obligation, but they do not result in a recognized loss to the retained portfolio because they are not in the retained portfolio.

Now, go back and reread the Morgenson/Duhigg version of this and see if it strikes you as a reasonable paraphrase. As you do this, ask yourself if you've read anything lately in the news about Freddie needing to increase its capital reserves and facing much higher borrowing costs than it had previously. Then ask yourself if this all might be about not "injecting capital" into "pools of securities."

Of course this election not to buy out every seriously delinquent MBS loan means that fewer losses have to be recognized in the retained portfolio. The whole damned idea is to keep these loans in the guaranteed portfolio instead of the retained portfolio. However, it certainly doesn't keep Freddie from having to pay interest to bondholders every month, whether paid by the borrower or not. It still has a major effect on credit losses. It simply keeps the loans' principal balance "financed" by MBS bondholders instead of by Freddie Mac.

Has that been a wise move by Freddie? Well, I don't know we could answer that question in Morgenson/Duhigg terms, since they seem to think that the only "losses" that can be taken are in the retained portfolio. You would have to analyze the effect of the interest advances to the guarantee side of the books to see if this was a smart move or not. But of course Morgenson and Duhigg have no intention of doing that--I suspect they fail to grasp how one might do that--because to do so interferes with the narrative of "cooking the books" that they're peddling.

The interesting question that will arise, of course, is what will happen to this repurchase policy post-conservatorship. Will the government order Freddie to start buying out every delinquent MBS loan at 90 days down--knowing that the government might have to provide the capital for them to do that--in order to book retained portfolio losses "promptly," or will it perhaps decide to let the bondholders continue to finance these loans, just as Freddie has done? I'm really looking forward to finding out, myself.

At any rate, if one more person starts bringing up this canard about "no losses until the loan is two years past due" in the comments, those of us who are actually paying attention are going to jump your case for--wittingly or not--spreading stupid. You gotta stop believing everything you read in the paper.

I am the kind of person who wants to read a long post about financial accounting issues.

Friday, August 29, 2008

The End is Nigh

by Tanta on 8/29/2008 02:11:00 PM

When you're going after the "impulse depositor" market share off the sidewalk, you're in trouble.

(Thanks, Alex.)

Friday, August 22, 2008

MTI: WaPo Hears Mortgage Voices

by Tanta on 8/22/2008 01:05:00 PM

Long-time readers will remember the MMI, or Muddled Metaphor Index, which was basically a long-running gag at the media's expense. Now I've been provoked again, and so I introduce the MTI, or Mortgage Telephone Index. I'm sort of hoping this will be the only entrant into the series, but you never know. The MTI features reporters and editors who apparently spend all their day on bad cell phone connections and do not actually read much about mortgages. This produces an effect like the old game of "Telephone," with equally hilarious results.

Today's Washington Post brings us "Bad Begets Worse," which is actually the title of this article and did I not make that up.

Freddie Mac, for instance, no longer finances no-money-down mortgages, nor does it continue to buy or guarantee mortgages given to people who have failed to document their finances. Fannie Mae has withdrawn from the market for all-day loans, which are considered risky because they require less documentation than traditional prime loans.
No, Fannie Mae has not suddenly decided that mortgage loans need to have terms of more than 24 hours to be eligible for purchase. It appears that someone said "Alt-A" and someone else heard "all-day."

Presumably we will be able to tell if we have any readers at the Washington Post by how long it takes for that to go away . . . .

(Hat tip, Michael!)

Sunday, August 17, 2008

Wingin' It at the IRS

by Tanta on 8/17/2008 07:15:00 AM

I have had occasion before now to compliment Michelle Singletary's personal finance column, The Color of Money, in the Washington Post. I don't read a lot of "personal finance" stuff because, frankly, most of it is drivel. But even in a better field of competition, I think Singletary's work would stand out as a combination of no-nonsense advice and original reporting.

Today she takes on the subject of the new $7,500 tax credit for first-time homebuyers. What started out as an attempt to explain the tax credit to potential homebuyers ends up being an interesting report on the extent to which the IRS has no particular plan at this point for managing this thing.

Since this is a loan from the IRS, will the IRS be sending an annual loan statement to taxpayers?

The details of how the IRS will collect this money or inform people have not been worked out. Smith said a line would probably be added to the standard 1040 tax form to indicate that the credit should be paid as part of your tax liability.

Can I pay off the loan early?

The IRS hasn't yet come up with a system to accommodate an early payoff. . . .

Will this be a debt that has to be settled at closing if you sell the house?

This debt isn't tied to your home but rather to you as a taxpayer. The outstanding loan will probably not be required to be paid at the closing table, Smith said. . . .

If there is not a lien on the property, how will a settlement company know the debt is due when a homeowner sells?

It probably will be up to the homeowners to inform the IRS that a sale has occurred and that they need to pay off the loan balance, Smith said.

It's this last answer that I see as an oversight nightmare for the IRS.

Let's say a homeowner sells and realizes a $7,000 profit. However, he or she still has $6,000 left on the first-time home buyer loan. This means the homeowner will have to set aside the bulk of that gain -- $6,000 -- from the sale to satisfy the tax debt, which would be due in the tax year of the sale.

If the person isn't financially disciplined and spends the money, he or she could end up with a hefty tax liability.

"We have to look at all the issues involved with this credit and figure out the best controls," Smith said.

No kidding.
I don't exactly expect any elaborate bureaucracy like the IRS to have all its operational and procedural ducks in a row within a couple of days of the passage of this kind of "stimulus" legislation, which by definition can't exactly wait for all the details to be ironed out before passage (or it is too late to "stimulate" the market). On the other hand, the work eventually has to get done, unless the IRS is willing to promise to not penalize people who don't handle this correctly. You can't exactly make it difficult for people to know when and how much to pay you and then turn around and slap them with penalties and fines if they don't follow the rules. The IRS can tell itself it's got years to figure this out, since the first installments won't be due until the 2010 tax year for people buying this year. But that inability to handle prepayments on sale of the property is going to mess that plan up.

If we had a dime, of course, for every story we've read lately that tells us that your average first-time homebuyer either doesn't read mortgage documents or manages to understand approximately every tenth word of them, including "the" and "and," we would be rich enough to fund a study comparing the relative comprehension on the part of the public of mortgage documents versus the tax code. If we had another dime for every story we've read about mortgage servicers making it difficult for people to prepay loans, refusing to provide clear payoff statements, fouling up servicing transfers and proofs of claim and generally making it an insurmountable challenge for people to know what they actually owe and where to send the damned payment, we would also be rich enough to buy the IRS a loan servicing platform it could manage not to use correctly, just like everyone else.

But no one is handing out dimes, so we will just have to send the IRS a cheap homemade housewarming present: a little note welcoming it to the neighborhood, Love, The Mortgage Industry.

Friday, August 15, 2008

A Salute to the Ownership Society

by Tanta on 8/15/2008 01:15:00 PM

I guess it's just Freaky Friday on the real estate front.

Y'all remember Rep. Laura Richardson (D-Deadbeat)? How those meanies at WaMu foreclosed on her poor innocent self, and how she threw her weight around and got the foreclosure rescinded and a loan modification done?

So far this noble effort to prevent foreclosure and keep the dream of ownership alive is workin' out great. From the LA Times:

This week, in the latest chapter in the housing saga, the Code Enforcement Department in Sacramento declared her home a "public nuisance."

The city has threatened to fine her as much as $5,000 a month if she doesn't fix it up.

Neighbors in the upper-middle-class neighborhood complain that the sprinklers are never turned on and the grass and plants are dead or dying. The gate is broken, and windows are covered with brown paper.

"I would call it an eyesore," said Peter Thomsen, a retired bank executive who lives nearby.

Thanks, Brian!

Tuesday, August 05, 2008

NYT Hit Job on Freddie Mac

by Tanta on 8/05/2008 08:23:00 AM

This has to be read to be believed.

More than two dozen current and former high-ranking executives at Freddie Mac, analysts, shareholders and regulators said in interviews that Mr. Syron had ignored recommendations that could have helped avoid the current crisis.

Many of those interviewed were given anonymity for fear of damaging their careers by speaking publicly.
Actually, all but two of the "more than two dozen" were given anonymity to damage Richard Syron's career while protecting their own, by my reading of this. One former Freddie Mac executive and one industry consultant are named. Nobody else is. And we are given no idea how many of the "more than two dozen" are shareholders. (Who need to protect their careers?) Or how many of them were found on Yahoo! message boards. (Hey! We don't know that they weren't!)

The Times reporter, Charles Duhigg, can't even bring himself to include Syron's full bio:
Mr. Syron joined Freddie Mac as chief executive and chairman in 2003, after the company revealed it had manipulated earnings by almost $5 billion. He came to Freddie Mac after serving as chairman of the Thermo Electron Corporation, a scientific instruments firm, and of the American Stock Exchange. An economist with a Ph.D. and the first in his family to graduate from high school, Mr. Syron was welcomed as an unpretentious but politically astute leader.
I have to wonder why the Times leaves off the part about how Syron is a former deputy assistant Treasury Secretary, asssistant to Federal Reserve chairman Paul Volker, and president of the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston in the late 80s and 90s, which included being a member of the Open Market Committee. None of that makes him perfect or infallible or anything else, of course. But why does the Times leave it out? If Syron is as clueless as the Times wants us to believe, isn't it relevant that Syron had a very influential role in restructuring failed banks and the FSLIC during the last major banking crisis? I remember all that being quite relevant when Freddie hired him in 2003 after the accounting scandal.

No, but a former employee wrote a memo in 2004 that apparently didn't impress Syron all that much. A lot of us wrote memos in 2004 that didn't impress a lot of people all that much. I can relate to the urge to say "I tolja so." I'm not sure I can relate to the claim that if this one memo had been taken seriously, all this "crisis" could have been averted.

But the Times story just isn't interested in plausibility:
By the time both men [Syron and Fannie Mae's Mudd] took over, the firms had perfected the art of making money by capitalizing on the perception they were implicitly backed by the government. That belief allowed Fannie and Freddie to borrow at relatively low rates and use those funds to buy mortgages as investments. The companies also collected fees in exchange for guaranteeing that borrowers would repay other home loans.

By the end of 2007, the firms held mortgages worth more than $1.4 trillion combined, and guaranteed payments on loans worth $3.5 trillion more.

Both firms had sophisticated systems to hedge against risks. But they remained exposed to one unlikely, but potentially catastrophic possibility: a wide-scale decline in national home prices.
"By the time both men took over." As far as I know the market has believed in the implicit guarantee of the GSEs since the day the GSEs were chartered. To say they "made money by capitalizing" on that fact is to say they operated as GSEs--government/private hybrids--since they were chartered as GSEs.

Also, what's with this exposure to the "unlikely, but potentially catastrophic possibility" of home price declines? What are we saying here? The article seems to want us to believe that all the probabilities had in fact been laid out for Syron (by his trusty memo-writer) and he ignored them. But it was also "unlikely"?

I suggest that the Times reporter and his anonymous sources (whose self-interest, of course, we cannot measure) are in a bind here: as they all, including the Times, spent so many years denying the reality of the housing bubble, they have to stick to the hoocoodanode line. But the currently popular narrative is about the GSEs being front and center of goofball lending--as hard to swallow as most of that is--so we have to shade this into "the GSEs coodanode, but not the rest of us."

There will be analysts, shareholders, industry experts, and professionals in financial services and housing--not to mention a couple of economists--who will, anonymously, comment on this blog that this reporter is a clueless hit-man. Starting with me. I wonder if that will make it true for the NYT.

Wednesday, July 30, 2008

Fraud in the 2008 Mortgage Vintage

by Tanta on 7/30/2008 10:04:00 AM

If you haven't yet had a chance to read this article by John Gittelsohn in the Orange County Register about a real estate sale that was financed by Wells Fargo in January of this year, please do so now. And if you were, like most people, working on the assumption that lenders and other industry participants had at least cleaned up their acts in time for the 2008 mortgage vintage to be worth something, think again.

There isn't any significant fact about this transaction I can identify that isn't a red flag. A home in a foreclosure-wracked neighborhood was purchased at foreclosure auction in October of 2007 for $304,500, just over half what the defaulted buyer had paid in 2006. In January of 2008, the house was flipped to a non-English-speaking couple for an apparent sales price of $625,000 after some "sprucing up" by the property seller.

Ridiculous? Sure. It turns out that the seller provided the $125,000 down payment, and also executed an "addendum" to the sales contract agreeing to pay the buyers $30,000 in cash, cover the borrowers' first three mortgage payments, and toss in a 52-inch TV. Subtract out all that, and the true sales price of the property was $460,000. But apparently nobody did subtract out any of that, because Wells Fargo made a $500,000 loan to these buyers to purchase this property.

The OC Register reporter, bless his heart, tracked down the various parties who had their hands in this transaction, and got the following comments:

From the mortgage broker who put the deal together: "Whatever agreement the buyer and seller made, it was between them."

From the appraiser who dutifully came up with a value of $625,000: "Like Sanchez, she had no knowledge of the terms of the sale."

From the escrow agent who closed this loan: "It sounds to me like the seller helped out," she said. "If someone gave them $125,000, what's the problem? That's a beautiful thing, if you ask me."

From Wells Fargo: "In many instances, borrowers are able to use gifts from family members or friends for a portion of their down payment, provided the amount and source of the gifts are documented."

Excellent point, Wells Fargo. Too bad in this case the down payment didn't come from friends or family members and wasn't documented. Too bad that the broker who originated the loan seems to think the details of the purchase contract aren't any of his business. Too bad your escrow agent doesn't care where the down payment money came from, either. Too bad your appraiser has apparently never heard of the Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice, to which she is obligated to conform if she wants to do appraisals for Wells Fargo, that say she is required to inquire into "the terms of the sale."

I don't think the real issue with this story is the problem of whether or not to use foreclosure or "distressed" sales as comparables in an appraisal report. The problem is that there are no comparable sales of any kind that are a reliable measure of market value if they all involved transactions in which nobody ever actually bothered to verify and analyze the terms of the sale.

If this is the level of elementary due diligence we can expect after the most atrocious mortgage blowup in history, what will it take to scare people into doing their jobs?

Thursday, July 17, 2008

Quote of the Day

by Tanta on 7/17/2008 02:14:00 PM

Mr. Dimon of JP Morgan, via Housing Wire:

“Prime [mortgage book] looks terrible,” he told analysts on the call. “And we’re sorry, and there’s nothing else we can say."

Monday, July 14, 2008

Perfect Timing

by Tanta on 7/14/2008 01:59:00 PM

I would be remiss if in the excitement today of the banking system apparently going to hell in a handbasket, I neglected to take notice of this:

July 14 (Bloomberg) -- The Federal Reserve tightened its mortgage rules by requiring lenders to determine a borrower's ability to repay and barring other practices that led to the collapse of the U.S. housing market.

The Fed Board of Governors voted in Washington today to require that lenders verify a homebuyer's income or assets, and create an escrow account for property taxes and homeowners' insurance. The rules curb penalties for repaying a loan early.
Just because they've waited until the children's 21st birthday to finally ground them doesn't mean they're not responsible parents.

They also left alone the practice of broker "yield spread premiums":
Bernanke questioned a staff recommendation not to ban a practice that lets lenders pay brokers based on the interest rates they charge a consumer, which he said sets an incentive for brokers to steer people into more expensive loans.

"Staff considered a rule that would ban that type of payment, but we ran into some serious, practical problems," Ryan said. She said it would be difficult to distinguish between the practice and legitimate payments to brokers.
Heaven forbid the regulators should have to make "difficult" distinctions. Far better to let consumers try to tell the difference, I guess.

Tuesday, July 08, 2008

Shoot Outs . . .

by Tanta on 7/08/2008 08:09:00 AM

. . . join Burn Outs and Trash Outs in the tabloid lore of the housing bust. Via Housing Doom, we find a 73-year-old man executing his real estate agent because the house he bought in 2005 is no longer worth the original sales price.

Like the recent case of the woman in foreclosure who torched her house, this story says less to me about responses to an RE bust than it does about a simple fact of homeownership in America: the universe of homeowners is big enough that it is a statistical certainty that it contains more than one person with long-term emotional problems and exceptionally poor impulse control that have very little to do with buying or mortgaging a home as such and undoubtedly predate that transaction by decades. There are simply people for whom losing their home (or their "investment") is unbearable stress that pushes them over the edge into violence. I am confident that these people would experience major illness, divorce, unemployment, a scratch on their new car or the neighbor's cat peeing in their yard as unbearable stressors, too, in the right circumstances.

I will nonetheless bet my neighbor's cat's bad habits that editorialists will endlessly recycle this story as a measure of the severity of the housing bust.

Tuesday, June 10, 2008

Richardson Update: This Workout Smells

by Tanta on 6/10/2008 02:29:00 PM

Our soberer readers (I know we have them) will remember California Congresswoman Laura Richardson (D-Speculator), who is facing foreclosure proceedings on three homes. The uproar began with the foreclosure of sale her unoccupied "second home" in Sacramento, which Richardson claimed was an "error" on WaMu's part, since (she claimed) she had worked out a last-minute modification agreement with WaMu the week before the sale. According to the Daily Breeze, WaMu has filed paperwork to rescind the foreclosure sale, and the man who bought the home is not happy:

The real estate broker who bought Rep. Laura Richardson's house at a foreclosure sale last month is accusing her of receiving preferential treatment because her lender has issued a notice to rescind the sale.

James York, owner of Red Rock Mortgage, said he would file a lawsuit against Richardson and her lender, Washington Mutual, by the end of the week, and has every intention of keeping the house.

"I'm just amazed they've done this," York said. "They never would have done this for anybody else."

York bought the Sacramento home at a foreclosure auction on May 7 for $388,000. Richardson had not been making payments on the property for nearly a year, and had also gone into default on her two other houses in Long Beach and San Pedro.

Richardson, D-Long Beach, has said that the auction should never have been held, because she had worked out a loan modification agreement with her lender beforehand and had begun making payments.
Richardson continues to refuse to authorize WaMu to release any information on her case, although frankly I'm not sure if I were WaMu I'd want to talk about it. This smells terrible, indeed. Perhaps reporters could simply ask some general questions of WaMu about its foreclosure workout policies. Like:

  • How often are modifications or repayment plans offered to owners of vacant investment properties with no or negative equity that have never been listed or rented?
  • How often are modifications offered to borrowers with two other properties currently in foreclosure?
  • How often are modifications arranged in the week before the scheduled trustee's sale, following nearly a year of no contact?
  • Does WaMu's policy on modifications make any reference to requiring a "commitment to homeownership" on the borrower's part? How, normally, is that established?
  • Does WaMu's policy on modifications make any reference to establishing that the borrower does not display a "disregard for debt obligations"? How, normally, is that established?
If, for instance, we had some evidence that stiffing creditors and getting the taxpayers to subsidize her financial imprudence was, like, a pattern of Richardson's long before the house payments went into default, would that, like, indicate that her mortgage problems may not have much to do with "extenuating circumstances"? WaMu may not be able to read a credit report, but the Press-Telegram ferreted this out:
In 2005, when she was still on the Long Beach City Council, she left one mechanic in a lurch with an unpaid bill, then later had her badly damaged BMW towed to an auto body shop but didn't pay for any work and abandoned the car there, owners of the businesses said this week.

The next day, Richardson began using a city-owned vehicle - putting almost 31,000 miles on it in about a year - and continued driving the car five days after she had left the council to serve in the state Assembly, city records show. . . .

Labreche said he spent months leaving messages on Richardson's cell phone voice mail, then he got a collection agency involved, but still the bill went unpaid. . . .

In December 2005, Lillegard filed for a mechanic's lien on Richardson's car to pay the towing, storage and administrative costs, he said. Lillegard said the lien was finalized in February 2006 and he sold the car to a junkyard, though a few days later - too late - Richardson sent him money to put toward the bill.
So in January of 2007, WaMu gave Richardson a 100% loan to purchase a second home, when her credit report would have shown recent derogatories related to the car repair bills, plus the payments on two other homes, on a State Assembly salary that I can't quite see being equal to her existing debts, let alone a new house payment. In other words, she got your basic subprime loan that relied on nothing other than a fervent belief in endless house price appreciation--in January of 2007. Or else she got a loan because she's a VIP.

I continue to want to know why WaMu is bailing out a deadbeat and a speculator at the expense of a good-faith buyer of a foreclosure property, and wasting operational capacity on a deal like this instead of working with struggling owner-occupants who might actually pay back the modified loan. I will leave it to the citizens of California to explain why you want this woman anywhere near fiscal, budgetary, or housing policy power.

(Hat tip to Brian!)

Friday, May 30, 2008

More Weird Numbers

by Tanta on 5/30/2008 04:13:00 PM

My day started with my inability to understand a series of statistics reported in Bloomberg this morning.

Housing Wire follows up on the "methodology change" that purportedly caused the new defaults and cured loan reporting for April to surge and plummet, respectively, in the Mortgage Insurance Companies of America's most recent report. I share HW's sources' skepticism about the explanation given for this change. It simply sounds like a very large lender has been allowed--heretofore--to report fewer delinquencies and more cures than everyone else does, by using different definitions. As that is not something that sounds very good, I would suggest that MICA needs to come up with a better explanation.

Meanwhile, the Hope Now folks released a pathetic set of data charts on mortgage loss mitigation through April 2008. For heaven's sake, we're the financial industry, people. We're supposed to be able to use Excel properly.

There are some really puzzling features of this data, like why the total loan counts have not changed since October (see the first page). Since those loan counts are used to calculate the 60+ day delinquency percentage, the failure to update the total count makes those numbers rather dubious. On page two, I found myself unable to make sense of the completed FC sales/FC starts calculation using any possible definition of "five months" I can think of. Perhaps I am misreading the footnote. In any event, I gave up on my ambition to put this data into a more sensible format for you, after I lost confidence in the data integrity.

So here's from the press release, instead:

The April report from HOPE NOW estimates that on an industry-wide basis:
• Mortgage servicers provided loan workouts for approximately 183,000 at-risk borrowers in April. This is an increase of 23,000 from the number of workouts in March 2008 and is the largest number of workouts completed in any month since HOPE NOW’s inception.
• The total number of loan workouts provided by mortgage servicers since July 2007 has risen to 1,558,854.
• Approximately 106,000 of the prime and subprime loan workouts conducted by mortgage servicers in April were repayment plans, while approximately 77,000 were loan modifications.
Maybe next month the report will be cleaned up a little and we can look in more detail at these numbers. If we can shame Hope Now into issuing something readable.

Harrumph. Is it Happy Hour yet?

Thursday, May 29, 2008

BK Judge Rules Stated Income HELOC Debt Dischargeable

by Tanta on 5/29/2008 07:10:00 AM

This is a big deal, and will no doubt strike real fear in the hearts of stated-income lenders everywhere. Our own Uncle Festus sent me this decision, in which Judge Leslie Tchaikovsky ruled that a National City HELOC that had been "foreclosed out" would be discharged in the debtors' Chapter 7 bankruptcy. Nat City had argued that the debt should be non-dischargeable because the debtors made material false representations (namely, lying about their income) on which Nat City relied when it made the loan. The court agreed that the debtors had in fact lied to the bank, but it held that the bank did not "reasonably rely" on the misrepresentations.

I argued some time ago that the whole point of stated income lending was to make the borrower the fall guy: the lender can make a dumb loan--knowing perfectly well that it is doing so--while shifting responsibility onto the borrower, who is the one "stating" the income and--in theory, at least--therefore liable for the misrepresentation. This is precisely where Judge Tchaikovsky has stepped in and said "no dice." This is not one of those cases where the broker or lender seems to have done the lying without the borrower's knowledge; these are not sympathetic victims of predatory lending. In fact, the very egregiousness of the borrowers' misrepresentations and chronic debt-binging behavior is what seems to have sent the Judge over the edge here, leading her to ask the profoundly important question of how a bank like National City could have "reasonably relied" on these borrowers' unverified statements of income to make this loan.

And as I argued the other day on the subject of due diligence, it isn't so much that individual loans are fraudulent than that the published guidelines by which the loans were made and evaluated encouraged fraudulent behavior, or at least made it "fast and easy" for fraud to occur. Judge Tchaikovsky directly addresses the issue of the bank's reliance on "guidelines" that should, in essence, never have been relied upon in the first place.

*************

Here follow some lengthy quotes from the decision, which was docketed yesterday and is not, as far as I know, yet published. From In re Hill (City National Bank v. Hill), United States Bankruptcy Court, Northern District of California, Case No. A.P. 07-4106 (May 28, 2008):

This adversary proceeding is a poster child for some of the practices that have led to the current crisis in our housing market.
Indeed. The debtors, the Hills, bought their home in El Sobrante, California, twenty years ago for $220,000. After at least five refinances, their total debt on the home at the time they filed for Chapter 7 in April of 2007 was $683,000. Mr. Hill worked for an automobile parts wholesaler; Mrs. Hill had a business distributing free periodicals. According to the court, their combined annual income never exceeded $65,000.

In April 2006, the Hills refinanced their existing $100,000 second lien through a mortgage broker with National City. Their new loan was an equity line of $200,000; after paying off the old lien and other consumer debt, the Hills received $60,000 in cash. On this application the Hills stated their annual income as $145,716. The property appraised for $785,000.

By October 2006 the Hills were short of money again, and applied directly to National City to have their HELOC limit increased to $250,000 to obtain an additional $50,000 in cash. On this application, six months later, the Hills' annual income was stated as $190,800, and the appraised value was $856,000.

At the foreclosure sale in April 2007, the first lien lender bought the house at auction for $450,000, apparently the amount of its first lien.

The Hills claimed that they did not misrepresent their income on the April loan, and that they had signed the application without reading it. The broker testified rather convincingly that the Hills had indeed read the documents before signing them--Mrs. Hill noticed an error on one document and initialed a correction to it. No doubt because the October loan, the request for increase of an existing HELOC, did not go through a broker, the Hills admitted to having misrepresented their income on that application. The Court found that:
Moreover, the Hills, while not highly educated, were not unsophisticated. They had obtained numerous home and car loans and were familiar with the loan application process. They knew they were responsible for supplying accurate information to a lender concerning their financial condition when obtaining a loan. Even if the Court were persuaded that they had signed and submitted the October Loan Application without verifying its accuracy, their reckless disregard would have been sufficient to satisfy the third and fourth elements of the Bank’s claim.
This is not an excessively soft-hearted judge who fell for some self-serving sob story from the debtors. "Reckless disregard" is rather strong language.

Unfortunately for National City, Her Honor was just as unsympathetic to its claims:
However, the Bank’s suit fails due to its failure to prove the sixth element of its claim: i.e., the reasonableness of its reliance.6 As stated above, the reasonableness of a creditor’s reliance is judged by an objective standard. In general, a lender’s reliance is reasonable if it followed its normal business practices. However, this may not be enough if those practices deviate from industry standards or if the creditor ignored a “red flag.” See Cohn, 54 F.3d at 1117. Here, it is highly questionable whether the industry standards–-as those standards are reflected by the Guidelines–-were objectively reasonable. However, even if they were, the Bank clearly deviated to some extent from those standards. In addition, the Bank ignored a “red flag” that should have called for more investigation concerning the accuracy of the income figures. . . .

Based on the foregoing, the Court concludes that either the Bank did not rely on the Debtors representations concerning their income or that its reliance was not reasonable based on an objective standard. In fact, the minimal verification required by an “income stated” loan, as established by the Guidelines, suggests that this type of loan is essentially an “asset based” loan. In other words, the Court surmises that the Bank made the loan principally in reliance on the value of the collateral: i.e., the House. If so, the Bank obtained the appraisal upon which it principally relied in making the loan. Subsequent events strongly suggest that the appraisal was inflated. However, under these circumstances, the Debtors cannot be blamed for the Bank’s loss, and the Bank’s claim should be discharged.
In short, while the Court found that the Hills knowingly made false representations to the lender, the lender's claim that it "reasonably relied" on these representations doesn't hold water, because "stated income guidelines" are not reasonable things to rely on. In essence, the Court found, such lending guidelines boil down to what the regulators call "collateral dependent" loans, where the lender is relying on nothing, at the end of the day, except the value of the collateral, not the borrower's ability or willingness to repay. If you make a "liar loan," the Judge is saying here, then you cannot claim you were harmed by relying on lies. And if you rely on an inflated appraisal, that's your lookout, not the borrower's.

This is going to give a lot of stated income lenders--and investors in "stated income" securities--a really bad rotten no good day. As it should. They have managed to give the rest of us a really bad rotten no good couple of years, with no end in sight.

Read on . . .

Saturday, May 24, 2008

UPDATED: A Congressional Speculator?

by Tanta on 5/24/2008 06:37:00 AM

This is an update to post below on Rep. Laura Richardson's foreclosure woes.

Gene Maddaus of the Daily Breeze kindly forwarded today's additions to the saga. There are not two, but three homes owned by Richardson in foreclosure. And yes, she appears to have cashed out her primary residence back in 2006 to fund her campaign for State Assembly. So it looks like a pattern.

* * * * * *

I have been watching the story of Representative Linda Laura [Oops! --Ed.] Richardson and her foreclosure woes for a while now, while heretofore hesitating to post on it. For one thing, the original story--a member of Congress losing her expensive second home to foreclosure--had that kind of celebrity car-crash quality to it that I'm not especially interested in for the purposes of this blog. For another thing, posting about anything even tangentially related to politics invites the kind of comments that personally bore me to tears.

All that is still true, but the story has taken such an unfortunate turn that I feel obligated to weigh in on it. Specifically, Rep. Richardson is threatening us:

Rather than shy away from voting on mortgage-related bills, Richardson said her experiences could help her craft legislation to make sure others don't experience what she did. For example, she sees a need to add steps to inform property owners before their property can be sold.

"We have to ensure that lenders and lendees have the tools with proper timing to resolve this," she said.
If Rep. Richardson is going to base legislative proposals on her own experience, then it matters to the rest of us what that experience was. So click the link below if you can stand to hear about it.

* * * * * * * * * *

The story was originally reported in the Sacramento Capitol Weekly, and picked up by the Wall Street Journal, and thence covered by a number of blogs, with the storyline being that Rep. Richardson "walked away" from her home, a second home she purchased in Sacramento after being elected to the State Assembly. The "walk away" part came from a remark made by the real estate investor who purchased the home at the foreclosure auction, not Rep. Richardson or anyone who could be expected to understand her financial situation, but that didn't stop the phrase "walk away" from headlining blog posts.

Rep. Richardson has variously claimed at different times that the house was not in foreclosure, that she had worked out a modification with the lender, and that the lender improperly foreclosed after having agreed to accept her payments. Frankly, unless and until Rep. Richardson gives her lender, Washington Mutual, permission to tell its side of the story--I'm not holding my breath on that--we're unlikely to be able to sort out this mess of claims to my satisfaction, at least. It's possible that WaMu screwed this up--that it accepted payments on a workout plan with the understanding that foreclosure was "on hold" and then sold the property at auction the next week anyway. It's possible that Richardson's version of what went on is muddled, too. Without some more hard information I'm not inclined to assume the servicer did most of the screwing up, if for no other reason that we didn't find out until late yesterday, courtesy of the L.A. Land and Foreclosure Truth blogs, that Richardson's other home--her primary residence--was also in foreclosure proceedings as recently as March of this year, a detail that as far as I can tell Richardson never disclosed in all the previous discussion of the facts surrounding the foreclosure of her second home.

What part of this I am most interested in, right now, is the question of what in the hell exactly Richardson was thinking when she bought the Sacramento home in the first place. Since the story is quite complex, let's get straight on a few details. Richardson was a Long Beach City Council member who was elected to the state legislature in November of 2006. In January of 2007 she purchased a second home in Sacramento, presumably to live in during the Assembly session. In April 2007, the U.S. Congressional Representative from Richardson's district died, and Richardson entered an expensive race for that seat, winning in a special election in August of 2007. By December 2007 the Sacramento home was in default, and it was foreclosed in early May of 2008. The consensus in the published reports seems to be that Richardson spent what money she had on her campaign, not her bills. According to the AP:
Richardson, 46, makes nearly $170,000 as a member of Congress and was paid $113,000 during the eight months she served in the state Assembly in 2007 before her election to Congress. She also received a per diem total of $20,000 from California, according to a financial disclosure form she filed with the House of Representatives clerk.
It seems to me that all this focus on what happened after she bought the Sacramento home--running for the suddenly-available Congressional seat, changing jobs, etc.--is obscuring the issue of the original transaction.

In November of 2006, Richardson already owned a home in Long Beach. As a newly-elected state representative, she would have been required to maintain her principal residence in her district, but she would also have had to make some arrangements for staying in Sacramento during Assembly sessions, given the length of the commute from L.A. County to the state capitol. She seems to have told the AP reporter that "Lawmakers are required to maintain two residences while other people don't have to," which is not exactly the way I'd have put it. Lawmakers are required to maintain one primary residence (which need not be owned) in their district. They are not required to buy a home at the capitol (of California or the U.S.); many legislators do rent. Richardson is a single woman with no children, yet she felt "required" to purchase a 3-bedroom, 1 1/2 bathroom home in what sounds like one of Sacramento's pricier neighborhoods for $535,500, with no downpayment and with $15,000 in closing cost contributions from the property seller. (The NAR median price in Sacramento in the first quarter of 2007 was $365,300.)

I have no idea what loan terms Richardson got for a 100% LTV second home purchase in January 2007, but I'm going to guess that if she got something like a 7.00% interest only loan (without additional mortgage insurance), she got a pretty darn good deal. If she got that good a deal, her monthly interest payment would have been $3123.75. Assuming taxes and insurance of 1.50% of the property value, her total payment would have been $3793.13.

The AP reports that Richardson's salary as a state representative was $113,000 in 2007, and she received $20,000 in per diem payments (which are, of course, intended to offset the additional expense of traveling to and staying in the Capitol during sessions). I assume the per diem is non-taxable, so I'll gross it up to $25,000. That gives me an annual income of $138,000 or a gross monthly income of $11,500.

The total payment on the second home, then, with my sunny assumptions about loan terms, comes to 33% of Richardson's gross income. I have no idea what the payment is for her principal residence in Long Beach. I have no idea what other debt she might have. I am ignoring her congressional race and job changes and all that because at the point she took out this mortgage, that was all in the future and Richardson didn't know that the incumbent would die suddenly and all that. I'm just trying to figure out what went through this woman's mind when she decided it was a wise financial move to spend one-third of her pre-tax income on a second home. (There's no point trying to figure out what went through the lender's mind at the time. There just isn't.)

Now, Richardson has this to say about herself:
"I'm Laura Richardson. I'm an American, I'm a single woman who had four employment changes in less than four months," Richardson told the AP. "I had to figure out just like every other American how I could restructure the obligations that I had with the income I had."
Yeah, well, I'm Tanta, I'm an American, I'm a single woman, and I say you're full of it. You need to show us what your plan for affording this home was before the job changes, girlfriend. You might also tell me why you felt you needed such an expensive second home when you had no money to put down on it or even to pay your own closing costs. As it happens, the Mercury News/AP reported that by June of 2007--five months after purchase--you had a lien filed for unpaid utility bills. You didn't budget for the lights?

But what are we going to get? We're going to get Richardson all fired up in Congress about tinkering with foreclosure notice timing, which is last I knew a question of state, not federal, law, and which has as far as I can see squat to do with why this loan failed.

Quite honestly, if WaMu did give Richardson some loan modification deal, I'd really like to know what went through the Loss Mit Department's collective and individual minds when they signed off on that. Sure, Richardson's salary went up to $170,000 when she became a member of the U.S. Congress, but what does she need a home in Sacramento for after that? Where's she going to live in Washington, DC? And, well, her principal residence was also in the process of foreclosure at the same time. I suppose I might have offered a short sale or deed-in-lieu here, but a modification? Why would anybody do that? Because she's a Congresswoman?

I'm quite sure Richardson wants to be treated like just a plain old American and not get special treatment. Well, I was kind of hard on a plain old American the other day who wrote a "hardship letter" that didn't pass muster with me. I feel obligated to tell Richardson that she sounds like a real estate speculator who bought a home she obviously couldn't afford, defaulted on it, and now wants WaMu to basically subsidize her Congressional campaign by lowering her mortgage payment or forgiving debt. And that's . . . disgusting. At the risk of sounding like Angelo.

I know some of you are thinking that maybe poor Ms. Richardson got taken advantage of by some fast-talking REALTOR who encouraged her to buy more house than she could afford. According to Pete Viles at L.A. Land,
She likes the Realtors, and they like her. She filed financial disclosure forms with the House Ethics Committee reporting the National Assn. of Realtors flew her to Las Vegas in November to help swear in the new president of the association, Realtor Dick Gaylord of Long Beach.

In suggested remarks* at the NAR gathering, also filed with the House, Richardson's script read: "I might be one of the newest members of Congress but I am not a new member of the REALTOR Party. When I needed help to win a tough primary, REALTORS stood up and backed me even though I was the underdog."

--Real estate industry professionals have given her $39,500 in campaign contributions in the current election cycle, according to Open Secrets.
No wonder she's blaming the lender.


Yes, I Can Stand to Hear About This.

Wednesday, May 21, 2008

Which Ratings Model is Broken?

by Tanta on 5/21/2008 08:10:00 AM

Via naked capitalism, there is this ugly report in the Financial Times:

Moody’s awarded incorrect triple-A ratings to billions of dollars worth of a type of complex debt product due to a bug in its computer models, a Financial Times investigation has discovered.

Internal Moody’s documents seen by the FT show that some senior staff within the credit agency knew early in 2007 that products rated the previous year had received top-notch triple A ratings and that, after a computer coding error was corrected, their ratings should have been up to four notches lower.
That's bad. That's really bad. But then there are these two paragraphs at the end of the article:
The world’s other major credit agency, Standard and Poor’s, was the first to award triple A status to CPDOs but many investors require ratings from two agencies before they invest so the Moody’s involvement supplied that crucial second rating.

S&P stood by its ratings, saying: “Our model for rating CPDOs was developed independently and, like our other ratings models, was made widely available to the market. We continue to closely monitor the performance of these securities in light of the extreme volatility in CDS prices and may make further adjustments to our assumptions and rating opinions if we think that is appropriate.”
The implication here, that Moody's jiggered its model to arrive at the same ratings S&P had already arrived at--presumably to keep the "second opinion" business--is ugly. However, the implication that Moody's had to fudge the numbers in order to come up with AAA on these deals but S&P came up with AAA with a "correct" model is something I for one am having a hard time with.

Sunday, May 18, 2008

Shiller on the Psychology of Foreclosure

by Tanta on 5/18/2008 12:07:00 PM

Gather 'round, children, because Tanta is about to engage in a curiously hard-headed look at an editorial by a famous economist that demands, in every sincere and decent sentence, our kindness and compassion instead. This is blogging at its finest: nobody should get away un-pissed-off about something. And on a Sunday, too.

It's also long blogging at its finest. You knew I'd have to try to figure out how to use the Read More thingy eventually . . .

* * * * * * * *

The editorial in question is by Robert J. Shiller, who is a professor of economics and finance and famous analyst of speculative bubbles. A specialist in behavioral economics, in the application of psychology to understanding financial markets. A co-founder of Case Shiller Weiss, that house price index we talk about a lot. His editorial, "The Scars of Losing a Home," speaks not of lofty academic economic concepts but of human sympathy, of things that are "really important." With references from famous academic psychologists. I haven't taken this kind of a tiger by the tail since I went after Austan Goolsbee last year.

Yes, it was only a year ago that the distinguished Dr. Goolsbee wrote this on the same editorial page:

And do not forget that the vast majority of even subprime borrowers have been making their payments. Indeed, fewer than 15 percent of borrowers in this most risky group have even been delinquent on a payment, much less defaulted.

When contemplating ways to prevent excessive mortgages for the 13 percent of subprime borrowers whose loans go sour, regulators must be careful that they do not wreck the ability of the other 87 percent to obtain mortgages.

For be it ever so humble, there really is no place like home, even if it does come with a balloon payment mortgage.
I actually think Goolsbee's piece was the high-water-mark of the "subprime helps the poor" talking point. You certainly don't hear much about that these days. Less than two months after Dr. Goolsbee's earnest op-ed, we got an interview in the very same NYT with one Bill Dallas, CEO of the famously defunct Ownit Mortgage, effusively testifying to his own burning desire to help out the unfortunate in a way that finally put paid to the respectability of that line ("'I am passionate about the normal person owning a home,' said Mr. Dallas, who is also chairman of the Fox Sports Grill restaurant chain and manages the business interests of the Olsen twins. 'I think owning a home solves all their problems.'") Plus by now we've got some numbers on the 2007 mortgage vintage, the one that Dr. Goolsbee was afraid wasn't going to ever materialize if we tightened up lending standards too much. A year ago we were looking at a 13% subprime ARM delinquency rate. Per Moody's (no link) the Q4 07 subprime ARM delinquencies were running 20.02%. And that is not, you know, "just" another 7%. By now, those delinquent borrowers in Goolsbee's 13% have probably mostly been foreclosed upon and are off the books. The 20% or so who are now delinquent were either part of the 87% that Goolsbee thought were "successful homeowners" last year, or else they're those lucky duckies who bought homes after the publication date of Goolsbee's plea that we not tighten standards too much.

Of course Shiller wasn't exactly spending his time a year ago defending the subprime mortgage industry on the grounds that it put poor and minority people into ever-so-humble homes with balloons attached. I seem to recall him mostly arguing that homebuyers were engaged in a speculative mania. In a June 2007 interview:
Well, human thinking is built around stories, and the story that has sustained the housing boom is that homes are like stocks. Buy one anywhere and it'll go up. It's the easiest way to get rich.
At the time, that kind of statement struck some of us, at least, as not possibly the entire story either, but in any event a useful corrective to the saccharine silliness of the "Ownership Society" and Bill Dallas solving everyone's problems by letting them put Roots in a Community (for only five points in YSP).

So I hope I can be just a tad startled by the New Shiller:
Homeownership is thus an extension of self; if one owns a part of a country, one tends to feel at one with that country. Policy makers around the world have long known that, and hence have supported the growth of homeownership.

MAYBE that’s why President Bush’s “Ownership Society” theme had such resonance in his 2004 re-election campaign. People instinctively understand that homeownership conveys good feelings about belonging in our society, and that such feelings matter enormously, not only to our economic success but also to the pleasure we can take in it.
So it's no longer irrational exuberance or plain old speculating; it's now an instinctive affirmation of some eternal verity of the human psyche? The ultimate patriotism: the definition of self so tied up in ownership of a slice of the motherland that to rent becomes not only psychologically dangerous--these people without selves can't be up to anything good--but politically dangerous as well? Is it possible that Shiller can mean what he is writing here?

If you just scanned the first few paragraphs of Shiller's op-ed you might come away with the impression of a sincere but somewhat hackneyed plea for us all to have a bit of sympathy for the foreclosed among us, foreclosure not in anyone's experience being a walk in the park. Fair enough. It being Sunday in America, I suspect millions of us are being treated to exhortations to take a kinder view of the unfortunate than we often do; we need those exhortations; we are often lacking in sympathy. Hands up all who disagree.

But you keep reading and you find Shiller trying to explain the "trauma" of foreclosure. And that's where this really gets weird:
Now, let’s take the other perspective — and examine some arguments against the stern view. They have to do with the psychological effects of strict enforcement of a mortgage contract, and economists and people in business may need to be reminded of them. After all, too much attention to abstract economic statistics just might make us overlook what is really important.

First, we have to consider that we cannot squarely place the blame for the current mortgage mess on the homeowner. It seems to be shared among mortgage brokers, mortgage originators, appraisers, regulatory agencies, securities ratings agencies, the chairman of the Federal Reserve and the president of the United States (who did not issue any warnings, but instead has consistently extolled the virtues of homeownership).

Because homeowners facing foreclosure must bear the brunt of the pain, they naturally feel indignation when all of these other parties continue to lead comfortable, even affluent lives. Trying to enforce mortgage contracts may thus have a perverse effect: instead of teaching homeowners that they should respect the contracts they sign, it may incline them to take a cynical view of the whole mess.
We need to modify mortgage contracts to keep homeowners from becoming cynical? That's somehow more respectable an idea than the one saying we should throw them out on the street to "teach them a lesson"? If Shiller is serious that all those other parties are "to blame," then why isn't the obvious solution to throw them out on the street? There seems to be an assumption here that nothing can be done to punish those who are "really" to blame, so we're left managing the psyches of those who can be punished. And that's not cynical?

This the point at which Shiller dredges up the most stunningly unfortunate quote from William effing James (1890) to define the "fundamental" psychology of homeownership:
Homeownership is fundamental part of a sense of belonging to a country. The psychologist William James wrote in 1890 that “a man’s Self is the sum total of all that he CAN call his, not only his body and his psychic powers, but his clothes and his house, his wife and children, his ancestors and friends, his reputation and works, his lands and horses, and yacht and bank account.”
Now, that's breath-taking. Horses. Yachts. His wife and his children. Ancestors. The whole late-Victorian wealthy male WASP defining the "Self" (with a capital!) as the wealthy male WASP surveying his extensive possessions, an oddly-assorted list that ranks the family and friends somewhere after the clothes and the house. (Yes, James did that on purpose.) The kind of sentiment that was a caricature of the late-Victorian male even in 1890. And Shiller drags this out in aid of generating sympathy for homeowners? Really? You couldn't find some psychological insight about the emotional relationship of people to their homes that doesn't speak the language of the male ego surveying his domain, sizing himself up against all the other males to see where he ranks?

(James on the psychological effect of losing one's property: " . . . although it is true that a part of our depression at the loss of possessions is due to our feeling that we must now go without certain goods that we expected the possessions to bring in their train, yet in every case there remains, over and above this, a sense of the shrinkage of our personality, a partial conversion of ourselves to nothingness, which is a psychological phenomenon by itself. We are all at once assimilated to the tramps and poor devils whom we so despise, and at the same time removed farther than ever away from the happy sons of earth who lord it over land and sea and men in the full-blown lustihood that wealth and power can give, and before whom, stiffen ourselves as we will by appealing to anti-snobbish first principles, we cannot escape an emotion, open or sneaking, of respect and dread.")

I'm actually, you know, in favor of some sympathy for homeowners, but one thing that does get in the way of that for a lot of us is, well, the rather disgusting shallowness that a lot of them displayed on the way up. There is this whole part of our culture that has sprung into being since 1890 that takes a rather severe view of conspicuous consumption, unbridled materialism, and totally self-defeating use of debt to buy McMansions, if not yachts. We were treated to a fair amount of that kind of thing in the last few years. In fact, we had Dr. Shiller explaining to us last year that a lot of folks just wanted to get rich, quick, in real estate.

It is undeniably true, I assert, that not everyone was a speculatin' spend-thrift maxing out the HELOCs to buy more toys, and that part of our problem today with public opinion is that we extend our (quite proper) disgust for these latter-day Yuppies to the entire class "homeowner." But it is surely an odd way to engage our sympathies for the non-speculator class to speak of it in Jamesian terms as the man whose self is defined by his Stuff, and whose psychological pain is felt most acutely when he recognizes that he is now just like the riff-raff.

It's worse than odd--it's downright reactionary--to then go on to that evocation of homeownership as good citizenship and good citizenship as "feel[ing] at one with [the] country." This puts a rather sinister light on Shiller's earlier insistence that we need to make sure people don't get too "cynical."

I see that Yves at naked capitalism was just as disgusted by Shiller as I am:
Now admittedly, this is not a validated instrument, but a widely used stress scoring test puts loss of spouse as 100 and divorce at 73. Foreclosure is 30, below sex difficulties (39), pregnancy (40), or personal injury (53). Change in residence is 20.

Note that if we as a society were worried about psychological damage, being fired (47) is far worse than foreclosure (30), and if it leads to a change in financial status (38) and/or change to a different line of work (36) those are separate, additive stress factors. Yet policy-makers have no qualms about advocating more open trade even though it produces industry restructurings that produce unemployment that does more psychological damage than foreclosures. As a society, we'll pursue efficiency that first cost blue collar jobs, and now that we've gotten inured to that, white collar ones as well (although Alan Blinder draws the line there).

But efficiency arguments don't apply to housing since we are sentimental about it. And it's that sentimentality that bears examination, since it engendered policies that helped produce this mess.
I would only add that we are about five years too far into a war that has not made a majority of us "feel at one with that country." I think of another really important policy change we could be pursuing right now to shore up everyone's psychological estrangement from their patriotic self-satisfaction. But "efficiency arguments" don't apply to wars, either.

My fellow bleeding heart liberals like Goolsbee found themselves defending the subprime industry in the name of increasing minority homeownership. Now we're treated to the spectacle of Shiller arguing for homeowner bailout legislation in the same terms that Bush used to defend the "Ownership Society." Housing policy, I gather, makes strange bedfellows. It certainly makes strange editorials.

Read on . . . if you dare . . .

Saturday, May 17, 2008

A Sorry Tale of A Second Lien Security

by Tanta on 5/17/2008 09:49:00 AM

Floyd Norris thinks this Merrill Lynch subprime second lien security issued a year ago this month is "a candidate for the title of worst ever." I suspect there are measurably worse deals out there whatever criteria you happen to be using, but Norris's observation that this one closed right at the time when a number of ugly facts--like the bankruptcy of the major originator and Merrill's involvement in it--were actually all over the newspapers (not to mention the blogs) is quite relevant. If you were reading the daily paper, not to mention your Bloomberg terminal, you knew about the problem. But somebody bought this dog anyway.

If you care to know, the deal in question is Merrill Lynch Mortgage Investors Trust, Series 2007-SL1. Norris runs down the list of ugly characteristics of this deal, but here are a few additional uglies:

  • 81% of the loans were purchase-money.
  • Nearly 98% of them were fixed-rate loans (only slightly more than 2% were HELOCs).
  • The weighted average Debt-to-Income ratio was 44.27%. As the overwhelming majority of the loans were stated income, and as it is likely that the first-lien mortgage payment used to calculate the DTI was based on a teaser-rate ARM, you can confidently assume that the true average DTI was significantly higher than that.
  • The weighted average loan age was 7 months when the deal closed in May of 2007, meaning that most of the loans were originated in Q4 2006. By and large, this pool of loans would have had most of the "EPDs" (Early Payment Defaults) selected out of it.
  • The A classes originally had 45.20% credit support and were rated Aaa by Moody's. As of last week, the A-1 bond is rated B3 and the A-2 bond is rated Caa1.

How fast did it all unwind? That, I think, is an interesting question given the reports we've seen in the last few days of an acceleration in losses on HELOC pools. Cumulative losses for the pool for its first twelve remittance months were: 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.15 0.95 2.70 5.50 7.81 10.59 13.37 16.00 19.40.

But nobody could have seen this coming.

Wednesday, April 23, 2008

State FC Prevention Working Group Report

by Tanta on 4/23/2008 10:23:00 AM

The State Foreclosure Prevention Working Group released its second report on loss mitigation efforts yesterday, and frankly it is just as disappointing as the first one. I see our colleague PJ at Housing Wire has already blown his stack over it. Allow me to pile on; someone has to.

The report finds:

Seven out of ten seriously delinquent borrowers are still not on track for any loss mitigation outcome. While the number of borrowers in loss mitigation has increased, it has been matched by an increasing level of delinquent loans. The number of home retention solutions (forbearance, repayment plan, and modification) in process, as compared to the number of seriously-delinquent loans, is unchanged during the four month period. The absolute numbers of loss mitigation efforts and delinquent loans have increased, but the relative percentage between the two has remained the same. [Emphasis in the original.]
This "seven out of ten" statistic comes from measuring all 60+ day ("seriously") delinquent loans against the percentage that have been identified by the servicer as "in process." There is no definition of "in process" in the report; my best guess is that these are loans for which the servicer's loss mit department has made actual contact with a borrower. (That does not mean merely that the servicer has made contact; collections department contacts are not, as far as I know, considered "loss mit contacts.") Even more importantly, the report does not define "closed" in terms of loss mitigation efforts. I cannot tell from this report whether, for example, a loan that has a repayment plan instituted is counted as "closed" when the plan is agreed to, or only when the plan period ends and the loan is either brought current (successful repayment plan) or referred to foreclosure (unsuccessful). If the former is the case, then loans that are still delinquent would fall out of the "loss mit in process" category, but you would hardly say that they are "not on track for any effort." They would simply be part of a delinquent loan pipeline that is not referred to FC, because the repayment plan is still underway. It actually gets worse if "closed" cases for the purpose of this report really mean the latter--loans where the repayment plan ended either successfully or not. Let's go to the further "findings":
Data suggests that loss mitigation departments are severely strained in managing current workload. For example:
a. Almost two-thirds of all loss mitigations efforts started are not completed in the following month. Most loss mitigation efforts do not close quickly. This consistent trend over the last three months suggests that many proposed loss mitigations fail to close, rather than simply take longer than a month to work through the system. Based on anecdotal reports of lost paperwork and busy call centers, we are concerned that servicers overall are not able to manage the sheer numbers of delinquent loans.
b. Seriously delinquent loans are “stacking up” on the way to foreclosure. The primary increases in subprime delinquency rates are occurring in very seriously delinquent loans or in loans starting foreclosure. This suggests that the burgeoning numbers of delinquent loans that do not receive loss mitigation attention are clogging up the system on their way to foreclosure. We fear this will translate to increased levels of vacant foreclosed homes that will further depress property values and increase burdens on government services.
If the expectation is that loss mit cases would reasonably "close" in the month after they were "started," then it sounds as if in fact "closed" refers to the date an agreement was put in place, not the date of final resolution. If that is true, then one could expect closure to occur by the following month. However, that has to mean that there is a pipeline of "closed" but not yet "cured" loans out there, which makes hash of that claim that 7 of 10 are "not on track."

Furthermore, although this summary finding refers to loss mit efforts that are "started," in the remaining detail areas of this report I see no numbers that look clearly like "starts" to me. The tabular data all measures loss mit "in process," not "started." Again, "starts" can be usefully defined only if "completions" can be usefully defined; if there are thousands of loans on repayment plans or forbearance periods that have not yet finished or expired, and they are not counted as "closed," then the "in process" data would include workouts started many months previously that are still underway.

As far as seriously delinquent loans "stacking up," I simply note that nowhere does this report ever address things like a servicer's bankruptcy pipeline. How many delinquent loans are under a BK stay? Once the stay is in place, the servicer can neither initiate foreclosure nor unilaterally offer workouts without court approval; for that reason, all servicers I am familiar with handle those loans in a bankruptcy department that is separate from the loss mitigation group. If, in fact, these servicers reporting here are including BK loans in the loss mit pipeline, I for one would like to know that.

This is the part of the report that sent PJ over the edge:
New approaches are needed to prevent millions of unnecessary foreclosures. Without a substantial increase in loss mitigation staffing and resources, we do not believe that outreach and unsupervised case-by-case loan work-outs, as used by servicers now, will prevent a significant number of unnecessary foreclosures.
That phrase "unnecessary foreclosures" is not simply tendentious in the extreme; it totally misses the whole point of "loss mitigation." Unless you grant that foreclosure can at least in theory be "less loss" to an investor than a workout option--as the converse can be true--then you do not understand that "loss mit" is the process of deciding which action is less expensive to the investor and pursuing it. In such a context no foreclosure is "unnecessary"; it is simply the better or the worse choice in dealing with a severely delinquent loan.

But in the same breath, the report asserts that "case by case" analysis of each loan is a problem. How can anything other than a case by case analysis determine whether a foreclosure is "necessary" or not? Besides the fact, as PJ notes, that the Working Group is entirely ignoring fraudulent loans, what about those loans where the loss mit people discover, after reasonably diligent efforts of analysis, that there's just no way the borrower can afford modified loan terms that remain less expensive to the investor than foreclosure? Or that the borrower is not cooperating in good faith with the servicer? You do not have to assume that all servicers are expending the correct level of diligence to be able to see that they need to, if we are to determine whether foreclosure is necessary or not. This report simply assumes, prima facie, that foreclosures are unnecessary, and then advocates that servicers slap together "New Hope" style one-size-fits-all quickie workouts in order to decrease the "backlog." Dear heavens above, a subcommittee of a conference of state regulators is on record encouraging servicers to cynically reduce their delinquent loan backlogs by just inking some "standard" modification or repayment agreement with the borrower, and call it "closed" after that?

I am not a knee-jerk defender of the mortgage servicing industry by any measure. These are the last people I would encourage to behave any worse than they already do. But even I am troubled by the gross naivete about delinquent loan servicing implied by this report:
Loss mitigation proposals do not close for a variety of reasons; one reason is the level of paperwork required to close a loan modification. Servicers have told us that borrowers simply do not return the required documentation to complete the modification, and borrowers and counselors have reported that servicers lose paperwork they have sent in to the servicer. Regardless of where the problem arises, it appears that the level of paperwork required is a barrier to preventing unnecessary foreclosures.
I am willing to believe that servicers do lose or misplace paperwork, although I'd really like someone to look into these claims rather than just engaging in he said-she said. On the other hand, this is default servicing we're talking about. I mean, the phrase "the check is in the mail" is a culture-wide joke of long lineage; you don't have to have ever worked for a servicer to know that people claim to have sent stuff they never in fact sent all the time. People are given explicit instructions to send things via trackable mail to the Loss Mit department, and they send them via regular mail to the payment address (which is usually just a lockbox, often located ten states away from the loss mit people). And sometimes borrowers do return only some of the paperwork, somehow "forgetting" the items like tax returns, pay stubs, or bank statements requested by the servicer to assure that the borrower qualifies for the deal offered. You know. I am not "blaming the borrower" here; I am pointing out that different stories between servicer and borrower are just like different stories between the two parties to a divorce: it is not wise to take only one version at face value without checking out the other, if for no other reason than this is a situation in which people are not exactly at their best, emotionally, psychologically, or indeed morally. That is a fact of life in default mortgage servicing. Any group affiliated with a state regulator who seems to want to pretend that this is not a fact is not, frankly, competent.

Beyond that, to conclude that "paperwork is the barrier" should strike fear in the hearts of everyone. It isn't just investors and servicers who are put at risk when we decide--you know this is coming--to just skip the part about executing formal agreements and start servicing these loans to "informal" relaxation of terms. It's the borrowers who are at risk as well. I've heard enough lately to last my lifetime about borrowers in FC and BK courts objecting to servicers unable or unwilling to produce the exact mortgage note executed by the borrower, which determines not just "standing" for the servicer, but the exact terms of the indebtedness. What defense does a borrower have if he or she is foreclosed against after failure to perform under an undocumented, unsigned agreement? What defense does the servicer have if it cannot prove failure to perform? What god-awful horrible mess are the courts going to inherit down the road a ways if we just dismiss formal agreements as "barriers" that servicers should dispense with?

The lesson of the "stated" disaster--stated income, stated assets, stated appraised values, oral "promises" of loan originators rather than clear written disclosures, the whole cluster of practices that removed the "barrier" of "paperwork"--is apparently still lost on the Working Group. We started this by being "efficient" about the documentation and casual about the borrower's own statements; we aren't going to get out of it that way. This report just reeks of political grandstanding. I'm sure I know at least one journalist who will love it.

Sunday, April 06, 2008

Maricopa: Do It For the Children

by Tanta on 4/06/2008 08:05:00 AM

Does anyone else remember when this buy-as-much-suburban-house-as-you-can thing was all about having a great place to raise your kids?

From the NYT Magazine's long piece on Maricopa, Arizona, "The Boomtown Mirage":

There were plenty of other cities in Arizona that were experiencing a housing-market boom at the same time. But most of those cities already had an infrastructure in place to deal with the influx of people. Nearby Casa Grande had, for instance, a courthouse, a police station, zoning laws, a fire department, a city hall, a local government and a sewer system. Maricopa had none of the above. There was one school in town, built in the 1950s, a four-building campus where Maricopa’s children were educated from kindergarten to 12th grade. . . .

Ideally, a growing city will negotiate with developers to reduce the impact that new residents will have on the area; it might offer the builder smaller setbacks from the road in exchange for providing space for a school or widening roads. But at the beginning of Maricopa’s growth, the city was unincorporated, and all these negotiations were made by a three-person county board of supervisors that was working from rural zoning codes dating back to 1962. As a result, in those early years, decisions about Maricopa were driven by the concerns of developers, who left little space in their plans for business or commerce — just lots and lots of houses. They created blocks of identical homes, because it was more efficient to build with as little variation as possible. They built sidewalks on only one side of the street to save money. They happily left space in subdivisions for playgrounds and five new elementary schools, which they thought would help bring in the young families they were targeting, but they did not leave space for parks for older kids or for a high school. . . .

By the time Maricopa became a city, though, almost half of its land was owned by developers. In 2005, the local school district appointed a superintendent, John Flores, who began pleading with the developers for space for a high school (for a while, Maricopa schools were admitting 300 new students every month). But it was to no avail. Amy Haberbosch, Maricopa’s former director of planning, told me that developers believed high schools lowered property values; she said one developer told her he’d rather build a jail on his property than a high school. . . .

At Fry’s, I met Adrianna Roberts, who is 16 and recently moved to Maricopa from Illinois. Her parents had wanted to get out of a bad neighborhood and into a bigger house, and her older sister, a real estate agent, had recommended Maricopa. Roberts and her friend Alajeda Howard, a recent transplant from Missouri, bagged groceries at the store, and they came to Fry’s even when they weren’t scheduled to work, because, they said, there was nothing else to do.

Roberts and Howard, who is also 16, live in Palo Brea, one of the least inhabited subdivisions in town. The roads in Palo Brea were each marked with a green street sign and a curb, and the lots had been wired for electricity and water, but they were mostly empty; just a few streets had homes on them. Roberts and Howard told me they missed their old neighborhoods. “Here you have to have someone drive you 45 minutes just to do something on the weekend, and everyone falls asleep on the way there,” Howard said, fiddling with a package of cheese she was supposed to return to the dairy cooler. Roberts concurred: “In Illinois, you could get home and walk anywhere you wanted to go — to the corner store or up the street to the YMCA. The mall was two blocks away.”

Shawn Bellamy, a 19-year-old store manager, came by to offer his two cents about Maricopa. “The only thing good is Fry’s. Without Fry’s, I wouldn’t have met anyone here. It’s just slit-your-throat-and-wrists boring.”

Although Howard and Roberts both live in Palo Brea, they had not met each other until they started to work at Fry’s. “Everyone makes friends at this store,” Howard explained. “This is the hangout for Maricopa.”
For some reason, these teenagers don't seem sufficiently grateful to have been saved from the horrors of urban life--YMCAs, corner stores, malls, sidewalks, high schools--and plopped into a community with a big golf course, no business district, and no social activities that don't require a driver's license, a car, gas, and 45 minutes of travel time. If the developers are horrified by the thought of having a high school around to bring down property values, you can imagine what they'd think of a YMCA. So the kids all hang out at a supermarket.

It sounds like a great supermarket, by the way. They put in couches, a TV, and internet access and clearly don't shoo those kids out as if the mere presence of teenagers near a business meant an uncontrollable crime wave. Then again, maybe they have no choice: while the developers might prefer jails to high schools, it looks like they didn't get a jail either.

Many of you no doubt noticed the big hissy fit over this story, in which a perfectly responsible mom let her perfectly responsible kid ride the subway by himself in New York, and ended up with a fondue-fork wielding crowd after her for "child abuse." Obviously she should move to Maricopa with the kid. He can have absolutely nothing to do until he's old enough to get a job at Fry's, which can become the focus of his social life. But he won't get mugged on the subway.